

5B 420

NEW GREECE



LEWIS SERGEANT.



LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Received 189

Accessions No. 46410 . *Class No.*

20

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

NEW GREECE.

BY

LEWIS SERGEANT.

WITH MAPS SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR THIS WORK.

““They are ungrateful; notoriously, abominably ungrateful!”—this is the general cry. Now, in the name of Nemesis! for what are they to be grateful? . . . They are to be grateful to the Turks for their fetters, and to the Franks for their broken promises and lying counsels! They are to be grateful to the artist who engraves their ruins, and to the antiquary who carries them away! to the traveller whose janissary flogs them, and to the scribbler whose journal abuses them! This is the amount of their obligations to foreigners.”—LORD BYRON (1811).



CASELL PETER & GALPIN:

LONDON, PARIS & NEW YORK.

[ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.]

[1878]

IF863
S5

48496

P R E F A C E.

AFTER half a century of existence, the New Greece created by England, France, and Russia, reckoning up her achievements and acquisitions, can find little further cause for gratitude to her earlier patrons. She may boast of a considerable development, political as well as material; but, save the annexation of the Ionian Islands, she has received no extension, and no great encouragement, from any of the European Powers. She has been left very much to her own devices; but she has been speedily snubbed whenever these devices tended towards the completion of the work of 1830.

Europe has borne hardly upon New Greece; and England most hardly of all. We know the reason, and it is one which we ought not lightly to under-rate. We should have helped Greece long ago, if we had not been afraid of weakening Turkey; and the events of the past few years have shown that the policy of defending the Porte against its enemies is still approved by a large portion of the nation. So long as this policy is observed by England, Greece

will never attain the rank to which she aspires. There are, however, many Englishmen who believe that the claims of Greece are above the claims of Turkey, and that a strong Greek Kingdom would be more serviceable to England and to Europe than a strong Ottoman Empire. There are many, again, who think that the one State might be largely extended without seriously impairing the strength of the other. It is probable that these two classes together constitute a majority of the English people; but, whether it be so or not, there is apparently plenty of inducement for the well-wishers of Greece to argue her cause.

My object in the following pages is to bring together and pass under review the many reasons which have been, or may be, urged on behalf of the Hellenic claims. The Greek Question is one of the most important of those which now agitate the public mind. Instead of settling it, the Congress of Berlin has given it increased urgency; and the occasion seems to justify a re-statement of the problem.

The cause of peace and good government in Europe appears to require the establishment of Greece as a Great Power on the shores of the *Ægean*. The interests of Greece and of Europe—more particularly of Greece and of England—are involved together in the accomplishment of this idea. It is

certainly impossible to dwell on the advantages to Europe of a strong Greece without simultaneously proving the justice of the Hellenic claims; nor could we show that Greece has a right to promotion without at the same time showing that England is bound and pledged to take a prominent part in the work.

Two main lines of argument suggest themselves. We may begin by reviewing the actual condition of the Greek Kingdom, noting the progress which it has effected since its foundation, and the position which it occupies, politically, financially, commercially, and otherwise, at the present time. In this way we shall be able to assure ourselves, first, whether Greece has made the most of her opportunities, whether she has fairly justified the hopes of her earlier friends, and proved her capacity for a higher mission; and, secondly, whether her failure or limited success is accounted for by circumstances independent of her own endeavours, and whether she could not have done more for herself and for Europe if she had not been fettered by the obligations imposed upon her. And, again, we may proceed from a knowledge of the existence of these impediments to inquire into their nature and magnitude. We may ask how they originally came into existence, and for what purpose they have been maintained; and thus, after a brief review of the last six decades of Greek history, we may find ourselves in a

position to judge more dispassionately of the events and the duties of to-day.

I have followed this course of description and narrative, going nowhere into greater detail than seemed necessary, and drawing only what appear to be the simplest inferences from recorded facts. Of the two parts into which the present volume is divided the first assembles a handful of sketches and statements on the material and intellectual progress of the country during the past few years; and, whilst indicating the general condition of the Greeks of to-day, it arrives at the inevitable conclusion that their advance has been hindered and arrested in a large measure by obstacles for which they were not themselves responsible. The second part, after a preliminary inquiry into the theory of intervention, and the rights of nationality in general, proceeds to search the pages of history for the mistakes which appear to have been made in the establishment of New Greece.

When I began to write, the Berlin Congress had not met, and it was impossible to anticipate how far England or any other Great Power would maintain the claim of Greece to a rectification of her frontiers, or even to a hearing. Now that the Congress has completed its work, and separated without doing anything of a practical character for the Hellenic cause, I have cast what was intended to be a short

postscript into the form of an Introductory Chapter. A few words would have served to record the fact that Thessaly and Epirus had been treated as well as Bulgaria, or that Crete had received the reward of her long and heroic struggle; but I confess that I was unequal to the task of dismissing briefly what the Congress actually did in this matter.

The latest volume of statistics on the present condition of Greece having any pretension to thoroughness is one by M. P. A. Moraïtinis, printed in Athens last year. I am indebted to M. Moraïtinis for many of the facts and figures reproduced in the first part of my work; and, indeed, apart from his book, the materials even for the incomplete review which I have attempted would have been out of my reach. A record of the social, political, and economic progress of Greece since the year 1830 is promised by the Commission which has represented the country at the Paris Exposition. I regret that this volume has not yet been published, for its statements will doubtless be of a most interesting character.

In the historical chapters of the second part I have leant upon the authority of the narratives of Gervinus and Finlay. In the second and third chapters of the same part I am under a special obligation, which I would here acknowledge, to my friend Mr. P. Grousset, whose knowledge of the diplomatic history of the

century is very extensive, and who has supplied me with many of my facts and citations.

Of the two Maps which accompany the text, that of "New Greece" is based upon one by H. Lange, in Conrad Bursian's "*Geographie von Griechenland*," supplemented by the historical map of Lapie which was annexed to the Protocol of February 3rd, 1830. As for the orthography of the proper names, a difficulty of no mean order has presented itself. In the case of many old towns, and even of many natural features of the land, we have two or three, occasionally four, distinct forms in the nomenclature. Thus there is the ancient Greek; the Venetian, or Frank; the Turkish, or the Albanian; and the modern Greek name, often different from all the rest. Probably the majority of the towns and villages have more than one name, or form of the same name; and it is often impossible to determine which of the different names or forms it is best to retain. If the Greeks themselves had made up their minds in every case, we might divest ourselves of the perplexity by following their example; but they have not done so. In the process of time, no doubt, this difficulty will be got rid of. For the present, there is no choice between recording all these alternative names in the Map and selecting the one, or two, which appear to be in most constant use.

The same observation applies, though in a less degree, to the Map of "Greater Greece," which, it is also to be remembered, illustrates a period of nearly twenty centuries. The object of this Map is to show how widely the Greek influence had at one time spread. It has not seemed necessary in every case to restore the original Greek spelling of familiar names; but there are very few amongst those introduced on the Map which are not clearly and indisputably of Greek origin.

CONTENTS.

Part I.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

GREECE AND THE CONGRESS.

	PAGE
The Question—The Protocols—The Future	1

CHAPTER I.

The General Character and Resources of Greece—The Traces of the Turks—The Process of Restoration—Natural Wealth of the Country—Prospects of the Nation—Its Disappointed Ambitions—Recent Checks—Necessary Inquiries	39
---	----

CHAPTER II.

GREEK EDUCATION AND GENIUS.

Education a Drug—Is Greece over-educated?—Mr. Watson's Report—The Value placed on Education by the Greeks—The National System—Comparative Statistics—The University of Athens—Respect for Learning inherent in the Greek Character—The Hellenic Genius—Hellenisation—Its Force not dependent on Numbers—The Greeks the Leading Race in Turkey—M. Lenormant's View—What is Hellenism?—An Impossible Anti-climax	48
--	----

CHAPTER III.

LITERATURE AND FOLK-LORE.

The Modern Greek Language—Tendency towards the Ancient Form—Language and Patriotism—Romaic Literature—National Songs—A Klephtic Ballad—Contemporary Greek Literature—Prose Works—Poetry—The Drama in Greece—The Greek Press—Republican Ideas—Folk-lore—Greek Fairy Tales	65
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT.

	PAGE
Recent Progress towards Self-Government—Universal Suffrage—The Representative Chamber—Abolition of the Senate—Order springs from Self-Government—The Greek Constitution—The Principal Articles—The Administrative System in Greece	89

CHAPTER V.

GREEK FINANCE.

New Greece Established as a Bankrupt State—Doubtful Economies—The Present Revenue and Expenditure of Greece—Comparison of the Budgets of 1877, 1876, and 1846—The National Debt of Greece—The Deferred Debts of 1824 and 1825—The Guaranteed Loan of 1832—Subsequent Loans—A Point of Honour—Suggestion for the Consolidation of the Greek Debt	103
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

PUBLIC ORDER AND JUSTICE.

Self-Government in Greece—Drawbacks which have prevented the earlier Attainment of Public Order—The Legacy of the War of Independence—Brigandage in Greece—Its Prevalence—Its Comparative Immunity—The Outrage of Marathon—Its Consequences—The Views of M. Emile Burnouf—Origin of the Brigands—The Vlaques, or Nomadic Shepherds—Suppression of Brigandage—Its Happy Consequences—Justice—The Legal and Judicial System—Origins of Greek Law—Crime—Its Diminution—The Administration of the Laws	114
--	-----

CHAPTER VII.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

The Lowest Ebb—Statements of Thiersch and Strong—Imports and Exports in 1833-40—A Favourable Contrast—Testimony of M. Moraïtinis—Growth of the Piræus—The Introduction of Steam Power—Mr. Wyndham's Reports—English Trade with Greece—Imports and Exports in 1873—The Trade in Wine, Currants, and Minerals—Customs' Duties—International Exhibitions—The New Olympiads—The Maritime Trade of Greece—Deductions	136
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

AGRICULTURE.

The Neglected Soil—The First Advance—Area of Cultivation in Greece—M. Rangabé's Description—Agricultural Education—Cereals—Domestic Animals—The Currant Crops—Vine Culture—Old and New Wines—	
---	--

CONTENTS.

xiii

	PAGE
Olives—Hesperidean Fruits—Tobacco and Cotton—The Forests— Forest Laws—Honey—State Encouragement—An Agricultural Bank— Conventual Property	149

CHAPTER IX.

PUBLIC WORKS.

Herculean Labours—The Marshes—Subterranean Outlets—Turkish Public Works—First Steps—New Greece on the Ruins of Old Greece— Reconstruction of Cities and Villages—Roads and Telegraphs—Bridges —Seaports—Lighthouses—Conclusions	162
--	-----

Part II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

The Right of Intervention—Recent Interventions, by Concert and by Single Nations—The Congresses of Laybach and Verona—National Enthusiasms—Intervention in Turkey—The Reconstruction of Turkey —The Claims of Greece	175
---	-----

CHAPTER II.

PANSLAVISM AND PANHELLENISM.

The Greek Question for England—Panslavism, its Origin and History— The Slavs in Europe—Russia's Claims to the Hegemony—The Pansla- vonian Committee—An Exposition of Types—Panhellenism—A Greco- Slavonian State—Enumeration of the Greeks—Greek Preponderance on the Ægean	191
---	-----

CHAPTER III.

GREEK NATIONALITY.

The Principle of Nationality; its Moral Limitations—Rights of Nationality —Distrust of the Principle—Its Application in the Case of Greece— Descent of the Modern Greeks—The Theory of Fallmerayer—Testi- monies to the contrary	216
---	-----

CHAPTER IV.

CAUSES OF THE INSURRECTION OF 1821.

	PAGE
The Eve of the Outbreak—The Preservation of Greek Learning—Powerful effect of this Circumstance upon the National Regeneration—Earlier Efforts—The Revolutionary Spirit—Contributory Causes—The Hetaïrias—Russian Philhellenes—Greece before the War—English Philhellenes—The Cession of Parga—Greek Commerce—Turkish Tyranny—Primates and Tax Farmers—Klephts and Armatoles	230

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Weakness of Turkey—Ali of Janina—The Danubian Revolt—The Massacre in the Morea—Character of the Struggle—Turkish Reprisals—Sultan Mahmoud—The Murder of the Greek Patriarch—Intervention of the Powers—1821 and 1876—English Interests—Rupture between Russia and Turkey—Progress of the Greeks—Declaration of Independence—The Greeks disavow the Foreign Intriguers	261
---	-----

CHAPTER VI.

THE APPEAL TO EUROPE.

Greek Dissensions—Want of capable Leaders—European Diplomacy—Indecision of the Czar Alexander—The Massacre of Chios—Its Effects—The Congress of Verona—The Appeal of the Greeks—Its Failure—The Responsibility of Europe—Greek Heroism—Byron in Greece—His Good Influence—The First Greek Loan—English Encouragement.	292
---	-----

CHAPTER VII.

EUROPEAN INTERVENTION.

Plans for Greece—Canning's Views—Successes of the Egyptians in the Morea—English Intrigues in Greece—England and the Holy Alliance—Canning and Metternich—Extremity of the Greeks—Death of the Czar—The Protocol of April, 1826—The Treaty of London (July, 1827)—The Secret Article—The Battle of Navarino; a Happy Blunder—Destitution of the Greeks—Responsibility of the Philhellenes	321
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM.

The Death of Canning—England's New Policy—The Views of Wellington—England Responsible for the Limitation of the Boundaries of New Greece—The French Occupation—Adhesion of Turkey to the Treaty of London—The Protocol of 1832—Removing the Landmarks—The Burdens of the New State—The Hopeless Condition of the Kingdom	349
--	-----

CONTENTS.

xv

CHAPTER IX.

GREECE UNDER THE BAVARIANS.

PAGE

The Crown offered to Prince Leopold—His wise Stipulations—Tyranny and Death of Capo d'Istria—Another Civil War—Otho of Bavaria—Bavarian Rule—The Council of Regency—European Responsibility—England and her Representatives—The Revolution of 1843—The New Constitution—The Creditors of Greece—Relations between Greece and Turkey—The Revolution of 1862	367
--	-----

CHAPTER X.

ENGLISH CONSTRAINT OF GREECE.

The Expulsion of Otho—Elevation of the National Sentiment in Greece—Hawking the Greek Crown—Prince Alfred—King George—Mr. Gladstone's Mission—The Cession of the Ionian Islands—Unreasonable Terms of Cession—England's Responsibilities—The Cretan War—Lord Stanley's Despatch—English Constraint in 1877-8—Pledges of the English Cabinet	392
---	-----

APPENDIX.

List of Treaties or Diplomatic Instruments bearing on the Kingdom of Greece from its Establishment up to 1878	415
---	-----





NEW GREECE.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER.

GREECE AND THE CONGRESS.

THE QUESTION.—THE PROTOCOLS.—THE FUTURE.

THE QUESTION.

DURING the anxious months which separated the Treaty of San Stefano from the Treaty of Berlin, the fortunes of Greece hung in the balance, in such a manner that it seemed as though the most trivial accident might turn the scale. And there were many persons in Europe to whom this particular suspense was the cause of greater anxiety than any other, inasmuch as to them the fate of Greece was the touchstone of the whole Eastern Question.

Turkey had been conquered, and conquered by the champions of a race whose interests in the Balkan Peninsula are in direct conflict with those of the Greeks. Russia had demanded and secured for the Slavs a fantastically-shaped territory, stretching south of the Balkans as far as Kavala on the Ægean, and westward into the heart of Albania. All Europe was startled by the new map of Bulgaria, as drawn by General Ignatieff and the Grand Duke Nicholas. England, especially, declared it to be unacceptable; but Greece had reasons

entirely her own for dreading to see it sanctioned by the Powers. Much of the country over which the invader was closing his hand, in order to stamp it for ever with the imprint of Slavonianism, was Greek by tradition, by language, and by preponderance of race. From the time when it had first been Hellenised, a score of centuries ago, it had never ceased to belong to the great Hellenic family, with whom the bulk of its population was still identified, by genius, by affinity, and by education. It was not Slavonian, except by desultory settlement, and by fictitious ethnography. It was not Mussulman by assimilation and good government, whatever it may have been by conquest and taxation. It was and remains Greek, from the Ægean to the foot of the Balkans, from the Black Sea to Monastir and Ochrida. It had been one of the ambitions and legitimate aspirations of the Hellenic race to see the valleys of the Struma, the Nestus, and the Maritza, sooner or later united with regenerate Hellas; and it was no mere jealousy of Russia, no mere rivalry with liberated Bulgaria, which stirred the deep emotions of Greece in view of the Treaty of San Stefano.

Sacred as are the Hellenic claims to the Greeks themselves, and just as they are in the opinion of a large section of the European public, their strength was by no means universally recognised as sufficient to warrant Greece in demanding to be heard at the Congress. The general title to consideration in the remodelling of Turkey was twofold. It was based partly upon success in the field—an argument which applied to all the subjects of the Sultan who had taken up arms in aid of Russia—and partly upon previous independent resistance against Ottoman misrule. The Greeks, we

were reminded, had not cast in their lot with the Bulgarians, the Roumanians, the Servians, and the Montenegrins ; nor had Thessaly and Epirus contended for their liberty as Bosnia and Herzegovina had done. Two years of successful rebellion had convinced Europe that the demands of the Slavonians must be listened to ; but the Hellenes had established no such claim upon the Powers.

This was the kind of reasoning commonly employed or implied by those who thought that the Greek Question did not fairly arise out of the Russo-Turkish war, and that Greece had no title to be heard at Berlin. But it was reasoning founded upon an imperfect knowledge of what had actually taken place ; and it could have had no weight with the plenipotentiaries who were charged with the re-settlement of Europe. Greece knocked at the door of the Congress with a well-assured hope of admission, and she brought forward her claims in the full anticipation that they would be favourably considered and adjudicated. Let us see what justification she had for this assurance and confidence.

The simple fact is that the Greeks had actually earned their *locus standi* in the European Areopagus, in the recognised, though barbarous, manner required by our present stage of civilisation. There had been the necessary rising in Thessaly and Epirus, the prescribed insurrection and bloodshed in Crete. The Hellenic Government had espoused the cause of Hellenic nationality in the Sultan's dominions, and had positively invaded Turkey. All was done in proper form ; and, if it be alleged that the outbreak was instigated from across the frontier, and that the invasion was effected for the sole purpose of creating a question with which Europe might deal, what more did Europe demand ?

Greece had an excellent precedent, and it would have been strange if she had not followed it. She would have followed it more vigorously and sternly, but for one all-sufficient reason; and this reason was that England stepped in from the ring of bystanders, and held her hand.

There was no hesitation on the part of Greece, as some of her critics have urged. She did not wait until the fighting was over, or seek to be in at the death without having gone through the labour of the chase. As early as June, 1877, before the Russians had crossed the Danube, Turkey apprehended an attack from Greece, and called upon England to restrain her. On the 23rd of that month, detachments of Greek troops were ordered to Lamia. In the beginning of August the mobilisation of the army was resolved upon and commenced. Disorders had already occurred on the frontier, and the Albanian beys were directed to organise their bashi-bazouks. Everything was in proper train, and the Greeks would undoubtedly have given a good account of themselves, if they had not been held back by England at Turkey's request.

It was natural that our influence should prevail at Athens. It may have been right that we should exercise that influence, even on the Porte's solicitation. But it is not right and it is not natural that Greece, having listened to us, and probably lost by listening, should be accused of presumption for expecting as much as the clients of Russia.

The gist of the question is this: How did the influence of England prevail over the policy of Greece, and what was the consideration by which Lord Derby induced the Hellenic Government to renounce the insurrectionary method pursued so successfully by

Russia? The answer to this question is given more at length in another part of the present volume;¹ but it may be repeated here that Greece withdrew from the war on receiving a distinct pledge from the English Government, in a despatch dated July 2nd, 1877, from Lord Derby to Mr. Stuart, in the following terms:—

“ Her Majesty’s Government . . . so far as may lie in their power, will, when the time comes for the consideration of the settlement of the questions arising out of the war, be ready to *use their best influence* to secure for the Greek population in the Turkish provinces *any administrative reforms or advantages which may be conferred upon the Christian population of any other race.*”

And on the 6th of February, 1878, after Greece had been with difficulty restrained from making her practical protest against the San Stefano Treaty, the English Government confirmed this pledge, giving to the Greek Foreign Minister “the assurance that it will *do all it can*” to secure for the oppressed Greeks the reforms and advantages “which may be conceded to” other races.

This was the formal pledge of the English Cabinet; but it is only right that it should be interpreted in connection with the demand of the Hellenic Government itself. From the beginning of the Russian invasion of Turkey, M. Tricoupi more than once declared the readiness of Greece to go beyond what international duties required of her, and to endeavour to prevent insurrection in the Turkish provinces, “upon condition of obtaining a promise from Great Britain that,” in the final peace negotiations, “it will be considered that *there is an Hellenic question before Europe*, no less than if such an Hellenic question had been

¹ See Part II., ch. x.



raised by the actual insurrection of all the Hellenic provinces."

The promise was given, and it was on this ground alone that Greece abstained from war—although M. Tricoupi made no secret of the fact that England's intervention at the request of the Porte was regarded by the Greek Government and people as "an unfriendly act." Turkey was saved from the danger which menaced her on her left flank, and Greece was prevented from taking those material pledges of future consideration to which, probably, the majority of men would have thought her entitled. In order to estimate what Greece deserved of the English Government for this abstention, and what she had a reasonable claim to expect from the Congress, it is necessary to bear in mind how favourable was the chance which she threw away in answer to Lord Derby's appeal. Greece has never fought Turkey since her emancipation. More than once a rupture between the two countries has been patched up by England; and in 1854 her efforts were rendered abortive by the presence of the Allied fleets in the Piræus. It is therefore impossible to say what might have been the eventual issue of a well-supported rising in Thessaly and Epirus. The history of the War of Independence forbids us to conclude that the most powerful army which the Porte could have sent against the Greeks would have been able to quell the insurrection of these two provinces out of hand. Long before the arrival of a regular Turkish force the army of King George, either in August, 1877, or in February, 1878, could have occupied many strategical points in the two border provinces, and converted the whole Greek population into an enthusiastic national guard. Albania and Macedonia would inevitably have felt the

shock, and Turkey would have found upon her left a peril scarcely less formidable than that in her front.

Under what circumstances would the Congress then have met? In addition to Russia at the gates of Constantinople, Servia in Nisch, Montenegro in Antivari, and Austria with the title-deeds of Bosnia in her pocket, the plenipotentiaries might have had to take account of Greece in possession of Janina and Larissa. Would Europe have ventured to turn her out?

This is the prospect which shaped itself before the Hellenic Government; and no doubt it shaped itself also before the English Government. Then it was that Greece realised, not for the first time, how much the patronage of England costs her. We need not jump to the conclusion that Greece has had to pay too much for the moral support of this country. It is just possible that she might have done worse under the protection of any other Power in Europe; but assuredly she has not much to thank us for at the present moment, even on the showing of our own statesmen. Let us take Lord Beaconsfield's estimate of the gains of Greece, secured to her by the patronage of England.

"We have given at all times," said the Premier on his return from Berlin,¹ "in public and in private, to the Government of Greece and to all who might influence its decisions, but one advice—that on no account should they be induced to interfere in those coming disturbances which two years ago threatened Europe, and which ended in a devastating war. And we gave that advice on these grounds, which appear to me incontestable. If, as Greece supposed, and as we thought erroneously supposed, the partition of the

¹ At the Conservative banquet to the plenipotentiaries, July 26th, 1878.

Ottoman Empire was at hand, Greece, morally, geographically, ethnographically, was sure of receiving a considerable allotment of that partition when it took place. It would be impossible to make a re-settlement of the East of Europe without largely satisfying the claims of Greece; and, great as those claims might be, if that were the case, it was surely unwise in Greece to waste its treasure and its blood. If, on the other hand, as Her Majesty's Government believed, the end of this struggle would not be a partition of the Ottoman Empire . . . it was equally clear to us that when the settlement occurred all those rebellious tributary principalities that have lavished their best blood and embarrassed their finances for generations would necessarily be but scurvily treated, and that Greece, even under this alternative, would find that she was wise in following the advice of England, and not mixing in a fray so fatal. Has not the event proved the justice and accuracy of that view? At this moment, though Greece has not interfered, fortunately for herself,—though she has not lavished the blood of her citizens and wasted her treasure, under the Treaty of Berlin she has the opportunity of obtaining a greater increase of territory than will be attained by any of the rebellious principalities that have lavished their blood and wasted their resources in this fierce contest."

This balancing of accounts, it may be observed, was made before Greece had received any rectification of frontier, any advantage of the most remote kind from the readjustment of Turkey in Europe. It was the "opportunity" for which she was to be grateful—the opportunity of getting from Turkey, by a kind of Solomon's judgment, one-half the provinces to which

she laid claim, and which she might have seized in their entirety. How much this opportunity was worth, the course of events is now declaring; and it becomes a serious question for us to consider whether, and in what spirit, our Government fulfilled at Berlin the promises which it made at Athens. If it be true, as the Greeks now contend, that the English promises have not been kept, and that they have suffered disappointment and loss by following the urgent advice of Lord Derby, this will undoubtedly be a matter of grave regret on the part of every Englishman. Not only will it reflect discredit upon us as a nation, but it will loosen the bonds of sympathy between ourselves and the people of Greece, it will cause them to incline more and more to the friendship of other States, rather than to our own, and it will render incalculably more difficult that ultimate solution of the Eastern Question which perhaps the majority of thoughtful men regard as most reasonable and desirable.

As for Lord Beaconsfield's justification of his policy, it seems hardly necessary to point out that there are flaws in both his alternatives. That which has actually happened with the Turkish Empire is and is not what the Premier describes it to be. Turkey is partitioned in a very real and practical sense, inasmuch as Russia has taken a part, Roumania has taken a part, Servia has taken a part, and Montenegro has taken a part. To say nothing of the Austrian occupation, of the Principality of Bulgaria, and the autonomous province of East Roumelia, we have here four independent States, each cutting off a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and all sharing in the spoils because they made common cause in the attack. Greece did not receive that share to which Lord

Beaconsfield admits her to be morally entitled, because the partition was not complete, because England had prevented her from satisfying her ambition, and because Lord Beaconsfield himself, in conjunction with the Marquis of Salisbury, refused to partition as soon as the compulsion to do it had ceased.

On the other hand, it is quite true that the Congress of Berlin preserved and strengthened the Ottoman Government, by comparison with what the Treaty of San Stefano would have done. The allies of Russia, if not "scurvily treated" by England and the other Powers, had to be content with less than they had expected in their most sanguine moments. But it is by no means evident, as Lord Beaconsfield asserts, that Greece has been "wise in following the advice of England." The implication is that the Hellenic Government derives more from the Congress of Berlin than it would have obtained if it had mingled in the "fatal fray," occupied Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, and relied upon the sanction of actual possession. No politician of the pavement, trained in the historical philosophy of the taproom, will believe that the chance of a petty rectification of frontier, at the good pleasure of the Porte, even on Europe's recommendation, is better worth having than a foothold in Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete.

THE PROTOCOLS.

The Protocols of the Berlin Congress enable us to form as accurate a judgment on the conduct of our representatives as it will be possible to arrive at, until the secret history of the meeting is known. The sittings in the Radziwil Palace were little more than formal gatherings at which the compacts and com-

promises of the plenipotentiaries were registered. The real work was done outside, and in the course of many private interviews, at which the venerable principle of the "quid pro quo" was recognised to the fullest extent. We are not now concerned with the bargains by which the Treaty of Berlin became practicable; for it is not likely that the treatment of the Hellenic Question was greatly influenced by the mutual concessions of the diplomatists. The fate of Greece was not sufficiently important, in the eyes of any of the plenipotentiaries, to be sacrificed in a formal manner. Indeed it would seem, on a balance of probabilities, that the problem of Hellenic regeneration was dropped by the English representatives and their colleagues in pure lightness of heart, as a man who has done a good day's work on 'Change will forget his wife's commissions, and remember them with a feeling of uneasiness only as he returns home in the evening.

Nevertheless, this question of Greece and the Congress is one of peculiar interest to every Englishman who is jealous for the honour of his country, and who considers the good faith of the nation at least as important as the good faith of an individual. In this mood we turn with anxiety to the Protocols, in order to discover how the Earl of Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury held themselves bound by the promises made on their behalf by the Earl of Derby in July, 1877, and February, 1878. We want to hear that our representatives acquitted themselves fairly and generously of the duty imposed upon them by their repeated constraint of Greece. We desire to know what they understood by the "best influence" of England, and by their pledge that they would "do all they could to secure for the Greek population in the Turkish pro-

vinces any administrative reforms or advantages which might be conceded to the Christian population of any other races."

How much can England do, at her best, when her influence is virtually supreme, for a nation which has trusted in her pledged word, and confided its whole interests and ambitions in her hands?

It may be admitted that the treatment of this question in the first instance by the Marquis of Salisbury left nothing to be desired. At the earliest sitting of the Congress his lordship gave notice that he should raise the question of the admission of Greek representatives. At the second meeting he proposed that delegates of the Hellenic kingdom should "at least be present at all sittings in which questions in connection with the interests of the Greek race were to be discussed;" and he made this proposal on wide and comprehensive grounds. He pointed out the general and common interests of the Porte's Christian subjects; the distinctions between the Slavs and the Hellenes, which had been intensified by the events of recent years; the natural fears of the Greeks lest their Church should be subjected, their language suppressed, and their race gradually absorbed and overwhelmed, if their rivals should gain a preponderating influence in certain provinces. "The two races," he continued, "are not on an equal footing before the Congress. The Slavs have as their defender in this room a powerful military nation, related to them by blood and by faith, strong in the prestige of its recent victories. The Greeks, on the contrary, have as their representative here no nation of the same race. Her Majesty's Government is of opinion that the decisions taken under such circumstances would not content the Greek race, and,

consequently, would not promote either the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire or the peace of Europe.”¹

This was an excellent beginning. The Greek Question was raised by the Marquis of Salisbury in its best and strongest form. The sincerity of Russia was directly appealed to, and an answer was given (and especially given, by anticipation, to Lord Beaconsfield himself) to all who maintained that the claims of Greece could not come fairly and fully before the Congress of Berlin. But this was not all that the English plenipotentiaries did for Greece, in form, and in theory, and in advance of the real and practical issues. When France proposed that a representative of his Hellenic Majesty should be “admitted to give expression to the observations of Greece when the question of determining the fate of the provinces bordering on the kingdom shall be brought forward,” Lord Salisbury suggested that the phrase “provinces Grecques” should be substituted for “provinces limitrophes du royaume.” In other words, he wished that the Congress should turn its attention to “Greek provinces which do not border on the kingdom,” and that the Greek representative should be present whenever there was question of “the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, and of Crete.”²

So far, the pledge of England seems to have been remembered ; and, if there had been as much anxiety at the inter-Congressional meetings to promote the cause of Greece as there was apparent sincerity in the Congress itself, we cannot doubt that at this moment Greece would have been fully satisfied, whilst her territorial ambition might have slumbered for another century. England went further than any of the Powers in asserting the rights of Greece, and in

¹ Protocol 2.

² Protocol 3.

defining the true position of the Hellenic race in the Eastern problem. Lord Salisbury carried Italy and Austria with him, and even Russia was willing to extend the French proposal so as to include the island of Crete. If it had not been for France, the Greek representatives would have been admitted to the meetings dealing with Eastern Roumelia, if not also with the southern and western limitations of Bulgaria. But Germany and Russia adhered substantially to the French formula, and Lord Salisbury's amendment could not be carried.

Let us immediately do justice both to the French representatives and to our own. Considered as friends and advocates of Greece, the former were men of deeds, rather than of words; whilst the Marquis of Salisbury proved himself to be a man of words, and not of deeds. This is a distinction which the Greek public has not failed to draw, and which is fatal to the prestige of England in Greece; for no man could be expected to hesitate in his discrimination between the friend who promises everything but does nothing, and the friend who, within certain limits which he considers necessary to be drawn, is ready to confer upon him a solid and durable advantage.

What was it, then, which made the English plenipotentiaries virtually withdraw from the advocacy of Greece after the third meeting of the Congress? What induced them, after pitting Hellenism against Slavonianism, and Greece against Russia, coolly and cynically to turn round upon their unfortunate client, and to snub, if not insult, the representatives of Greece? It is difficult to suppose that England intended from the very beginning, after pressing for the admission of Greece as the controversial attorney of Hellenism, to

refuse her all practical means of defending in act the race which she was to defend in counsel. If Greece had regularly "taken part in the deliberations" of the Congress, on the footing first suggested by Lord Salisbury, she could hardly have been put off with a mere recommendation to the generosity of Turkey. Nor can we suppose that the discrepancy is due to a conflict of opinion between the Marquis of Salisbury, who raised the hopes of the Greeks to the skies, and the Earl of Beaconsfield, who plunged them in the depths of despair again. It might not have been surprising to find the Marquis subjecting his first convictions to the stronger resolution of the Premier; but it is not permitted to Englishmen to conceive that their plenipotentiaries at Berlin could have played such a hap-hazard diplomacy, or manifested such a puerile discordance of views, in the face of a Congress whom they had come to convert and manipulate. Moreover, if Lord Beaconsfield had held, at the third sitting, the views which he expressed at the thirteenth, and if he had been penetrated in June by the same degree of sympathy for Turkish susceptibilities which he developed in July, he could not conscientiously have sat silent whilst Lord Salisbury proposed the admission of Greece as the protector of Turkish subjects in Macedonia and Thrace, and whilst the Ottoman representatives protested against the oblivion of their master's sovereign rights. The fact that he left all the speaking to Lord Salisbury may show that he was less eager on the subject than his colleague; but it cannot be taken to show that he dissented from him in principle.

On the other hand, if we are to assume that a change came over the English policy—not the last of many changes—between the 19th of June and the 5th

of July, we can only conclude that, at the latter date, Lord Beaconsfield had signed away so much of the Sultan's territory, and had paid so dearly for Russian concessions and Austrian support, that he began to fear lest history should associate his name, as well as those of his Russian friends, with the destruction of Ottoman independence and integrity. A misgiving of this kind would account for the modification of plans, for the sudden abandonment of the Greeks, for the utter oblivion of Hellenic interests, and for the heartless resolution to make Greece pay for Slavonian triumphs.

In the meantime, as Greece had been invited to give expression to its claims before the Congress, it became necessary for its representatives to formulate the desires of the nation. This was done by M. Delyannis and M. Rangabé at the ninth sitting, held on June 29th. It is impossible to read these documents (whereof the first alone is included in the Protocol) without admitting the moderation of the Greek demands. After Lord Salisbury's magniloquent address, on first proposing the admission of the Hellenic delegates, the latter might have been excused if they had gone into the whole question of population, religion, and race-characteristics in Macedonia and Thrace, and proved, as they could easily have proved, that the whole littoral of the Ægean was the lawful inheritance of Greece. But they did nothing of this kind. They had probably heard that M. Waddington "shrank from expanding too greatly the sphere of the Hellenic Government's observations;"¹ and they had still more probably been prepared for the lukewarmness of England. They had had that "dark hour unseen;" and they now came before Congress with nothing

¹ Protocol 3.

more than a demand for Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete. It is true that they were nominally limited to this demand by the terms of their admission, as settled by the French formula;¹ but it would not have been difficult for them to extend their argument over the whole field of their national ambitions.

M. Delyannis, after observing that Greece forms only a small portion of the Hellenic nation, and recognising that the views of Europe are not at present favourable to the realisation of the entire problem, maintained that the satisfaction of the desires of the Hellenic Government in respect of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete "would be the fulfilment of the firm and persistent will² of the populations of these provinces, and would give peace and a practicable existence to the kingdom." He pointed out that the transfer of the border provinces would remove a constant source of trouble from Turkey, at the same time that it would be a natural complement of what has already been done for Greece by the Great Powers; and he continued:—

¹ The French formula, indeed, limited the question to the two border provinces. It was the 15th Article of the San Stefano Treaty (now under discussion) which brought Crete before the plenipotentiaries. Russia alone seemed to be solicitous about the unfortunate island—with what sinister design I know not. The article in question stood as follows:—"The Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the regulation put in force in 1868, while paying regard to the wishes expressed by the indigenous population. An analogous ordinance adapted to the needs of the localities will be also introduced into Epirus, Thessaly, and other portions of Turkey in Europe, for which there will be a special organisation not within the purview of the present document. Special commissions, in which the indigenous element shall largely participate, shall be formed in each province to elaborate the details of the new ordinance. The result of these labours shall be submitted to the examination of the Sublime Porte, which will consult the Russian Government before putting them in execution."

² "Volonté ferme et tenace." It reminds us of the *θέλγησις* of the Ionian Islands, so significantly expressed to Mr. Gladstone during his mission in 1867.

“As for the supreme interest which these provinces themselves possess in their annexation, it is known on all hands that, for half a century past, they have been demanding their union with Greece. . . . Only a few months ago, one of them could be pacified solely by the formal assurance of a Great Power that ‘the Hellenic cause should not be injured,’ and that this Power itself would state explicitly to the Congress that this pacification was owing to its intervention. Another province, the Island of Crete, is still in full insurrection, and, according to the latest news, much blood is being shed there. Would it not be a work of justice and humanity to satisfy the national aspirations of these countries, to fulfil their wishes so often expressed, and for the future to spare them the destruction and catastrophes to which they expose themselves in order to gain a national existence? As regards the Hellenic Kingdom, all the expressions of the national wishes of the Hellenic population of Turkey can naturally only produce profound emotion in the Hellenic Kingdom. . . . This excitement is rapidly communicated to all the inhabitants of the country, although not natives of the fighting provinces, and the whole population of the kingdom, which cannot forget what it owes to the former struggles of these disinherited brethren, nor remain impassive in view of their struggle for deliverance, rushes to join their ranks in order to assist them in re-conquering their liberty. Such a state of affairs gives rise each time to serious crises in the Hellenic Kingdom, which render the position of its Government very difficult. Unable to refuse its sympathies to the Greeks of the provinces in question, united by the bonds of history, race, and common misfortunes to free Greece; unable to proclaim an

indifference which would deprive it of the confidence of Hellenism, and would smother the just hopes which the Greeks of Turkey have always founded on free Greece, every Greek Government would be powerless to struggle against the stream."

In conclusion, M. Delyannis referred to the great pecuniary burdens imposed upon Greece by the troubles on her frontier. "It is very natural," he declared, "that the poor Hellenic Kingdom, which has more than once been saddled with the like obligations, which even now is supporting thirty thousand refugees on its soil, and is compelled to undertake preparations beyond its strength, should not only be weighed down by the burden of such expenditure, but should be crushed by it."

To this temperate and logical argument M. Rangabé added some further considerations on the advance effected by the Kingdom of Greece since the proclamation of its independence, and on the difficulties experienced from its contracted area, from its ill-defined boundaries, and from the never-ceasing agitation of the frontier provinces. And he went so far as to say that an increase of territory was necessary to the very existence of the State.

Such, then, were the net demands of Greece at the Congress of Berlin. To these points the Government had reduced the Hellenic Question referred to in the diplomatic correspondence of the previous July and February. It was in connection with these claims that England stood pledged to see that "the Hellenic cause should not suffer" from the cessation of the insurrection at the urgent request of the English consuls. How did our representatives interpret the generous disposition of the English people in regard to the promises made in its name? How did they observe, I will not

say the letter, but the spirit of the pledges given by Lord Derby in 1877 and 1878—pledges which England looked upon as sacred when they were given, and which it was unquestionably the general desire of the nation to redeem in a liberal, a loyal, and a munificent sense? How did Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, having reaped their fatal triumphs over the Slavonians, having helped to spill the life-blood of Turkey in their efforts to save her, having assisted in the “scurvy treatment” of Russia’s allies, whereby the latter secured independence and additional territory, having established Bulgaria in Sofia and Austria in the Herzegovina—how did our plenipotentiaries set about securing for the Greek provinces an equality of rights and privileges with the other Christian races?

Let us come to the thirteenth Protocol, referring to the sitting of July 5th.

At this sitting M. Waddington developed his plan for the rectification of the Greek frontier. During the six days which had elapsed since M. Delyannis read his memorandum to the Congress, the first French plenipotentiary had been studying the question, at the desire of his colleagues; and, in accordance with the system of intermediate deliberation which contributed so much to the attainment of a general understanding, and to the success of the general traffic whereby the fate of Turkey was decided, he had held sundry confabulations with the plenipotentiaries of the other States.¹ The result of these confabulations was that

¹ In the course of the debate held by the House of Commons between July 29th and August 2nd, Sir Charles Dilke recorded a chapter of the secret history of the Berlin Congress, which is as significant as anything contained in the Protocols. I should not repeat the passage here if it did not tally with information which I had myself received from a distinct and trustworthy source. “What,” asked Sir Charles Dilke, “had happened

M. Waddington now formulated a miserable proposal, the offspring of his own timidity at the third meeting, and of the virtual abandonment of Greece by the English representatives. The French Minister prefaced his resolution by a clumsy attempt to draw a line of conciliation between two absolutely irreconcilable interests ; and it is well that his incongruous sentiments on the question should be borne in mind by those who would too hastily persuade Greece that she has more to hope from France than from England.

It was not the object of the Congress, M. Waddington declared, "to satisfy the extravagant aspirations of certain organs of Hellenic opinion ;" but at the same time it might be a just and politic act to annex to Greece provinces which would be a source of strength for her, whilst they are now a cause of weakness to

between the ninth and thirteenth sitting of the Congress? After the ninth sitting M. Waddington had been charged by his colleagues with the duty of studying the Greek proposals and formulating a resolution to be submitted to the Congress. His first resolution had been for the annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. This proposal was supported privately by Italy, and even by Austria herself. It was not opposed by Germany and Russia, yet it had to be abandoned on account of the resistance which it met with somewhere. M. Waddington then fell back on the territorial limits which are mentioned in the Protocol, but proposed a definite and settled annexation. This met with decided opposition from the English delegates ; and on the very morning of the sitting which was to decide the case of Greece M. Waddington had an anxious but fruitless interview with Lord Beaconsfield, and pointed out in how hard a position he was placed by those who had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his minimised proposal, which was in fact their own. The result of the opposition of the English delegates was the proposal of the resolution in such a form that it found no place as a resolution in the Treaty. The outcome of the transactions was the loss by England of the sympathy of the only rising Power in the East that was not Slavonian." (See also, on the same subject, the letters of "An Epirote," in the *Times*, Aug. 12, 1878.) It is sufficiently manifest that a history of the Congress of Berlin which did not include such chapters as the one here cited would be worse than useless to the historical student.

Turkey. Prince Leopold thought that "Greece could not prosper under the territorial conditions imposed upon her—above all, without the Gulfs of Arta and Volo, with the territories adjacent to them; and experience has proved the justice of that view." Greece cannot prosper within her present limits; she cannot maintain a peaceful frontier; she cannot meet the engagements incumbent on all civilised States. Therefore, M. Waddington desires to point out, in a general way, and "without derogating from the sovereignty of the Porte," the final arrangement which he considers desirable.

"The authority of the High European Assembly would impart to the two Governments—Ottoman and Greek—the *moral strength necessary, for the former to consent to opportune concessions*, and for the latter to abstain from exaggerated pretensions (*revendications*). But, to accomplish this object, his Excellency considers it necessary, on the one hand, not to demand from the Porte impossible sacrifices; on the other, to appeal to the moderation of Greece. The first French plenipotentiary has therefore thought it of use to trace, as a basis for negotiations, a general line, indicating, at one and the same time, to Turkey, *the measure of the intentions of Europe*, and to Greece, the limits beyond which she cannot be allowed to go. Such is the object of the following resolution which he had the honour to submit, in common with the first plenipotentiary of Italy, to the deliberations of the Congress:—

"The Congress invites the Sublime Porte to come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and is of opinion that this rectification might follow the Valley of the Salamyria (the ancient Peneus) on the side of the Ægean

Sea, and that of the Calamas on the side of the Ionian Sea.

“‘The Congress is confident that the interested parties will succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, the Powers are prepared to offer their direct mediation to the two parties.’”

Was there ever a proposal less in keeping with the arguments by which it was introduced? The only explanation of the inconsistency between M. Waddington's reference to the difficulties of Greece and his utterly inadequate suggestion of means for their removal is this—that he had prepared his arguments to serve as the introduction for a much more liberal resolution.

The words in italics appear to show that the original design of the Congress, as interpreted by the French plenipotentiary after his round of confabulations, was to enforce the rectification of frontiers upon the Porte. But, if so, that idea was distinctly rejected by Lord Beaconsfield. After Austria had adhered to the proposal, the first English plenipotentiary, with the full knowledge that Germany and Russia coincided in the scheme, gave utterance to his reservations and protests in a speech which is already famous, and which is not likely to be forgotten either in England or in Greece.

“Lord Beaconsfield wishes”—to quote the Protocol—“before the Congress decides the important question submitted to it, to offer some remarks intended to prevent a misunderstanding which might be caused by the declaration of the Greek delegates. His Excellency states that England has always used her influence (*‘insisté’*) with Greece and Turkey, with a view to the maintenance of a good understanding indispensable in

her eyes to counterbalance the influence of a third race—that which by disturbing peace has led to the assembling of the Congress. At first these efforts of Great Britain were seconded on both sides. But the two countries found themselves in presence of a great difficulty, the insufficient and imperfect frontier traced in 1831. In the eyes of every competent statesman, this frontier is a danger and a disaster as well for Turkey as for Greece : its conformation is an encouragement to brigandage, and brigandage necessarily produces agitations in the adjoining provinces. When the last war commenced, and the inhabitants of the district bordering on the frontier became excited by it, England caused representations to be made to the Porte which that Power listened to favourably ; but his Excellency regrets to have to add that this time it was not the same as regards Greece ; the good advice of England could not prevail against the contrary opinion, and serious difficulties arose. Lord Beaconsfield, however, believes it to be his duty to add that the insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly was not fomented by the Greek Government, which on the contrary, in conformity with the advice of Great Britain, applied itself to its repression. England, moreover, caused to be conveyed to Athens the advice not to count upon territorial aggrandisement.”

It is difficult to reconcile the statement that Greece did not listen to England in 1877 with the other statement, that the Greek Government, “in conformity with the advice of Great Britain,” did what it could to repress the insurrection. The fact is, as we have seen, that Greece, however unwillingly, yielded to English restraint, greatly to her own detriment. Was it not as part of the bargain that the English Premier was now

“using his best influence,” and “doing all he could,” to secure liberty for the Greek provinces of Turkey?

Then followed the very curious protest of Lord Beaconsfield against the notion that Turkey was an “Etat vieilli,” and was undergoing a process of partition. The word partition could not apply to the “arrangements and retrocessions” which Europe was sanctioning, and “the Greek Government was entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe.” Entirely mistaken in asking for the retrocession of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete? Well, it is true that the terms of Greece’s admission to the Congress only forbade her to trouble herself about more than these three provinces. And it is true that Lord Salisbury’s amendment only suggested that she should plead the cause of all “the Greek provinces”—Macedonia and Thrace included. But it is not easy to believe that M. Delyannis had received no encouragement to prefer his demand; and indeed we know for a fact that M. Waddington’s first suggestion had been for the simple annexation of the frontier provinces.

Taking these ascertained facts into account, what are we to understand by Lord Beaconsfield’s assertion that Greece had entirely mistaken the views of Europe?

His lordship still had arrows in his quiver. Returning from a vindication of the Austrian mission in Bosnia to the question of Greece, Lord Beaconsfield declared, to quote the language of the Protocol, that “no one could doubt as to the future of this country; States, like individuals, which have a future are in a position to be *able to wait*. But at the same time, his Excellency is convinced that Greece and Turkey will proceed to a rectification of their frontiers; that a cause of disorder and trouble will thus be got rid

of, and a *lasting peace* secured." Nevertheless his lordship "would not recommend, for the attainment of this end, measures of coercion; in his eyes, the Sultan, tried by such great misfortunes, deserved great respect and sympathy. His Excellency believes, however, that the opportunity should not be allowed to pass of expressing, in a very decided manner, the opinion that a rectification of frontier would be an act of high policy favourable to the welfare of the two countries. Lord Beaconsfield looks upon the boundary proposed by the first plenipotentiary of France as open to discussion; but, unanimity being above all things desirable, his Excellency would withdraw all objection in presence of an unanimous vote of the other Powers. The first plenipotentiary of Great Britain ended by expressing the hope, and even the conviction, that an equitable solution of the question of frontiers will be accepted by the Sultan."

So that Lord Beaconsfield regarded even the Kalamas and Salamvria line as open to discussion. He thought the very nearest natural frontier too wide for the country which he desired to protect from border troubles. Surely this moderating influence had gone far enough! What, then, was the Premier's idea? Was Greece, unable to assure herself from disturbance in the passes of the Othryx, to set up a line of stones somewhere down the mountain sides, and there beat the boundaries at stipulated periods? Was this his plan for getting rid of "disorder and trouble," and securing "a lasting peace"? He had just reminded Greece that she had a future, and he must have known what Greece herself understood her future to be. What "lasting peace" did he expect from a country which, having a

future, was put off with an appetising morsel of her legitimate inheritance, and cynically told to wait for the rest? The objection applies to the frontier traced by M. Waddington's proposal scarcely less than to the yet narrower limits which Lord Beaconsfield would apparently have assigned. What are we to think of the collective wisdom of Europe, which, anxious to rectify a weak and vulnerable frontier, shifts the line from the crest of a mountain range to a couple of rivers in a comparatively flat country, with a wide gap between their sources? How are we to reconcile the zeal of the Congress for a definitive settlement with their conduct in throwing down a bone of contention between the Greeks and the Turks? Did they imagine that Thessaly and Epirus, which by tradition, education, prevailing language and customs, should be treated as living and sentient organisms, might be wantonly cut in halves without a desperate and protracted struggle? Could they for a moment contemplate a lasting peace, so long as Crete should not be united with the mother country?

But we are concerned mainly with our own representatives; and, as for them, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that their statesmanship was utterly at fault in regard to the Hellenic difficulty. This inference must be drawn even from their own point of view, and on the evidence of their own words.

First, by sending Greece from the Congress dissatisfied, and by assigning to her narrow and inadequate frontiers, they have ensured the renewal of the border-struggles on an early occasion, when their very aim in rectifying the frontier was to prevent these disorders.

Secondly, by refusing to decide between Turkey

and Greece, by sending Greece cap in hand to Turkey, and by declaring at the same time (as Lord Beaconsfield declared) that they would not "recommend coercive measures" against Turkey, they lost the opportunity of closing the incident at once, and made it very questionable indeed whether the Porte would follow their advice.

Thirdly, by dividing Epirotes from Epirotes, and Thessalians from Thessalians, they effected almost the only "partition" of a race for which the Congress is responsible; and thus Lord Beaconsfield himself, in one breath, affirmed a great principle and violated it.

In brief, our plenipotentiaries posed as the restorers of Turkey,¹ as the advocates of the Hellenic claims in their widest sense,² as the friends of humanity, as the champions of international agreements, as sticklers for the authority of the European concert. And when the time came for deeds instead of words, they left a powerful and determined enemy on Turkey's western frontier, absolutely certain to harass her perpetually; they snubbed Greece for "mistaking the intentions of Europe"; they took no note of Turkish atrocities in Thessaly and Epirus, as shocking in their character as those in Bulgaria; they made light of an agreement which they had themselves entered into with Greece; and they prevented the authority of Europe from intervening in Turkey on the only worthy and sufficient grounds.

This is how Greece was treated at Berlin, and by her friend England in particular. This is what she got by trusting us, and sheathing her sword when she might have annexed three large provinces. Russia,

¹ "Fortifier un ancien Empire:" Lord Beaconsfield, Protocol 9.

² Lord Salisbury, Protocol 2.

France, Italy—all had helped her, or desired to help her. England alone had stood in her way. England, the very soul of generosity when speaking from national impulse, too often harsh and unscrupulous when a bold minister conceives her interests to be at stake—England, great and powerful, turned round to Greece, and said, “I promised to ‘do all I could’ for you; but it has since occurred to me that to keep my promise might cost me something. In one respect our interests seem to be opposed, and—*la force prime le droit!*”

THE FUTURE.

From the Congress, then, Greece received nothing—scarcely even fair words. It has indeed been taken for granted that her frontier will be advanced to Janina and Trikala, according to the recommendation of the plenipotentiaries. We shall see.¹ There may be some who imagine that Turkey will cede territory to Greece without being compelled, after ceding so much to Russians and Slavs on compulsion. It will, however, be more in accordance with precedent if she steadily declines to do this, knowing herself to be safe from coercion. It is true that the Congress, by the terms of the Franco-Italian resolution, declares the Powers to be “ready to offer their direct mediation,” in case the Porte and the Government of Athens should be unable to agree. But whatever force may have been intended to reside in this declaration was practically destroyed by Prince Bismarck in the 18th meeting. The 13th

¹ This is written in August, and there are as yet no signs of concurrence on the part of Turkey. On the contrary, the Porte has refused to concede anything to Greece. M. Waddington’s “moral force” has not yet been assimilated.

Protocol was being read over for confirmation, and, when the paragraph referring to the disposition of the Powers had been recited, Carathéodori Pasha asked that it might be adjourned, on the ground that he was expecting instructions from his Government. Thereupon Prince Bismarck observed that "the paragraph in question expressed a desire of the Congress, and not a resolution in which the Porte was asked to concur. The Powers confine themselves to declaring that they are animated with the desire of seeing the negotiations succeed."

The pashas were satisfied; and so, no doubt, was the Porte. The language of the plenipotentiaries, to which Lord Beaconsfield supplied the key-note, signified, as plainly as possible, that the Government of the Sultan might do exactly what it liked. There was no necessity that it should give a single acre to Greece—unless it particularly wished to satisfy the Hellenic aspirations (meaning, to ruin itself), or to gratify the desire of the Powers (meaning, to display a supernatural gratitude, such as the Koran, at all events, does not prescribe).

So much for Thessaly and Epirus. As for Crete, the Sublime Porte engages¹ "scrupulously to apply the organic law of 1868, with such modifications as shall be judged equitable." A great deal, it will readily be admitted, depends upon the authority which is to decide what is equitable and what is not; but it is certain that many modifications will be necessary before the Constitution of Crete can satisfy the Greeks in that island. In the course of the year 1878 the General Assembly in Crete forwarded a "Decree and Memorandum" to the Governments of the Christian Powers, from which documents we may gather the professed

¹ Article 55 in the formal Treaty.

objects of the Cretans in their last insurrection. The Assembly demanded complete autonomy and self-government, the right of electing their own ruler, and a guarantee from the Powers; and they offered to pay a tribute of half a million piastres to the Porte. But at the same time they indicated what they considered the most just solution of the difficulty, and what is evidently the ultimate aim of their policy—the union of the country with the Kingdom of Greece.¹ It is not easy to suppose that any “lasting peace” will result from mere modifications of the existing form of government in Crete.

The same article of the Treaty of Berlin, which has been ratified by the Sultan, records certain further engagements of the Porte. These are the terms of this last batch of Turkey’s promises. “Analogous laws adapted to local requirements shall be similarly introduced into other parts of Turkey in Europe, for which special provision has not been made by the present Treaty. The Sublime Porte shall appoint special commissions, in which the native element shall be largely represented, to elaborate the details of these new laws for each province. The proposed laws resulting from their labours shall be submitted to the examination of the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the acts destined to put the laws in force, will take the sense of the European Commission appointed for Eastern Roumelia.” Add to this that the Porte has promised full religious toleration throughout its dominions, and we arrive at the sum total of what Greece and the Greeks obtain (or are invited to expect) from the Congress.

The question again recurs—Have they obtained anything at all?

¹ *Décret et Mémoire, &c.*,” Athens, 1878.

It is impossible to anticipate that the work of Europe at Berlin will be entirely fruitless, or that its fruits will be limited to those which the Powers have given themselves the right to seize by force of arms. Unless the Governments abdicate their authority and sacrifice their dignity, we must conclude that the "analogous laws" will be introduced and "scrupulously applied," in Albania, in Western Roumelia, in Macedonia and Thrace. These provinces will at least have new laws and Assemblies, similar to those of Crete; and the several "native elements" will be duly represented. Though the initiation of the reforms is left to the Porte, the authority of the European Commission ought to be quite equal to the task of ensuring their introduction. Therefore it may be assumed that a slight advance of some sort will be made in the direction of liberty. And if the intentions of Europe in this respect are actually carried out, if there is a genuine representation of "native elements" in the *Ægean* provinces, there can be little doubt that the Hellenic race will at once assume its legitimate predominance—legitimate not merely from the numerical superiority of the Greeks along the whole littoral, from Avlona to Burgas, but also on account of their intellectual and political qualities, which will draw the practical hegemony of European Turkey into their hands.

This would be a great gain; and indeed the Kingdom of Greece, which, as Lord Beaconsfield says, is lord of the future, however difficult she may find it to wait for her inheritance, may yet be consoled by the amelioration of her children's lot. She is heir to all the good that may be secured to the Greek subjects of Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin. If the Hellenes of Roumelia, Macedonia, and Thrace are to serve their

apprenticeship to Constitutionalism under the sway of the Sultan, it is in the Hellenic State that they will hereafter translate the lesson into action, and it is to Athens that they will continually turn their eyes and direct their aspirations. But it can hardly be expected that the hopes of Greece will be sanguine by reason of anything which has taken place at Berlin. The fatal example of Crete must rise between the promises of Turkey and the anticipation of their fulfilment. Crete, too, elicited the sympathy of Europe. Crete was patronised by the Powers, and received a Constitution from the Porte. We have had no cause to believe that the nature of Turkey has changed, and we have therefore no right to ask a Greek to trust a Turk. "Analogous laws" may only too naturally end in analogous oppressions and analogous bloodshed.

On the whole, it results from the Treaty of Berlin, and from the Protocols on which it is based, that the Kingdom of Greece has been virtually abandoned by Europe; whilst the Hellenic race in general, if it is to profit at all by the deliberations of Europe in council, will do so simply as one of the "native elements" of Turkey, and on no other basis than the Gueghs of Albania, the Mirdites, the Slavs scattered over Western Roumelia, and the Mahomedans themselves. Moreover, this abandonment of Greece and the Greeks is due, not to the attitude of Europe, but to the direct and deliberate policy of England—nay, we may even say to the personal and deliberate action of one man. Lord Beaconsfield appears to have made himself thoroughly responsible for the desertion of Greece—a desertion which has cost her far more than the "scurvy treatment" supposed to have been suffered by Russia's allies. If it is not so, Lord Beaconsfield

owes it to himself to make us acquainted with the true facts of the case. There is no necessity for him to bear the whole blame of this conduct if it does not rightly belong to him. But if it was not the first plenipotentiary of England who, entirely alone, forbade the emancipation of Thessaly and Epirus, who is there to share the reproach with him? If it be Lord Salisbury, it was so only after the third meeting of the Congress. If it be one or more of the representatives of France, Italy, Austria, or Germany, it was not so until they had agreed to the liberation of both the border provinces. It is certainly not Russia, who has been consistent in demanding the freedom of the Porte's Christian subjects, and who expressly asserted the Hellenic claims in the San Stefano Treaty. Whom will the Premier associate with himself in this great political blunder?

Whosoever it may be, one man or a party, a Minister or a Government, the blunder has been committed, and many years will not suffice to redeem it. It is not for want of clear perception that the Cabinet has thrown away so rare a chance of erecting the only effectual bulwark against the advance of the Slavonians to the *Ægean* Sea. No one better understands the importance to England and to Europe of the Hellenic element in Turkey than did the Lord Salisbury of June. No one can better appreciate the folly of disappointing and alienating the Greeks than the Lord Salisbury of July. It was possible for us, when our representatives went to Berlin, not merely to lay the foundations of Hellenic supremacy in Macedonia and Thrace, but also to strengthen the actual Kingdom of Greece in a very substantial manner, without perceptibly weakening the Porte. The duty was imposed upon us by every con-

sideration of justice and honour; and the opportunity was one which an English statesman should have seized with eagerness. Surely events have followed each other with sufficient rapidity to convince us that, if we do not provide for the future to-day, it will provide for itself to-morrow without our assistance. We have had the moulding of the Balkan peninsula almost in our own hands. Europe would gladly have united to charge Greece with the mission for which she is manifestly designed. We might easily have combined the extension of the Hellenic State with the maintenance of the Porte in Europe. But we have thrown away the chance; we have elected to put our trust in the broken reed which has so often failed to support us.

This is hardly the place in which to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our past relations with Turkey, or to balance the loss and gain of the traditional policy imposed upon us by Wellington, Aberdeen, and Palmerston. But one central truth stands out from the history of the past half-century, which forces itself upon the consciences of the present generation, and which indicates a duty to the English Government and people. We have set up New Greece, not in mere benevolence, but after a long and gallant struggle waged by the Greeks against their oppressors. We compelled Turkey to acknowledge the independence of her former subjects, and covered the latter with our guarantee; but at the same time we fettered them with such bonds and conditions that they were absolutely incapable of exercising their nominal freedom. We made Greece, but we made her bankrupt. We weakened Turkey a little in order to obtain liberty for the Greeks, but we made and maintain Greece virtually impotent in order that we may preserve the fiction of power to the Turks. We further

endowed Greece with the Ionian Islands, but we made special stipulations to prevent these islands from being thoroughly serviceable to the State. We have been benefactors to the Greeks, as they readily admit; but we have persistently and advisedly clogged their advance, paralysed their struggles, and retarded their emancipation. We have even pleaded their cause before the other European Powers, but we have simultaneously grudged them every inch of progress which they have made at the expense of Turkey.

It is time to ask ourselves two serious questions in connection with this policy. Is it wise in our own interests? And are we justified in sacrificing a nation in order to maintain a tradition?

Part I.

THE GREECE OF TO-DAY.

CHAPTER I.

The General Character and Resources of Greece—The Traces of the Turks—The Process of Restoration—Natural Wealth of the Country—Prospects of the Nation—Its Disappointed Ambitions—Recent Checks—Necessary Inquiries.

WHEN Byron first wrote of the Greece he loved so well, and lamented the loss of its ancient glories, he had probably no idea that the work of devastation was about to be renewed, and that the Turks, within five or six years of his death, would do almost as much towards the material ruin of the land as they had done in the four preceding centuries. At the time when "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage" was written, its author scarcely ventured to hope that the Greeks would strike a blow for freedom; and up to the moment of his death, in 1824, he was not sanguine of their ability to throw off the Turkish yoke. But he knew Greece thoroughly—not only its history and associations, but the actual condition of the oppressed and wasted country. His poetry rose to the highest levels of enthusiasm when he sang of the beauty of Greece, and of the noble Hellenic types which had survived the shocks of ages. It was only when he saw the decay to which every coast and every plain bore witness, and marked the deterioration of national character betrayed by most of the Greeks with whom he came in contact, that his muse assumed the tone of reproach and foreboding.

The half-dozen years which followed the poet's death



produced many changes. They served to remove not a few of the causes which had aroused Byron's indignation. They showed that there were still patriots in Greece, that the Grecian mothers had not all suckled slaves, and that the "new Thermopylæ" might be something more than a poet's aspiration. Childe Harold could not have sung in 1830, as he sang twenty years before—

"Ah Greece! they love thee least who owe thee most—
Their birth, their blood, and that sublime record
Of hero sires, who shame thy now degenerate horde."

But of the physical decay he might have spoken even more strongly, and with greater justification for his regret. The Turks and Egyptians had fought against Nature, as well as against the Greeks. They had burnt and trampled and hewn to the ground what they could not slaughter or carry into captivity. They strove to make the rebellious land a wilderness, and succeeded only too well in their endeavour. There was a moment when no Greek could hold up his head against Ibrahim Pasha from one end of the Morea to another. There was a series of years in which scarcely a crop was gathered throughout the Peloponnese, and scarcely a plough-share turned the rank and blackened soil.

A few more years, and Nature had done much to repair her disasters. The hand of man was slow to help her; but in Greece the bounties of earth and sky need little help of man. Once more the poet might have sung:—

"Yet are thy skies as blue, thy crags as wild,
Sweet are thy groves, and verdant are thy fields,
Thine olive ripe as when Minerva smiled,
And still his honied wealth Hymettus yields;
There the blithe bee his fragrant fortress builds,

The freeborn wanderer of thy mountain air ;
Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds,
Still in his beam Mendeli's marbles glare ;
Art, Glory, Freedom fail, but Nature still is fair."¹

The Bavarians came and went, and thrice-liberated Greece began to enjoy freedom at last. A dozen years after the accession of King George, and the conquest of a Constitution which has rarely been seriously violated, it was possible for the Greeks to boast that they had recovered, together with their liberty, much of the ancient dignity and refinement of character which had made their ancestors models for all succeeding generations. They could boast, also, that their national prosperity was being renewed at the same time with their national character ; and this is a boast whereof the justification increases year by year.

The Greeks of to-day stand in this special relation to the rest of Europe, that their condition is regarded as a state of probation. They secured the bulk of their present territory by the sword ; but there are provinces yet to be gained which, they have been told, must not fall to them as the guerdon of a new campaign, but will be added to their possessions by the judgment and consent of Europe. The difficulties which now stand in the way of such a transfer may, ere long, be removed ; and it is for Greece to show, conclusively and beyond all cavil, that she deserves the wider dominion to which she aspires. Can she already show this, as her statesmen and publicists confidently maintain ? This is a question to which the following pages, dealing with the country as it now is, may help to furnish an answer.

The great hope of New Greece, whether cramped within her existing boundaries or extended so as to in-

¹ *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, ii., 87.

clude the Hellenic provinces of Turkey, will always consist in the enterprise and energy of her people. The Greeks are remarkable for both these qualities, and the resources of the country itself are practically inexhaustible. What Greece needs is the capital wherewith to develop and circulate more widely the natural products of a peculiarly wealthy land. The ancient Greeks distinguished themselves, even before the Christian era, by their agricultural industry and by their commerce. In almost every age we find traces of the activity of Greek merchants, of their thrift and perseverance, of their skill and prosperity, wherever the great markets of the world were open to them. Their commercial aptitude has continued to be one of the characteristic features of the race; and the success which has crowned their efforts is attested in all the important centres of industry. The Turks, from their first raid on the Morea in 1346, gradually destroyed the indigenous traffic of the country; and the subsequent occupation drove the people into the mountains, ravaged the coasts, and paralysed the maritime trade. But, whether at home or abroad, the commercial aptitude survived. It secured wealth and consideration for the Greeks under the sway of their conquerors, and it even preserved a comparative independence in certain districts and prosperous islands, which were able to pay for their immunity with a tribute of food or gold.

When the Turks had been driven out, and the anarchy of the liberated country began to subside, the industrious instincts of the Greeks revived, and they set themselves to work to restore the ruined land. Nearly all the labours of their ancestors had to be undertaken afresh. Towns, harbours, lighthouses, aqueducts, canals, roads, bridges, dwelling-houses, needed reconstruction.

The shipping trade had not entirely died out, but a new fleet of mercantile vessels was necessary, in order to provide employment for thousands of sailors. Agriculture had almost come to a standstill during the War of Independence, and a vast proportion of the soil required the first operations of tillage and culture. The rich mineral stores of Greece were virtually untouched. The whole land was little better than a desert, though it contained resources more than sufficient for the maintenance of a dense population. Unlimited wealth awaited, as it still awaits, the hands to garner it in. As soon as the Greeks are in a position to make the most of their natural advantages, there is no reason why they should depend on other countries to create an artificial balance between their revenues and their expenditure.

The configuration of Greece is marked by numerous mountain chains, which break up the surface into a thousand valleys. - Thus a large area is not susceptible of cultivation; but, fortunately, the country is excellently watered, and the basins of the streams are fertile in a high degree. The diversity of hill and plain, plateau and luxuriant slope, whilst it contributes largely to the picturesque character of the scenery, accounts for the remarkable variety of the agricultural products. The plains of Greece feed a great number of cattle, sheep, and goats, whilst the bees are probably as productive to-day as they were at any previous time. The corn and olives of Attica, Phthiotis, Acarnania, the gardens and vineyards of the Eurotas and of Laconia, the plantations of Corinth, Achaia, Elis, the vines and fruit-trees of the southern Morea, the citrons and olives of Methana, the dense forests of Acarnania, of Cæta, of Taygetus, of Eubœa, the inexhaustible products of the soil both on and beneath the surface, bear witness to the

fertility of a land whose capabilities have never yet been fairly gauged.

With so lavish a provision of Nature, and with such an unstinted supply of raw materials, an industrious people may do much, by commerce and manufacture, to establish their national prosperity on a firm basis. And accordingly we shall find that the Greeks, in addition to the mere exportation of natural products, such as olive oil, currants, citrons, and the like, have already created a number of manufacturing industries, which will doubtless receive a notable development in proportion as the available capital of the country increases. The making of wine and other liquors, oil, silk and cotton goods, glass and pottery, is carried on in various parts of the mainland and the islands, and employs machinery to a considerable extent, many of the machines being themselves constructed in Greece. The mineral resources of the country are by no means slight, and it is certain that a rich reward awaits the explorer who, with capital and enterprise, will seek the hidden wealth where it is likely to be found. The Government, in spite of what has been said to the contrary, is quite ready to sanction and encourage the operations of foreigners, as well as of Greek subjects; and it may safely be asserted that to any one who is prepared to invest his money liberally, and to watch his investment carefully, Greece offers a field full of promise.

But the progress of Greece, it is much to be feared, has suffered a serious check by the events arising out of the Russian invasion of Turkey. The hopes of the Hellenic world had been so steadily set upon the recovery of Thessaly and Epirus, and the annexation of Crete, not to mention Macedonia and the islands in the Archipelago, that the extremity to which Turkey

was reduced in 1877 and 1878 could not but cause a deep excitement throughout the whole of Greece. The belief that the country was at last about to receive that enlargement of its borders to which its inhabitants had looked forward as their right was shared, probably, by every Greek, at home and abroad, whatever his rank or calling. The nation was prepared for any sacrifice in order to attain the object of its ambition. It did not expect to be made rich for nothing; but it never doubted that, in some way or another, the defeat of Turkey would turn to its advantage. It had every reason to take this sanguine view; and its disappointment, from the moment when its hopes began to fail, has been proportionately severe.

The mood of Greece, from the first outbreak in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the day when she was prevented by diplomatic pressure from taking part in the war, was one of almost intolerable suspense; and the military preparations which she saw fit to make entailed upon her a very considerable expenditure. But the mood which supervened, after the exercise of that pressure, and in consequence of the support extended by England to Turkey, was one of extreme discouragement. The present generation of Greeks, the children of those who fought for independence, have been taught from their cradles to believe that the possessions of their ancestors would speedily become their own, and that Europe was only tarrying for a fair opportunity to restore their legitimate heritage. They had, indeed, been undeceived more than once. They had been sternly held back in 1854, and had found their claims neglected by the Conference of Paris. Their brethren in Crete had been cruelly repressed in 1841, and again a quarter of a century later. On each occasion they had

been tempted to despair;¹ and yet on each occasion the sanguine temperament of their race prompted them to hope once more. They had probably never been so hopeful as they were in the spring of 1877; and, in the earnest persuasion that one supreme sacrifice would ensure the attainment of their hopes, they contracted a new loan, increased their army, and prepared to qualify themselves, by the only infallible method, for a hearing before the bar of Europe.

The effort was thrown away; but the effects of the sacrifice upon the material progress of Greece have been neither few nor inconsiderable. No nation which sets its mind upon war can pursue the arts of peace to any profitable purpose; and least of all could Greece do so whilst the crisis of 1876-8 was at its height. The industrial records of the country will show how seriously its financial difficulties were aggravated by the events of 1877. In the pages which follow, our statistics will not, as a rule, extend beyond the last-mentioned year, and the deductions which may be drawn from them will affect Greece only so far as her material development had not been suddenly cut short by the outbreak of her abortive patriotism.

Let us then attempt, by a brief examination, to take the measure of Greek progress since the establishment of the kingdom. What, in the first place, is the intellectual condition of New Greece at the present moment? What has the State done for education; and what is its position in the scale of literature, science, and the arts? How is Greece governed? What is her con-

¹ M. Emile Burnouf, Principal of the French School of Archæology at Athens, wrote in 1869:—"When I say that the present generation of men, most of them devoted to their country, are now in a state of despair, I am translating the Greek word which reaches my ears from all sides—*ἀπηλπισμένοι*."

stitution, and what are the guarantees of her popular liberties? What is the character of Greek finance, and what are the bases on which the revenues and expenditure of the kingdom rest? How is Greece administered, and what hopes or misgivings are suggested by her trade and agriculture? How far has she triumphed over the manifold difficulties which have beset her from the very beginning of her new career? What has she done with the curse of brigandage, which threatened to hold her in perpetual anarchy? What, in short, are the prospects for the future which are warranted by the phenomena of the present? Let us seek an answer to each and all of these questions.

If the answer is unsatisfactory—if we find that, after a decade and a half of constitutional life, Greece is still paralysed by internal dissensions, ill-governed, undeveloped, poverty-stricken, and without hope of the speedy attainment of prosperity—we may indeed admit that the task of the Greeks has been utterly beyond what it was reasonable to expect of them, but we shall be obliged to conclude that they are incompetent to adjust the balance of power in South-eastern Europe. On the contrary, if we find that Greece has advanced in a remarkable manner, in orderly government, in the arts of peace, in education, refinement, and national dignity, especially since she has enjoyed the rights of constitutional self-government, then we shall be warranted in expecting a still more remarkable advance within the next few years, and we shall admit a full and practical justification for the pleas which are urged in her favour.

CHAPTER II.

GREEK EDUCATION AND GENIUS.

Education a Drug—Is Greece over-educated?—Mr. Watson's Report—The Value placed on Education by the Greeks—The National System—Comparative Statistics—The University of Athens—Respect for Learning inherent in the Greek Character—The Hellenic Genius—Hellenisation—Its Force not dependent on Numbers—The Greeks the Leading Race in Turkey—M. Lenormant's View—What is Hellenism?—An Impossible Anti-climax.

A TRAVELLER in Greece, conversing one day with a member of the Government, to whom he had just brought a letter of introduction, and with whom, consequently, he was not on specially intimate terms, mentioned his desire to find a trustworthy Greek attendant, who might amongst other services act as his interpreter.

The Minister took the hint, and at once turned it to account.

"Why not engage my brother?" he said. "You will find in him just what you need. He is a graduate of the University of Athens, speaks several languages, is a civil and obliging fellow, and is anxious for a situation."

The story is told in various forms, and is familiar in the mouths of men who like to raise a laugh at the expense of the Greeks. But a moment's consideration will show that it may be used for the very opposite purpose. No doubt it is typical of the state of society in Greece at the present moment. A visitor to Athens, or to any other of the populous towns on the mainland or in the Morea, may, if he chooses, retain the services

of half a dozen University men, and be waited upon at every turn by fairly educated gentlemen, holding diplomas in law, theology, or medicine. The fact is one which speaks volumes for the high degree of development attained by national education in Greece; and it cannot be regarded as reflecting any positive discredit on the Greeks themselves.

It is quite true that there is a plethora of educated men in Greece, and that the million and a half of inhabitants do not require, and cannot find employment for, all the physicians and lawyers turned out by the University of Athens. The poverty of the country, still more than its paucity of inhabitants, precludes the full utilisation of this professional training. The phenomenon is unique in modern history; and some critics have been led to talk of the widespread education of Greece as an "impediment in the way of progress." Perhaps it may be so in a particular sense; but at all events the very plethora of scholars and professional men indicates the fitness of the Greeks to undertake a civilising rôle in the East, and establishes on their behalf a strong claim for the extension of their influence and authority.

The phrase just quoted occurs in a report made by Mr. Watson, one of our Secretaries of Legation in Athens, on the "Obstacles to Material Progress in Greece."¹ The facilities for instruction given to all classes, Mr. Watson thinks, are by no means an un-mixed advantage. "The benefits derived from this system—a system which undoubtedly confers considerable advantages on the Levant in general—are in some measure counterbalanced by drawbacks which affect

¹ January 20th, 1872. "Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, 1872;" No. 69, p. 403.

chiefly the kingdom of Greece. Many provinces of the Ottoman Empire are indebted to the seats of learning in Athens for a supply of intelligent doctors, divines, lawyers, chemists, and clerks, who in turn act as the voluntary agents of a propaganda for the spread of Hellenic ideas; but, on the other hand, the same seats of learning throw annually upon the Greek kingdom a superfluous supply of men of the same class, who form a grave impediment in the way of progress in the country, inasmuch as, having received a learned education, they overcrowd the learned professions, and, failing to obtain a livelihood therein, become political agitators."

There is no doubt whatever that the educated Greeks are political agitators; but the agitation is not confined to those who fail to obtain a livelihood. The Greeks of to-day are patriots almost without exception; and the acquisition of knowledge could not fail to strengthen the universal aspirations of the race.

The fact attested by Mr. Watson, that the professional men in certain provinces of Turkey are supplied from Athens, is precisely what one would have expected. The physicians, lawyers, administrators, and clerks of the Ottoman Empire have been principally Greeks for centuries past. Education amongst the Mussulmans has never been more than rudimentary, and the State has had no system whereby public instruction was practically enforced upon the young. To the present day, the best, if not the only schools in populous Turkish towns are those in which Greek and Mahomedan pupils are taught side by side; and the masters or mistresses of such schools are nearly always Greek. There is no comparison of any sort between the national education of the Turks and that of the Greeks; and the superiority of the latter race, in point of instruction, to every

other now or recently subjected to Turkey is very distinctly marked.

The Greeks have been penetrated in every age by the conviction that knowledge was the most available and the highest kind of power. This conviction was the saving clause of their servitude, and it may be said to have been the chief agent in their recovery of national independence. As soon as the Morea and the southern continent of Hellas were freed from the Turks, and the remaining nucleus of Greeks were able to turn aside from their internecine quarrels to consider the basis of their future institutions, the first lawgivers of New Greece resolved that education should be the primary aim and effort of the State.

It is true, as M. Burnouf has observed (although, perhaps, in too sweeping terms), that the instruction of the Greeks in 1830 was almost non-existent; that the country was in some sense "a solitude overrun by triumphant and ignorant klephts," and that everything needed to be done. Much, no doubt, required to be done over again; for the barbarous rage of Sultan Mahmoud and his mercenary, Ibrahim Pasha, had destroyed the schools of Greece with special zest. The education of children and adults was at a standstill; and for ten years the land had been overshadowed by intellectual darkness. But still a system of education had been at work even under the rule of the Pashas; and the Greeks fell back, without difficulty or long preparation, into a familiar groove.

They began, first of all, with the elementary education of both sexes. Even Capo d'Istria turned his attention to the matter as to one of the highest importance; but it was not until the Bavarians made a certain approximation to orderly government that anything

durable was achieved. In 1834 a training school, or "seminary for schoolmasters," was established, and supplied the elementary schools with their teachers. In the year 1840 there were registered in Greece as many as 252 of these elementary schools, which were attended by 22,000 scholars. These were under Government control, and dependent upon Government support; but in addition there were voluntary schools, supported by the priests and others, which brought up the total number of children receiving some kind of education to 32,000. The proportion to the entire population was little more than four per cent., or forty in the thousand. Poor as this result unquestionably was, the rate was already half as high as it was in England a generation later.

According to Mr. Watson's report, in 1872, there were under instruction in Greece—

At public establishments	73,219 pupils.
At private establishments	7,978 „
Total	81,197 „

—or something over 56 in the thousand.

The corresponding figures for 1877, as given by M. Moraitinis,¹ are as follows:

In the Communal Schools	74,561 pupils.
In Private Schools	10,650 „
Total	85,211 „

—or, on a population of one million and a half, about the same proportion as in 1872.²

Elementary education in Greece is provided by the communes or demarchies; though the Government

—¹ P. A. Moraitinis: *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est.*

² The population of the kingdom in 1870, according to a census taken in that year, was 1,457,894.

renders assistance in particular cases. Parents who can afford it are (or were a few years ago) required to pay at the Primary Schools a sum varying from one penny to fivepence a month; which, it need hardly be said, does not go far towards relieving the rates. In 1870 the demarchies spent on education about one-sixth of their gross incomes, amounting to 1,100,000 drachmas, or about £39,286.

Elementary education in Greece, in addition to being gratuitous, is compulsory—at least in theory. Children are compelled by law to attend the primary schools between the ages of seven and twelve years.

The comparison between Greece and other civilised countries in the matter of education is more favourable to the former when we pass on to the Secondary Schools. Between the age of ten and twenty, one out of every fourteen male inhabitants is under instruction in Greece (1877). The different classes of these secondary schools, including those supported by the State and those dependent upon private effort, are as follows—the numbers attending them being taken from the statistics of 1871:—

“Hellenic” Grammar Schools, attended by 6,055 pupils.			
Gymnasia	„	1,942	„
Foreign Societies’ Schools	„	1,414	„
Naval Schools (six)	„	83	„
Ecclesiastical Seminaries (four)	„	115	„
Roman Catholic Girls’ Schools	„	240	„
Polytechnic School	„	300	„
Other Establishments	„	5,826	„

The regular gradation for male scholars in Greece is from the Primary Schools to the Grammar Schools, and thence to the Gymnasia and University, the instruction being gratuitous throughout.

The annual expenditure of the country on national

education, taking the statistics of the year 1877, is, on Secondary Schools, 1,000,600 drachmas, and on higher education, 333,240 drachmas; in addition to the occasional assistance rendered to Primary Schools, to the exhibitions granted to poor scholars, and to various sums allowed for the publication of literary works. Altogether, taking into account the expenditure of the demarchies, the average annual burden, per head, imposed upon the Greeks for education alone may be reckoned as amounting to about sixteen pence; whilst the cost of each pupil is from 15s. to 16s.—the figure in both cases approximating to those of the best educated countries of Western Europe.

The University of Athens, opened in the year 1837, numbered, four years later, 292 students—167 in Law, 53 in the Arts, 52 in Medicine, and 20 in Theology. Of these, no fewer than sixty-nine came from abroad; that is to say, from the Ionian Islands, from Wallachia, from Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, and Asia Minor.¹ Thus, from its first institution, the University served to bring together the most prominent and promising of the rising generation of Greeks, and it became, as its founders expected that it would, a rallying-point for the scattered and half-emancipated race. It was with this anticipation that the wealthy Greeks in all parts of the world made a strenuous effort to establish it on a firm basis, and to erect a worthy edifice as the chief home of learning in Greece. Up to the year 1841, about a quarter of a million drachmas were subscribed for the building, whereof 32,000 came from Alexandria, 9,500 from the Ionian Islands, 7,600 from Constantinople, and other considerable sums from Smyrna, Ibraila, Jassy, and Galatz, and wherever the Greeks formed a numerous

¹ Strong: *Greece as a Kingdom*.

colony. The University buildings are situated in a fine square in Athens, where their white marble walls, columns, and statues present what is considered to be one of the finest features in the restored capital.

The progress of the various faculties has been as marked as that of every other form of education in Greece. Thus the number of students had risen to 550 in 1855; it had more than doubled in the first year of King George's reign; and it now reaches an aggregate of about fourteen hundred. Connected with the University there are excellent museums, laboratories, a library of over 150,000 volumes; clinical, obstetrical, and other hospitals—the last-named being attended by forty-two female medical students; an observatory, a botanical garden, and almost every adjunct which an English or French scholar would find at Oxford, Cambridge, or Paris.

The State expended, in 1876, the following sums in providing gratuitous education at the University:—

On the four Faculties	333,240 drachmas.
„ Library	33,900 „
„ Observatory	14,220 „
„ Botanic Garden	7,760 „
On Archæology	123,690 „

—a total of more than £18,000.

The extension of national education during the twenty years between 1855 and 1875 is indicated by the following comparison:—In 1855 there were 450 primary schools, with 35,273 pupils. In 1874 the number of schools had risen to 1,127, and the number of pupils to 74,561. The grammar schools in 1855 were 80, and the pupils 4,224. In 1875 the schools numbered 136, and the pupils 7,945. The gymnasia were only seven in 1855, and the pupils 968. Twenty years later the

number of gymnasia was 18, and the number of pupils 2,460.

There are not wanting symptoms which appear to show that the over-education of Greece—if it be admitted that this word is correctly applied to the phenomenon—has now reached its climax, and that the proportion of young men who pass through all the higher stages of the educational system is gradually diminishing.¹ Is this an advantage or a disadvantage for New Greece?

Mr. Watson, in the report already mentioned, gives the number of students at the University in 1872, who were divided under the following heads:—

			Natives.	Foreign Greeks.	Total.
Theology	20	6	26
Law	556	66	622
Medicine	299	124	423
Philosophy	75	45	120
Pharmacy	45	8	53
			995	249	1,244

“From the above numbers,” says Mr. Watson, “it would be inferred that there is actually thrown upon the Hellenic world,—that is, upon Greece, with scarcely a million and a half of inhabitants, and upon the Greek-speaking districts of Turkey, with perhaps double that number—a larger proportion of men educated for the learned professions than is called for by the wants of either community; and in so far as relates to the Hellenic kingdom, at least, experience abundantly proves this to be the case. While there is felt in Greece a painful dearth of men whose education has fitted them to supply some of the multifarious material wants of the country—such, for instance, as surveying, farming, road-making, and bridge-building—there is on the other hand a

¹ Moraitinis, p. 99.

plethora of lawyers, writers, and clerks, who, in the absence of regular occupation, become agitators and coffee-house politicians."

No doubt it would be immediately favourable to the material progress of Greece if a certain number of the native and resident Greeks who now attend the University, and who are practically barred from the exercise of their professions by the thin population of the kingdom, were to pass straight from the grammar schools or gymnasia to some trade or calling in which they might recruit the actual wealth-producers, as farmers, gardeners, builders, and the like. Greece needs every artisan or tradesman whom she can attract by the promise of a regular livelihood or a fortune; and she could spare many a doctor and philosophical *diplômé*.

But, on the other hand, the number of spoiled artisans—of men who might have been content with honourable manual labour if they had not learned law or medicine at the University—is not absolutely a large one. The excess of the supply over the demand is not so great that the superfluous students in Athens would make a very appreciable difference in the trades over which they might have been scattered. And, even if it were so, it would be difficult to decide upon the comparative advantage to their country of men who sacrifice knowledge to gain, and of men who sacrifice gain to knowledge. Knowledge, after all, is at the root of prosperity; and Greece has already experienced the benefit of her highly efficient national education. What but this education made her turn so readily from the anarchy of her earlier years to the order, industry, and sustained effort of the past decade and a half? What but education taught her to conquer and to value her Constitution, to organise her Government and her

finances, to suppress brigandage, to devote herself to the development of her resources and the advancement of her public works?

This high esteem and encouragement of education would have afforded matter for the greatest surprise in any other race of South-eastern Europe except the Greeks. They alone amongst the subjects of the Ottoman Empire have displayed a natural and instinctive love of learning, and have clung to it through centuries of servitude. The Servians, the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, the Albanians, have had the same opportunities of developing their innate faculties and cultivating their inherited tastes; but none of them have shown a special attachment to education, or have exhibited so much as a perception of the great practical truth which the superior race has turned to such good account. The shrewd Greeks not only seek knowledge for its own sake, and out of a genuine appreciation of theoretic subtleties, but they know that it is a marketable commodity, bringing with it increased consideration, influence, and the means of acquiring and retaining wealth. On both these grounds, the higher and the lower, has the Hellenic race established its incalculable superiority to the savage and intractable Albanians, to the rude Bulgarians, satisfied when they can secure prosperity by hard manual labour, to the Servians, who have hitherto given evidence of slight intellectual capacity, and even to the Roumanians, who have so much Greek blood in their veins, who have imbibed a decided taste for Greek refinement, but whose share of the ancient Byzantine inheritance appears to have been its enervating luxury and its specious corruption.

Respect for learning, however, is only one of many features presented by the Hellenic genius, which has of

late afforded such remarkable proofs of its rejuvenescence and vitality. The true character of Hellenism reveals itself wherever the Greeks have enjoyed a few generations of free social life. A worthy appreciation of the sacredness of domestic ties; the honour paid to women; the observance of religion tempered by pure reason; the love of justice, order, and virtual equality, creating and directing the municipal community as it governs and directs the family; the fervour of patriotism, giving birth to phenomenal heroism whenever the country is in danger; the idealisation of natural beauty, offspring of a cultivated eye and an intellectual sense of harmony and subordination; the industry born of this same subordination, when carried into effect in a settled and peaceable State—all these characteristics we find in the Greeks of antiquity; and we meet them again, some already prominent, others as yet less distinctly indicated, in the Greeks of to-day.

It is one of the most interesting studies of the age to watch the progress of this new Hellenisation, gradually recovering its force after a suppression of centuries, and after what was so nearly an absolute effacement. The terrible incubus of Turkish misrule is at last all but expelled from South-eastern Europe, and we begin to realise the full extent of the mischief which it has effected during the past five hundred years. The crime of the Turk is summed up in the fact that he has almost destroyed Hellenic civilisation; and the merit of his victorious enemies begins with the fact that, perhaps in spite of themselves, they have rescued and restored this civilisation. It is true that history has preserved for us a record of the continuity of Greek civilisation—not only in the persistent encouragement by the Eastern Church of secular learning, but also in

the high refinement of comparatively free Greek colonies, and of comparatively neglected portions of the Ottoman Empire—such as the island of Chios up to the beginning of the present century. But, in spite of this, the nucleus of effective Hellenism whereby the modern kingdom of Greece was endowed at its birth was extremely feeble, and its work for the past fifty years, performed under the most adverse conditions, has been laborious and slow.

The spirit of the Turk has been a negation of intellect, industry, and art. Now that Europe has taken heart of grace, and has abolished Turkish rule over so large a portion of the Ottoman Empire, we shall see with what renewed vigour the genius of Hellenism will assert itself. We shall see what part the Greeks of East Roumelia will play in the regeneration of that autonomous State. We shall see what the Greeks of Bulgaria will contribute towards the self-government of that Principality. We shall see what the many thousand Greeks of Cyprus will do with their new freedom. We shall see how the Greeks of Southern Thessaly and Epirus (unless for them the Russian invasion and the Berlin Congress have been thrown away) can justify their emancipation. And we shall see whether the Hellenic race in general will not henceforth more energetically assert its superiority, and exercise its beneficent influence, over the whole seaboard of the *Ægean*.

It is sometimes argued that little is to be expected of the Greeks, because of the paucity of their numbers; and that Bulgarians, or Albanians, or Mahomedans, have a prior claim upon such and such a territory because a census of the population shows the Greeks to be in a minority. Many hasty conclusions have been

accepted with regard to the population of the Ottoman Empire, from which deductions have been drawn unfavourable to the cause of Greek regeneration; but, even if these were all correct, the plea of numbers is by no means the strongest of those which are put forward on behalf of the cause in question. It is less needed in the case of Greece than it would be in the case of any other nationality. It may be that the Greeks in Europe are hardly more in number than the inhabitants of London. How many, then, were the Greeks who broke the power of Xerxes? How many were the Greeks of the mother country which colonised Thrace, Asia Minor, the islands of the Levant, Egypt, Sicily, the coast of Gaul? What, judging from the narratives of the historians, would have been the census of the Spartan and Athenian Republics? There could be no greater mistake than that of judging the force of the Hellenic race, either in the age of Leonidas or to-day, by the single criterion of numbers.

M. François Lenormant puts this view cogently, whilst describing the predominant influence of Hellenism in the recent fortunes of the Porte's Christian subjects.¹ "The rôle of Greece in the contemporary East," he says, "closely resembles its rôle in antiquity. . . . The Hellenic race represents the motive power in the Ottoman Empire, as, twenty-two centuries ago, it represented it in Persian Asia. It represents the same motive power even in the immense Russian Empire, to which it has given its faith, its civilisation, and its arts, so that, in a moral sense, there has been rather a kind of transformation of Slavs into Greeks than the alleged transformation of the Greeks into Slavs, which Fallmerayer took upon himself to assert as a positive fact.

¹ *La Grèce et les Iles Ioniennes*, p. 5.

Wherever trade, industry, and civilisation have attained a certain degree of development in Eastern countries, the honour of the fact belongs to the Greeks. Clergymen, physicians, money-changers, merchants, pasha-secretaries, financial clerks, interpreters, all over Turkey, the Greeks have cast over the country a sort of immense net, which allows them to secure all the business, to take in hand the direction of every Governmental intrigue or popular movement. Their mission has been even to revive the national sentiment in the other Christian races. In Serbia, the germs of emancipation and recovery were planted by Rhigas, and by the hospodar Constantin Hyspilantes, long before the movement which has now manifested itself amongst the Slavonian populations. The Roumanians of Moldavia and Wallachia, who show to-day so much animosity and rage against the Greeks, and confiscate, in spite of right and treaties, the property of their convents, only began to feel themselves a nation when they were released from their ignorance and debasement by the Phanariot princes, when they had had for a century an exclusively Greek education, and when Bucharest was the first reconstructed centre of Hellenic life. . . . In the parts of Bulgaria where Hellenism has diffused its influence, the Bulgarians also have risen in their own estimation. In the condition of decadence to which servitude had reduced them, they had scarcely preserved any love of country, and their only patriots had passed through Greek schools. It would be easy to show the Hellenic movement, as powerful as it is beneficent, penetrating, by a sort of infiltration, through Asia Minor and Syria, amongst the Maronites of the Lebanon, and even, occasionally, amongst Mussulman chieftains, like Ali Bey and the Emir Daher, who attempted to

raise the flag of Arabic nationality against the Ottoman Porte."

Not even here is the limit of the Hellenic influence to be found. According to some thinkers, for whose theories a great deal may be said, there is an Hellenism in the history of individual minds, as in the history of the human race. The phase is reached when a man has attained the full conception of his individual dignity. It is the highest product of the Indo-Caucasian spirit, and, once imbibed, is hereditary through endless generations. It probably entered Europe with the Greek family of the Aryans, and, through them, has overspread the southern and western Continent. It informed and inspired the noblest productions of art, speech, and thought, gave us a Phidias, a Sophocles, a Demosthenes, a Socrates, dominated and perfected the minds of men in every succeeding generation. The history of Hellenism is the history of our race in its sublimest flights; and it has been said, with scarcely perceptible exaggeration, that it would be easier to enumerate the refinements which mankind does not owe to the Greeks than it would be to reckon up our debts. The subtle influence has transformed and appropriated all that went before it, as it has been foremost to generate or impregnate all that has come after it. It brooded on the rude conceptions of Arabia and Egypt, and gave us the natural and metaphysical sciences. It brooded over the abstractions and absorptions of Judaism, and nursed the infant Christianity into a giant before whom the world was fain to bow. It found on the Nile an essence of reason and scepticism, which it refined seven times in the fire of its own penetrating genius, and endowed with its own immortal spirit. It conquered its conquerors in every age, most beneficent when most

oppressed, and saved civilisation alive when all the world was relapsing into primeval savagery.

Is it possible for us to suppose that the true Hellenic race—or be it merely the descendants of a race to which the world owes all that it holds most sacred—is to be subordinated to Turk, or Slav, or Russian? Is there room in human nature for such an anti-climax as this?

CHAPTER III.

LITERATURE AND FOLK-LORE.

The Modern Greek Language—Tendency towards the Ancient Form—Language and Patriotism—Romaic Literature—National Songs—A Klephtic Ballad—Contemporary Greek Literature—Prose Works—Poetry—The Drama in Greece—The Greek Press—Republican Ideas—Folk-lore—Greek Fairy Tales.

THE fact which governs and controls the literature of modern Greece is that the language has, for a considerable time past, been undergoing a peculiar process of change. The speech of the Hellenic race has been regenerated with the race itself; and this important modification, which began in some sort before the outbreak of the insurrection in 1821, is not yet complete. It would therefore be useless to look for a contemporary literature which should be at the same time classical in form and expressive of the popular national sentiments.

The history of language offers, perhaps, no more striking instance of a race of men setting itself deliberately to reconstruct its own ancestral grammar, and vocabulary, and discarding, in the course of a generation or two, the corruptions of centuries. Yet that is what the Greeks have attempted, and with no small measure of success. As the revival of national life involved, for Greece, the revival of learning, so, with equal necessity, the revival of learning implied the return of the race towards the classical epoch of its language. From 1820 forwards, the Greeks began to make it almost a point of honour to employ the most

archaic forms, and especially to strip from the speech of Pericles and Æschylus the ungainly Turanianisms of their oppressors. To take a single instance; the Turkish name for a gun, *toufeki*, had been the word most frequently used in Greece for that invention of modern times. In this case the ancient Greek did not supply a name for the complex idea; but it instantly resumed its vital energy in obedience to the instinctive demand, and thenceforth the gun of the Greek patriot was his *televodon*, that which carried his missile far, when he aimed it at the heart of his enemy.¹

But language is too subtle a concretion to be made, or remade, at will. The mere addition to the classical vocabulary of names for all the ideas unknown to Xenophon, however ably the new glossary may have been constructed, necessarily produces a speech differing widely from that of two thousand years ago. The modern Greeks have struggled with their difficulty in a fairly creditable manner; but, even if their vocabulary is accepted, they have not been thorough in their resumption of the classical models and idioms. The purest contemporary writers of Greek do not venture, or did not venture a few years ago, to return absolutely to the Greek of Xenophon or of Thucydides.

The change, however, is already a radical one; and the consequence is that there are now in Greece two distinct forms of speech, one for writing and the other for speaking. Or, more precisely, we may say that there are a score of different forms, from the classicalism of the University to the rudest *patois* of Bœotia or of the Maina. We have, therefore, two distinct kinds of modern Greek literature, the Romaic (as the corrupt

¹ See Prosper Mérimée, Introduction to *Contes et Poèmes de la Grèce Moderne*.

Greek has commonly been called), and the neo-classical, whereof the former dates as far back as the Middle Ages, and consists almost entirely of the language of outlawry and patriotism.

The Greek language was already undergoing a rapid process of decay before the break up of the Byzantine Empire. It shared to some extent the fate of Latin in Western Europe, although its decomposition was not destined to proceed so far. Latin has been practically dead for centuries ; but Greek has never been a dead language. It has been spoken by purists in every age —by every Greek, in fact, who has not bowed in spirit to the Turk. It has been retained (like the Latin) by men of science, and in the Universities ; but it has also had the advantage of being preserved in constant use by the patriarchs and priests of the Eastern Church. And, finally, it has been taught, from the best text-books, in the schools which have been constantly associated with the ecclesiastical organisation of the Orthodox communion. In these schools, at the patriarchates, in the houses of the wealthy Greeks, in the libraries and syllogues which escaped the long arm of Turkish oppression, the sacred flames of learning and of patriotism supported each other with a mutual heat ; and towards the end of the eighteenth century the ardour of these flames had made itself felt over the whole extended surface of what may not inaptly be described as Greater Greece —amongst the primates and the commercial men of Hellas and the Morea, amongst the great shipowners of Hydra, Spetzas, and Psara, in learned and refined societies, such as that of Chios, in the thousand mercantile communities of Thrace and Macedonia, and throughout the numerous Greek populations of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. Wider even than this the

fervour had extended itself. It had been nursed by the great hospodars of the Danubian principalities; it was fanned into greater brightness in the capitals of Europe; it supplied work for the printing-presses of Vienna, Venice, and Paris; it generated a new flame of Philhellenism in Russia, Germany, and the West.¹ Europe hailed with enthusiasm this regeneration of the Greek language and the Hellenic spirit. For more than two centuries the scholars and the schoolboys of Christendom had been indoctrinated with the ideas of the classical age. They were destined now to repay a long accumulating debt to the two great Aryan races of the South; and it is not entirely fanciful to say that "the great dead of Greece," the tragedians, the historians, old Homer himself, contributed to the redemption of their race in the nineteenth century.

There was indeed a literature in Greece during the Middle Ages, which divided itself into two main streams—the one chivalric, chiefly imitated from the romantic narratives of the French *trouvères* and the Italian chroniclers, and owing its existence in part to the ceaseless eastern flow of Latinised Europe towards the Holy

¹ "From the farthest limits of Thrace and from Macedonia to Tenarus, in all the islands and in the western parts of Asia Minor, Greek was the language of the Church, of literature, and of politics. For many years the population under Turkish rule were deprived of all means of education, for most of the scholars who rendered Greece illustrious during the fifteenth century—Gemistos, Bessarion, George of Trebizond, Argyropoulos, Lascaris, Chalcocondylas, and numberless others—passed with their learning either into Western Europe, or to those Greek Islands still occupied by the Venetians, and were thus the cause of the revival of Greek civilisation in Italy and France, whilst in its birth-place it was obscured from the middle of the fifteenth down to the end of the sixteenth century. Public instruction began to revive about the beginning of the seventeenth century, owing to the initiative of that Greek community which was formed at Venice by fugitives from all parts of Greece. They left their country, but they did not forget her, and sought to prepare for her a brighter future. They advanced funds, and chose able teachers. Many schools were founded

Land—the other, more distinctly popular and national, reflecting the national life in its simplest and most familiar forms. The characteristics of this latter species of song—for song it was, almost invariably—are much the same as those of the ballad and *chanson* literatures of France, Italy, and Spain, at corresponding periods of their history. Always accompanied by rude music of some kind or another, of the voice when the lyre or *saza* was absent, often improvised by the wandering minstrels, or drawn from the repertory of an imperfect memory, or accommodated with more or less skill to new and special occasions, these rude ballads sprang direct from the daily experience and sensations of the peasants, shepherds, and muleteers of Greece, and reflected the superstitions and the wild passions of a subjected race.

Two trains of ideas more frequently than any other may be distinguished amongst these songs of modern Greece—those which were inspired by religious observances, and those which clustered round the romantic life of the mountaineers, the refugees from oppression, and the bandits, all of whom have been somewhat roughly classed as klephts. The Eastern Church has invariably exercised a powerful and paternal influence over the humbler ranks of Greeks—as it does to this day over the millions of Slavs and Greeks whom it has gathered into its fold. We cannot, therefore, be

at Athens and Yanina. Yanina, especially, became quite a college for teachers, who in their turn became the heads of schools in the Peloponnesus and Continental Greece, in Thessaly, Macedonia, Scio, Cydonia, Constantinople, Yassy, and Bucharest. The words of such celebrated masters as Eugenius, Boulgaris, Nicephoros, Theotokis, John Demitriades, Constantine Koumas, Stephen Doungas, Constantine Economos, Neophytos Bambas, of George Gennadios, and others as illustrious, resounded from one end of the Hellenic East to the other.”—“*Modern Hellenism*,” p. 10 (*published by the London Hellenic Committee*).

surprised to find that many of the songs and “recitatives” of the Greeks—a sort of secular hymns—are associated with the rites and ceremonies of their religion. The feast of St. Basil (Jan. 1), the Carnival, the feast of St. Constantine, and other days and seasons more or less specially sanctified by the Church, are celebrated with great fervour by the majority of the population; and most of them have their appropriate songs. The observance of days extends beyond the ecclesiastical calendar. Thus the children have a feast of their own on the 1st of March, when they sing from door to door, carrying the figure of a swallow in their hands, and repeating a simple refrain:—

“She is here, she is here !
The swallow that brings us the beautiful year ;
Wide open the door !
We are children again, we are old no more.”¹

The songs of the klephts, or, more properly, of the mountaineers—for there are many so-called klephtic songs which are the purest outpourings of an unalloyed patriotism—are very popular throughout the provinces of Greece, and were still more popular previous to and during the struggle with Turkey. There is, it must be confessed, a great monotony, and no particular beauty, in this anthology of a wild and oppressed race, which is interesting rather as an historical phenomenon than as the efflorescence of a tender and attractive sentiment. It is impossible to compare it with the poetic anthology of France or Italy; but there can be no question as to the vitality and strength of the feeling to which it bears witness. I venture to

¹ Bougeault, *Histoire des Littératures Etrangères*, t. iii., p. 534.—The modern Greek songs have been collected by Fauriel, the Count de Marcellus, Pappadopoulos Vretos, Sathas, Passow, and Wagner.

paraphrase one of these klephts' songs, taking it almost at hazard, and as a fair specimen of the mingled baldness and significance of the majority:—

“Bathed in the mountain-spring Pliaskas lies
Immersed, and yet his pulses throb and burn.
Then to the sparrows round him twittering cries,
‘Birds, is there any hope? Will strength return?’

“‘Pliaskas, wouldst thou live? Dost healing crave?
To fair Olympus wend thy weary way!
There brave are never sick, sick ever brave,
There dwell the klephts, and wield unfettered sway.

“‘Riches and glory wait on courage there;
Tolios at Caterina rules alone,
Nikos and Christos wide dominion share,
Young Lazopoulos leads at Platamon.’

“Forth fares the brave Pliaskas, evil-starred;
To Tournavos his lagging steps are bound:
By treacherous enemies the path is barred,
And soon his head is rolling on the ground.”¹

¹ C. Fauriel, *Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne*; t. i., p. 29.

Κοίτετ' ὁ Πλιάσκας, κοίτεται 'σ τὴν ἐρήμην τὴν βρύσιν:
Μετὰ ποδάρια 'σ τὸ νερὸν, πάλε νερὸν γυρεύει.
Μετὰ πιουλιὰ συντύχαινε καὶ μετὰ χελιδόνια.
“Τάχα, πιουλιὰ, θὰ ἰατρευθῶ; τάχα, πιουλιὰ, θὰ ἴανω;”

“Πλιάσκα, μὰν θέλῃς ἰάτρευμα, νὰ ἴανουν ἡ πληγαὶ σου,
'Εβγα ψηλά 'σ τὸν Ὀλυμπον, 'σ τὸν εὐμορφον τὸν τόπον.
'Ανδρεῖοι 'κεῖ δὲν ἀβῶστουν, κ' ἀβῶστοι ἀνδρεῖόνουν.
'Εκ' εἰν' οἱ κλέφτες οἱ πολλοί, τὰ τέσσαρα πρωτάτα.

“Ἐκεῖ μοιράζουν τὰ φλωριά, καὶ τὰ καπετανάτα.
Τοῦ Νίκου πέφτ' ἡ ποταμιὰ, τοῦ Χρήστ' ἡ Ἀλασῶνα,
'Ο Τόλιος καπετάνεψε φέτος 'σ τὴν Κατερίνην,
Καὶ τὸ μικρὸν Λαζόπουλον πῆρε τὴν Πλαταμῶναν.”

Κ' ὁ Πλιάσκας ὁ κακόμοιρος, ὁ κακομοιριασμένος,
'Σ τὸν Τούρναβον κατέβαινε, ἐκεῖ νὰ σεριανίση,
Καὶ οἱ ἐχθροὶ κατόπι τοῦ τοῦ πῆραν τὸ κεφάλι.

The son of Lazos and his fellow klephts lived early in the present

Who will doubt that the vivid Greek imagination saw more than meets the eye in these simple lines? —saw wounds of the soul, rather than of the body, which no cunning of nature or art could cure, and which drove the sufferer from house and home, to appease his restless heart in the wild freedom of the mountains? The melancholy close is a common feature in these poems; and that, too, is a reflection of the circumstances amidst which they were composed and sung.

There are other songs expressing still more forcibly the patriotic sentiments of the mountaineers; and the most remarkable of them all are those which show that the *armatoles*—originally local guards, enrolled in order to keep the troublesome *klephts* in order, and tolerated when not actually encouraged by the Turks—were themselves frequently as patriotic as those who had

century, on the mountains of Thessaly. Several of them were surprised and slain at Kapsaris, about the middle of the second decade.

A rendering in English verse of the songs collected by Fauriel was published in the year 1825, by Mr. Charles Brinsley Sheridan, from whom I quote a few stanzas of the inspired "Hymn to Liberty" of Dionysius Salômos, a Greek poet, who had previously written both in Greek and in Italian. The date of this poem is 1823.

"Yes! I know thee by the lightning
Of thy tyrant-slaying glaive,
By thine awful glances bright'ning
As thou gazest on the brave.

"Kindle from our country's ashes,
Liberty! thy sacred fire.
Many a Spartan sabre clashes,
Breathe on one Tyrtæan lyre.

"Thou wert grovelling in the dust,
Humbled by thy bitter doom;
Heaven was still thine only trust—
Heaven has uttered, 'Quit the tomb!'

"Brooding o'er our hills and plains,
Silence watch'd the thunder near.
Every arm was cramp'd by chains,
Every heart was chill'd by fear.

... "Now thy sons, defying danger,
Strike beneath their native sky,
And distrusting every stranger,
Swear to free themselves, or die.

... "Seven young sisters from the main
Raised on high applauding hands,
Though protection's treacherous chains
Bound them still in flowery bands.

... "Woe to those who meet the glaive
Grasp'd by Freedom's fearless hand,
And infatuated brave
Græcia's roused and patriot band.

... "Terror, solitude, and death,
Freedom! mark thy withering path
And the blade without the sheath
But inflames thy righteous wrath."

never accepted service under the tyrants. The following bold allegory may serve as an instance :—

Olympos and Kissavos, the mountains, chide each other.
 Olympos says to Kissavos, " Why with me do you quarrel ?
 You who have ever been trampled by the Moslem.
 I am ancient Olympos, and in the world am famous.
 Of summits I have forty-two, and brooklets two and sixty.
 Each brooklet has its banner, and every tree its Klept.
 And on my highest peak is perched an eagle.
 He holds within his talons' grasp a warrior's head.
 Oh, wretched head of mine, why are you thus maltreated ?
 Eat, bird, my youth, and, if you can, my courage.
 Your wing will grow a yard in height, your claw will stretch a palm.
 Twelve years was I an Armatole at Xerómero and Louro.
 At Khassia and on Olympos twelve years was I a Klept.
 Sixty Agas have I killed and left in flames their hamlets.
 Many are the Turks, my bird, and many the Albanians,
 That I have left upon the turf ; they never can be numbered.
 But my turn came at last to fall in midst of battle." ¹

The contemporary literature of Greece, whether cast in a severe classical mould or clinging to a more popular form, is still a continuation of the literary activity of the past century and a half. It was not until the eighteenth century that modern Greek became the medium of a written literature ; but from the time of the illustrious Phanariots who first won the confidence of the Porte, from the patriarch Samuel, from Bulgaris,² Doukas,³ and Rhigas,⁴ from Rhizos Neroulos,

¹ See *Modern Hellenism*.

² A Corfuot, who taught at Mount Athos, was made Bishop of Kherson by the Empress Catherine, translated the *Æneid*, and the *Confessions* of St. Augustine (1716—1806).

³ A pupil of Lambros Photiades, at Bucharest. He modernised Thucydides.

⁴ "The Tyrtæus of New Greece"—a Thessalian in the service of Michael Soutzo, hospodar of Wallachia, whose patriotic songs did much to rouse his countrymen to rebellion. He ventured across the Austrian frontier and was promptly handed over to the Turks.

Minas, and Schinas, to the present generation, the succession has been uninterrupted. Of the later historians and prose writers we may take note of Paparrigopoulos, author of a "History of Greece from its Origin," of Tricoupi and Soutzo amongst the historians of the Revolution, and of Sathas, who, amongst his numerous historical and bibliographical labours, has given to the world the most complete account of Greek learning from the year 1453, enumerating within the four centuries no fewer than twelve hundred writers in his own language.

The literature of New Greece is, perhaps, richer and more brilliant in its poetry than in its prose; or at all events its poetry enjoys a greater popularity, and is rewarded by a livelier and quicker appreciation. If the picture contained in the following passage from a contemporary writer¹ is not extravagantly overdrawn, we may form some idea of the encouragement held out to the younger Greek poets, and of the fresh enthusiasm with which the nation as a whole regards its intellectual achievements. "Year by year the Academy at Athens conducts a competition in poetry, and gives a prize, founded by the wealthy patriot, Ambrose Ralli, to the poet whose production is considered the most noteworthy for originality, and best calculated to restore the language to its pristine purity. The day fixed for the formal winding up of the competition is the 25th of March, the anniversary of the proclamation of Greek independence. On that day the whole of Athens is excited; every class of society displays the like eagerness; the cafés and bazaars are deserted; the open places are filled by the crowd, which gesticulates, shouts, and argues with the warmth

¹ In the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, April, 1860.

natural to the race. After reading a report on the several productions in the competition, the president announces the winner, congratulates him on behalf of the nation, reads his verses aloud, and sets a laurel crown on his brow. The crowned poet, when he quits the meeting, is received by the acclamations of the multitude, and is borne off to his home almost as it were in a triumph."

There is possibly more of patriotism in this enthusiasm than of a purely literary appreciation; but, as we have seen, the Greeks are disposed to look upon the cultivators of the national language and literature as patriots of a very genuine kind; and they are wont to pay special honour to their poets. It is not unnatural that they should consider poetry and patriotism as indissolubly associated, seeing how many of the first soldiers of independence were poets, and how many of their poets supplied the music of war which led their countrymen to victory. Rhigas and his contemporaries have already been mentioned. George Zalokostas, author of "*Armatoles and Klephts*," was one of the soldier-singers who survived the struggle long enough to see his country rid of a foreign yoke; at all events rid of the yoke of the Turks. He was an instance of the so-called klephts who were driven to the mountains in pure self-defence, and whose only enemies were the enemies of their country. Zalokostas was one of the last of the "vulgarists," who did not care to frame their speech after the new fashions. A poet of stronger stamp was Alexander Soutzo,¹ member of a famous Phanariot family, a scathing satirist, who holds a high rank even in the literature of Europe, and who lashed the follies of his country with a wholesome

¹ Born at Constantinople, 1803; died at Smyrna, 1863.

severity. He spent much of his life in exile, at various European capitals; but on his death the National Assembly voted him a statue. One quality had never been denied in him—that of an ardent love of his country. The last years of his life were occupied, not in satirising his friends, but in a dreary and unfinished epic of the Crimean War, “The War of the East.” The part completed is said to be full of fervent patriotism—and it was written at St. Petersburg.

Other Greek poets of yesterday, whose writings are still fresh in the memory of to-day, were Orphanidis, author of “Chios in Chains,” Panayotes Soutzo, brother of Alexander, who wrote “The Traveller,” and Valaoritis, who glorified the Epirote heroes in their own rough dialect.

Of living poets perhaps the most prominent, by his age, his talent, and the favour in which he is held by his fellow-countrymen, is Rhizos Rangabé, born in 1810. His style and taste are varied in a notable degree; for in addition to his miscellaneous poems, which pass “from grave to gay, from lively to severe,” he has written two dramas,¹ a series of romantic stories, an heroic ode to Lord Byron, ballads which are highly praised for their combined spirit and finish, and a number of archæological treatises in Greek and French. M. Rangabé is also a distinguished statesman, for some time Greek Minister at Washington;² and he was one of the unfortunate embassy which represented Hellenic interests at the Congress of Berlin.

Rangabé is by no means the only dramatist of

¹ “Phrosyne,” and “The Old Woman.”

² He published at New York, in 1867, a volume on “Greece: her Progress and Present Position.”

modern Greece. Rhizos Neroulos, who, at Geneva, early in the century, did much to inspire his pupils and friends with an interest in modern Greek literature, wrote two elegant tragedies, "Polyxenes" and "Aspasia." Christopoulos wrote his "Achilles" about the same time; and he was followed by Evanthia, the female author of "Nikirate;" by Alexander Soutzo, with his "Botzaris;" by Zambelios, with "Karaiskakis;" and by others who took their subjects from the War of Independence. These dramas were put on the stage at Jassy, at Odessa, at Bucharest, and in Corfu; and they are occasionally acted to the present day. Amongst later dramatists have been Bernardakis ("Merope," "Phrosyne," "Maria Dezapatri"), Spiridion Vasiliadis ("Loukas Notaras," and "The Kallergis"), and Athanasios Mavromichaelis ("Coriolanus," and "The Capture of Tripolitza").

The Greeks have freely translated the works of their contemporaries, and their stage in particular has been indebted to the lighter dramatic repertory of the French. A more genuinely national character, however, distinguishes the comedies of Vlachos and others, whose works have been stamped with approval by the Academy of Athens. "The Grocer's Daughter," "The Captain of the National Guard," and other pieces, illustrating national habits and character, though not considered remarkable for dramatic interest, are described by competent critics as giving earnest of yet more important efforts in the future.

Vlachos is the author of many fugitive poems, distinguished by their beauty and finish, and of a rendering of the "Meditations" of Lamartine. Vasiliadis, also, is favourably known for his "Attic Nights," consisting of pictures from the history of the country. Skyllizis,

Karasoutzas, Terzetis, Bikelas, Paraschos, are eminent amongst the remaining poets of New Greece.¹

Amongst the characteristic manifestations of intellectual activity amongst the Greeks are the *sylogoi*—associations or clubs which combine literary intercourse with the exercise of practical benevolence, and no doubt, also, with an occasional dash of aggressive politics. A syllogue is, presumably, a simple club, and the ostensible object of its formation may be literary, charitable, political, or otherwise; but most frequently the members, including representatives of both sexes, allow themselves to travel beyond the range of interests comprised within their special denomination. It is certain that the custom of forming and taking part in these syllogues originated in a state of society in which a subject race, superior to its masters in knowledge, manners, and modes of thought, felt the necessity of frequent and intimate communion amongst themselves, both for the satisfaction of their loftier tastes and aspirations, and for the purpose of mutual protection. All the objects named above are accounted for by the circumstances under which the earliest of the syllogues were established.

The cohesiveness of the Greek race, in its modern regeneration, is illustrated by the fact that political or semi-political *côteries* of this kind exist in almost every Hellenic community throughout the world. "In all towns where there are but a hundred Greeks," says M. Moraïtinis, "in Turkey, in Asia Minor, in Egypt, in Russia, in the towns of the West, in America, in the Indies, in Australia—in brief, wherever there are Greeks, such associations are set on foot."

In the kingdom of Greece itself there are many syllogues of considerable importance and influence,

¹ Bougeault, *passim*.

especially devoted to literature and benevolence. Thus there are in Athens two philanthropical societies, founded by the Princess Maria Hypsilantes and by Madame Helen Paparrigopoulo, which carry on a serviceable work amongst the poor of the capital. There is the "Syllogue for the Propagation of Greek Literature," the object of which is "to found schools for children of both sexes, to extend elementary instruction by the best methods, and to publish works necessary for this purpose." There is the "Byron Philological Syllogue," for "the intellectual development and moral training of its members, and other citizens, by study and literary work." There is the "Hetairia of the Friends of Education," under the patronage of the Queen, which supports schools, principally for girls. The capital of this association is over a million and a half of drachmas, and the pupils for whom it provides instruction number more than 1700.

Amongst other associations of a similar character may be mentioned the Musical and Dramatic Syllogue, maintaining an institution after the manner of the Paris Conservatoire; a Syllogue of Sacred Byzantine Music; various societies for the support of orphanages, for the instruction of the labouring classes, &c. &c. In fact, it may be said that Greece, taking her late start into account, is able to bear comparison with many far wealthier states in the matter of her public beneficent institutions.

The Greek press has sustained an honourable part in the drama of Hellenic regeneration. Under Capo d'Istria, under the Bavarian Otho, it fought the battle of popular liberty, and earned a title to gratitude by its outspoken courage and its defiance of persecution. Since 1864, Greek journalists have been almost free from oppressive censure, and they have distinguished

themselves, as a rule, by the dignity and patriotism of their writings. In 1867 nearly a hundred periodicals figured amongst the evidences of Greek progress at the Paris Exhibition. At the present day the number has risen to 129, whereof fifty-five are published at Athens, ten at Patras, nine at Syra, seven at Calamata, five at Zante, and the same number at Corfu.¹ Other Greek journals are published at Constantinople, at Smyrna, at Alexandria, and in other populous Greek centres. Amongst the best of them may be mentioned the *Hora*, the *Stoa*, *Ephemeris*, *Neologos*, *Palingenesia*, and the *Messenger d'Athènes*, in French; amongst reviews the *Byron*, the *Athenæum*, the *Neohellenika Analekta*, the *Homer*, published at Smyrna, the *Ecclesiastical Review* at Constantinople, the *Phœnix* at Alexandria; and, amongst satirical prints, the *Phos* and the *Aristophanes*.

Republicanism seems to have comparatively few serious advocates in Greece, at all events as a practical object of the immediate future. The *Aion*, as M. Moraïtinis informs us, "one of the most important and oldest papers, recently unfurled the standard of Republican ideas, and discussed them with perfect freedom. Its articles were in the best manner, and bore witness to the erudition of their author. Why did this journal cease to exist? Because, in spite of the worthiness of its political management, the public read it with an interest which had no effect upon the heart—with that negative interest wherewith we read any essay which, though well written, deals with facts far removed from ourselves, incapable of disturbing the sphere in which we move."²

The attitude of Greece in this respect is, apparently,

¹ Moraïtinis.

² *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*, p. 205.

the same as that of England and Italy, and of the two or three other truly constitutional monarchies. With the substance of liberty and self-government a people cares less for the form. Virtual Republics can afford to be indifferent as to the names by which their institutions are known. The probability is that a vicious, or even an unwise monarch would destroy monarchy in any country where popular self-government is an established fact. King Otho was on the point of making a Greek Republic possible in 1862; and, indeed, it is to be remembered that Otho's successor was found for Greece, not by herself, but by England, in accordance with the understanding of the Great Powers thirty years before. But King George has been content, on the whole, to reign without ruling; and the Greeks have no temptation to demand a change.

Before leaving the subject of literature in Greece, a word may be said of the Greek folk-lore, which is rich in legend and homely mythology, and which has not yet been systematically collected, or even discussed. The relics of ancient faith and superstitions, of the pantheism and heroölogy of two thousand years ago, survive in the traditions of the Greeks of to-day. Long narratives, as well as short fables and ballads, are faithfully handed down from memory to memory; and, judging from the testimony of Greeks who know their country well, a little industry and patience would suffice to garner a large harvest of the most interesting popular lore.

The fact is one more proof, if more were needed, of the legitimacy of the modern Greeks.¹ The stamp of their ancestors is unmistakable in those legends of the

¹ In the second part of the present volume, this and other cognate subjects are treated in a more argumentative manner.

fates and furies, the nereids and hamadryads, which subsist amongst the mountaineers and villagers of Greece. A few pages may be devoted, without apology, to the outline of one or two of these Hellenic fairy tales.

The following story of "The Three Sisters" (which the reader will recognise as an old friend in a new dress) is abbreviated from the pages of the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, whose *impressions de voyage* go far to satisfy the curiosity of those who have never travelled in Greece.¹

Once upon a time there were three sisters, who slept together.

One night the Fates came to tell their fortunes, and sate above their heads; for each sister had her Fate.

When the first two had spoken, it was the turn of the Fate who belonged to the youngest sister.

"Mine," she said, "being the prettiest, shall have the best fortune. She shall marry the king's son."²

But the eldest sister had awoke, and was listening. When the morning had come she took the second sister on one side, and told her all that the Fates had said; and they began to tyrannise over the youngest.

One day they resolved to go and cut some wood. They therefore made a cake, and set out. When they had gathered their fagots they sat down on the edge of a precipice, so deep that no one could climb down it on any side. Then the eldest sister said to the youngest—

"Now, little one, come and let me do your hair."

The little one went, and the eldest began to arrange her hair. But as she was doing it she let the cake roll from her knees on the ground.

"There," she said, "now go and look for it!"

And she gave her a great push, and the little one fell over the precipice.

The poor child fell to the bottom, and, being unable to climb up again, began to weep. But then, behold, a Nereid came to her, and said—

"Why are you weeping, child? Have you fallen from the rock,

¹ *La Vie de Province en Grèce.*

² "Basilopoulo."

and cannot get up again? Come with me, and I will take you for my daughter."

And she took her to her house.

So the little girl was very happy with the Nereid. But when Sunday came the Nereid wanted to go to her church; and, as she would be a long time away, she told her that she was to open the copper in which the serpents were, and give them something to eat.

"You must not be afraid," she added. "When you want them to go in again you have only to rap with a stick on the pot, and the serpents will go in of themselves."

Meanwhile the two sisters, when they got home again, said to the Sun—

"Sun, dear Sun, which is now the fairest one? Is it one of us, or she whom we have thrown over the precipice?"

"It is your sister," he replied, "who is in the Nereid's home."

Then the two sisters returned to the precipice; and the younger of the two pushed the elder so that she fell in the same place where the youngest had fallen. When she was at the bottom she came to the home of the Nereid, went in, and found her sister; and the little one kissed her when she saw her.

Then the eldest one began to dress her sister's hair again, and by-and-by she stuck a poisoned pin in her head. The poor little one fell down dead on the spot, and the eldest one ran away.

When the Nereid returned she found the little one, and took her in her arms, and wept over her. Then she saw the pin, and pulled it out; and the little one came to life again.

Meanwhile the eldest sister had gone home; but when she repeated her question to the Sun, and received the same answer, she returned to the Nereid's house. The Nereid was out again, but she had forbidden the little one to open the door; so the eldest sister took a slate off the roof, and threw in a poisoned grape. The little one ate it, and fell down dead again.

This time the Nereid could not find the cause of her death, so she put her in a box, and threw her into the sea. But her Fate did not desert her. The waves shook the grape from her mouth, and she revived; and the box floated until it came to the king's palace. Basilopoulo saw it, and told his servants to bring it to land; but when he found that it was only a box he sent it down to the kitchen.

In the night the little one was hungry; so she opened the lid, got out, ate some food, and lay down in the box again. This she did

every night, until the servants found how the food disappeared, and went and told the king's son.

"I see," said Basilopoulo. "Very well, I will go and catch the thief."

So he went into the kitchen at midnight, and saw the little one come out, and caught her in his arms. And the king's son, seeing her so pretty and so sweet, loved her, and took her for his wife.

Then the two sisters said to the Sun—

"Sun, dear Sun, which is now the fairest one? Is it one of us, or she whom we poisoned?"

And the Sun replied, "It is your sister, who has the king's son for her husband."

Meanwhile Basilopoulo had been obliged to go to war; and in his absence the queen had a son. One day a poor woman came to her, and asked to be allowed to live in the palace, and nurse her child. The queen did not recognise her sister, and consented. Presently the sister, whilst dressing the queen's hair, stuck an enchanted pin into her head, and the queen was changed into a little bird. Then the other took her garments, and put herself in her place.

When Basilopoulo returned he found his wife greatly changed, and took a strong dislike to her. So he spent the whole day in a room apart, with his child. One day a little bird flew in to them, and fondled them both with its wings; and then it began to sing—

"Sweet be the slumbers of the king!
Night bear his child on downy wing!
But let the gipsy woman lie
Full many an hour with sleepless eye!"

One day the false queen heard the words, and she said to Basilopoulo—

"Are you not going to tell some one to kill this bird, which deafens us day after day?"

"I shall never give you that pleasure," replied the king; "for I while away my time with that bird."

But the queen pressed him every day to kill it, and in the end, wearied out, he let her have her way. She instantly ordered her servants to seize the bird and kill it; but they were to take care not to let a single drop of its blood fall to the ground.

The servants did not attend to her; and a drop of blood fell down, and from this drop a tree of great beauty grew up.

One day the king went into his garden, and, seeing this wonderful

tree, sat down under the shade of its leaves. Then the tree drooped down its long branches, closing them about the king; and the king was so much delighted that he did not move from it, and returned every day to sit there with his son.

The queen also took it into her head to sit in the same place; but the tree, drooping its branches, parted its leaves, and pricked her with its thorns.

Then she turned to the king, and asked him to cut it down.

At first the king refused, but at last he ended by consenting. So she ordered her servants to cut it down by the roots, and not to give the smallest piece to any one.

An old woman, who was passing, asked them to give her a branch to light her fire, but in vain. Then the old woman snatched a branch, and ran away.

When she got home she forgot to put it on the fire, and left it in a corner.

Every morning the old woman went out marketing. One day, when she came back, she found the house put straight, the fire lighted, and the floors swept. She asked her neighbours if they had seen any one enter the house; but no one had done so. On the following day, and every day afterwards, the same thing took place.

Once she pretended to go out, and hid herself in the house, in order to keep watch. Then she saw a woman, as beautiful as a Nereid, coming out of the branch; and she immediately clasped her in her arms.

After that these two women remained together, and the elder one felt a great love for her companion, who was so beautiful and so good.

The news spread about that the old woman had in her house a lady as beautiful as a Nereid. The king himself heard of it, and sent for the old woman to question her. Then the old woman told him all that she knew.

Basilopoulo at once guessed that it was his wife; and he sent for her.

So she told him from the beginning all that had happened to her; and he immediately ordered that her sister should be tied to two strong horses, and that the horses should be whipped until they had torn her to pieces, for having pretended to be the queen.

And they lived very happily.

It is somewhat strange to find our old friends of the nursery reappearing in a Greek dress, and in the

heart of a country where they have evidently been long acclimatised. Without attempting to fix the period when such stories as that of "The Three Sisters" first entered Greece, it may safely be asserted that the introduction is by no means recent. There is more local colour in the narrative just quoted than is indicated by the presence of the Parcæ and the Nereids. The story of Basilopoulo and his enchanted wife is steeped in the spirit of Greek mythology and pantheism;¹ and more than one or two centuries have been needed to make it a familiar legend in every province of Greece. It might, indeed, be argued, with not a little force, that the shores of the Mediterranean are likely to have become the home of many a familiar fairy-tale, now common to the whole of Europe, before the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea.

The same authority to whom we have been indebted for the Greek version of "The Three Sisters"² extracts another short fairy-tale from the *Neohellenika Mythologia* of M. Politis, wherein a more prominent part is played by the Nereids, who have enjoyed a greater vitality in Greece than any other personages of the ancient mythology. This story is more distinctly Greek in its complexion, and belongs more characteristically to the soil. The locality is in Crete.

A shepherd of Sgourokephali had been carried off by the Nereids to their grotto, because he played the lyre well, and that amused them.

The man fell in love with one of them, and, finding no remedy for

¹ Thus the author of *La Vie de Province en Grèce* observes: "Helios and Apollo, who were afterwards confounded together, were entirely distinct in Homer; and Helios (the sun) then discharged exactly the same functions as in our story. It is he who knows all, he who is consulted, he who reveals to Vulcan the infidelity of Venus, and to Ceres the rape of her daughter by Pluto."

² The Grimms have a similar story under the same title.

his love, went to ask the advice of an old woman in his village, to whom he related his sufferings.

And the old woman advised him after this fashion—

“At the hour when the birds are about to sing, take her whom you love by the hair; hold her fast; and, as she has the power of changing herself into different shapes, do not be afraid. Take care to hold her until the birds sing.”

Having obtained this advice, the young man returned to the grotto, and began to play on his lyre as usual; and the Nereids began to dance.

When the hour drew nigh at which the birds were about to sing, he threw down his lyre, sprang forward, and caught his well-beloved by the hair.

The Nereid instantly began to change her shape: now into a dog, now into a serpent, and a camel, and a fire. But the man, who was not frightened by all this, at length heard the birds sing, and saw the other Nereids become invisible.

Then his well-beloved went back into her first lovely shape, and followed the young man into his village, and lived with him for a year, and bore him a son. But she never spoke a single word.

This marvellous and unbearable silence made the young man go once more to the old woman, to tell her of his disappointment.


The old woman advised him to light his furnace, and, holding her child in his hands, say to the Nereid, “Will you not speak to me? Then I will burn your child”—and, so saying, pretend to throw him into the fire.

And he did as the old woman advised him.

But he had scarcely spoken those words when she cried out, “Stop, dog! my child!”

And she snatched her son, and became invisible to his eyes. And as the other Nereids did not care for her in their company, because she had become a mother, she settled herself on the margin of a spring called Loutra, near the grotto. And twice or three times in the year she is to be seen, watching over her child.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Nereid Thetis, wife of Peleus, King of the Myrmidons. The story is an inversion of one of the later traditions of Achilles, according to which his mother placed him on the fire in order to render him immortal, and fled on being



discovered by her husband. This very inversion is a testimony to the age and indigenous origin of the fable.

It is in such stories as this that we recognise the descendants of Homer and the later fabulists.

Constitutionals

CHAPTER IV.

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT.

Recent Progress towards Self-Government—Universal Suffrage—The Representative Chamber—Abolition of the Senate—Order springs from Self-Government—The Greek Constitution—The principal Articles—The Administrative System in Greece.

GREECE has made her greatest strides in the direction of popular self-government since the accession of King George. It was then that the Greeks were first liberated from tyrannical rule. It was then that the valuable group of Ionian Islands was finally made their own. It was in 1864 that a Constitution worthy of the name was substituted for the imperfect instrument of 1844. And it was from this time forward that a direct popular representation by universal suffrage, in a nation where the masses were peculiarly fitted by their character to exercise it, prevailed over all the elements of disturbance and disorder which had hitherto distracted Greece.

Universal suffrage was decreed by the National Assembly¹ elected after the flight of King Otho. The Provisional Government at the same time enrolled a National Guard; and the effect of these two measures was what every one acquainted with the condition

¹ This Assembly met December 22, 1862, and was dissolved November 28, 1864. The Provisional Government was composed of Bulgaris, Kanares, and Rouphos. The ministry included Zaimes, Koumoundouros, Kalliphronas, Deligeorges, Manghinas, D. Mavromichaelis, Nikolopoulos, and Diamantopoulos.

of Greece would have anticipated. No sooner was the supreme control of the country, legislative and administrative, placed in the hands of the people at large, than the era of anarchy and lawlessness practically ceased. As it had been the Greek nation, rather than the leaders of the Greeks, who had thrown off the yoke of Turkey, so now it was the nation, choosing and inspiring its leaders, which was to restore order out of chaos.

The abolition of the Senate, and of the Council of State, left the government of Greece to the Representative Chamber and to the King—the powers of the latter being very considerable, although his authority is strictly limited (as was proved in the political crisis terminated in 1875) by the authority of Parliament, emanating directly from the people. According to the charter of 1864, the king is personally irresponsible, though his ministers are responsible; he appoints and dismisses these ministers, as well as officers of the army and navy, and all public officials; he sanctions and proclaims the laws; he can prorogue or “suspend the continuance of” a legislative session; he has the right of pardon and amnesty, of conferring decorations and coining money. His civil list is fixed at 1,125,000 drachmas (£40,179), including the sum appropriated from the revenues of the Ionian Islands.

The Representative Chamber consists of 190 deputies, elected by universal suffrage and by ballot, and, approximately, by equal electoral districts. The franchise is limited solely to men who have completed their twenty-fifth year. Every possessor of a vote is eligible to the Chamber on the completion of his thirtieth year, provided he has a domicile in the eparchy or province wherein he becomes a candidate, and owns a property,

or exercises a profession or other calling therein. It is computed that there are in Greece 311 electors in every 1,000 of the inhabitants; whilst in France, where also universal suffrage is established, the number is only 267 in every 1,000. The proportion in other countries is much smaller. In England the number is not much over 50, and in Italy only 20 in every 1,000.

The Greek Senate disappeared under the general condemnation of the bodies which exercised the functions of a Second Chamber in the earlier stages of the national existence. The proposal to restore this branch of the Legislature has been more than once repeated, but it has not hitherto secured the acquiescence of a majority.

“On the outbreak of the Revolution,” writes M. Moraïtinis, “Greece had to deplore the death of a few heroic defenders of constitutional liberties; but, as soon as the Revolution had triumphed, there was not the least disorder of a serious kind, no revenges, no carnage. An Assembly, elected by the whole nation, assumes supreme authority. A body of troops shows a disposition to rebel; public opinion overwhelms it, and the enterprise is instantly checked. Property is respected; not a single act of pillage or violence disgraces that critical period.”¹

Greece, in fact, was a genuinely progressive and orderly State as soon as it was a genuinely constitutional State. Everything was assured from the moment when it became possible to speak of a Greece for the Greeks. So long as it had been Greece for the Bavarians, Greece for the Russians, Greece for the English, or even Greece for a handful of Greeks, liberty had been a name, and progress a fallacy.

¹ *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*, p. 560.

The Constitution, as ratified by King George on the 21st of November, 1864, was another achievement of the Revolutionary Assembly. That it is not a perfect instrument need hardly be said; but it proved to be a very notable advance upon the Constitution of 1844. The latter virtually abolished the municipal self-government which had subsisted even under the Turks. Under it the demarchies were simply subordinate governments taking their initiation and authority from the central administration. Their officers were nominated by the king, or by his ministers, and they held their appointments at the good pleasure of the Court, or of a party. Even the rates levied by the local councils were liable to appropriation by the central government. The Constitution of 1864 swept away the whole system on which these abuses had been possible; and, by enacting that "the election of the municipal authorities shall be made by direct, universal, and secret suffrage, by ballot," it conferred upon the communes and town councils an adequate power of controlling their own affairs and securing their privileges.

The following articles of the Constitution are those whereon the modern liberties of Greece principally rest, and upon which the actual edifice of government has been built.

After declaring the establishment of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and granting toleration to "every other recognised religion," the text proceeds to define the public rights of the Greeks:—

3. Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and contribute without distinction to the public burdens in proportion to their fortunes. Only Greek citizens are admissible to public employments. Citizens are those who have acquired or may acquire the qualifications required to constitute citizenship by the laws of the state.

Titles of nobility or distinction cannot be conferred on Greek citizens, nor recognised.

4. Personal liberty is inviolable. No man can be prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise restrained, except when and how the law provides.

5. Except when taken in the act, no man can be arrested or imprisoned without a judicial warrant specifying the ground of arrest or imprisonment. He who is seized in the act or arrested by warrant must be carried without delay before the competent examining judge, who is bound, within a delay not exceeding three days from his compareance, either to release him, or to deliver a warrant for his imprisonment. Should three days elapse without the examining judge granting a warrant of imprisonment, every jailor or other person, civil or military, who may be charged with the detention of the person arrested, is bound to release him instantly. Any violation of these provisions is punishable as illegal imprisonment.

6. The Council of the Judges of the Court of Delicts (correctional tribunal) in the case of political offences, can, at the demand of the person detained, authorise his release under bail, to be determined by a judicial order, against which an appeal is allowed; nor with a judicial order can this preliminary detention be prolonged beyond three months.

7. No punishment can be inflicted unless appointed by law.

8. No one can be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the judge assigned to him by law.

9. The right to address written petitions to public authorities may be exercised by a single person, or by many, on conforming to the laws.

10. Greeks have the right to assemble tranquilly and unarmed. The police may be present at all public meetings. Meetings in the open air may be prohibited if they offer danger to public security.

11. Greeks have the right to form societies in conformity with the laws, and in no case can the law require a previous permission on the part of Government for the exercise of this right.

12. The dwelling is inviolable. Domiciliary visits can only be made when and how the law authorises.

13. In Greece men cannot be sold or bought. A purchased slave, or a serf, of every race and religion, is free from the time he enters Greece.

It is already evident from whence the Constitution

of Greece was derived. The basis is English, with a French extension; and it was urged by the first critics of the Greek constitution-makers that they had taken the armour of a giant to clothe the body of a dwarf. The result has proved the fallacy of this argument, often employed in every country by the party whose prerogative it is to moderate the progress of popular liberties. All the best and most successful experiments which have followed political revolutions have shown that the rapid education of a people by the exercise of free institutions is attended by results almost, if not quite, as satisfactory as the slow conquest of such institutions, in the teeth of opposition from privileged classes and individuals. This rapid process of education may be signalised by displays of awkwardness on the part of the learners; but there is a distinct advantage in the absence of the venerable abuses and evil traditions associated with the slower methods.

The thirteenth article of the Constitution established a notable contrast between the social condition of Greece and that of Turkey. To this very day the human traffic is carried on, however surreptitiously, in the Greek provinces of the Sultan's dominions; and this fact has been one of the most fertile causes of hostility between the neighbouring authorities.¹

14. Every one may publish his opinions by speech, by writing, or by printing, conformably to the laws. The press is free. The censorship, with every other preventive measure, is prohibited. The

¹ Mr. F. W. Chesson, who has done as much hard work as any living Englishman in the crusade against slavery, says, in a recent tract on "Turkey and the Slave Trade," that "one of the most illusory reforms ever carried out in any country was the closing of the slave-markets of Constantinople. The public sale of human beings naturally shocked Western ideas of decency, but it is manifest that to the slave himself it mattered little whether he was sold in an open market or by private treaty, while

seizure of newspapers and other printed communications, whether before or after publication, is prohibited. Exceptionally, the seizure after publication is permitted in case of insult to the Christian religion, or the person of the king. But in this case the public prosecutor is bound within twenty-four hours after the seizure to submit the case to the judicial council, and the judicial council is bound to decide whether the seizure is to be maintained or withdrawn; otherwise the seizure ceases to be valid. Appeal is allowed only to the publisher of the article seized, and not to the public prosecutor. Only Greek citizens are allowed to publish newspapers.

15. No oath can be imposed except in the form provided by law.

16. Higher instruction is provided at the expense of the state. The state contributes to the schools in the municipalities according to the exigencies of the case.

Every one has the right of establishing private schools in conformity with the laws of the state.

17. No one can be deprived of his property except for some public necessity duly certified in the manner provided by law, and always preceded by indemnification.

18. Torture and general confiscation are prohibited. Civil death is abolished. The punishment of death for political crimes, except in the case of complicated crimes, is abolished.

19. No previous permission of the Governmental authorities is required to prosecute a public or municipal official for illegalities committed in the exercise of his functions, except for acts specially ordered by ministers.

20. The secrecy of letters is inviolable.

The freedom of the press, once asserted and guaranteed, has rarely been interfered with. In no country has this liberty been so conspicuously respected,

the cause of humanity on the whole suffered rather than gained by the privacy with which henceforth the traffic was veiled in the coffee-houses of Tophaneh and the khans of Stamboul. All visitors to Constantinople who have made inquiries into this subject will confirm me when I say that although the external signs of human servitude are only too apparent, it is extremely difficult to discover how or where the contraband trade is carried on." And that the kidnappers even to this day pursue their labours amongst the Hellenic populations, up to the very frontiers of Greece, appears to rest on evidence which cannot be gainsaid. (See also a note in Chapter V., Part II., of the present volume.)

after so short a probation. The chief cause of the remarkable immunity of public opinion in Greece is to be found in the enlightened attachment to education and literature, whereof something has been said in the preceding chapters. The supreme importance attributed to national education in Greece is attested by the insertion of such a clause as the sixteenth in a formal Constitution.

Clause 17 appears to have anticipated the necessity of appropriating the conventual estates; and it was cited a year or two ago in support of a proposal for this very object.

21. All power has its source in the nation, and is exercised in the manner appointed by the Constitution.

22. The legislative power is exercised by the king and the House of Representatives of the people.

23. The right of proposing laws belongs to the representatives of the people, and to the king, who exercises it by his ministers.

24. No proposal relative to an increase of the public expenditure by salary or pension, or in general for any personal interest, can originate from the House of Representatives.

25. If a project of law be rejected by one of the two legislative powers, it cannot be introduced again in the same legislative session.

26. The authentic interpretation of the laws belongs to the legislative power.

27. The executive power belongs to the king; but it is exercised by responsible ministers appointed by him.

28. The judicial power is exercised by courts of law. Judicial sentences are executed in the king's name.

These articles strictly define the royal prerogative; and they were dictated by the experience acquired during the reign of King Otho, who constantly violated the authority of the judges, and overrode the rulings of the courts. The theory of royal prerogative under a constitutional *régime* could scarcely be enunciated in a more satisfactory and judicious form; although it is

evident that, as national self-command increases, it will be found desirable to contract still more closely the limits of the king's privileges. The twenty-fourth article is a self-denying ordinance, specially honourable to the framers of the Constitution.

The substantial observance of these articles, both by King George and by the popular representatives, is one of the best possible proofs of the fitness of Greece for advanced liberal institutions. An exception to this rule occurred in the year 1866, when the Chamber, which had assembled on the 23rd of January, voted the payment of its members ten days later. It was immediately dissolved by the king, who was unquestionably justified in thus sharply upholding the Constitution.

59. No tax can be imposed or collected, if it has not been previously voted by the House of Representatives and sanctioned by the king.

60. The House of Representatives votes annually the limitation of the military and naval forces, the conscription for the army and navy, and the budget, and it revises the expenditure of the preceding year. The budget must be brought before the House during the first two months of each session. The examination is made by a special committee, and it is voted as a whole.

61. No pension or recompense can be issued from the Treasury without a law.

62. A representative cannot be prosecuted or questioned on account of any opinion or vote given in the exercise of his duty as a representative.

63. A representative cannot be prosecuted, arrested, nor imprisoned during the session of the House, except in case of seizure in the criminal act. Personal detention cannot be exercised against a representative during the session, four weeks previous to its commencement, nor three weeks after its termination. If a representative be in prison, he must be released four weeks before the commencement of the session.

The following articles, on the composition of the

Assembly, when compared with our English system of representation, do not in every respect leave the balance in our favour.

66. The House of Representatives is composed of deputies chosen by the citizens having the right to elect, by direct, universal, and secret suffrage, the votes being given by ballot, according to the provisions of the law of election passed by the Assembly, which can only be altered in its other provisions.

67. The deputies represent the nation, and not the eparchy by which they are chosen.

68. The number of deputies from each eparchy is determined in proportion to the population. In no case can the whole number of representatives be less than 150.

69. The representatives are elected for four years.

70. To be elected a representative, it is necessary to be a Greek citizen of the eparchy, or to have been domiciled and possessed of political and civil rights for two years in the eparchy where the election is made ; to have completed thirty years of age ; and also to possess the qualifications required by the law of election.

71. The duties of representative are incompatible with those of paid officials and demarchs, but not with those of officers of the army or navy not in active service. Officers may be elected, but when elected they are placed on half-pay during the whole representative period, and remain so until recalled into active service.

Leave of absence must be granted on demand five months and a half before the commencement of the elections.

Parliamentary government has answered, on the whole, thoroughly well in Greece. The Chamber of Representatives has served as a safety-valve to an excitable people, peculiarly fond of discussion, hot in contention even when not factious in conduct. No doubt there have been scenes of violence and illegality, unconstitutional enterprises, and even acts tending to subvert the liberties of the nation, within the Greek Chamber ; but it is right to add that those regrettable incidents have not been more discreditable to the country than very similar scenes and acts in the English and French

legislatures have been discreditable to Englishmen and Frenchmen. The Greeks have shown that they were fitted for representative self-government; just as the present king of the Greeks has shown that he is fitted to be a constitutional monarch of a free people.

The statesmen of 1863 had much to do to establish the administration of justice on a firm basis, and to remove the stigma which had been cast on the entire judicial system by its frequent violation under King Otho. A dozen articles of the new Constitution regulated the appointment, the general immovability, the powers and the privileges of the judges. Thus:—

86. Public prosecutors, their substitutes, and justices of the peace have not the right of appointment for life.

87. Judicial commissions and extraordinary courts of judicature cannot be established under any pretext.

88. The sittings of courts of law are public, except when publicity would be injurious to good morals or public order, but in such cases the courts are bound to publish a decision to that effect.

89. Every sentence must be founded on reasons assigned, and announced at a public sitting.

90. Trial by jury is maintained.

91. Political crimes are judged by juries, as well as those relating to the press, as often as they do not relate to private life.

92. Judges can accept no salaried employment except that of Professor of the University.

In a subsequent chapter on “Public Order and Justice” in Greece, we shall see how the judicial clauses of the Constitution have been expanded and carried out in practice.

Greece is divided, for administrative purposes, into thirteen nomarchies (under officers whose duties correspond to those of French *préfets*); into fifty-nine eparchies (under eparchs, or *sous-préfets*); and into 351 demarchies (under demarchs, or mayors). The nomarchs

and eparchs are appointed by the government of the day; whilst the 351 demarchs are elected by the people. The nomarchies are governed by municipal councillors, elected on the spot by universal suffrage, in whom resides the power of levying the local rates. The nomarchs have no control over this latter function; but the accounts require to be audited by Government officials, as in the case of local expenditures in England. The constitution of the eparchies is of a similar kind; and the popular representatives meet annually, like the French municipal councils, in local parliament.

The thirteen nomarchies, or departments, of Greece are as follows:—On the Continent, Attica and Bœotia, Eubœa, Phthiotis and Phocis, Acarnania and Ætolia; in the Morea (Peloponnese), Achaia and Elis, Arcadia, Laconia, Messenia, Argolis and Corinth; in the Archipelago, the Cyclades; in the Ionian Islands, Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante.

The Ministry of Greece comprises the departments of the Interior (Public Works, Post and Telegraphs, Roads, Police, &c.), Instruction and Religion, Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Army, and Navy. The holder of any one of the several portfolios may occupy the position of President of the Cabinet.


The profession of politics, like every other, is an open career; and not only are the Greeks naturally inclined to the methods of parliamentary government, and disposed by their training and traditions to throw themselves with fervour into the business of debate and intrigue, but the circumstances of the country render the competition for every political office exceedingly keen. The ministers in power are constantly besieged by a host of qualified candidates; and it is needless to add that some of the worst evils of competition are

experienced as the result of this plethora of politicians. The crowds of able men, all anxious to serve their country and themselves, are like a great swarm of bees crowding round a hive which is too small for them. If the hive could be enlarged, every bee would find its cell, and apply itself to a profitable work. Failing that, they will crowd upon each other, impede each other's industry, and probably prevent the achievement of any valuable result.

It is useless, in the existing state of things, to expect that this severe rivalry, with all its injurious consequences, can be brought to an end. There is an honourable understanding in Greece that the rights of citizenship extend, practically, if not legally, wherever the Hellenic race exists. Epirotes, Macedonians, Cretans, are all good subjects of King George when they come to Athens, and the right of all is admitted to take their share in the service of their country. Attempts have been made to overcome, or at least to check, the disadvantages of excessive competition; but the Greeks are very jealous of their privileges and freedom, even when they are not based upon the strictest constitutional sanctions. The ministerial crisis of 1875, which created an intense excitement throughout the country, and which at one time even threatened to develop into a revolution, turned specially on this point. The Constitution was menaced by the conflicts of leaders who, more or less unblushingly, admitted that they derived their strength from place-holders and place-seekers, and who, having risen to power by corruption, endeavoured to fortify themselves by illegality. Public opinion expressed itself boldly and sternly. The eyes of the nation had been opened to the worst abuses of a system which was sapping the morality of the State; and, after a short

but severe struggle, the honour of the country was vindicated, and the Constitution was solemnly ratified.

Unfortunately, the evils in question recurred—though not in such an exaggerated form—in the following year. A great example had been made; the king had submitted himself to the wisest and most honourable of his subjects; ex-ministers had been punished for their acts of bribery and extortion. But the swarms of place-hunters had not been driven out of the country; Greece was no better able than before to find work for the vast overflow of talent which clamoured for employment; and the same causes which had produced the troubles of the past have again operated in a similar manner. There is only one way in which Greece can be delivered from this, as from most of her other troubles. Until the Greeks are in possession of a field ample enough to occupy the capacities and energies of the whole race, it is impossible that they should rise to the highest level of national life.



CHAPTER V.

GREEK FINANCE.

New Greece Established as a Bankrupt State—Doubtful Economies—The Present Revenue and Expenditure of Greece—Comparison of the Budgets of 1877, 1876, and 1846—The National Debt of Greece—The Deferred Debts of 1824 and 1825—The Guaranteed Loan of 1832—Subsequent Loans—A Point of Honour—Suggestion for the Consolidation of the Greek Debt.

NEW GREECE may fairly be said to have begun her career in a state of bankruptcy; and she has never yet succeeded in paying her original debts, or even in showing a genuine excess of revenue over expenditure. The fact would be a standing disgrace to her if it could be proved that her expenditure was wasteful, or that her Government made no efforts to discharge the liabilities of the nation; but this is not the case. Her budgets, when duly examined and criticised, reveal few, if any, items on which it would be just or practicable for her to effect a considerable economy.

It has been urged that the Greeks ought to spend less on their Army and Navy, less on Education, less on their embassies, and on other items of expenditure in the department of Foreign Affairs. Those who offer this doubtless well-intended advice appear to forget, or to estimate too lightly, the peculiar circumstances in which the kingdom is placed. Situated as Greece is on the borders of Turkey, with whom it may at any time become necessary for her to engage in war; having to consider not only the defence of her weak frontier, but

also the control (for which Europe holds her responsible) of her own easily excited population; and compelled, moreover, to suppress by force the tendency to brigandage, or other forms of lawlessness, in a country which offers unusual obstacles to military operations, it is not easy to see how the annual charge of something like a quarter of a million sterling on the Army, and less than £70,000 on the Navy, could be sensibly reduced. The disbursement on Public Instruction and Religion in 1877 was a little over £75,000; surely not an extravagant amount for a country in which education has always been so liberally and honourably encouraged, and which, in its earliest charters after the recovery of independence, resolved on the establishment of gratuitous and obligatory education.¹ With regard to the foreign embassies, and to various analogous items of the annual charge for the department of Foreign Affairs, it is to be observed that the legitimate aspirations of the Greeks require the maintenance of a constant diplomatic activity, which it would be suicidal on their part to forgo. Greece as a nation might as well cease to exist if she ceased to strive, by such means as she can command, to complete the elevation and emancipation of the Hellenic race.

The actual condition of Greek Finance may be gathered from the following tables, in which the items of the Budget of 1877 are recorded in detail, and the totals of the several chapters are compared with those of the preceding year, and of the year 1846.²

¹ This resolution was taken as early as the year 1834, when a law was passed to that effect.

² See "*Moraïtinis*," p. 498, and a report of Mr. Wyndham, Secretary of Legation at Athens, in "*Parliamentary Accounts and Papers for 1876*," No. 73, p. 54.

REVENUE.

CHAPTER I.							1877.	1876.	1846.
<i>Direct Taxes.</i>							Drachmas.	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Land and Property	8,500,000	10,000,000	
Bees	45,000	45,000	
Pastures	60,000	40,000	
Cattle	1,200,000	1,200,000	
Patents	950,000	800,000	
Houses	850,000	650,000	
Total							11,605,000	12,735,000	7,198,900
CHAPTER II.									
<i>Indirect Taxes.</i>									
Customs	13,400,000	11,500,000	
Stamps	4,200,000	4,200,000	
Various	555,000	505,000	
Total							18,155,000	16,205,000	4,097,000
CHAPTER III.									
<i>Public Services.</i>									
Post Office	650,000	700,000	
Telegraphs	500,000	400,000	
Printing	5,000	4,800	
Total							1,155,000	1,104,800	368,500
CHAPTER IV.									
<i>Public Domains.</i>									
Mines and Quarries	836,000		
Thermal Springs	6,000		
Salt	850,000		
Fisheries	315,000		
Forests	385,000		
Olive Gardens	5,000		
Vines and Currants	30,000		
Gardens, &c.	131,000		
Buildings and Factories	22,000		
Total							2,580,000	2,788,300	1,391,600
CHAPTER V.									
<i>Sale of National Property.</i>									
Annuities, &c.	250,000		
Terminal Dues, Leases, &c.	930,000		
Sale of Land in Patras	20,000		
Estates and Plantations	1,800,000		
Total							3,000,000	3,085,000	103,000
CHAPTER VI.									
<i>Miscellaneous.</i>									
Interest	300,000		
Forfeits to Treasury	1,500		
Judicial Dues	250,000		
Various	405,000		
Total							956,500	1,095,700	218,500

REVENUE (*continued*).

CHAPTER VII.					1877.	1876.	1846.
<i>Ecclesiastical Revenues.</i>					Drachmas.	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Conventual Property	60,000		
Rents	205,000		
Interests	10,000		
Various	1,000		
Ecclesiastical Estates	20,000		
Total					296,000	303,000	238,000
Sundry other Receipts	1,500,000	1,500,000	900,000
Total Revenue					<u>39,247,500</u>	<u>38,816,800</u>	<u>14,515,500</u>

EXPENDITURE.

	1877.	1876.	1846.
	Drachmas.	Drachmas.	Drachmas.
Interest on Foreign Debt	1,246,000	1,258,000	} <i>nil.</i>
„ Internal Debt	7,287,749	6,435,499	
Pensions ¹ ...	3,818,800	3,070,820	
Civil List	1,125,000	1,125,000	1,000,000
Salaries of Deputies	450,000	450,000	426,500
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1,127,196	1,152,973	499,731
„ Justice	3,016,043	3,091,782	857,431
„ Interior	4,802,745	4,777,477	1,790,935
„ Instruction, &c.	2,111,949	2,106,410	873,026
„ War	7,637,104	7,469,300	4,429,952
„ Marine	2,114,705	1,959,890	1,134,725
„ Finance	1,353,270	1,334,240	439,480
Administration and Collection of Revenue	2,773,262	2,847,450	1,895,485
Repayments and Restitutions		50,000	} 285,600
Indemnities		325,000	
Payments to Individuals who served in the War of Independence	404,000	100,000	
Committee connected with above		10,000	
Refunding of Road Debt	1,800,000	1,500,000	
Total Expenditure	<u>41,067,823</u>	<u>39,063,841</u>	<u>13,632,865</u>

RECAPITULATION.

	1877.	1876.	1846.
Revenue	39,247,500drs.	38,816,800drs.	14,515,500drs.
	£1,401,725	£1,386,314	
Expenditure	41,067,823drs.	38,063,841drs.	13,632,865drs.
	£1,466,734	£1,395,137	

¹ This item includes the pensions appropriated to English and Greek subjects possessing property or vested interests in the Ionian Islands at the time of their cession to Greece.

One of the most noteworthy features of the preceding tables, after the rapid increase of revenue to which they bear witness, is the enormous amount of the annual charge made upon the Greek people for the payment of interest on their debts. The sum required for the payment of interests of various kinds, and of the pensions and indemnities of Greek subjects who suffered by the War of Independence, is upwards of fourteen millions and a half of drachmas, or considerably more than one-third of the entire expenditure. As the figures stand, they show a surplus for the year 1846, and a deficit for 1876. But in the former year nothing was paid in the shape of interest on loans; and if the first two items of the budget of expenditure were struck out, the comparison would be very strongly in favour of the later years.

The increase of wealth, of trade, of the various industries which chiefly attest the vitality and elasticity of a nation's resources, is very remarkable. Thus, twelve years after the accession of King Otho, the population of Greece having increased in the interval by about one half (from 600,000 to 900,000, in round numbers), the revenue from indirect taxation had reached four millions of drachmas, or about £142,860. Twelve years after the accession of King George—that is to say, after the lapse of thirty years—whilst the population had increased at barely half the former rate, the yield of indirect taxation had been swollen in the ratio of more than four to one. In a subsequent chapter we shall have occasion to notice other facts which place the material progress of the last few years in a yet stronger light. For the moment it is sufficient to observe that the apparent poverty of Greece does not arise from any want of vitality in her

resources. A comparatively light taxation of property and productive industry is sufficient for all the administrative charges of modern Greece; but a heavy and a grinding taxation would be necessary in order to leave her a surplus after discharging all the burdens which have been laid upon her.

Let us see what these burdens are, whereof the origin is not to be sought exclusively in the misconduct or rashness of the Greeks themselves.¹

First, as to the Debts of 1824, 1825, and 1832. A succinct account of these obligations is contained in a Report made, in 1875, by Mr. E. B. Malet, Secretary of Legation at Athens.²

¹ M. Moraïtinis expresses an opinion on this subject which may be for the most part, if not entirely, endorsed. After observing that the rivalry of England and Russia in the East has thrown many obstacles in the way of Greek progress, he continues:—"Thus, public opinion, and sundry revelations which have since come to light, accuse Russia of having organised, in 1839 and 1840, the vast Philorthodox conspiracy. Then again, in 1843, Russia and England in combination energetically directed the movement of the 3rd of September against the crown; and at that moment the fall of the dynasty would have been the ruin of Greece. But the Greek people and the leaders of the movement wisely impressed upon it, before it was too late, another character, and contrived that it should end in the acquisition of the Constitution. In 1847 England fanned the flame of revolt in Eubœa, Phthiotis, and Achaia. In 1850 Lord Palmerston sent the British fleet to the Piræus, on the pretence of supporting the idle claims of the Jew Pacifico, and in this way he struck a cruel blow at the growing commerce and maritime trade of the Greeks. 'What reason,' says M. Brunet de Presle, 'can have impelled Lord Palmerston to this cowardly abuse of power? . . . It was annoyance at seeing the Russian influence increase in the councils of the king, and the desire of overcrowding it.' Two years later, in 1852, Russia armed against the Greek Government, in the Maina, the religious revolt of a monk; and then followed the mad campaign against Turkey in 1854, which naturally aroused the West. Lastly, in 1869, she encouraged for a long time the insurrection of the island of Candia, which exhausted so many of the vital forces of the nation—this campaign having cost Greece more than any other since the Wars of Independence."—*La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*; p. 492.

It is at any rate serviceable to know how the most enlightened Greeks regard the treatment of their country by Europe.

² "Parliamentary Accounts and Papers for 1875;" No. 74, p. 226.

The external debt of Greece, says Mr. Malet, began with the original debts of 1824 and 1825, and the guaranteed debt of 1832—the debt of the 21st of February, 1824, amounting to £800,000, and the debt of 1825 amounting to £2,000,000. “Of the latter, £250,000 were used to buy £500,000 worth of the first debt, so that the debt then consisted of £300,000 on the first loan, and £2,000,000 on the second, amounting together to £2,300,000, or 64,676,000 drs.¹ Add to this amount interest at 5 per cent., from 1825 to 1874, 161,690,000 drs., and it appears that the present debt on account of these loans is 226,366,000 drs., or £8,084,500. 2. Loan of 60,000,000 drs. in 1872. This loan, negotiated under the guarantee of the three Powers, was raised at the time that King Otho came to the throne. It was negotiated with the house of Rothschild at 94, on the security of the revenues of the State for the interest and sinking fund. Bonds of three series were put in circulation to the amount of 57,329,040 francs, or 63,924,559 drs. Redeemed by drawings up to the 1st of September, 1866, 48,300,652 drs. At that date, 13,661 bonds remained, value 15,623,906 drs. The guaranteeing Powers paid, from 1838 to the 31st of December, 1866, on account of the loan, 89,410,048 drs., on which sum certain repayments were made to them. Their respective shares of advances were:—England, 26,223,237 drs.; Russia, 27,536,288 drs.; France, 26,299,615 drs.; total, 80,059,140 drs. (with fractions). But as the Powers paid for the rest of the 13,661 bonds, as they were drawn, the sum of 15,623,906 drs., the debt of Greece towards them,

¹ The present rate of exchange may be reckoned on the basis of one million drachmas to £35,715.

without interest, amounts to 105,033,954 drs., or £3,751,212."

This sum, it may be observed, represents (with the modification introduced by the payments of the past few years) the actual liability of Greece for a loan whereof the Greeks received, in the first instance, a net sum of five million drachmas. The remainder of the advance went, as already explained, in the shape of rebate, commission, expenses of the Bavarian Regency and troops, and indemnity to Turkey.¹

The further loans contracted by the Greek Government are as follows:—In 1862, 6,000,000 drs.; in 1866, 1,500,000 drs.; in 1867, 28,000,000 drs.; in 1868, 1,500,000 drs.; in 1870, 9,000,000 frs.; in 1871, 4,000,000 frs.; in 1874, 26,000,000 frs.; in 1876, 10,000,000 frs. In the year 1877, in view of the difficulties caused by the Russo-Turkish war, and for the purpose of increasing the strength of the army and navy,² the Government obtained power to raise another forty millions of drachmas, half by borrowing at two per cent. from the National and Ionian Banks,

¹ See more fully, Moraitinis, p. 522.

² At the beginning of the year 1877 the permanent Greek army, on its full establishment, consisted of

10 battalions of infantry	8,700	men.
4 „ chasseurs	2,000	„
1 battalion of artillery	900	„
1 „ engineers	500	„
1 „ cavalry	420	„
Total					12,520	

The gendarmerie is usually included in the lists of the army; and in this way the total number of men is raised to about fourteen thousand. But a better idea may be formed of the actual fighting strength of Greece from the fact that the National Guard, organised in the demarchies, numbers some 200,000 men. All Greeks capable of bearing arms are rendered liable, by a recent enactment, to be called out in the event of an actual war. The Greek navy consists of two ironclads and twelve wooden vessels.

and half by the issue of a loan at 75, bearing a maximum interest of nine per cent.

In addition to the sums above-named, whereof several have been reduced in amount by partial repayment of capital, Greece has contracted sundry minor obligations by accepting provisional loans from her own subjects; and she has not yet discharged the whole of the indemnifications voted to the islands (Hydra, Spetzas, &c.), which had been ruined by the Turks.

The entire annual charge of the Foreign and Internal Debt of Greece (taking the figures of the Budget of 1877) is 8,533,749 drachmas, or about £304,750. This does not include any interest on the loans of 1824 and 1825, which are described by the Greek Treasury as a "Deferred Debt." Many Greeks dispute the liability of the nation on this account; but the moral responsibility of Greece for the engagements of her earlier patriots is not seriously contested by the statesmen of the day.¹ They only urge—and with much reason—that the usurious character of the original loans, and the manner in which the capital was manipulated by the foreign agents, would justify the Greek Government in offering to liquidate the obligation by the payment of a smaller sum than that to which the nominal capital and interest have now amounted.

M. Moraïtinis makes a suggestion in reference to this Deferred Debt, and to the general debt of Greece, which deserves the earnest consideration of his fellow countrymen, as well as of the foreign creditors of the kingdom. The matter is of so much importance to

¹ In 1864, shortly after the cession of the Ionian Islands, the new Ministry under Kanares acknowledged the Debt of 1824 amongst its first acts.

all who have the welfare of Greece at heart that this suggestion may be repeated here with advantage.

“The distinguished Greek economist, Mr. John Soutzo, recently calculated that the capital invested” by the present holders of the bonds of 1824 and 1825 “is so trifling, that the sum of twenty-five millions of francs (one million sterling) would suffice to cover their investments, with a large difference in their favour. The question once reduced to these proportions, it might be possible and practicable to settle this business without a day’s delay. And this is how it might be done.

“If everything testifies that the Greek Government and nation are actuated by a sentiment of honour; if the administration of the public funds offers guarantees as satisfactory as we have asserted them to be; if the budget reveals a situation full of favourable aspects, and if the resources of the Treasury are constantly increasing; if the State, as it is, pays with the utmost regularity six million drachmas for the interest of its debt—six millions regular and certain, not hazardous or doubtful; and if the Deferred Debt may be extinguished by a payment of twenty-five millions of francs; it then becomes unquestionable that Greece may proceed, from this very day, to a general measure for the consolidation of her internal debt, and the extinction of her Deferred Debt.

“For this purpose she would simply have to issue, in the Western markets, or in the United States, so wealthy and so friendly to Greece, a consolidated loan of 120,000,000 francs, nominal capital, at five per cent., and at the price of 75, whereby the investor would receive a regular and assured return of 6·65 (£6 13s.) per cent.

“This loan will produce ninety millions of francs,

or upwards of a hundred million drachmas, less the charges and commission ; and that sum will suffice to extinguish the Deferred Debt, 25,000,000 francs, the provisional debt, and the floating debt. A few millions will remain, to be applied to public works. Is it necessary to recount the salutary consequences which will result therefrom? Greece will be recognised as solvent, her bonds will be admitted on the European exchanges, foreign capital will come to the aid of national undertakings, agricultural and industrial products will be forthwith trebled.”¹

The picture, bright as it is, does not appear to be too highly coloured. The resources of Greece are still practically undeveloped ; and, even if the country must wait for the wider extension of its borders, its productive power is already amply sufficient to realise the scheme here propounded.

¹ *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*, p. 532.

CHAPTER VI.

PUBLIC ORDER AND JUSTICE.

Self-Government in Greece—Drawbacks which have prevented the earlier Attainment of Public Order—The Legacy of the War of Independence—Brigandage in Greece—Its Prevalence—Its Comparative Immunity—The Outrage of Marathon—Its Consequences—The Views of M. Emile Burnouf—Origin of the Brigands—The Vlaques, or Nomadic Shepherds—Suppression of Brigandage—Its Happy Consequences—Justice—The Legal and Judicial System—Origins of Greek Law—Crime—Its Diminution—The Administration of the Laws.

It was said in a preceding page that the Greeks had respected their Constitution, and that they had rapidly learned the lesson of self-government from the excellent legislative and administrative system conferred upon them by their statesmen.

The assertion requires to be modified—at all events for any one who may have understood it to be made absolutely, and without reservation. There is no people whatever which at all times, and in every particular, subordinates its passions and interests to the principles on which its institutions have been based. If we cannot always rise to this height in England, where our constitutional liberties are undoubtedly the object of supreme veneration, we shall scarcely expect that a nation, practically in the second decade of healthy political existence, will offer a spectacle of unvarying self-restraint. There is no necessity to conceal the faults or weaknesses of a people which has suffered so much for its shortcomings, and which has been visited

with so many just and unjust criticisms, from the time of its first establishment until the present day. It is easy to see what the special vices and weaknesses of the Greeks have been ; and it is at the same time easy to account for their existence. They spring in part from the inherent character of the race ; and in part they are the result of those unfortunate conditions of national life over which the Greeks themselves have had very little control.

The two causes, or groups of causes, are entirely distinct from each other, inasmuch as the conditions of Greek nationality are not the direct consequence of Greek character, but merely restrictions and provisions imposed by the Great Powers for their own purposes, and as the issue of a compromise with Turkey. One of the greatest evils by which the Greeks have been afflicted is the anarchy and lawlessness of the kingdom in its earlier times—the violence and dissensions by which some portions of the country have been disgraced, even in the present generation. It may be that these dispositions are based upon some specific vice or defect in the national character. That, at any rate, is the allegation of a large number of visitors to, and writers about, Greece, and of a still larger number of persons who have neither visited nor studied the country, but who hold themselves none the less competent to speak on that account, and who have drawn the most positive conclusions from a few isolated facts. It is worth while to examine the validity of this allegation, which, together with another already mentioned,¹ is the gist of the accusations frequently brought against the Greeks, and has undoubtedly cost them the support of many unthinking people.

¹ See the preceding chapter on Greek Finance.

Now, it is certain that, when the character of the Hellenic race is considered independently, and by induction from a wider domain of facts than that which is presented by the history of the Greek kingdom, the conclusion almost invariably arrived at is that the nation has been distinguished by its orderly instincts, by the discipline of its social life, by just and equal government in the community and in the family, by the general industry and thrift of the race. All these dispositions are opposed to the habits of lawlessness and violence; and it will be admitted that, judging from the first principles of human action and association, it is all but impossible to conceive that the several adverse tendencies could be strongly and simultaneously developed in any nation.

Yet anarchy and lawlessness were very largely developed in Greece during the first years of her independent existence; and they had certainly not been wholly eradicated from the country at a very recent date. How are we to account for the paradox?

The explanation is a simple one. Less than twenty years ago there was no good government, and no adequate administration of the law. Twenty years before that, the government had been tyrannous and incompetent in a high degree; whilst the law, though good in theory, was not obeyed, was scarcely insisted upon, and was overruled as often as it became the interest of its administrators to set it aside. Daring criminals, in fact, enjoyed comparative immunity. The greater part of the Morea and the southern continent was left practically at their mercy. Was this a fault of the Greek character? Had Bavarian impotence and European indifference nothing to do with it?

Who, again, were these daring criminals who held

Greece in awe, and made the friends of Greece almost despair of her regeneration? They were, as a rule, men with arms in their hands, having mountain fastnesses for their base of operations, who for the most part had played an honourable *rôle* of patriotism in the liberation of their country, and who, even if they wished to turn to peaceful and industrious pursuits, had no inducement or power to do so. Out of these fighting materials there were always bold and ambitious men ready to create factions, and to carry on civil war; and thus for a long time the country was the scene of constant lawlessness, pillage, and slaughter. When the authority of the central Government began to make itself felt, the temerity of the armed bands was checked. Men who aimed at plunder only, and who had been spoiled for labour by the constant compulsion or temptation to fight, became more cautious in their proceedings, and took care to keep out of the way of the Bavarian or regular Greek troops, except in the rare cases when they were superior in numbers, or when a share in the booty sufficed to disarm the guardians of order. But of course there were many who had used their swords and guns chiefly for self-defence in a lawless state of affairs; and others, again, who had clung to the life of an outlaw only so long as its alternative seemed to be starvation. As the country became more settled, the land more cultivated, and the national trade more extended, these latter came down from the mountains, or emerged from the forests, and betook themselves to peaceful occupations.

Nevertheless, it was no easy task to put an end to the anarchy of Greece. It was not done in Otho's reign, and would not have been done to this day under a continuance of Otho's modes of government. Bri-

gandage remained a virtual institution amongst the Greeks—or at all events a crime which the authorities were incompetent, if not unwilling, to suppress—for many years after civil war had died out. What else could have been expected under the circumstances? How could the best qualities of the race—pre-eminently the qualities of peace—be developed on the morrow of such events as those of the War of Independence? And who can wonder that violence had seemed to become a fixed characteristic of a people which had passed through such a crisis?

In regard to Greece, perhaps more than in regard to any other country in its modern phase, it behoves us to avoid speaking of her to-day on the facts of yesterday. She has changed and developed so quickly, in many important respects, that it would be an act of great injustice, especially on the part of those who are moved to hostile criticism, to level accusations against her in one year on the strength of their having been justified a few years previously. And the question of public order amongst the Greeks, of security for life and property, of the respect paid to authority, is one in connection with which the nation can show a very notable advance during the past decade.

The fact that Greece is now practically free from brigandage, and that the most solitary mountain roads are scarcely less safe for the traveller than many districts which might be mentioned in the British Islands, is one which speaks eloquently to those who bear in mind the recent history of the country. Although the accession of King George did much to tranquillise the public mind, and to add a new sanction to authority, yet the curse of brigandage continued to throw a deep shadow over the land, and to prejudice its

reputation in the eyes of all Europe. The audacity of the plundering gangs who infested populous communes, and even showed a bold front in the neighbourhood of the capital, appeared to reach a climax after the flight of King Otho, and before his successor was firmly fixed upon the throne. In 1863 a brigand named Kyriakos, at the head of a somewhat formidable band, ventured into Attica; and there were some who asserted that his assistance was privately retained by a distinguished Minister of State. Many accusations of a similar kind were made in the following years; and the suspicion of such secret connivance with crime, added to the actual offences of the marauders, caused frequent Ministerial crises during the years 1865 and 1866.

But in 1870 an event occurred which finally roused the country to the highest pitch of indignation, and which proved to be the turning-point in the history of Greek brigandage. In April of that year a party of travellers, five of them English and one French, were seized by a band of brigands at Oropos, near the historic Marathon. For more than ten days England was kept in suspense about the fate of the prisoners. On the 11th of April two of these, Lord and Lady Muncaster, were released, after being informed that their companions would be liberated on the payment of a ransom of £25,000, coupled with a free pardon. It was determined that this sum should not be paid; and the Greek Government, strongly urged thereto by the foreign representatives in Athens, resolved to secure the robbers at all hazards. Troops surrounded the gang, and cut off all hope of escape. The prisoners—Mr. Vyner, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Lloyd, and the Count de Boyl—were dragged from place to place by the retreating brigands, who repeatedly threatened to

murder them ; and in the end, on the 21st of April, the miscreants carried out their threats.

The band was broken up immediately afterwards ; some of the men being killed in fight, whilst seven were captured. But this was far from being sufficient to appease the very serious feeling of anger and indignation excited in Greece, in England, and throughout Europe, by so lamentable a proof of the insecurity of life in the country. The charges of connivance were freely repeated—in some cases, it would seem, with great injustice. Once more there were frequent Ministerial crises ; but the king and his advisers had determined that brigandage should be definitely suppressed. A decree was issued in October, six months after the Marathon outrage, giving additional power to the authorities ; and the provisions of this measure have been carried out in a thoroughly effectual manner.

There was certainly much that was unreasonable, however natural, in the anger expended on Greece in 1870 ; and as the effect of the excessive resentment of Englishmen has not passed away, but has survived in a sort of settled conviction that order and security are unattainable in Greece, it may not be amiss to indicate the arguments on the other side, which were employed at the time by temperate men.

M. Emile Burnouf contributed an article to the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for June, 1870,¹ wherein he examined the facts of the massacre, and showed how little direct blame was attributable to the Greek authorities for this particular outrage, and how vast was the difficulty with which they had to contend in their efforts to repress the evil. On the latter points he said:—" In order to give an idea of the ease with which

¹ See t. 87, p. 987.

these men move from place to place, I will adduce but one fact, which has not been seriously disputed. On the evening before the day whereon the Arvanitakis band captured the travellers near Marathon, they were at Villia, the ancient Idyllia, in Cithæron, a short distance to the west of the road leading from Athens to Thebes, by way of Eleusis. In one night they moved at least sixty-four kilometres across the mountains; and by daybreak they were beneath a bridge by which the travellers had to pass, and by which they actually did pass. These men, therefore, are less like the inhabitants of towns than like great mountain lions.¹ . . . The wandering life of these brigands would be inexplicable if the interior of Greece were pictured as being similar to the mountainous departments of France. . . . Neither roads, nor towns, nor factories,

¹ The brigands of Greece were no doubt recruited for the most part amongst the Vlaques, or wandering shepherds (*βλαχοποιμένες*), who have from time immemorial led their flocks of sheep and goats from ridge to ridge amongst the mountains of the peninsula. An Albanian or Slavonian origin has been ascribed to them, and their head-quarters, if they can be said to have any, are in the Pindus ranges, between Thessaly and Epirus. M. Burnouf, however, would have us mount higher still for their origin. He says, in his very interesting memoir:—"Les Vlachopoïmenes forment donc dans toute la péninsule une race d'hommes isolée, à peu près pure, et qui voit les choses humaines d'un tout autre œil que les civilisés. L'état d'hostilité où elle se trouve, de cœur ou de fait, avec ces derniers serait inexplicable, si l'on ne remontait jusqu'à l'antique conquête par laquelle ils ont été confinés. Il faut savoir en effet que ces pasteurs se font brigands avec une facilité extrême, et que ce triste état n'est pas déshonorant à leurs yeux. La bande des frères Arvanitakis se composait en majeure partie de ces gens à foustanelle. Sur les sept qui ont été pris vivants, six étaient pasteurs et originaires de Turquie; leurs familles habitent le Pinde entre la Thessalie et l'Épire. Un d'eux, interrogé par une personne qui lui reprochait ses méfaits, lui répondit: 'Ce n'est pas crime, c'est bravoure' (*δὲν εἶναι κακία, εἶναι παλληκαριά*). Durant l'interrogatoire, un autre trouva mauvais et 'illégal' que les soldats grecs fussent venus les troubler 'dans l'exercice de leur profession.' Ils sont en Grèce ce que furent dans les monts des Asturies les compagnons de Pélage. . . . Pour en finir avec les Vlaques du Pinde, je ferai remarquer que de tout temps, et aussi

nor shelters for the flocks are to be found there, as in France or in England, but only desert mountain ridges, frequented solely by the wandering shepherds, by eagles and vultures, and by a few foreign tourists, who ascend them in order to enjoy magnificent panoramas in an historical land."

M. Burnouf goes on to describe the depredations of these criminals on their own countrymen; how they subsisted by levying forced contributions from the shepherds and isolated farms. But it is clear that these resources would soon begin to fail them. They were driven to more adventurous exploits, and attacked parties of travellers even when under the escort of soldiers or police.¹ Occasionally they had to fight for their plunder, but not always. That which was true of many inferior (and possibly also of the superior) authorities in Greece, was true of individual soldiers and gendarmes; they either tolerated brigandage through fear, or turned it to their own profit. "Whole villages, with their mayors and *adjoints*, became the servants of the brigands, and their most constant providers. . . . The Greek nation is not responsible for these faults; it is the victim and not the culprit."

The nation was the victim, undoubtedly, of a weak government and a corrupt administration; but M. Burnouf's argument may be qualified by the remark that the Greek nation had not proved itself to be the victim,

haut que l'on peut remonter dans l'histoire hellénique, on trouve ces populations sauvages et barbares menant de front le métier de bergers errants et de voleurs. . . . Pour écarter l'idée que ce soient des Slaves, je rappellerai seulement qu'ils formaient un corps de troupes probablement irrégulier dans l'armée d'Alexandre le Grand."

¹ M. Burnouf mentions cases in which residents in the towns had paid contributions to the funds of particular bands, on the demand of the chiefs, in order to purchase immunity for the future, though being in no immediate danger.

and had not thrown off the reproach, until it gave expression to a public opinion so strong that it could no longer be resisted by the authorities. This it did in 1870. The Marathon murder was a startling event which brought to a crisis the indignation which had long been gathering force amongst the Greeks; and M. Zaimes was the mouthpiece and the instrument of this honourable feeling. A nation can always find an instrument for the operation of its resolves. In M. Zaimes the Greeks found an enlightened and able Minister, already associated with some of the brightest pages of their history, who had wanted nothing more than the support of the nation to enable him to deal thoroughly with the evil of brigandage. This support he received in 1870; and he instantly set to work. All the available troops were employed in hunting down the brigands, in bringing them to justice, or driving them out of Greece. Some of the malefactors abandoned their trade from the moment when they found the Government so terribly in earnest; others fled across the borders into Turkey. Strict measures were adopted with the municipalities or individual officers who could be shown to have truckled to the brigands; and it must be admitted that these local authorities were in many instances glad enough to forswear the discreditable practices which, if they had been in some slight degree profitable, had been virtually imposed upon them by the force of circumstances, and had rendered them obnoxious to the most honourable section of the community.

The task of clearing the mountains was worthy of being looked upon as a new labour of Hercules. It was clear that it could not be effectually performed without at the same time adopting measures tending to diminish

the number of the *vlaques*; and there was an additional inducement to adopt such measures in the fact that these nomadic shepherds were in many cases little better than flights of locusts, doing vast injury to the country over which they travelled. Wherever they went they hired large tracts of pasturage from the State, or from private owners, paying a small sum for their term of occupation, and extracting from the land incalculably more than the value of their payment. It was not only the grass which they consumed; but their enormous herds of goats browsed on the underwood, the young shoots and lower branches of the trees, to say nothing of the damage over and above what they actually devoured. At the same time they prevented the forests from being cultivated and preserved, as they might have been if there had been no regular pittance of rent forthcoming from the shepherds. A still more disastrous consequence of the system had been experienced in the fact that, as the *vlaques* had no permanent interest in the land of their sojourn, and no relations with the inhabitants of the towns and valleys except in supplying them with goats' milk, and occasionally with meat, they regularly assisted their fellow-nomads, the brigands, whose trade would have been almost an impossibility without their connivance. The evil had long been recognised. There were laws in existence—the first passed in 1836, the last in 1861—which had for their aim to preserve the forests from destruction. These, strengthened and extended by the decree of 1870, were now more strictly enforced, and the tendency from that time to this has been to discourage the letting of pasturage to wandering shepherds, and to encourage sedentary agriculture. Less progress has been made in this direction than might have been expected to follow

upon the good resolves of 1870; but I am informed that a new law has been drafted, if it be not actually before the Greek Chamber, which is intended to deal with this important question in a more thorough manner.

Another radical and enlightened method of warfare against brigandage, and the causes which have made brigandage so formidable in Greece, was found ready to the hands of the Government in the improvement and multiplication of the roads. In a subsequent chapter on the Public Works of the country it will be seen in what manner the Greeks have turned their opportunities to account in this respect. For the present it is sufficient to say that the energy of M. Zaimis and his successors, and the measures taken by the Greek Government, have practically extirpated brigandage from Greece. With the exception of rare incursions across the Turkish borders, the country has of late been almost entirely free from disorder of this kind.¹

The best result of the abolition of brigandage has been to relieve Greek statesmen and administrators from the suspicion—fatal, whether justified or not, to all prospect of advancement for the nation—of con-

¹ M. Rhizos Rangabé, in his work on *Greece, her Progress and present Position* (1867), mentions what was clearly one of the principal sources of the trouble in Greece. "The summits of the Othryx," he says, "which separates Greece from Turkey, are everywhere passable. The Turks entrust their protection to the dervenayas (dervendji pashas) or irregular chiefs, who commonly dispense with the use of soldiers, to the end that they may pocket the soldiers' pay; as to the brigands, as they cannot fight them, they enter into an agreement with them, permitting them to enter Greece without hindrance, and on their return affording them protection, or, what is the same thing, allowing them to enter the ranks. . . . Every public excitement serves also to cause a fresh infliction of brigandage. . . . In 1856, after the insurrection of Epirus, principally because of the insurrection and its results, Greece swarmed with brigands, who were nearly all armed. The first care of the Greek Government at that time was to convince

nivance with those desperate criminals. It has, indeed, so far as the present writer is aware, never been brought home to any of the leading politicians in Greece that they made common cause with the brigands, or disgraced themselves to the extent of being in any sense or form in the pay of the chiefs. No doubt a Minister here and there may have relaxed the arm of authority in the persuasion that the result of a general election might depend upon his doing so. This in itself would be a sufficiently grave crime; but it would be one differing in degree rather than in kind from the crimes of statesmen in more ancient and prosperous States.

Thus public order, the basis of all just administration, has been completely established in Greece; and the consequences have been perceived in many notable ameliorations of the condition of the country. In no direction has the improvement been greater than in the impartial enforcement of the laws, and in the respect paid to authority. Not many years ago, the judgments of the courts were overridden year after year, at the instance of almost any one who had the wealth or the skill to make his influence felt. To-day, few would dream of interfering with the regular course of justice.

In 1854, it was possible for M. Edmond About to enliven his pages with shrewd hits at the corruptibility of the bench. "The patriotism of the judges," he wrote,¹ "passes all the bounds of legality. I once

the Turks that it was more for their interest than for that of the Greeks to exterminate brigandage. . . . Halil Bey, a man of intelligence, who represented Turkey at Athens, appreciating the sincerity of this observation, and going in person to Constantinople, effected the substitution in Thessaly of regular troops, commanded by the Pole, Sadic Pasha, for those of the dervenayas. . . . *During the four years that this system was enforced, there was no trace of brigandage in parts of the country remote from Turkey; nor did the evil reappear until the Turks returned to their former system.*"

¹ *La Grèce Contemporaine*, p. 247.

heard a magistrate, on the occasion of the death of the Duchess of Plaisance, observe, 'Her heirs will not have a drachma of the property she left here.' 'What! with so much money standing in her name?' 'Never! Our tribunals cannot decree in favour of a foreigner.' 'But she had excellent mortgages?' 'Oh, as for that, mortgages are just our *forte*!'"

The Greek satire is *maligne*, like the French, and there is no necessity to take this compliment to the patriotism of the judges in a strictly literal sense. But the jest would be absurdly inappropriate at the present day. It is true that the decisions of the Greek courts are occasionally impugned. But this also is the experience of countries in which the duration of constitutional government is reckoned by centuries rather than by decades. The concurrent testimony of Greek writers and of foreign travellers in Greece, as well as the rarity of grave charges against the administration of justice, warrants us in affirming that the law is dispensed with ability and firmness, and that the tribunals, as a natural consequence, have secured the respect and confidence of the nation.

The outlines of the legal and judicial system in Greece are clear, and without complication.¹

With the Hellenic love of theoretical perfection, it would have been strange if the early leaders of the insurrection had not set themselves the task of drawing up a complete legislative code. And accordingly we find that the Assembly of Epidaurus appointed a Commission for this purpose in the first year of the war. The members consulted and collaborated; but the vicissitudes of the nation were too great and sudden to allow them to attain any definitive conclusions.

¹ The following sketch is taken, in the main, from Moraïtinis.

In the meantime the clergy, and the better educated Greeks who had studied in foreign universities, supplied the void; and the tribunals relied as well as they could upon the principles of the Roman law, and of the imperfect Byzantine codes.

When the Bavarians came, the Roman and Byzantine law was supplemented by special decrees, as the necessity for such modifications impressed itself upon the minds of the judges and the Government. Von Maurer, one of the Provisional Council during the minority of Otho, was himself an able lawyer, and he did much to render the composite code more supple and serviceable. His innovations were based upon the laws of Bavaria, upon the French Code, and upon the traditions and customs of the Greek community. Even in the time of Capo d'Istria, in the year 1830, the law of succession had been adapted to the peculiar requirements of Greece.

In 1847, after the granting of the first Constitution under Otho, the project of establishing a Greek Code was renewed, and another Commission was appointed to draw up the plan of a legislative scheme. And, in effect, 94 articles formulated by this Commission were sanctioned by the Legislature, and decreed. In 1861, this Code was increased by the addition of 137 new articles. Nevertheless the work which had been done up to this point was for the most part tentative. It by no means covered the whole ground of civil jurisprudence; and in 1866, after the acquisition of the Ionian Islands, which were at least as ripe for a comprehensive system of law as the mainland itself, a third Commission was appointed, for the purpose of formulating a precise and complete scheme.

The labours of this Commission were brought to a

close in 1870, when they presented their report to the Minister of Justice. The Government, however, did not deal hastily with the project; and in 1874 another Commission went over the whole field, comparing the Code of their predecessors with all the laws previously in operation. The consequence was a comprehensive scheme of civil legislation, which may be described as an eclectic Code, based upon the French and Italian systems, and adapted to the genius and traditions of the Hellenic race. In the year last named, this Code was presented to the Chamber; but, for some reason or another—owing chiefly, it would seem, to the punctilious caution of the Greek nation—it has not yet been voted.

So much for the Civil Law. The Criminal Code and procedure remain to this day—with casual additions—the same as von Maurer introduced them in 1833-4. His work was based upon the Bavarian law, and is admitted to have been excellent in its character. The criminal procedure, like the civil, is founded almost exclusively upon that of France; but the judicial organisation of Greece is modelled upon the German and French systems taken together.

The Commercial Law, as introduced in 1835, is identical with the French Commercial Code.

The Civil Law is administered by 191 judges of the peace, whose jurisdiction extends to the sum of 30 drachmas (something over £1), or, with an appeal, to 300 drachmas; by 17 courts of first instance, with jurisdiction up to 500 drachmas; and by four commercial courts (at Syra, Nauplia, Patras, and Corfu), with jurisdiction up to 800 drachmas. The Courts of Appeal are four in number, and are established at Athens, Nauplia, Patras, and Corfu. Each of these comprises

a President and four Councillors, with the King's Procurator.

The Criminal Law is administered by police courts in connection with each justice of the peace (with one judge); by correctional courts in connection with each court of first instance (with five judges); and by criminal courts, in periodical session within the district of the courts of appeal. The judicial authority in the criminal courts is vested in a jury of twelve, chosen by lot from the citizens, and in three accessory judges, selected from the judges of the inferior courts, who apply the law in accordance with the verdict of the jury.¹

The Administration is the virtual prosecutor in the police courts. An attorney or *procureur* is attached as public prosecutor to each of the courts of first instance; whilst the King's *procureur* sustains the accusation in the criminal courts. Thus in the case of every detected crime it is the direct business of some one official to see that justice is duly sought and obtained.

The supreme court of justice in Greece is the Areiopagus, which receives appeals from all the inferior courts. It is composed of a President, vice-President, and five Councillors.

Military and naval offences are tried in military and naval courts. The offences of Ministers, and a few other superior functionaries, are tried by special courts, organised in accordance with the Constitution of 1864.

¹ This is the theory of trial by jury—jury first and accessory judges next. I am told that a Greek jury would not submit to be browbeaten by the judges, and that a Greek judge would not venture to lecture a jury on its verdict, or to require that such and such a jurymen should not appear before him in any future case. These inversions of the theory have become possible in England, where we enjoy so much liberty that we rather like the idea of sacrificing it in small quantities, if only for the sake of conquering it back again.

In the latter case the court receives its sanction from the Chamber of Deputies; but all the courts previously mentioned are under the authority of the Minister of Justice.

Such are, in their outlines, the law and procedure of Greece. It will probably be admitted without difficulty that they are, theoretically, almost as perfect as the circumstances of the country would allow them to be. They are certainly superior in many respects to those of greater and stronger States; and they require only a wise and resolute Administration to ensure the good government of Greece. That Administration the country has begun, within the past few years, to boast that it possesses; and the boast is not without a fair amount of justification.¹

It is superfluous to say that crime in Greece shows a large diminution since the year 1870. The restoration of public order and security by the extermination of brigandage necessarily produced this effect; but it is more to the purpose to affirm that the decrease of crime within the period referred to has been a very remarkable one, and that it has been observed over the whole

¹ There is one particular in which the administration of justice in Greece leaves much to be desired, and that is the condition of its prisons—those of Corfu alone being well organised. “This lamentable state of affairs,” says M. Moraïtinis, “like so many other of our shortcomings, is due almost exclusively to the weakness of our financial means. . . . There is published at Athens a journal dealing specially with the interests of prisoners, the *Prison Gazette*, established by one of our most courageous lawyers, M. Aristides Economos, *procureur* of the Royal Court of Athens. It is curious to go through the numbers which have already appeared. . . . The journal throws light on all the faulty aspects of our prisons, indicating the improvements which need to be introduced. It also receives the complaints of the convicts, and publishes the letters which they write.”—One of the letters in question, from a prisoner undergoing his sentence, offers to a fund which is being raised for the construction of better prisons twelve stremmas of land, 2,000 cubic metres of stone, and 1,000 metres of sand.

surface of the kingdom. The fact is attested in a trustworthy manner;¹ and it is one which the reader will not be slow to accept. As crimes of violence are gradually eliminated from Greece, the remaining aggregate of criminal offences will appear less and less serious. Most recent travellers in the country agree that, with the one exception named, the vices of the Greeks are few. M. Edmond About admitted, a quarter of a century ago, that the vices arising from self-indulgence, in regard to sexual passion or to the abuse of intoxicating liquors, were rare throughout Greece. The virtue of women was respected, and their weakness was seldom presumed upon. At the present day the judgment of travellers is equally favourable; their opinion as to the general self-restraint of the Greeks is almost unanimous. The Baron d'Estournelles de Constant tells us that "the Hellenes have one small convict establishment and a few prisons, which are more frequently empty than full;" and he declares that "there are more homicides than thefts in Greece."²

May we not hope that, when the tendency to violence is further counteracted by the continued

¹ M. Moraitinis gives no particulars or figures relating to crime in Greece, or to the number or categories of the prisoners. I regret that the assertion in the text, which I base on what appears to me to be adequate evidence, must remain vague.

➤ ² *La Vie de Province en Grèce*, p. 71. The author goes on to say that "Occasionally the sentence of death is passed. It is related in this connection that it was for a long time impossible to find executioners in any part of the kingdom, and that the practice of getting them from abroad had to be given up, because the populace massacred them. In view of this obstacle it was in contemplation to revise the law, when an unhappy wight offered himself; I think it was about 1850. Since that time executioners have not been wanting. This officer is lodged, like the convicts, in one of the castles (of Rhion and Antirhion). He is sometimes a long time without having to exercise his trade; whilst it has happened to him, when the army has made an important capture of brigands, to cut off as many as seven heads in a day."

practice of the arts of peace, by security and respect for the law, and above all by the just satisfaction of the national claims, Greece will hold a very enviable position amongst the nations by her comparative immunity from crime?

The evidence of the writer last quoted is the more valuable because he has not much to say in favour of the institutions under which the Greeks live. He has, in fact, a good deal to say against them, or at least against the result of them; and it would not be candid to pass over what he says about the administration of justice in the provinces. After describing the popular elections, and the "political excesses" which appear to him to characterise them, he asserts that the influence of party affects the whole administration of the country ("s'étend sur tout ce qui touche à l'administration"). "Justice is no more exempt from it than any other authority; and, each town being divided into two powerful factions, around whom all the inhabitants are ranged, it results that the accused are always necessarily judged by friends or by enemies. Consequently the most insignificant civil or criminal process is from the first the occasion of all sorts of intrigues The situation of the judges is embarrassing; the leading men speak loud and threaten; it is often very imprudent to displease them To invoke authority would be childish, for they are always sure to be replaced, though they are immovable, after the new elections; to allege indisputable laws is a wretched argument to the most artful minds in Europe. The best arguments are powerless against a fixed resolve, and when we hear, to the honour of the Greek magistrature, that judges have been known to set their conscience above their interest and their

animosity, we may very sincerely inquire how they manage to do it."

Here we unquestionably have another of the many overdrawn pictures of Greek manners and society. It is a picture, we may readily admit, sketched in parts from the life; but the canvas has been filled in after the models have departed. The fault is in the generalisation; one or two figures are permitted to give colour and manner to all the rest. In other words, it is unfortunately true that justice has been influenced by considerations of fear or favour, within recent years; but it is not true—so far as we may judge from the evidence of other travellers, from surrounding circumstances, and from the witness of Greek statesmen and publicists—that the magistrature as a whole is tainted by the crimes and weakness laid to its charge.

In so far, however, as the accusation is true, what are the deductions which we should be compelled to draw from the facts? Much the same as those which we have been compelled to draw from other symptoms of the weakness, the failures, and the shortcomings of the Greeks. There is something at the source of national existence, at the root of the constitutional growth of Greece, which retards her proper development, and makes it impossible for her to present to Europe that ideal of perfect order and government which we so sternly demand of her.

She has given herself an excellent Constitution and excellent laws. She administers her affairs after an almost unexceptional method. She has already achieved a truly remarkable triumph in the restoration of public order throughout the country, and under circumstances of extreme difficulty. In some respects, notwithstanding, her critics are still able to say of her that she

falls short of the standard offered for her imitation by countries like France and England.

Let this be fully and freely admitted. But let it also be remembered that Greece is subject to great deprivations, to galling restrictions, and to conditions of national life which stifle her noblest aspirations. Let those, especially, who are responsible for these things do Greece the justice of not forgetting them.

CHAPTER VII.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

The Lowest Ebb—Statements of Thiersch and Strong—Imports and Exports in 1833-40—A Favourable Contrast—Testimony of M. Moraïtinis—Growth of the Piræus—The Introduction of Steam Power—Mr. Wyndham's Reports—English Trade with Greece—Imports and Exports in 1873—The Trade in Wine, Currants, and Minerals—Customs' Duties—International Exhibitions—The New Olympiads—The Maritime Trades of Greece—Deductions.

THE internal and external trade of Greece suffered a shock in the War of Independence, from the effects of which it was very slow in recovering. And one of the most unfortunate of all the circumstances attending the restoration of her national life by the Great Powers was that no efforts were made to foster, or encourage, or even give fair play to the industry of the paralysed country. There were, in Greece, all the makings of a great trade. There were raw materials, natural products of a hundred kinds, abundance of labour, which, if properly aided and directed, would have hastened by a score of years the commercial development of the new State, and would have enabled it to pay its debts within a few decades.

The Greeks could not do all that was necessary for themselves, and neither the Russians nor the Bavarians who presided over their political training were able to do much for them. Consequently, we find that the progress of their trade was at first comparatively sluggish, whilst it more than once threatened to relapse into stagnation.

The industrial condition of Greece in 1833, previous to the arrival of King Otho, may be appreciated from the remarks of Thiersch, who had been the Prince's tutor, and who preceded him to Greece in order to form an estimate of the actual state of the country. Thus he declared that, even as regarded the necessary enterprise (though there were plenty of Greek capitalists anxious to spend their money on the advancement of their fatherland) and labour (though there were thousands of men accustomed to labour, and willing to return to it) everything was unprepared—"almost everything remains to be accomplished." "The trades of the weaver, the cloth manufacturer, the fuller, are barely exercised in this country; and so with the trades of the tanner and the leather-dresser. Skins, finding no workmen to dress them, are nearly without exception exported, and that at a low price . . . The country draws everything from abroad; its linen, its leather, its iron, including locks, nails, knives, and boilers, its arms, its furniture, and its glass."

The list might easily be extended; and the condition of affairs was not much improved after six years of Bavarian rule. In 1839 the value of the imports of manufactured goods, including glass, silk, wool, cotton, straw, wood, linen, leather, bone, iron, and other miscellaneous articles, amounted to over 7,000,000 drs., whilst the exports of similar articles during the same period may be estimated at less than 250,000 drs.

The total value of Greek exports and imports for the eight years 1833 to 1840 inclusive, in drachmas, was as follows¹:—

¹ Statistics quoted by Mr. Strong, *Greece as a Kingdom*. 

Imports. drs.				Exports. drs.
1833—12,267,773	5,534,219
1834—16,438,363	6,772,110
1835—16,179,145	9,779,900
1836—15,905,389	12,803,222
1837—18,374,617	7,522,307
1838—21,751,283	6,739,770
1839—18,599,167	7,330,438
1840—20,270,004	8,748,477

The advance, it will be observed, was by no means continuous in either respect; and whilst the values of the imports point to increasing means at the command of the Greeks, the figures relating to the exports certainly do not attest much increase of industrial effort.

As for the domestic trades of Greece at the end of the same period, Mr. Strong writes more explicitly than Thiersch. Corn-mills were turned by mules (in 1842 and later), which left the flour coarse and brown. Carpenters, blacksmiths, and shoemakers could only produce the most common and necessary articles, whilst “many trades, as those of hatters, opticians, glovers, saddlers, watchmakers, wire-drawers, nail-makers,” were “totally unknown.” No attempt had been made to introduce the art of paper-making, although printing and book-binding had taken root in the country. The pottery trade was in its infancy, “though Greece possesses large quantities of excellent clay, capable of making the finest porcelain.” The trades in which the Greeks chiefly excelled were those of confectionery, tailoring, and embroidery in gold, silver, and silk—these latter, like the trades of printing and bookbinding, being stimulated by special tastes of the nation.

In 1845 a French observer, M. Lecomte, found it worth while to remark on the fact that there were a few ship-building yards, a few small manufactories of gauze, hats, leather, soap, rope, and silk, all relying upon hand

labour; whilst one or two other factories had failed for want of prolonged enterprise.

A quarter of a century later, in 1869, M. Burnouf wrote that Greece was still selling her raw materials, and buying them back in a manufactured form.

Now let us take the contrast to this dreary picture—a contrast of ten years against five and thirty—which affords one of the most significant proofs of the remarkable progress made by Greece within the present generation.

“In the Piræus alone,” says M. Moraïtinis,¹ “a town of 18,000 inhabitants, which fifty years ago was a mere deserted plain, rendered ugly by three wretched cottages, and which, ten years ago”—that is to say, in 1868—“did not possess a single manufactory, contains at the present time more than thirty steam factories: six cotton mills, one silk-weaving establishment, three forges, two good factories for machines and agricultural implements, one for pottery, one for glass, one for nails, eight steam mills, two manufactories of tissues, and several of furniture. . . . Moreover, industrial progress is manifest also in the provinces, so that the aggregate industry of the country shows us at the present day 112 important steam factories, most of them established within the space of ten years; more than 300 factories similar in their character to steam factories, and more than 400 other establishments; wherein there work about 24,300 artisans, and which turn out annual products of the value of about 166,000,000 drachmas” (say £5,925,000).

We have here one of the most significant and valuable facts which it is in the power of the Greeks of to-day to bring forward. The advance of Greek manu-

¹ *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*, p. 296. 

facturing industry, and of the trades which depend upon the manufactures, either to supply them with raw materials or to distribute their products, may be compared with the rapid growth of such towns as Merthyr and Middlesborough, in England, and of the industries whereof they are the centres. Few countries could show a more remarkable increase in the rate of progress during an equally brief period. The causes of this very encouraging movement were, no doubt, many and various, and it might be impossible to enumerate them all. Amongst them were the same causes which operated generally throughout Europe in stimulating trade, during the first few years of the period in question; the stimulus felt by Greece after the close of the Cretan war, and the great increase of her shipping trade in the Mediterranean during the temporary paralysis of the French trade—perhaps we might also say, of the Austrian and Italian trades; the fillip given to Greek industry by Mr. Gladstone's enlightened commercial policy, which caused the trade in Greek wines to spring into sudden importance; and the more energetic encouragement of trade by the Government, which acted, after the suppression of brigandage, as though an oppressive weight had suddenly been lifted from its shoulders.

The reports of Mr. Hugh Wyndham, to which we have already been indebted, supply us with interesting particulars as to the volume and direction of Greek trade with foreign countries in 1872 and 1873; and these figures are especially satisfactory to Englishmen, since they indicate the extent of the trade carried on between Greece and our own country. The total value of the import and export trade with England in 1872 was 57,289,120 drachmas (£2,046,040), or 37 per cent.


of the whole trade of Greece. The value in 1873 was 65,709,716 drs., an increase of more than £300,000, amounting to 41 per cent. of the whole trade. The corresponding values for the under-mentioned countries were as follows :—

					drs.	£
1872.	Turkey	21,893,501	= 781,911
"	Austria	21,627,502	= 772,411
"	France	18,211,872	= 650,424
"	Russia	17,455,765	= 623,420
"	Italy	8,588,211	= 306,722
1873.	Austria	21,390,928	= 763,962
"	Turkey	20,622,132	= 736,505
"	France	15,755,257	= 562,688
"	Russia	13,749,576	= 491,056
"	Italy	9,572,135	= 341,862

The six countries absorb 93 per cent. of the foreign trade of Greece.

"During 1872 and 1873 the largest quantity of imports were from England. They represented in 1872 the value of 25,664,068 drs. (£916,574) constituting 26 per cent. of all imports, and in 1873, 28,468,875 drs. (£1,016,746), or 31 per cent. of the total. The principal imports from England were, in 1872 :—Tissues—cotton, £290,245; woollen, £53,036; cotton and woollen, £37,529; linen, £21,459; other, £19,360; coal, £93,220; raw hides, £91,269; cotton-yarn, £56,046; sugar, £41,764; salt provisions, £25,462; liquors, £20,859; coffee £20,215; unwrought iron, £13,928; wrought iron, £11,045. In 1873 :—Tissues—cotton, £305,602; woollen, £37,286; cotton and woollen, £30,644; linen, £16,341; other, £33,992; coal, £124,911; raw hides, £113,904; cotton-yarn, £51,067; sugar, £41,962; salt provisions, £24,512; liquors, £19,989; coffee, £22,038; unwrought iron, £20,478; wrought iron, £10,989." ¹

¹ *Parliamentary Papers.* Report, January 19, 1876.



In regard to the exports of Greece for the same years, England took no less than 57 per cent. of the total in 1872, and a greater proportion in 1873—the values being respectively £1,129,466 and £1,330,030. The principal items were as follows :¹—

					1872. £	1873. £
Currants	830,204	1,065,890
Lead	183,429	179,636
Emery Powder	23,598	13,809
Valonea	20,050	6,294
Olive Oil	13,801	33,846
Tobacco	41,376	8,812

A comparison of the exports and imports in 1873 with those of thirty years ago shows that the total value had become six times as great. Again, whilst in 1845 the imports were twice as valuable as the exports, in 1873 they were in a proportion of less than three to two. The gradual increase in each respect may be estimated from the following figures :—

					Imports. drs.	Exports. drs.
1845	22,000,000	11,000,000
1862	49,109,666	32,323,426
1865	90,251,389	51,671,719
1870	97,021,085	52,908,429
1871	108,536,576	76,382,701
1872	128,131,725	67,378,524
1873	117,642,163	76,858,333

These figures refer to the general commerce of Greece. The special commerce, comprising the exported produce of the country and the imports consumed within it, may be reckoned approximately at 80 per cent. of the general. Thus in 1873 the special imports were

¹ These are apparently the latest returns which have been published. M. Moraïtinis, who in most other matters carries his statistics down to the years 1877 or 1878, does not record the exports and imports of a later year than 1873.

valued at 92,187,500 drs., and the special exports at 64,482,756 drs.

The figures for 1876–8 show a sensible decrease from those above quoted. The Russo-Turkish war, and the burdens which Greece took upon herself in the hope of establishing her claim to Thessaly and Epirus, have made a very serious impression on the commercial records of the country. The general commerce of the year 1877 seems to have been barely three-quarters of the amount for 1873.

Another test of the value of Greek trade may be obtained by comparing the value of the special commerce of the country, relatively to the number of inhabitants, in the case of France, Italy, and Greece. Thus we have for France, in the year 1872, a special commerce equivalent to nearly £9 per head on the whole population; for Italy in the same year, a value of £3 15s. per head; and for Greece, in 1873, a value of £3 17s. 6d. per head¹—a result of a thoroughly healthy character, and bearing witness to the more than hopeful condition of Greek trade.

It is unnecessary to give particulars in respect of all the special items which figure amongst the imports and exports of Greece; but one or two exceptions may be allowed on behalf of the principal articles of commerce.

The increase in amount of the exported Greek wines has been remarkable. Within a few years of the virtual creation of the trade, the amount exported had reached, in 1870, as high as 2,814,980 okas—the oka being equivalent to about two and a third pints. The figures were—

In 1871	2,817,515 okas of wine.
In 1872	3,542,796 ,,
In 1873	4,728,401 ,,

¹ Moraïtinis, p. 396.

The export of currants has made vast progress, as the following figures will show. There were exported—

In 1846, to the value of 3,500,000 drs. of currants.

In 1872 „ 25,472,491 „

In 1873 „ 35,646,570 „

The minerals of Greece, including gold, copper, lead, coal, sulphur, magnesia, emery, marble, and many others, have been worked in recent years with constantly increasing enterprise and success. One example must suffice. The value of the lead exported by the Laurium Company alone amounted,

In 1871, to 3,574,100 drs.

In 1872, to 5,464,500 „

In 1873, to 5,031,600 „

How, it may be asked, does the State profit by the industrial enterprise and the commerce of the people? Our previous examination of the Greek budget has anticipated the answer to this question; but a few facts may be added here.

In the first place, it is manifestly to the interest of Greece that its public revenues should draw as sparingly as possible upon the trade of the people; and this principle has been observed wherever it was practicable. The great natural resources of the country have enabled the State to derive a considerable income from the sale and lease of lands, the concession of mining rights, and so on; whilst the encouragements given to various trades, by subventions and privileges of one kind or another, exceed in value the revenue arising from imposts upon the internal industries of Greece.

But the customs duties, and the taxes on commerce in general, go a long way towards providing for the indispensable requirements of the State. The customs

duties alone, which amounted to a little over four millions of drachmas in 1862, had reached nearly eleven millions in 1871, and in the budget of 1877 they stood at 13,400,000 drs. To these amounts must be added other customs receipts, arising from the traffic in land, and figuring, in round numbers, at about one-fourth of the receipts on external trade.

The State receives no duties on the internal commerce of the country between one place and another. Up to the year 1843 there had been a galling tax of six per cent. on the transport of goods within the kingdom; but it was abolished in that year. Nevertheless the eparchies are entitled, by a law passed in 1847, to octrois of this kind, which amount in the aggregate to about two per cent. on the value of the merchandise.¹

Amongst the stimulants to trade in recent years, by which Greece has profited no less signally than other nations, are the International Exhibitions. The Greeks have taken part in the whole series of the greater European shows, from the first, in 1851, when it was represented by thirty-six exhibitors, to the Paris Exposition, in 1878, when the number of exhibitors had risen to as many as 1,000, and when the space occupied by the productions of Greek trade and art was fifty-five times as large as that occupied at the Exhibition in Hyde Park.

Greece would seem to be thoroughly alive to the importance of encouraging the national industry by every means in its power; and, by a happy combination of one of the best of its ancient traditions with one

¹ The total octrois from this source are reckoned at 1,200,000 drachmas, which indicates an internal commerce of sixty millions or upwards of £2,142,000.

of the newest developments of an age of competition, it has given an earnest of enduring commercial prosperity. In 1858 it was determined to found a series of "Olympic Games," under which title are included an international exhibition of industrial products, scientific and literary competitions, and athletic sports. The first Olympiad was inaugurated in 1859. The Revolution of 1862, and the Cretan war of 1866-9, appear to have caused a break in the series; but the third meeting was held in 1875, and was attended by 1,272 exhibitors. Whatever may be thought of the value of this scheme in some of its particulars, no practical man will deny that the competitions, especially amongst manufacturers and agriculturists, are calculated to exert a very wholesome influence on the trade of the country.

It remains for us to glance at the actual condition of the maritime trade of Greece, by which the commerce with foreign countries is to a large extent carried on. Greece has always been famous for her marine; and though the Ottoman conquest had done much to ruin it, it had once more attained a high position towards the close of the eighteenth century. The War of Independence dealt another heavy blow at this industry. Many of the vessels had been destroyed in action, and little had been done in the way of repairing, or of filling up the gaps created by destruction or decay. At the end of the war there were barely a thousand Greek vessels, including the smallest gauges, afloat. In ten years the number exceeded three thousand, and within another quarter of a century it had reached five thousand. In the year 1871 there were 6,135 Greek merchant vessels, with an aggregate burthen of 419,359 tonnes (or thousand kilogrammes).

In 1872 the French Assembly, strongly inclined at

the moment towards protection, directed a partial measure against the Greek maritime trade, by increasing the duties on all imports under the Hellenic flag beyond those exacted from other nations. The consequence was that many Greek captains adopted the plan of changing their flag whilst continuing their trade ; and thus the number of registered vessels had fallen in 1872 to 4,767, and the tonnage, in still greater proportion, to 239,947. The obnoxious duties, however, were withdrawn a year later ; and since that time, though all the transformed vessels did not return to their original flag, the register has gradually increased again. In 1874 the number of vessels was 5,330 ; and we may fairly conclude that it is now as high as the number recorded in 1871.

These figures do not, of course, represent the whole trade of the Greek seaports. Thus in 1873 there were 48,714 recorded voyages from port to port, with a traffic of more than two million English tons. During the same year, 8,457 foreign vessels entered Greek ports, with 1,336,175 tons ; whilst 8,173 foreign vessels left the country, with cargoes of nearly a million tons. A certain proportion of the Greek commercial marine consists of steam vessels, the number of which has steadily increased within the past few years. The Hellenic Steam Navigation Company, having its headquarters at Syra, runs eleven fine steamers, and is able to show a constantly augmenting traffic.

It was as a maritime country in particular that Europe expected New Greece to rise to a high degree of development. In 1832 Lord Palmerston was the spokesman of Lord Grey's Administration in the House of Commons, and it was his business to ask the House to sanction the English guarantee for the proposed Greek loan. In order to commend this step to the country he

expressed his confidence that "the commerce of Greece would in a short time rival that of Italy when in the zenith of her prosperity."

It was a bold affirmation; and yet few men of discernment, bearing in mind the extraordinary fitness of the country for maritime trade, and the remarkable energy and activity of the race, would have hesitated to make it. The Greeks have done something to justify the good opinions of their friends. Who can doubt that they would have done all that was ever expected of them if they had been left free in the course of their natural development?

Enough has probably been said to prove that the little kingdom of Greece, with its million and a half of inhabitants, and its thirteen millions of acres, has already secured a trade which stands favourable comparison with that of many more important countries, and which fairly promises a yet more remarkable development. Two inferences force themselves upon us before we pass on to another subject; and they are these:—

If Greece has made greater strides within the last ten years than during the whole of her previous history, all conclusions adverse to her claims which may have been arrived at in consequence of her former apparent stagnation must now be reconsidered.

Again, as the Greeks have done so much with such slender resources, they could do incalculably more if the area of their activity were multiplied, and if their present fetters were removed. There was unquestionably a time when it seemed reasonable to doubt whether Greece could ever become a powerful State. There is now every reason to believe that she has capacity and energy for such a task.

CHAPTER VIII.

AGRICULTURE.

The Neglected Soil—The First Advance—Area of Cultivation in Greece—M. Rangabé's Description—Agricultural Education—Cereals—Domestic Animals—The Currant Crops—Vine Culture—Old and New Wines—Olives—Hesperidean Fruits—Tobacco and Cotton—The Forests—Forest Laws—Honey—State Encouragement—An Agricultural Bank—Conventual Property.

WHATEVER may have been the condition of the Greek soil under the Venetian domination, the Turks made it and left it a wilderness. Even before their last devastations, when their principal object was to denude it of inhabitants, and, as far as possible, of vegetation, it had been a land of ruins and deserts. Millions of stremmas had remained uncultivated and unenclosed, and that which was actually under cultivation received only the rude tilling of a yoke of oxen and a primitive plough. When Byron was in Greece, before the insurrection had been dreamed of, the plain of Marathon was offered to him for nine hundred pounds. What would he have been asked for a plain of equal size without a history? Thiersch found "everything in the condition of patriarchal society. Many centuries have passed without disturbing the primeval methods of culture." In 1833 the peasants were still on the verge of starvation; thousands of them had not so much as an ox to draw their plough. As for irrigation, the canals and aqueducts had been destroyed; and if the rivers fertilised

their banks as of old, they converted many miles of the richest land into marshes.

One of the principal obstacles in the way of effectual cultivation—arising, like the marshes and the ruined aqueducts, from long-continued neglect—was the absence of almost all means of intercommunication. Serviceable roads were exceedingly few, and those which had been levelled in ancient time, occasionally by a vast expenditure of labour, had in many cases been blocked up or overgrown. This of course added to the general insecurity of the country.

Not to dwell upon the miserable condition of Greece half a century ago, let us turn to more recent times. M. Rangabé, speaking of his country as he saw it some five-and-thirty years after its worst, draws the contrast with pardonable pride. “A few years of liberty,” he says,¹ “have completely changed the aspect of the land. They who visit it to-day, after having known it when the Turks were in possession, behold a spectacle which, like an effect in a panorama, suddenly transforms arid deserts into luxuriant landscapes. Nature seems to be regenerated together with the people. Fields once barren are covered with a rich growth. The earth, scarcely furrowed by the plough of the slave, who knows not if he will be permitted to reap the fruit of his toil, is to-day a source of increasing revenue.”

In 1860—we may still follow M. Rangabé, who quotes official statistics—the number of stremmas² under cultivation, in crops and fallow, was 6,076,000, out of a total area of 45,699,248. The plantations (yielding fruit of various kinds) occupied 1,359,900 stremmas. The ground not susceptible of culture,

¹ *Greece: her Progress and Present Position*, 1867.

² A stremma is a little more than a quarter of an acre.

including rocks, forests, marshes, towns, and roads, amounts to about 26,405,348 stremmas. Thus the land still open to culture, or uncultivated arable land, was as much as 11,748,000 stremmas.¹ In other words, only one-sixth of the entire area of Greece was under cultivation in 1864—including plantations, but not forests.

Only one European country was in a worse plight, and that country was Russia, with its immense and almost irreclaimable steppes. But it must be remembered that more than one-third of Greece consists of sterile rocks, whilst the rivers, lakes, and marshes occupy one-tenth of the remainder. The marsh of Kopais alone has a superficial extent of nearly 300,000 stremmas.

“Nearly one-fourth of the population of Greece,” says M. Rangabé, “subsists by agricultural pursuits. This is something, in a country where maritime pursuits are more profitable, and employ upwards of thirty thousand families. They who pass through Greece to-day gaze with pleasure upon vineyards extending as far as the eye can reach, upon rich plantations, where the olive, the fig, and the orange mingle their verdant shade, and give to Messenia, Laconia, and Argolis the appearance of vast gardens. The number

¹ A more detailed statement is given by Mr. Strong. Neither he nor M. Rangabé takes account of the Ionian Islands, which contain about 5,350,400 stremmas.

	Morea.	Continent.	Islands.	Total.
Mountains and rocks	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,967,226	15,967,226
Rivers and lakes	1,500,000	2,000,000	. . .	3,500,000
Forests	3,000,000	4,000,000	. . .	7,000,000
Arable land	11,436,409	8,171,949	300,000	19,008,358
Gardens	35,000	69,000	115,000	219,000
Vineyards	240,000	186,000	324,000	750,000
Currant plantations	14,440	2,120	. . .	16,560
Olive groves	12,551	21,455	7,604	41,610
Lemon and mulberry groves	260	116	110	486
Towns and villages	157,340	47,360	7,060	211,760
Total stremmas	21,396,000	19,498,000	6,721,000	47,615,000

of foreign trees, intended for new plantations, which pass the custom-house of the port of Athens alone, amounts to many millions."

The description will apply equally to the present day; for, though the agricultural products of Greece have increased in bulk since 1864, it does not appear that the cultivation of the land has made such notable progress within the past fifteen years as to transform the general surface of the country. Statistics prove that special industries have been stimulated, and that the trade in particular articles of consumption has rapidly grown; but on the other hand the science of farming has not yet taken root in the soil. No doubt a considerable amount of capital has been invested in the plantations of currants, olives, citrons, mulberries, and the like; but the arable land is not farmed after the systematic manner of English and French farms, with a liberal expenditure in draining, tilling, and planting, and with the aid of the best machinery.

Agricultural science has not been neglected in theory. Capo d'Istria founded a school at Tyrinth, and endowed it with land and a State grant; but in 1865 the Chamber found it necessary to close the establishment, on account of its want of success. It was replaced by a more technical school, which seems to have had no better fortune than its predecessor. Whatever the reason may be, it is certain that farming as a practical art is rarely understood or encouraged in Greece. The State itself is too poor to bring its own lands under the highest kind of culture. The peasant proprietors, owning from the smallest patches to a few score stremmas, have neither capital nor knowledge sufficient to do justice to their farms. The *métayers*, tilling the estates of the larger proprietors,

and living on a moiety of the profits, are still less likely to adopt scientific methods; whilst such of the large proprietors as farm for themselves, or by stewards, are rarely wealthy enough to put the necessary capital into the soil.

There were in the year 1860 about 7,435,900 stremmas of land under cultivation, of which, including plantations and fallows, some 3,560,000 were occupied by cereal crops. No trustworthy statistics appear to have been collected since that time; but an estimate is annually made of the quantity and value of the production. The estimate for the year 1876 was 12,000,000 killots¹ of wheat, barley, and maize, valued at 79,200,000 drachmas. In 1846 the quantity had been reckoned at 6,000,000 killots, and the value at 25,925,000 drachmas.

The herds were computed in 1865 at about four millions and a quarter, including 1,778,729 sheep, 2,289,123 goats, and 226,737 cattle. Of the latter, 168,927 animals were employed for labour. The horses were 69,787, the mules 29,637, and the asses 64,051. The number is probably no larger to-day.

The most important article of commerce amongst the productions of Greek agriculture is the currant. In 1820 the currant plantations on the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth exported, in round numbers, ten million pounds weight of the fruit. The Turks under Ibrahim Pasha destroyed the plants systematically; so that in 1831 the whole production amounted to no more than 5,000,000 lbs. Twenty years later it had reached 57,000,000 lbs.; but in the following year it was reduced by disease to 10,000,000 lbs. The disease was overcome by the use of sulphur, and in

¹ A killot contains nearly 7·3 gallons.

1858 the yield was 62,000,000 lbs. From this time it has steadily increased. In 1865, after the annexation of the Ionian Islands, 111,000,000 lbs. were exported from Greece. Eleven years later, in 1876, the exportation amounted to 195,000,000 lbs., representing a value of about £1,400,000 per annum.

The quantity of land under cultivation for currants is nearly 40,000 acres, and it is probable that this figure could not be greatly increased. The currant vine is fastidious in its growth, and appears to flourish nowhere except in some of the Ionian Islands, on the northern and western shores of the Morea, and around Missolonghi. When the fruit is produced, it is liable to destruction or deterioration by rough weather or excessive moisture; and yet the culture cannot be extended far inland. The crops are gathered in August; and it happens that the Gulf of Corinth is at this time frequently exposed to storms, which may in a day convert a heavy crop into a light one. The vine bears in its sixth year, and does not reach perfection for a dozen or fifteen years, so that it is necessary to manage the plantations very systematically, and to sink capital long before a return is expected. The planters, however, are not so restricted in these respects as the farmers. A prosperous trade, in which there is a ready market for all that can be produced, enables those who are engaged in it to provide efficiently for its extension; and the currant trade of Greece is, in fact, one of the most healthy branches of the national industry.

The wine trade has existed in Greece from time immemorial. Some centuries ago there was a considerable export of the well-favoured malmsey and malvoisie (apparently several brands under each name) from the neighbourhood of Napoli di Malvoisia, the

ancient Epidaurous Limera, and now Monemvasia, on the eastern coast of the Morea. The vines were destroyed, though a few of the best varieties are alleged to have been transplanted to Tenos. For a long time, however, the Greek wines were in very little request. Much depends upon the proper cultivation of the vine, and much upon the process of making; but both of these arts had been neglected under the Ottoman rule. The Greeks and Albanians settled on the shores of the *Ægean* still crushed a few grapes, ripe and unripe together, suffered them to ferment, drained the juice into skin bottles, and threw in a lump of resin from the pine-trees. The product of this barbarous process was a coarse, strong raki, good to make a slave forget his servitude, or to awaken the poetic fervour of a klepht, but entirely useless as an article of commerce.

In 1830 there were only 24,000 stremmas (6,000 acres) of vineyards in Greece. In 1865 the area of vine culture had risen to half a million stremmas; and the increase has continued up to the present day. In 1867 the production was reckoned at 1,850,679 barrels,¹ coming from Achaia, Elis, the Cyclades (especially Santorin), Arcadia, Attica, Bœotia, Argolis, &c., in this order. It has been from the year 1858 onwards that the exportation of wine from Greece has resumed its commercial importance.²

Ibrahim Pasha's victories extended also to the olives, whereof it was computed that he destroyed as many as

¹ The French fût; about 16½ imperial gallons.

² The figures are those of M. Moraïtinis, who does not include the Ionian Islands, "desiring to record the progress achieved by regenerate Greece, adorned and enriched by the men of Greece, under Greek laws." If the statistics of the Ionian Islands had been within my reach, I should have added them; for it is surely high time that the western islands should be thoroughly identified with the progress of modern Greece.

two-thirds. In 1834 there were 2,300,000 olive-trees, producing about a million okas of oil. In 1860 the trees numbered about 7,500,000, and the oil, 5,812,315 okas, from 370,000 stremmas of land. In 1876 the trees were estimated at twelve millions, and the okas of oil at nineteen millions, yielding an income to the State of 1,600,000 drachmas on a total value of 23,000,000 drachmas, contributed by every province of the kingdom. The exportation of figs had attained, in 1876, a value of 4,286,250 drachmas, more than half of which was earned by Messenia. The culture of the mulberry has advanced steadily from 300,000 trees in 1833 to about 2,000,000 in 1878.

Greece also yields large quantities of other sub-tropical fruits. M. Mansolas, in a volume of statistical information relating to the country, states that "all the varieties of the *Hesperidæa*, oranges, lemons, bergamots, citrons, &c., about a hundred sorts, have been introduced. These trees are spread over the gardens of the islands and coasts, as well as on the slopes and valleys of Southern Greece. In many parts, and especially at Paros, Andros, Karysto, Naxos, Messenia, Sparta, Argolis, Lenidi, these fruits have become an important article of commerce. At one time Genoa largely exported these trees to Greece and the East; to-day Karysto, Paros, Andros, and Naxos have taken the place of Genoa. Finally, Greece also cultivates rice, particularly in Levadia, madder, opium, and flax."

Tobacco and cotton are comparatively new branches of culture in Greece. The annual yield of the former is now little short of four million okas; and the export alone has risen from 121,263 okas in 1851 to upwards of a million okas in excess of the import. The cotton industry was practically created by the American Civil

War. The plants were tried in the marshy lands of Levadia and Phthiotis; and they have thriven so well, there and elsewhere, that the production of raw cotton, which rose from 28,537 quintals¹ in 1862 to 193,615 quintals in 1864, has now attained considerable importance.

The forests of Greece had deteriorated greatly during the Turkish occupation, and they continued to deteriorate so long as they were left without proper superintendence, at the mercy of the klephts, the wandering shepherds, and the villagers.² The present extent of the forests is about five and a half million stremmas, which would be ample for the regulation of the climate and the attraction of rain, if they had been systematically preserved by the constant planting of young trees to fill the place of those which were cut down, or which had fallen into decay. This necessary work was long neglected, and the climate probably suffered in consequence. In many parts of Greece the rains are insufficient; but there has been considerable improvement in this respect during recent years. The sale of timber, again, which yields to the State only a small revenue, might be made to produce a sensible effect upon the national balance-sheet; and there is here a fine opening for greater enterprise, and for the employment of a more abundant capital.³ The mountains of Acarnania, the Pholoë mountains, many of the ranges

¹ The quintal is about 100 kilogrammes, or 210 lbs.

² Lycabettus is now almost naked. Pentelicon, Parnassus, and even Hymettus, have been stripped.

³ A project is now before the Government, having been framed by a special commission, for the consolidation of the law relating to forest lands. This project, in common with other contemplated reforms, appears to have fallen into the background in consequence of the more imperious political considerations which have recently engrossed the attention of the Greeks.

of the Morea, of Attica, of Eubœa, are covered with forests of oak, fir, and other serviceable trees.

Greece has indeed her forest laws, which, if strictly enforced, would soon bring about a more satisfactory state of things. As early as 1836 the Bavarian Government promulgated three decrees, all directed towards the prevention of the evil. Severe penalties were pronounced against those who injured the growing trees, and it was specially forbidden to drive the flocks into the underwood. An ephor was appointed to overlook the forests, having under him inspectors, guards, and foresters. There are at the present day two inspectors, ten general forest-wardens, forty-four inferior officers, and seventy guards. But it would seem that the revenues of the State are benefited by less than a quarter of a million drachmas—a sum utterly insignificant by comparison with what it might easily be made.

The produce of bees in Greece may be valued at about a million drachmas annually, in honey and wax. The honey of Hymettus is still distinguished by its flavour, contracted from the many aromatic flowers of the plains and slopes of Attica; but still more appreciated is the honey of Karysto, which, “transparent and golden, of a delicious flavour, fills the mouth with an aroma of roses, exquisitely delicate.”

On the whole, the agriculture of Greece is in a hopeful condition, languishing chiefly for want of capital, but not for want of soil, excellent varieties of plants, or the industry of agriculturists. The Government, moreover, has generally done its best to encourage cultivation, by subsidies, by remission of taxes, by founding institutions calculated to promote the scientific development of the natural wealth of Greece, and by

providing facilities for technical education. The University of Athens, as we have seen, has its Botanic Garden and Museum. Chambers of Commerce and Agricultural Councils exist in the principal towns of the nomarchies, part of whose business it is to keep the Government instructed as to the progress and the requirements of their several districts. Many laws have been passed, in the past and present reigns, having for their object to protect and foster the agriculturists.

The absolute necessity for capital for the proper development of the national resources has stimulated Greek statesmen to attempt the foundation of an Agricultural Bank, not only to supply the needs which may hereafter arise, but also to assist the State in a work which seems to be imperatively demanded—the relief of the land from the heavy imposts now weighing upon it. More than once a vigorous effort has been made to establish such a bank, but hitherto the labour has been in vain. The last proposition was due to M. Coumoundouros, and its boldness gave rise to not a little excitement throughout the country. He proposed that the State should take possession of the property of the convents, and, setting apart one-half of the value to provide pensions for the dispossessed monks, appropriate the other half to the foundation of the Agricultural Bank. The total estimated value of the conventual property in Greece is ten million drs.—only £357,000; and as the half of this would be insufficient for the purpose in view, it was suggested that additional capital should be raised, either by special bonds, or by loans from the National and Ionian Banks, at four per cent., in return for a twenty-five years' extension of their privileges. And furthermore, the new bank was to have the privilege of issuing to the

extent of five times its actual capital—which would give it a nominal capital of a hundred million drachmas.

Conventual property has been secularised in various countries, and after various methods; but in this case Greek met Greek, and the scheme fell to the ground as soon as it was made public. The Holy Synod opposed four arguments to the proposition of M. Coumoundouros, which the Government considered too forcible to be neglected.

It urged, first, that there were plenty of lands in Greece, not yet under cultivation, which might serve the turn of the State as well as the conventual lands. This, of course, was far from being the case, inasmuch as the property of the monks is readily salable, whilst the property of the State is not so. The second contention—that the confiscation was opposed to the canon law—might have had no greater force than the first; but the remaining two were more formidable. If the Government were to alienate the property of its own convents, urged the Synod, it would justify the confiscation of Greek convents in Roumania, against which it had strongly protested; and finally, it would give the Porte an excuse for stripping the Greek religious institutions in Turkey.

The Government of Athens admitted the cogency of these arguments, and abandoned its scheme. But it may be doubted whether a bolder policy would not have been better, after all. The secularisation of religious estates, with proper compensation for the religious communities, rests on very good precedents, and is certainly within the competence of every State. And it cannot be logically argued that such a step on the part of the Greek Government, within the limits of Greece, would justify either Roumania or Turkey in

confiscating the property of Greek religious communities, to which both States had given solemn guarantees. In any case it would not have justified confiscation without compensation. But the Greek statesmen doubtless knew with whom they had to deal; and the critical relations between Athens and Constantinople at the moment when the danger was pointed out to them will adequately account for their hesitation.

CHAPTER IX.

PUBLIC WORKS.

Herculean Labours—The Marshes—Subterranean Outlets—Turkish Public Works—First Steps—New Greece on the Ruins of Old Greece—Reconstruction of Cities and Villages—Roads and Telegraphs—Bridges—Seaports—Lighthouses.

OF all the Herculean labours which the men of New Greece found themselves called upon to perform after coming into their inheritance, none was greater or more important than the reconstruction of the towns and villages, the harbours and quays, the breakwaters and lighthouses, the roads and bridges, the walls and dykes, which had fallen into ruins during many centuries of neglect and foreign domination. Here, even more literally than in any other respect, it may be said that everything remained to be done; and the urgency was all the greater because commerce and agriculture were paralysed for want of these indispensable public works.

The Greeks have effected much, as we shall see. But there is also very much which they have hitherto been unable to effect; and it is still necessary to say that commerce and agriculture are paralysed.

Something has already been said of the overflowing rivers, lakes, and marshes of Greece, which have swallowed up so much of the best land, and which might still be confined within reasonable limits, if the resources of the kingdom were sufficient for its greatest

needs. The country which the Turks left behind them on their expulsion bore no more significant evidences of their impotence and neglect than the vast marshy plains of the Morea and Levadia. The heart of the Peloponnese, once the granary and storehouse of dense populations—the fertile tracts surrounding the cities of Megalepolis, Mantinea, Orchomenos, the plains of Stymphalos, and of the twelve cities round Kopais, the broad banks of a dozen life-giving streams, had all been reclaimed by the element from which the engineers of younger Greece had redeemed them. Part of this work of devastation, it is only right to say, was the consequence of the ten years' war, and of the abandonment of precautions which were observed even in the time of the Turks. Mr. Strong, writing in 1842, said that he had been told by the villagers living near the ruins of Stymphalos how, a quarter of a century before, they had been able after a dry winter to cultivate certain tracts of the marshy plain, and reap fifty times as much as they had sown.¹

The extent of the mischief wrought by the neglect of public works, and of works of drainage in particular,

¹ Here is a fact to the credit of the Turks in Greece, worth recording on that account:—"The old men of the valley of Stymphalos," says Mr. Strong, "still remember the considerable works which were undertaken by the Turkish Government sixty-five years ago, in order to clear the subterraneous channel, which had become stopped up. During the six summer months of the year 1776, 500 men were employed on the undertaking. After having cleared away the mud and soil which choked up the modern channel, to the depth of fifteen feet, and above a hundred feet in length, they discovered regular steps cut in the red marble rock of which the mountain is composed. On clearing out the mud which covered the twenty steps, the lowest of which was about thirty-five feet below the level of the valley, which had risen by the accumulated deposit of alluvial soil, they came to the entrance of the ancient channel, consisting of two large gates, or openings cut in the rock. The operations were then directed to clearing these passages of the mud which obstructed them, in the hope of reaching the point where the ancient channel joined that through which the waters

may be judged from the circumstance that, out of twenty subterranean passages by which Lake Kopais was formerly drained, only one now exists in a serviceable condition. These artificial outlets were amongst the most creditable works of the old engineers; and we can readily understand that the opening of one of them (at Pheneus) was ascribed, as Pausanias relates, to Hercules. In the time of Alexander the Great, Crates pierced the mountain which separated Lake Kopais from the Eubœan channel. Forty vertical shafts, sunk into this tunnel for the purpose of cleansing it when necessary, remain to the present day.¹

It would be a long task to enumerate all the notable public works of the ancient Greeks, many of which are still capable of reconstruction on their original bases. We may live to see much of this heroic labour undertaken and carried out; but that prospect can only be realised when New Greece acquires the resources necessary for such an ambitious enterprise.

Nevertheless, that which has already been done is well worth mentioning. In 1845 Greece had drained the marshes of Chalkis, of the Cephissus, of the plain of Tripolitza, and those formed by the river Sperchius. It had also made considerable progress with the principal roads, especially those leading from Athens. But it was in the generation succeeding this date that the most rapid and significant progress was

are at present disgorged, and which traverses the mountain at a less depth than the two ancient gates, but in the same direction. Scarcely, however, had they proceeded twenty yards with the operation, when a part of the roof of the cavern fell in suddenly with a tremendous crash, burying half a dozen workmen under it. The rest, who were mostly Greeks, were so frightened that they fairly ran away, and could not be persuaded to return, in consequence of which the works were unfortunately abandoned."—*Greece as a Kingdom*.

¹ Strong, p. 167.

made. The credit of the fact is due in great measure to the office of Public Works, and to its skilful and energetic directors. One of these, M. Manيتaki, has left us a concise account of the material progress of Greece in his time, from which a few particulars may be quoted.¹

Up to the date of M. Manيتaki's publication, in 1869, eleven new cities had been rebuilt on ancient sites; namely, Syra, the Piræus, Sparta, Patras, Megalopolis, Petalidi, Othonopolis (in Eubœa), Eretria, Amaliopolis, Adamas (in Milo), and New Corinth.

More than forty towns, specially injured in the war, had been restored and enlarged. Amongst these may be mentioned Athens, Thebes, Levadia, Lamia, Hypatia, Missolonghi, Vonitza, Astakos, Carpenitza, Amphissa, Galaxidhi, Atalanta, Lepanto, Agrinion, Nauplia, Argos, Tripolis, Calamas, Modon, Coron, Navarino, Calavryta, Pyrgos, Lenidi, Cranidi, Kyparissia, Gythion, Nisi, Chalkis, Cumæ.

More than six hundred villages had been reconstructed; whilst it would, of course, be impossible to enumerate all the minor repairs and rebuildings of single dwellings or public edifices, undertaken by the State or the local authorities.

The total cost of these works was estimated by M. Manيتaki at 250,000,000 drachmas; but the Minister of Finance, in the budget of 1861, had computed at 350,000,000 drachmas the cost of the operations carried out up to that date.

As for the public roads of Greece, it is to be observed that the ancient inhabitants of the country left none of those solid level causeways which the Romans were wont to construct in every land where

¹ *Aperçu sur les Progrès Matériels de la Grèce*: Athens, 1869.

they settled. The Greek roads were for the most part difficult tracks across an uneven ground, wherein nature was not greatly assisted by human skill. The later subjugators of the country did nothing to supply the want; and indeed they neglected what had actually been effected by the Greek engineers. The Frank and Venetian kings and dukes who divided Greece amongst them had little motive for breaking down the barriers between their dominions; and thus there are few mountain roads or bridges owing their origin to the middle ages.

In 1833 the Bavarians found scarcely a single carriage road in Greece; and, for that matter, scarcely a single carriage. The traffic, such as there was, had long been carried on by means of horses and mules; but the tracks which they followed were generally those which Nature had indicated to the earliest inhabitants. The Government of King Otho immediately ordered the construction of suitable roads from the capital to Agrinion, and another to the Piræus; from Patras to Gythion; from Nauplia to Argos, and from the same to Tripolitza; from Loutraki to Calamaki, across the isthmus of Corinth; from Navarino to Corinth; from Thebes to Chalkis; from Amphissa to Lamia; and from Missolonghi to Agrinion. The task was necessarily a slow one, and it had not been completed as late as 1870. At the present day it is reckoned by M. George Soutzo, the successor of M. Manitaki as Director of Public Works, that the roads of the mainland have an aggregate length of 889,933 kilometres; whilst those of the Ionian Islands are 375,000 kilometres—more than a quarter of a million of the whole having been constructed or improved since 1873.

There is but one railroad now at work in Greece.

It unites Athens and the Piræus, and is about seven and a half miles in length, having a station at Phalerum, where it has already created a new town. The concession for this railway was obtained by an English capitalist, who sold his privilege to a company for twenty thousand pounds. The company (also English) laid the line, and then sold it to the Greek company which now works it, at a profit of more than fifteen per cent. Greeks are fond of quoting this fact as a proof that foreigners have little difficulty in turning their enterprise and capital to good account in Greece. Another and more important line is projected from Athens to Patras, and from thence southwards. The concession is in the hands of Greek financiers; and, if well managed, the line would appear to have every prospect of success. Its route passes through the currant country, and through the well-wooded neighbourhood of Pholoë. It would connect the capital with some of the most important towns in the Morea, and would give an alternative means of intercommunication between the east and west of the kingdom, which merchants, and even tourists, would frequently prefer to the slower sea-passage of the Gulf of Corinth.

The seaports of Greece had been practically closed by a long course of neglect. Sand and mud had accumulated, breakwaters and sea-walls had fallen to decay, and there were few harbours along the coasts of the mainland, or in the islands, where the anchorage was safe or convenient. It is surprising that, under such disadvantages, the Greeks were able to retain any portion of their maritime trade—much more surprising that they were able to increase it, as the shipowners of Hydra, Spetzas, and Psara increased it, even before the yoke of the Turks was rejected. The reconstruction

and development of the old ports were amongst the first serious labours of the State; and the country was soon in a position to boast of good roadsteads and ports, capable of receiving vessels of the first magnitude. Thus Manitaki mentions seven restored harbours of primary importance—those, namely, of the Piræus, of Nauplia and Coron, and, in the islands, of Syra, Stauros (in Tenos), Naxia, and Thera. To these had been added six others, virtually new—Kyparissia, Catacolo, Cyllene, Patras, New Corinth, and Andros. The acquisition of the Ionian Islands enriched Greece with two or three more valuable stations; and down to the present day the Government and the demarchies on the sea-board have constantly devoted their attention to the improvement of their harbours. It was, indeed, to the energy of the demarchies in particular, which paid heavy rates for this express purpose, that the re-opening of many of the existing ports was due.

Thus the Piræus, which in 1830 was “barely accessible to fishing-smacks,” has been rendered capable of holding a large fleet, and is annually increasing in commercial importance. At Nauplia a fine quay has been constructed, which swarms with shippers and sailors. Coron is the port through which much of the oil and other productions of Southern Greece is carried to foreign markets. Catacolo, at the mouth of the Alpheus, is almost the only refuge on the rocky western coast of the Peloponnese, between Patras and Navarino, and is one of the principal outlets of the currant and wine trades. At Patras, a busy town, where there was no natural harbour, a mole was constructed which had attained a length of 350 metres in 1869. A complete list of these works is given by Manitaki, and quoted by M. Moraïtinis, who adds that “up to

the present day sixty-five ports are already established, either by special laws or by the general law of December 29th, 1865, respecting the construction and repair of quays, lighthouses, jetties, and the streets leading to them, and the cleansing of the harbours. In most of them the works are carried out regularly, or by instalments, according to the receipts of the ports."

The lighthouses have not been neglected in recent years, as for a long time they had been. In 1847 there was only one (on a small island near Syra) over the whole of the dangerous seas of Greece and the Archipelago. There are now forty-six, including the revolving lights of Andros (visible for thirty nautical miles), of Zea, Psytalia, and Catacolo (seventeen miles), of Patras, Antirhion, Ægina, and the Piræus.

These evidences of the industry and enterprise of the Greeks in the material reconstruction of their country should be sufficient to clinch the argument that they are worthy of a better endowment than any they have yet received from Europe, and capable of a higher political mission than that which the jealousies and "policies" of the Great Powers have hitherto permitted them to discharge. And they will prove, at the same time, that the achievements of the nation, creditable and valuable as they have been up to the present day, have been limited entirely by the want of greater resources, and not in any sense by the sloth or incompetence of Government or people. Add to Greece a few millions of inhabitants, a safe frontier populous towns, harbours, and fertile valleys—all her own—and who will doubt for a single moment that her enterprise will be stimulated, her industry

redoubled, her prosperity increased, and her beneficial influence widened, to a remarkable degree?

We have glanced, in a very cursory manner, at the actual condition of the Kingdom of Greece, and considered the Greeks of to-day as they appear to lookers-on from the outside, prejudiced neither for nor against them by residence in their midst. We have seen how they estimate the value of education and refinement, to what ambitions on their own part, and hopes on the part of their friends, the genius of the Hellenic race has given birth; we have reviewed the liberal Constitution under which they live, the enlightened character of their Government, the unfortunate state of their finances. We have marked the progress effected during the past half-century, in the restoration of public order, in the purer administration of justice, in the extension of trade and commerce, of manufactures and maritime industry, of agriculture and public works. We have found, moreover, that much of the best of this progress has been achieved within the last twelve or fifteen years — although from the very day of their emancipation the former slaves of the Turks have been laboriously plodding, year after year, to redeem their country from destruction. And, notwithstanding all that has been actually done, in spite of the advance which has been made, we have detected at every step, interfering with every forward movement of Greece and the Greeks, some stumbling-block in the path of national progress, some obstacle to popular development.


What is the origin of these drawbacks to the prosperity of Greece? From whence has she received the fatal inheritance of liberty without the power to be free? Under what circumstances did Europe impose

upon her the conditions which have fettered and restrained her?

Greece has been rendered impotent by the Great Powers, whose "policies" and "interests" in the East have been supposed to require her perpetual restraint. Her liberation from the Turks has been stultified by the espousal of Turkey's cause by England and France; and more especially by our own obstinately cherished idea, that the defence of the Porte is necessary to the defence of the British Empire. History tells the tale of the establishment of New Greece in terms which, with slight modifications, would apply to the events of yesterday as aptly as to the events of fifty years back. Reading this tale in the light of contemporary facts, it is possible that we may not only gain a clearer comprehension of the motives of Europe in 1878, but also unfold a reasonable plea for a wiser and more generous treatment of Greece.

Part II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW GREECE.



CHAPTER I.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

The Right of Intervention—Recent Interventions, by Concert and by Single Nations—The Congresses of Laybach and Verona—National Enthusiasms—Intervention in Turkey—The Reconstruction of Turkey—The Claims of Greece.

WHEN we speak of the right or claim of Europe to make new dispositions of any part of the territory which composes this particular quarter of the globe, little else can be intended than that the Powers, acting in concert, may deal with facts and situations as they arise, in such a manner as may seem most for the benefit of the people affected by their decisions, or for the common benefit of the nations. These two objects are generally, but not always, coincident. In the very rare cases in which it might seem right to overbear the will of a nation in determining its future lot, we must at least expect to find a practical unanimity amongst all the remaining nations: and even then the ultimate advantage of the people thus constrained must be manifestly implied and assured in the advantage of the majority. The constraint of an individual nation for the common weal of an economy of nations rests upon the same sanction as the constraint of the liberty of an individual for the common weal of a human society. No words can be needed to show that, without this practical unanimity, and without this sanction, any interference with the

freedom of a people, uninvited or unprovoked, is a crime. It cannot be maintained that one or two Powers, or even a coalition, would be justified in assuming the control of a nation's destinies for no better reason than that the nation in question was weak, whilst its possessions were coveted by its neighbours.

But if, up to a certain point, the complete independence of a people within its own territories must be acknowledged, and if every people may justly claim to be "master in its own house," this cannot preclude the right of a community of nations to intervene in the affairs of any one member of the community, when either this member is disturbing the general peace, or its Government has become clearly and indisputably impotent. It is no doubt fairly open to question how far the collective authority of a community like Europe ought to be systematised, or whether we should be doing wisely to set up an international court, extending its jurisdiction over nations, and an international police in order to carry out its decisions. But the rights of the majority must necessarily be paramount, however they ought to be exercised. There is probably very little difference of opinion as to the right which the Powers possessed in 1876, for instance, to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, so long as they intervened in concert, and for the benefit of the several nations which constituted the subjects of the Porte in Europe.

It is, perhaps, possible, in the absence of any distinct international agreement, or in times when the mutual understanding of the Powers has been weakened by the independent action of one or two of them, to justify the conduct of a single Power, or of a coalition, which intervenes in the affairs of a notoriously ill-governed State, in so far as its intervention is directed solely to

the benefit of the oppressed nationality, and not in any respect to its own exclusive interests. Such justification, however, is only possible on the ground that the intervention is beneficial to the nationality relieved, and, through it, to the community of nations whereof it is a member. The principle of the mutual dependence of the associated nations is not necessarily violated by an intervention of this kind, even though the intervening State has acted nominally outside the general concert.

Of the interventions in Europe during the past century, the present generation would probably be agreed that the majority were unjustifiable; whilst there are instances in which it would hardly now be denied that the intervention of the European concert, though refused, was extremely desirable. The history of the suppression of Poland furnishes examples of intervention and non-intervention which seem to be almost equally destitute of justification. The partition of the State by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in 1772, rendered more effectual in 1795, was the source of many of the subsequent crimes and misfortunes of Europe; whilst the later history of that ill-fated nationality has furnished a dozen opportunities for the restraining influence of the European concert, which have been either neglected or used in a fashion too mild to be effectual. The settlement of 1815, which had left Cracow a free republic, and central Poland a kingdom under the protection of Russia, was set aside in 1846 by the three parties to the treaty of 1772; and on this occasion it is true that the conscience of England, France, Sweden, and Turkey revolted at the open theft. These four Powers protested; and perhaps they would have done more to vindicate the right of nations if the swords of

the plunderers had been less heavy in the scale. Intervention might have been renewed in 1863 with more apparent hope of success, for Russia was comparatively isolated. But England, for reasons which seemed to her sufficient at the time, stopped short of an effectual assertion of the authority of Europe; and the Poles were once more left to their fate.

The intervention of Europe in the affairs of revolutionary France was certainly unjustifiable in the first instance, and brought with it its own expiation. It was justified from the moment when the Republic became wantonly aggressive; but in its origin it had no better excuse than the scandalous intervention of the Allies in Naples (1821) and Spain (1822). After the final defeat of Napoleon the victorious Powers conceived a scheme, admirable from the point of view of the monarchs and statesmen of the time, by which the well-being of Europe was to be assured through their united action. It was, in fact, just such a scheme of European concert and international police as theorists in every age have recommended for our adoption; and its results may probably be accepted as a sufficient condemnation of the specious doctrine—specious, at all events, under such conditions as then existed. The Allies agreed to meet in Congress, from time to time, in order to take concerted action wherever it might seem advisable in the common interest. At Laybach, accordingly, in the year 1821, the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France, determined to suppress the Liberal Government of Naples, and to assist the worthless Ferdinand in violating the Constitution which he had sworn to maintain. England had already grown sick of the compact into which she had entered, but her representative went no further than to wash his hands

of the decision of his colleagues, simply demanding that no idea of self-aggrandisement should enter into the plans of the Powers.

Austria gladly became the mercenary executioner of Italian freedom—Austria, the tool of so many European crimes, the mock umpire and betrayer of Napoleon in 1813, the jailer of Greek and Slavonian patriots, whose hollow empire would long since have crumbled to pieces but for the perfidies which still prop up her tottering rule.

A year later the Congress of Verona pronounced the fate of Spain. The Spanish Ferdinand had shared the fate of his Neapolitan namesake—his subjects had dared to proclaim a Constitution, and the crowned heads of Europe saw in this fact a rebellion against the first principles of government, and a menace to civilisation. Such was the language of European statesmen little more than half a century ago; and the representatives of the Powers at Verona decided on another benevolent intervention. This time England spoke more boldly. Canning had succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office, and, so far, the honour of the country was safe. The Duke of Wellington—himself a conscientious opponent of popular reforms—declared that England would have nothing to do with an intervention in the internal affairs of other nations which would be more likely to prejudice than to promote the interests of those whom it professed to benefit. But the Congress proceeded without the concurrence of England, and France was made the instrument of this new oppression. The Duke d'Angoulême, with his army of 100,000, over-rode Spain, set the king on his throne, and left him 50,000 troops to keep him there. The results of this intervention—the greatest blot on the scutcheon of modern France—were

lamentable in the extreme. In the wake of the army, which contained thousands of Liberal Frenchmen, the Spanish royalists turned upon the champions of popular freedom, and slaughtered them without mercy. The outbreak of murderous passions was incomparably more fierce and sanguinary than the White Terror had been in France; and, worse still, the unhappy country was doomed to half a century of impotent struggles for liberty, which, but for the Congress of Verona, it might have been to a great extent spared.

It may be observed that the flagitious acts of these two Congresses prove nothing absolutely against the wisdom and value of a European concert, systematised into a kind of international court of arbitration. The concerted action agreed upon in 1815 was made an instrument of oppression in 1821 and 1822; but it had succeeded in 1818, when the allies met the representatives of France at Aix-la-Chapelle, and anticipated the evacuation of that country by several years. Moreover, it was not the action of the European concert which failed at Laybach and Verona, but the concert itself. Such a concert, indeed, could not have been held to be broken by the wanton and inequitable abstention of a single Power, any more than the judgment of a court in *banco* could be vitiated by the withdrawal of one of the judges. But a European concert in 1822 without the concurrence of England was an absurdity. The decisions taken at Verona in the autumn of 1822 were, therefore, so far as they referred to Spain, anything but the decisions of a concert. They amounted, virtually, to a mere pact between the representatives of four crowned heads, who resolved to trample on a whole nation in the interests of an impotent king.

And, again, if it is attempted to argue from these

examples that a serviceable European concert, established for anything more than a single specific object, is impracticable, and doomed to failure beforehand, it is sufficient to reply that the compact of 1815 was a compact in which absolute monarchs had the predominance, in obedience to whom the veterans of a quarter of a century of constant war stood ready to dragoon Europe at a day's notice. It might be very different with a concert of free nations, of enlightened republics like France and Switzerland, and of constitutional monarchies like England and Italy, in which the royal prerogative, when opposed to the will of the people in Parliament, is no stronger than the voice of a child. A concert of nations would rarely be deserted except by a Power anxious to engage in war; and the worst motives and incentives to war are unknown in a land which has set its mind upon self-government. The self-government of an economy of nations demands much the same qualities as the self-government of a single nation, or of an individual. As these qualities are developed in individuals and in single nations they will become more and more applicable to economies; and the main tendency of our time, however counteracted by reactionary lusts of war, is to develop these qualities in the fullest and widest sense.

Of interventions by one State, or a coalition of States, in the internal affairs of another, it would be far more difficult to define the justifications; but no doubt the strongest one of all would be that the step should be taken in each case for the benefit, and at the request, of an oppressed nation struggling against an oppressor. Moreover, it must be taken only with the sanction of the community of nations, or after such sanction has been frankly and unreservedly asked. Indeed, we are com-

pelled to fall back once more upon the broader question of the international concert; for though a single State may under certain circumstances be justified in intervening, it cannot claim to be so justified until it has at least solicited a sanction of this kind. The solidity of European interests, for instance, plainly forbids the idea of an intervention against the will of the community of nations, if for no other reason than because such an intervention must necessarily affect the trade, the property, and the legitimate influence of each particular Power. The practical wisdom of stipulating for the sanction of the community of Powers is manifest. The responsibility of deciding between a nation and its Government is occasionally very great. It is better that this responsibility should rest on the concert of nations than on a single State, or even on a powerful coalition.

It is barely possible to conceive a case of justifiable intervention on behalf, and at the request, of a dynasty or Government against its people. A people cannot oppress its rulers; in the event of hostility it is the privilege of monarchs and Governments to put themselves out of the way. The most familiar recent instances of such intervention by a single Power are those of Russia in Hungary (1849) and of France in Rome (1848), neither of which, we may suppose, would find many palliators in the present day. As the world progresses tyrants have fewer opportunities of crushing their subjects, whether by their own strength or with the aid of a neighbour. In place of these benevolent interventions of royal cousinship we occasionally meet with a somewhat novel phenomenon in history—the intervention of one crowned head on behalf of the revolted subjects of another. It is a little remarkable that the same tyrannies which butchered the Hungarians

and suppressed the Roman Republic were amongst the first to turn their hands to work of a directly opposite character. Louis Napoleon cast off the Austrian yoke from Italy, and the son of Nicholas severed the chains of the Turkish rayahs. There is, indeed, nothing new in the fact of one monarch espousing the cause of another monarch's subjects. When wars were mainly dynastic or religious, the pretext of national deliverance was very commonly put forward, and with more or less of apparent justice. But the spirit of the age in which we live is peculiarly favourable to the assertion of popular liberties, whether by internal revolution alone, as in France, or by the combination of internal revolution and external aid, as in Italy, or mainly by foreign instigation, as amongst the subject races of Turkey.

The distinguishing feature, as well as the justification, of most modern interventions on behalf of oppressed nationalities consists in the generous enthusiasm of one people for another less free than itself; and the intrigues of a Government can scarcely be justifiable when they are not based upon, and do not spring directly from, such a national enthusiasm. A nation has much the same right to deliver a nation as an individual has to protect an individual; and, when the nation speaks, its Government is entitled—nay, bound—to act. But without this popular warrant it is very difficult to conceive a justification for the interference of a Government; for under such circumstances the Government cannot be that of a free country, but must be actuated by dynastic and selfish motives. The world very rightly distrusts constitutions, and liberties, and deliverances, which are the gift of autocrats. Such gifts, indeed, must almost of necessity be immoral. Autocrats,

tyrants, crowned heads in general, exist under a virtual compact with each other; they logically stand or fall together; there is an honour amongst them, so that, when one departs from the recognised precedents and traditions, he is guilty of a certain treachery towards all the rest. As no monarch can give his subjects a full measure of personal freedom without making himself the actual or virtual president of a republic, so no autocrat can take forcible measures to give liberty to the subjects of another autocrat without becoming a traitor to his order, and practically forfeiting his title to his own crown.

To come now to the illustration afforded us by the history of our own generation, it may be observed in the first place that the attitude of Russia towards Turkey is a peculiar one in this sense—that, if the present Czar is still an autocrat, he began his reign by giving a considerable increase of liberty to his own subjects, before he turned his attention to the subjects of the Sultan. The case falls between the two indicated above; for, though no one can call Russia a free country, yet the Russian people have displayed a generous enthusiasm for the Turkish rayahs, which at least testifies to their own capacity for freedom. And here we perceive a further complication in the problem; for it is fairly open to doubt whether the Slavophil tendencies of Russia are not in great measure the creation of previous intrigues on the part of the Government. It is doubtful whether the former wars between Russia and Turkey—at all events prior to 1828—were incited or endorsed by any pronounced sympathy of Russian subjects with the victims of Turkish misrule. However this may be, the war of 1877 had a better justification than those which went before it, on the

precise ground that it was a popular war, based, at least in part, upon a generous popular enthusiasm.

Passing from particular to general justifications, for intervention in the Ottoman Empire, and to the reasons which seem to warrant Europe in endowing Greece with a share, greater or smaller, of the possessions of Turkey, it must be observed that the sanction for any such interference must rest, in the first place, as already indicated, on the existence of certain facts, and of a certain situation, which could not by any conceivable method be replaced by the facts and the situation of a previous period. We could not, even if we would, reconstruct the Turkey of 1875, obliterate the crimes and repair the misfortunes of the Turkey of 1876, undo the victories of Russia over the Turkey of 1877. Assuming that the voice of Russia in regard to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire could be silenced, and supposing that the Power which had silenced Russia's voice were to invite Europe to revert, as far as possible, to the state of affairs as it was established in 1856, what could Europe do? What she would not do, what the public opinion of Europe would not suffer to be done, what the mind revolts from as an impossible crime, is that she should restore the direct rule of the Porte over the nationalities which it had failed to govern justly. It would be superfluous to enlarge upon the crimes of the Turkish Government, which it has either committed of its own volition or allowed to be committed through its impotence. As well might the United States attempt to restore the institution of slavery as Europe to rehabilitate the sway of the Porte.

The thing is physically, as well as morally, impossible. The Turkish system is destroyed throughout the provinces affected by recent wars—that is to say,

throughout the larger portion of the empire. The valis, the mutessarifs, the caimakans, the mudirs, have fled, or have been driven away ; the whole civil administration of the vilayets, the whole military organisation and police of the country, so far as the Turkish authority is concerned, are at an end. Not a pasha, not a bey, not a zaptieh, could return to his post and resume the power which he was wont to exercise. The rayahs have realised their freedom from and their supremacy over the Mussulmans. They have had arms in their hands, and have used them. The old spell has been broken—a Bulgarian legion has fought and bled ; and the first lesson in liberty which the Slavs have received is of such a kind as can never be unlearned.

Moreover, what Europe at large demands in the south-east is, above all, finality. It recognises the impossibility of such finality under the integral and independent sway of the Porte, it despairs of re-constructing Turkish credit, it has lost all confidence in Turkish solvency, and it has thus arrived at the conviction that no successor of Abdul Aziz can ever again hold sway over the Turkey of 1875.

The Powers of Europe, therefore, have had to face these facts and this situation. They were called upon to devise, in concert, a new equilibrium in place of the old instability. It was a task not for one Power but for all. Unless this task had been undertaken by the European concert, and unless the Powers had agreed in looking upon intervention as a duty, rather than as a matter of option, there could have been no reasonable prospect of finality in their deliberations.

If any further justification had been needed for the constraint and control of Turkey by the Great Powers, beyond that which springs from the actual condition of

the empire, and the impossibility of restoring its former government, we might find it in the appeal made to Europe by all the subject nationalities, which (the Mussulmans of course excepted) demanded their liberation from the Turkish yoke, basing their demand on the plea of oppressive and unprogressive government, which morality and history approve as a sanction of revolution. An impotent government, revolted subjects of half a dozen nationalities, the absolute need of pacification from without, more than justified the statesmen of Europe in their acts of intervention.

How, then, were we bound to intervene? Who is to rule where Turkey has failed to rule? What ought to be the limits of our interference? And, having regard to the desired finality, to what eventual disposition of South-Eastern Europe ought we most to incline?

The territory comprised in what was recently known as Turkey in Europe—the territory, that is to say, between the Mediterranean and Austria, between the Adriatic and the Black Sea—must be governed in the future either in one dominion or in several. A little consideration will show that a single Power could not hope to wield authority over the various races of this wide tract of country, forced apart as these races are by irreconcilable creeds, by antipathies of history and character, by differences of language and habits, by animosities which have become inveterate through centuries of oppression. For the present, at all events, it is impossible to suppose that the Greeks, the Osmanli Turks, the Tartars, the Serbs, Bulgarians, Ruthenians, Roumanians, Albanians, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Tcherkesses, and other families more or less numerous, which were recently bestridden by the dynasty of Osman, will

again settle down under any single king or sultan. What may come hereafter, and what may be effected under the influence of peace, prosperity, and a civilising rule, it is impossible to predict. But it seems most natural to conclude, on a careful review of the whole situation, that the best guarantee for the future peace and stability of south-eastern Europe is to be found in giving the fullest possible effect to the claims of the Greeks—not in the sense of extending their dominion over other distinct nationalities, but with the policy, deliberately adopted and steadily carried out, of adding to the existing kingdom of Greece, as occasion may serve, and as speedily as a strict adherence to political morality may allow, every province, every city, every coast and island, to which the Hellenic race can establish so much as the semblance of an historical title.

I hope, in the pages which follow, to show a sufficient justification for this policy, by examining the nature and extent of the Hellenic claims. It will be no part of our task to consider the future settlement of those portions of the Ottoman dominions in Europe which lie outside the sphere of Greek nationality. The future of the Slavs is no doubt also an urgent European question; but it is a question of secondary importance as regards the ultimate equilibrium of the south-east. This equilibrium will be practically secured when we have established a single dominant Power on the *Ægean*, and a keeper of the *Dardanelles*. We need not set out by assuming that the master of the *Ægean* and the holder of the *Dardanelles* must be one and the same Power. It would be useless to advocate any policy or cause which cannot be maintained with the strictest regard for international justice. But it may safely be contended that it is from the

Greeks, amongst all the rival nationalities in the south-east, that Europe must expect the most efficient, the most stable, the most enlightened, the most independent rule, with a view to the elimination of weakness, to the speedy exclusion of foreign interference, to that *finality*, in short, without which this long-troubled region will continue to trouble us, for decades and centuries to come.

Briefly expressed, the claims of Greece to a definite predominance in south-eastern Europe may be described as resting upon the following arguments, which will be found expanded in the remaining chapters of the present work :—

Europe should espouse the cause of Greece—

(i.) Because Greece has a strong historical title to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, based both upon former possession and upon existing nationality.

(ii.) Because, if we do not promote the advance of Greece towards Constantinople, as the Mahomedans recede there is a danger lest the Slavs should occupy the ground.

(iii.) Because Greece, already established on the Ægean, has no rival in her claims to the remainder of the coast, even as far as Constantinople, except the Mussulmans, whose power is declining in Europe.

(iv.) Because the Greeks initiated the movements which have led to the partial dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, and which bids fair to put an end to Turkish misrule.

(v.) Because Greece was raised to her present position by Europe—by England, France, and Russia, especially—and has thus been encouraged to hope that Europe would complete the work of her restoration.

(vi.) Because Greece, being now independent, would remain less bound to any one of her benefactors, and would speedily assume the strength and dignity of a "Great Power."

(vii.) Because Greece, in spite of great drawbacks, is already a strong nation, with an orderly and developed Government, and has proved her capacity to rule.

(viii.) Because Greece has the traditions of greatness and refinement; and the Greeks of to-day have shown, at their best, that they retain the faculties of their ancestors.

(ix.) Because the establishment of Greece on the *Ægean* as a Great Power would be a menace to no other Power—would not in itself contain the germs of future troubles, but would tend distinctly to avert them.

CHAPTER II.

PANSLAVISM AND PANHELLENISM.

The Greek Question for England—Panslavism, its Origin and History—The Slavs in Europe—Russia's Claims to the Hegemony—The Panslavonian Committee—An Exposition of Types—Panhellenism—A Greco-Slavonian State—Enumeration of the Greeks—Greek Preponderance on the *Ægean*.

It is not sufficient to consider the question of restoring Greece as one affecting the whole of Europe. There is a Greek Question for each particular Power; and the Greek Question for Englishmen is one which stands in close relation to all our paramount interests in the East. The wardenship of the Straits and the possession of Constantinople can never be matters of indifference to a great commercial nation whose merchantmen perpetually swarm in the Levant and the Black Sea, whose manufactures constitute fully one-half of the freights carried along the trade-routes of Asia Minor,¹ whose traffic with the Turkish and Russian ports, and the towns of the lower Danube, is so vast, and whose sea-route to India would of necessity be menaced if the command of the *Ægean* and the Levant were in the hands of a hostile Power. And, in particular, England has every reason for desiring to see the Straits and Constantinople in the keeping of a friendly or neutral Power, or Powers, rather than under the influence of a confessedly aggressive empire,

¹ This, at all events, is the case with the Persian trade by way of Batoum and Bayazid. The proportion may be smaller in other cases, though it is not easy to see why it should be so.

which has been hostile to us before, and whose interests undoubtedly clash, in several important respects, with our own.

There can be no hesitation for Englishmen as to the direction in which their desires and their policy ought to tend. Between strong and independent Greeks, with no other aim for a century to come than to build up their commercial prosperity, and weak Slavs, virtually dependent upon Russia, it is impossible to balance for a single moment. But when it appears that not only our material interests, but also the loftier interests of justice, impel us to use our influence in favour of the Greeks, the whole question as between these two nationalities passes out of the domain of controversy.

Now, however strong in their justice the claims of the Greeks may be, it would be puerile for Europe, and above all for England, to sit down as mere spectators in the great drama which is to be played before them, and expect that the right would triumph as a matter of course. That great principle of energy and motive-power which, under the name of Panslavism, is alleged to have instigated the Russian attack upon Turkey in 1877—an allegation which is, indeed, a proved fact—is of necessity antagonistic to the cause of Greece. The antagonism may not yet be openly declared, but it exists, without the shadow of a doubt; and its existence was revealed in the abortive treaty of San Stefano, wherein the Russians, in the first glow of their military triumph, carried the boundary of Bulgaria to the very shores of the *Ægean*. That extravagant demand seemed to give the key-note of Panslavism, and opened the eyes of every friend of the Hellenic cause to the full extent of its danger.

Panslavism and Panhellenism have found their point

of collision, and it is one of the problems of the present generation to trace out their common boundary. It may be well to contrast the two with a certain attention to details.

It is barely a third of a century since Panslavism had its birth as a new element in European politics; and its origin constitutes one of those striking facts which—often trivial enough in themselves—illustrate the philosophy of history; which seem to exhibit history as a distinct and sentient organism, self-conscious and self-avenging, exacting the expiation of every crime, and visiting the sins of fathers upon their children.

So far as can be ascertained, the word Panslavism, or Panslavonianism, was first used by the Polish insurgents after the revolt of 1846, in the hope of converting it into a weapon of revenge against Austria. A French historian¹ narrates the circumstances in which this fatal instrument of a nation's vengeance was forged. "The Marquis Wielopolski," says M. Martin, "had started in life as a patriot. In 1831, despatched to London by the Polish Revolution,² he presented several remarkable diplomatic notes to Lord Palmerston. His efforts failed against the fixed policy of abstention adopted by the British Government. He returned to Poland, sorely wounded at the desertion of his country by the whole of the West. When the revolution was at an end he did not emigrate; and for fifteen years he remained silent. In 1846 the massacres of Gallicia occurred. A document of sinister eloquence won the attention of Europe—'A Letter from a Polish Gentleman to Prince

¹ Henri Martin: *Pologne et Moscovie*, p. 11, *et seq.*

² The Duchy of Warsaw became a kingdom of Poland, under the protection of the Czar, in the settlement of 1815. The ten months' insurrection of 1830—31 ended in the conversion of the kingdom into a Russian province.

Metternich.' It was by him. The opening was an outburst of indignation and vengeance against Austria. The conclusion was this: that Poland, abandoned by the West, cannot deliver herself from her three oppressors; let her give herself to the one who is Slavonian like herself; let her abdicate, disappear in a vengeful suicide, and punish Europe by creating Panslavonianism."

Wielopolski was faithful to his idea, and discountenanced the rising of his fellow-countrymen against Russia in 1861. For two years he presided over the Administrative Council under the Grand Duke Constantine, and contributed to the failure of an attempt which would have destroyed his subtle edifice of revenge. No man can say how deeply his weapon was destined to wound. The Pole himself could scarcely have foreseen the use to which Russia would apply it.

The Panslavonian movement, of which Russia has undertaken the direction and guidance, affects one of the largest families of the human race. The Aryan tribes from whom the modern Slavs are descended took possession of the bulk of Eastern Europe; and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that they formed the great vanguard of the Asiatic immigration, settling down on the first plains which they discovered on the hither side of the Caucasus, and gradually spreading over the countries now known as Russia, Eastern Germany, Poland, Northern Hungary, Northern Turkey, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Transylvania.

The Slavonian peoples are capable of subdivision into six principal classes:—1, Great Russians, or Muscovites; 2, Little Russians, Rusniacs, or Ruthens; 3, Poles or Lekhs; 4, Slovacs, including the Bohemian Czechs, the Moravians, and other Carpathian families; 5, Sorabians and Obotrites of Lusatia and Brandenburg;

6, Illyrians, including the Wends, or Venets, the Bulgarians, Servians, and Croatians.

The highest (Russian) estimate of the number of Slavs is as follows:—

Russian Slavs...	47,700,000
Austrian	17,000,000
Prussian	2,400,000
Saxon	200,000
Turkish	7,700,000
Total					75,000,000

The name of “Slav” is a comparatively new appellation for the Sporæ, or Serbs, and the Venets or Wends, under which latter name, according to Professor Max Müller, the older historians usually refer to the Slavonian tribes. The Slavs probably owe their modern name to the grammarians, if not to their successful warriors; the word “slava” or “slavitza,” in their own language, signifying “glory.”¹

Such are the peoples over whose destinies Russia has, during the past few years only, assumed the right to preside; and it is worth while, in days when so much force is supposed to reside in the principle of nationalities, to inquire how far this right may be fairly based on the Slavonic origin of the Russian people. M. Henri Martin’s conclusion from the known facts of the case will probably commend itself to the reader’s acceptance:—²

“The people whom we call Finns, or, under another name, Uralians, appear first on both sides of the Ural. . . . On the south and east, towards the Volga and the Don, appeared under various names another

¹ See, amongst the best authorities on this subject, Schafarik, *Slavische Alterthümer*; Cyprian Robert, *Le Monde Slave, son Passé, son Etat présent, et son Avenir*; Louis Léger, *Le Monde Slave*; and *Etudes Slaves*.

² Henri Martin, *La Russie et l’Europe*, p. 21.

Turanian branch, that of the Turks, or western Tartars. . . . About the time of transition from antiquity to the middle ages,¹ a new and great European race, that of the Slavs, makes its appearance in opposition to the Finns and the Tartars. . . . From their first place of concentration on the Vistula, in the region where Poland was to be, they diverge in every direction, absorb the groups of analogous origin spread over eastern Europe, overflow on the west as far as the Elbe, on the north as far as Lake Ladoga, on the east as far as the Don, on the south-east as far as the Dnieper, on the south as far as the Danube; they then cross the latter river, and flow like a torrent in the direction of Greece.

“The name of Russians was unknown in this first age of Slavonic history—namely from the 6th to the 9th century; it was introduced from without, in the second half of the 9th century, by foreign conquerors. After their wide expansion, the Slavs had in their turn submitted to a reaction from the peoples which surrounded them, whereto their loose and shifting federation of tribes was unable to oppose a sufficient resistance. In the south they lost their Greek possessions; in the west the German peoples recovered large territories from them; in the south-east, on the lower Danube, on the Black Sea, on the Don, the Turanian races robbed them of their supremacy. . . . In the extreme north a Slavonic tribe, which the old chroniclers call the Slovenes, and which had founded Novgorod, on

¹ I am quite unable to decide between such authorities as Martin and Schafarik. The reasons of the latter for assigning an earlier period for the Slavonic irruptions are very deliberately and forcibly given. M. Martin, however, may not wish to imply that the entrance of the Slavs into Europe was subsequent to the period of which we most frequently speak as “antiquity.”

Lake Ilmen, found itself locked in between the Scandinavians, by this time masters of all the seas and rivers, and the Finn populations. The most eastern of the cis-Uralian Finns, the Permians or Biarmians, who possessed a kind of civilisation, and a trade with Central Asia, seem to have disputed the supremacy with the Scandinavians, and, like them, to have harassed with their incursions the other Finns and the Slovenes of Novgorod. The Finn tribes nearest to the Slavs . . . as well as their neighbour Slavs of Novgorod and Isborsk, had been, about 859, conquered by the Vareg Russians." In the following year they had expelled the invaders ; but, finally, "having fallen into an anarchical state, and being probably again attacked by the Permians, they recalled the Vareg Russians across the sea, and invited the latter to assist and govern them.¹

"These Vareg Russians were nothing else than Scandinavians—this is a fact now beyond question. The name of Russian, under the form of Ros, Rhos, Russ, was in the ninth century synonymous with that of Scandinavian or Norseman. It was in sufficiently general use to be known at the same time by the Byzantines, the Franks, and the Arabians ; and a passage in the Gallo-Frank annals of St. Bertin for the year 839 testifies that the Scandinavians themselves assumed that name, although its origin was probably Finn. It is believed that the Scandinavians thus summoned across the sea by the Finn and Slavonian tribes came from the Swedish district called Ross Lagen, in the vicinity of Upsal. Another hypothesis, less probable, fixes their point of departure on the Russian coast, on the shores of the Kurische Haff and the Niemen, which were held for a

¹ M. Martin quotes as his authority the celebrated chronicle of Nestor, combined with other historical monuments.

time by the Væreg Russians, and retain a trace of their name. . . .

“ The language underwent a change with the lapse of time, but not the mind, a phenomenon which has more than once been observed in history . . . The Russo-Finns (the Muscovites) speak Slavonian, but they do not think Slavonian. Slavonian and Scandinavian freedom could never be established in Suzdalia, which presently assumed the name of Moscovia. Never was municipal bell sounded, or popular assembly periodically convened in the cities of Suzdal, Rostov, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscov.”

After insisting on the fact that the founders of the Muscovite dynasty had transferred their seat of government from Kiev in disgust at “ the turbulence of their Slavonian provinces,” preferring, in the words of Karamzine, “ the docility of a people always ready to obey,” M. Martin concludes that the Muscovite empire was equivocal from the first, “ with a prince of Scandinavian origin, speaking Slavonian, and taking his base of operations amongst the Finns. . . . The basis of the Russian empire is consequently Finn, or, to use a more general term, Turanian. . . . Some Scandinavians and more Slavs had evidently followed the Rurevitches into the region outside the woods (*zavolotchîé*). Others came after. The Novgorodians, on their side, sent a colony to Viatka, in the north-east. Need we weigh the drops of Slavonian or Scandinavian blood in the veins of the great Russian people, follow the series of the crossings, inquire into the varieties of the physical type? By no means; that is not the question. The question is this: In that combination of a Turanian base with an adventitious European element which has formed the Muscovite or great Russian people, what spirit has always dominated,

and is still predominant? The Turanian or the Aryan spirit? The Asiatic or the European? The answer cannot be doubtful."

M. Martin's conclusions—and they are those of the majority of students—are of considerable importance. They would at all events dispose of the principal historical and national arguments by which the Russians of to-day, and the Muscovites in particular, seek to establish their claim to direct the political destinies of the Slavs. They strike at the root of Panslavism, as it has been preached and held up for admiration within the last dozen years. They prove that if the Russian theory of Panslavism could be carried out, the result would be a so-called Panslavonian empire, of which by far the greater part—the whole of Asiatic Russia, the northern, eastern, and southern provinces of European Russia—would be inhabited by races which are not Slavs.¹ And, beyond all question, if there is in the centre and west of European Russia a fair admixture of the Slavonic element, the Finn element predominates in the north, and the Mongol in the south.²

Notwithstanding its weaknesses and absurdities, the theory of Panslavism has set on foot a movement of

¹ These arguments are fully borne out by the researches of M. Duchinski of Kiev, on the anthropological types of the Russian people.

² The Empress Catherine II. had her own notions as to the origin of the Russians. According to her, the Russians were descended from the Roxolans. It was her own historiographer, Müller, who first demonstrated the fact that the word "Russian" is of Scandinavian origin. The discovery cost him dear, for he was imprisoned, and compelled to acknowledge that his mistress was right. Trediakowski, secretary of the St. Petersburg Academy, fared still worse. Having ventured to agree in the opinion of Müller, he received a hundred blows with the knout, which gained one more convert to the Empress's views. When the German historian, Stritter, declared that the Russians were of Finnish origin Catherine rose to the occasion by issuing a special ukase, wherein the descent of her subjects was placed beyond further doubt.

considerable force, which has already produced great results, and which it would be a fatal mistake to treat as though it must necessarily prove abortive. It may fail in the end. Wielopolski's weapon of revenge may pierce the hands of those who would use it for their own selfish purposes, but at the same time it may easily be fatal to victims who have had no part nor lot in the oppressions of Poland. The later history of Panslavism, which has all but destroyed the Ottoman Empire, and which still menaces the interests of Greece, is well worthy of a brief review.

The movement, at first promoted chiefly in Austria, by the Bohemian Czechs—amongst them, especially, MM. Pulazki and Reiger—found one of its earliest Russian organs in the *Moscow Gazette*, edited by M. Katkoff. This gentleman argued the cause which he had adopted with a patriotic persistence; and it may be observed that the fact of this persistence, which had its reflection and its support amongst vast numbers of the population of Russia before official Russia would have anything to do with the theory, strengthens the contention that the espousal of the Bulgarian cause in 1877 was due in great measure to a popular enthusiasm, and was not a mere pretext of dynastic ambition.

In 1864, shortly after the suppression of the insurrection in Warsaw, the Moscow "Society of the Lovers of Natural Science" proposed to form an exposition of "Russian types," in order to celebrate the unity and integrity of the empire. The idea had virtually collapsed, when, in 1866, the battle of Sadowa gave the death-blow to Austrian predominance in the German Confederation; and the Panslavonians drew fresh courage from the humiliation of the house of Hapsburg. The intended Russian exposition now assumed the form of a

Slavonian exposition, and the Czar for the first time gave open countenance to the movement. He, the Empress, the whole court and official world of Russia, favoured the scheme of the Moscow Society, the Grand Duke Vladimir accepted the presidency of the Exposition, and Panslavonian Committees were formed in every foreign country of Slavonian origin. The importance of these facts was manifest to everybody who heard of them, and who was in a position to see the goal to which they pointed. M. Katkoff enjoyed a legitimate triumph in the columns of the *Moscow Gazette*. "The new era dawns at length" (he wrote, on the 17th of February, 1867), "and for us Russians it is of momentous import. That era is ours; it calls to life a new world, kept to this moment in the dark, and in expectation of its destiny—the world of Slavonians. After centuries spent in sorrow and servitude, that world at last approaches the hour of its renovation. That which has long been forgotten and suppressed once more comes to the light, and prepares for action."

The Ethnological Exposition was opened by the Czar in person on May 5th, 1867. There, dressed in their national costume, and surrounded by their characteristic weapons and domestic implements, were lay-figures of Great and Little Russians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovacs, Czechs, Moravians, Croatians, Dalmatians, Servians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians; and the visitors were able to admire their numerous cousins gathered from over half the continent of Europe, and to nourish their enthusiasm by noting the remarkable similarity of feature which the modellers in wax had succeeded in imparting to the effigies.

On the same occasion, and also under official patronage, there was held a Panslavonian Congress. Repre-

sentatives of the various groups above named, with the exception of the Poles, were invited to Russia, and entertained in most of the principal cities. The banquet given to them at Moscow, with Prince Tcherkasky in the chair, was naturally more enthusiastic than any of the rest, and betrayed the force already acquired by a movement which, within ten years from its sanction by the Court of Russia, was to carry the armies of the Czar to the gates of Constantinople.¹

The earlier propaganda of Panslavism was conducted in the name of the Greco-Slavs; but from the year 1866 we rarely meet with this conjunction of nationalities. Was it one of the stipulations of the Russian Government that the claim of Greek kinship should be dropped, and that no Hellenic delegates should be invited to the Congress? Was it jealousy or a wise caution which prompted this modification in the original programme? Some light may be thrown upon the subject by the successful negotiations which General Ignatieff presently undertook, with the object of transferring the Bulgarian Christians from the bosom of the Greek Church, and the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, to the so-called "orthodox" national Church of Russia.

Let us see, then, what cause for jealousy the Russians might reasonably find in Greece. What is it that Hellas can hopefully oppose to the theory of Panslavism? What, in short, are the character and force of that Panhellenism, as we may call it (for want of a better name), which may be brought forward as the rival and opponent of Panslavism?

Stated in broad and general terms, and with an

¹ Constantinople itself, in the theory of the more adventurous spirits, is a Slavonian city.

assumption at all events no greater than that of the Russian theorists in the assertion of their Panslavonian claims, we may say that the Hellenes of to-day, whose demand for complete re-unification and redintegration is beginning to make itself heard, are spread over the whole coast of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia Minor—that they hold the sea-board of the *Ægean*, from the kingdom of Greece, from Epirus and Thessaly, to Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople, and, with a few exceptions, the shores of Asia Minor, and the islands of the Archipelago. The entire group of the ancient Greek colonies, the entire Byzantine Empire, is the inheritance of the kingdom of Greece, in a sense quite as real and as forcible as that in which the Russians can be held to have established the claim of the Slavs to the reversion of Turkey. It is on no mere tradition, no laborious assemblage of texts and obscure references, that we have to build up the history of the Greek expansion. Hardly a link is wanting in the records of that peaceful and beneficent progress, and all the records combine to show the thorough and genuine character of the hold which the Greeks had secured upon their colonies, before the paralysing irruption of Turanian barbarism. When the Christian apostle Paul made his journey from Syria to metropolitan Greece, he travelled by far the greater part of the way through Greek-speaking lands, which had been Hellenised (and therefore civilised) for centuries. In Cilicia, Cyprus, Lycaonia, Galatia, Pamphylia, Lycia, Phrygia, Troas, Samothracia, he was constantly amongst Greeks. Up to the period of the Roman conquests there was scarcely any authority which could contest that of the Greeks in Asia Minor and south-eastern Europe; whilst the barbarians, who from time to time had broken in amongst the Ionians and

other Greek colonists, had become Hellenised almost immediately after their incursion. No schoolboy needs to be reminded of these facts ; but it does seem necessary to bring them to the knowledge of Panslavonian committees, and of too enthusiastic Slavonian advocates amongst ourselves, who are adventurous enough to claim a foothold on the *Ægean* for the heirs of the Finns and Scandinavians.

It may be objected that the progress of the ancient Greeks was one of colonisation only, not of conquest—an advance of trade, confining itself to seaports, to a few large inland towns, and to the trade routes connecting these, rather than an advance of arms, which held entire realms in awe. This is not a very accurate distinction ; but, even if it were, it would be sufficient to answer that such a peaceful and civilising progress is a more real and stable conquest than any which can be reaped by the sword. The fact is that the Greeks, like the modern English, carried war in one hand and industry in the other. What the conquerors won by force of arms the colonists and merchants knew how to retain by the arts of peace.

Nor were the legitimate conquests of the Greeks limited, even in Europe, by the mere sea-board. The geographical names of the Balkan peninsula prove how widespread the Greek influence must at one time have been, and how the Hellenic civilisation must have permeated the whole land, as far as and even beyond the Danube. Sophia and Nikopolis are by no means the only important towns north of the Balkans which attest their Greek origin by their names. The testimony of M. Elisée Reclus, an impartial authority, who is certainly actuated by no political bias in stating the result of his researches, will assist us in appreciating the

position of the Hellenic race in European Turkey. "Setting aside the Turkish element," says this writer,¹ "the one which has the greatest importance in the Bulgarian regions is the Hellenic. On the northern slopes of the Balkans the Greeks are not numerous, and their influence hardly exceeds that of the Germans and Armenians established in the cities. But south of the Hæmus, although relatively few, they are more widely spread. In every village there are one or two, living by trade, and practising every handicraft. They are the indispensable men of the locality; they know how to do everything, are ready for any emergency, have a hand in everything, and stir up the whole population with their energy. Always bound close together, forming a sort of freemasonry in the country, always eager for knowledge, they obtain, almost invariably, an influence infinitely superior to their numerical importance. No sooner are they two or three in number, than they act as a petty council. On the other hand they constitute, here and there, some considerable groups amongst the Bulgarians. They are numerous at Philippopolis and Bazardjik. In one of the valleys of the Rhodope they have a large city to themselves, Stenimacho; neither Turk nor Bulgarian has been able to thrive there."²

¹ Elisée Reclus: *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle*, vol. i. p. 223.

² This statement seems to be controverted by the testimony of several correspondents during the war of 1877—8, who mentioned Mahomedans and Bulgarians as having resided in Stenimacho (Stanmaki) and the neighbourhood. M. Synvet gives the number of Greeks in Stenimacho at 10,182, a slightly higher total than that of Philippopolis. As for the proportion of the Bulgarian and other elements of the population south of the Balkans, which it had been proposed to add to the new Bulgarian State, a significant confirmation of the views above quoted is to be found in the communications of the same correspondents, which I have nowhere seen contradicted. Thus, it was stated in a telegram dated May 16th, 1878, and forwarded to the *Standard* newspaper from Constantinople, that "the Bulgarian authorities at Philippopolis and other places, after taking a census

Again, the same authority bears testimony to the Hellenic character of the Turkish sea-board.¹ "By a curious effect, which shows how the sea has been the principal element in the distribution of the Mediterranean peoples, and in the course of their history, the whole Ægean littoral of Turkey belongs ethnologically to the Hellenic race. As Greece proper extends, under the sea, towards Egypt, through the island of Crete, so it extends northwards to the Danubian regions, by a long line of territory bordering the Ægean. Thessaly, Macedonia, the ancient Chalcidice, Thrace, are Greek countries. Constantinople itself is in the ethnological Hellad. Hence a complete breach of concord between the geography of races, by far the most important, and that of mountains, rivers, and climates. Hellenic Turkey, formed by so many different natural basins, has no geographical unity, except in connection with the waters of the Archipelago which bathe all its shores."

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this testimony, confirmed as it is by every impartial authority on the subject. It serves to emphasise the fact that the Greek race is the only one whose right to the shores of the Ægean is incontestable, and that, of all the subject races of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks alone could claim the hegemony, by virtue of former predominance and of actual moral force.

three times, and trying to force the Greeks to declare themselves Bulgarians," were so dissatisfied with the result that they brought men of their own race across the Balkans, and housed them in the dwellings deserted by the Mahomedan refugees, who had fled before the Russian advance. Similar attempts to weaken the Greek element in Macedonia were attributed to the Russians, who seem to have enforced a conscription amongst the Greeks of the Rhodope district. See the *Times*, May 20th, 1878, for a protest on this subject, presented by Greek delegates in Constantinople to the representatives of the Powers.

² *Ibid*, p. 145.

The superiority of the Greek genius has led some to argue in favour of a Greco-Slavonian State, which should be independent at the same time of Turkish misrule and of Russian influence. The Slavs, it is urged, whose blood is nowhere pure, are of specially mixed descent in Bulgaria and Albania; and these would amalgamate with the Greeks more readily than with the Russians. The religion of the great mass of Turkish Christians is that of the Greek Church, and it is doubtful if Ignatieff's intrigue has definitively weaned the Bulgarians from the Greek form of that Church. Again, it would be better for Europe that the Bulgarians should not be brought wholly and finally into the hands of Russia, as they will be if the Panslavonian theory is established, and the chance of creating a Greco-Slavonian State be thrown away. The prevalence of the Russian idea of Panslavism would be injurious, not only in a political sense, but also morally, for it would substitute a Turanian and even Mongol cast of thought for the Aryan genius, which has, under the happiest auspices, become identified with the civilisation of Europe.

The argument is strong, but I do not think that we ought to be convinced by it. It is doubtless a great temptation—always supposing that a legitimate and equitable reason had been found for excluding Ottoman claims—to carve a strong kingdom out of European Turkey, extending from the Morea to the Danube, fronting the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea, and strong enough to hold the Dardanelles and the Danube mouths as the *mandataire* of Europe. Equally great is the inducement to check, whenever we have the power to check it, the growth of an immense empire which, already holding

some two-thirds of the continent, and numbering 72,000,000 inhabitants in Europe alone, threatens to absorb another 28,000,000 Slavs, and thus bring up the total of her population to 113,000,000;¹ an empire which, by its law of compulsory service, passed in the beginning of 1874, places nearly three millions of soldiers at the disposal of one man, which is almost the last refuge of autocratic power in the civilised world, and which is credited, by men of considerable discernment, with the desire of yet more sinister aggressions in Europe and Asia than any yet accomplished.²

One can hardly avoid saying that, if the dangers of Europe from Russian aggression were really so great, no Greco-Slavonian kingdom could do much to protect Europe against them. But that which Europe may reasonably expect from any new and solidly-constructed State on the *Ægean*, namely, the safe wardenship of the Straits, and a check to the southward impetus of Panslavism, will in all probability be secured from a strong Greece with more ease and prospect of finality than it could be from a combination of Greeks and Slavs. Russian statesmen and diplomatists have always been conspicuous for their skill in intrigue; and it is easy to understand what would be the prospects of a Greco-Slavonian State in the presence of an ever-active Panslavonian propaganda. The difficulty, if there is

¹ *S. Petersburg Kalendar*, 1876. The total has since been increased.

² Thiers, in his *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, seems almost to have lost the balance of his judgment in writing of the future of Russia. "When the Russian Colossus," he says, "shall have one foot on the Dardanelles and the other on the Sound, the Old World will have been reduced to servitude, and freedom will have fled to America. A chimera still for short-sighted politicians, these sad previsions will one day be painfully justified; for Europe, stupidly divided, as the Greek cities were in presence of the king of Macedonia, is certain some day to suffer the same fate." (Vol. viii., p. 448.)

any momentous difficulty, arising from the vast extent of the Russian Empire, and from its alleged desire to absorb all the Slavonian race, must be met and dealt with by Europe as seems best when the emergency arises; but it would be increased rather than diminished by involving Greece in the same toils which enfold and fetter Austria. New Greece could in no sense be strengthened—least of all under existing circumstances—by being saddled with the burden of four and a half million Bulgarian Slavs. Her added force must come from the same quarters which gave her her force in the earlier ages—from the seaboard of the Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with Epirus and Thessaly, and proceeding, as just occasion offers itself, perhaps with the Shkipetars of Albania, but certainly with Macedonia and Thrace.

When we come to inquire what is the actual numerical strength of the Greek element under Ottoman rule, and of the Greek race in general, we are met by difficulties which it is impossible wholly to surmount. The population of the Greek kingdom, according to the census taken in 1870, was 1,457,894; but, as the increase had been at the rate of 63 per cent. within the previous 32 years (more rapid, with one exception, than in any other European country),¹ the number is now probably as high as a million and three-quarters. It is when we turn to Greater Greece, and attempt to reckon up the scattered Hellenic family in Europe and Asia, that we find ourselves baffled. No trustworthy census of the Ottoman dominions has ever been taken; and the estimates made by Turkish officials, and by foreign statisticians, differ remarkably in respect of every

¹ Moraïtinis: *La Grèce Telle qu' Elle est*, p. 43.

portion of the empire. In 1867 the Turkish Government estimated the number of the Sultan's subjects in Europe, Asia, and Africa, at 40,000,000. Ubicini and Courteille¹ reckon the population, not including the tributary States, at 28,500,000, which is considerably lower than the official reckoning. Of these twenty-eight millions and a half the same writers count 3,520,000 Greco-Latins, including the Greeks proper, the Albanians, and the Zingarians.

Some light is thrown upon the question of the Greek population in Turkey, and especially in Macedonia and Thrace, by a memorandum of the Syllogues² in

¹ *Etat Présent de l'Empire Ottoman.*

² The Syllogues in Turkey, though nominally instituted for benevolent purposes, and for the encouragement of Hellenic letters, naturally and inevitably take a deep interest in politics. We may suppose that they are to some extent the counterpart of the old Hetairias. The memorandum mentioned in the text is a fervid and eloquent plea against the threatened absorption of part of Macedonia and Thrace in a new Bulgarian state. After observing that in pre-Turkish times these two provinces were entirely in the hands of the Greeks, and that the descendants of these ancient possessors are to this day incomparably superior in intelligence to the Bulgarian settlers south of the Balkans; it dwells upon the arguments against extending the frontiers of Bulgaria into territory which is the legitimate inheritance of the Hellenic race. I cannot resist the desire to quote the words with which this protest concludes. "It would be unworthy of Europe to suffer this nursery of civilisation to be swept away to make room for a mere peasant race. The philanthropic and Christian principles invoked by Orthodox Russia—the very principles, in fact, for the sake of which Russia made war—would be trampled under foot. The world would behold an abnormal government set up on a detestable basis, while the peoples of the East would perceive that the torrents of blood shed till now in the cause of justice, truth, and civilisation, have been poured out in vain. . . . And there is yet a last danger. The landed estate of Thrace and Macedonia is owned by Greeks and Mussulmans. The Bulgarians are only labourers. To place these latter in the position of masters is to introduce the principles of socialism and communism; to deliver the proprietor, trained in the virtues of civilisation, into the hands of a labouring class, needy and uninstructed—in a word, it means pillage, devastation, and ruin; and the communism thus established in the East would constitute a menace to Europe."—See the *Times*, May 15th, 1878.

Constantinople, addressed to the foreign representatives in that city. This document contains statistical tables, giving in detail the respective numbers of the Mahomedan, Greek, Bulgarian, and other races in the two provinces. The totals are as follows :—

	In Macedonia.	In Thrace.
Mahomedans	349,000	558,300
Greeks	705,500	743,900
Bulgarians	140,500	315,520
Armenians, Jews, &c.	100,000	223,000
Foreigners	35,000	132,000
Total	1,330,000	1,972,720

That is to say, in these old Hellenic provinces the Greeks are still almost one-half of the population, whilst the members of the Greek Church are, probably, more than three-fifths. And it may be here observed that the pure Greeks are fully persuaded that the bulk of the Mahomedanised Greeks in Turkey would at once return to the faith of their forefathers if the Turkish yoke were removed.

In European Turkey alone M. Elisée Reclus¹ estimates the Greco-Latins at 2,800,000, and the pure Greeks alone at 1,200,000. It may be interesting to quote his ethnological classification of the races of European Turkey, in which he rests upon the authority of Lejean, Kranitz, and Crörnig :—

Slav : Serbs, Bulgarians, Russians.

Pelasgian : Shkipetars (Albanians), Hellens.

Latin : Roumanians, Zingarians, Italians.

Turanian : Turks, Tartars, Turkomans, Magyars.

And, mingled amongst the other races, Armenians, Germans, Jews, Arabians, Tsiganes.

The same authority gives us the following distribu-

¹ *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle* (1875).

tion of races and religions in European Turkey, including the tributary states, in the year 1875.¹

		Population.	Mahomedan.	Greek Cath.	Latin Cath.
Slavs .	{ Serbs	1,775,000	650,000	945,000	180,000
	{ Bulgarians	4,500,000	60,000	4,400,000	40,000
	{ Russians, Ruthens, Cossacks	10,000			
	{ Poles	5,000			5,000
Latins .	{ Roumanians	75,000		75,000	
	{ Zingarians	200,000		200,000	
Greeks .		1,200,000		1,200,000	
Albanians {	Guegans	600,000	400,000	50,000	150,000
	Toscans	800,000	600,000	200,000	
Turks .	{ Osmanlis	1,500,000	1,500,000		
	{ Tartars	35,000	35,000		
Semites .	{ Arabs	5,000	5,000		
	{ Israelites	95,000			
Armenians .		400,000		20,000	
Tcherkesses.		90,000	90,000		
Tsiganes .		140,000	140,000		
Franks .		50,000		45,000	
		11,480,000	3,480,000	7,070,000	440,000

Leaving 380,000 Armenians, 15,000 "Orthodox Christians," and 95,000 Jews.

The vast preponderance of Greek Catholics (previous to the political conversion of the Bulgarians) is a fact well worthy of our attention, for it speaks eloquently of the enduring influence of the Greek spirit amongst all the European subject races of Turkey.

The conclusion at which we might arrive, judging from these statistics alone, would be that the recognisable Greeks, in Greece and Turkey together, amount to something under four millions—excluding the Albanians (Pelasgians). More liberal estimates have been made by other authorities; but the simple fact is that the precise enumeration of the Hellenic race is, in the present condition of our knowledge, impossible. The Greek descent is overlaid and obscured by the lapse of time, and by the blighting effect of the Turkish oppression; but it seems

¹ *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle* (1875), vol. i., p. 238.

absurd to suppose that the descendants of the ancient Greeks, and of the colonists who settled on the Ægean and Levantine shores, and over the whole region of Asia Minor, are included in the handful of men represented by the foregoing figures. Under one name or another the Greeks must be far more numerous; and let it not be forgotten that the supple genius of the race has prompted a certain proportion of the Sultan's Greek subjects to adopt the turban, for their own greater freedom and security, as men have accommodated their religious professions to their circumstances in every age and clime.

One more enumeration may be added; and it is drawn up with greater circumstantiality than any of those above quoted. This is taken from a collection of statistics recently made by M. Synvet,¹ a Greek gentleman resident in Constantinople, who has discharged honourable functions as an Ottoman subject, and whose testimony must be looked upon as the result of a careful and unprejudiced investigation.

M. Synvet reckons the Greeks under direct Turkish rule in the beginning of 1878 at a total of 4,324,369, the summary of his census being as follows:—

Turkey in Europe	Thrace	728,747
	Macedonia	587,860
	Epirus	617,892
	Thessaly.	247,776
	Dobrudska (formerly Preslava) and the towns on the right bank of the Danube	30,000
	Moesia, Raxia, Metochia	40,000
The Islands		724,000
Turkey in Asia	Asia Minor	1,188,094
	Northern Syria, Coelesyria, Palestine, and Phœnicia	125,000
	Other Catholic Greeks, scattered	35,000
Total		4,324,369

¹ *Les Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman*. Constantinople, 1878.

The Turkish towns with a Greek population of 6,000 or upwards are the following :—

Constantinople	230,000	Korytza	8,400
Adrianople	24,450	Castoria	6,000
Philippopolis	10,000	Klissoura	7,000
Stenimacho	10,182	Janina	14,362
Thessalonica (Ægean) . .	15,000	Bitolia (Monastir) . .	23,400
Rodosto („). . . .	6,000	Arta	9,600
Khora („). . . .	9,000	Prevesa	7,200
Kavakly	6,250	Metzovo	14,000
Kirk-kilissa	6,750	Berat	8,400
Demotika	6,860	Larissa	7,600
Souffi	7,875	Tournovo	8,750
Varna	8,000	Trikala	7,000
Kozani	10,800	Volo	6,500
Schatista	7,800	Vromyri	6,800

In the island of Crete M. Synvet reckons just a quarter of a million Greeks ; in Cos, 120,000 ; in Cyprus, 90,000, and in Mitylene, 90,000 ; in Chios, 70,000 ; in Rhodes, 50,000 ; and in Samos, 40,000.

Now if the total population of European Turkey be compared with the several particular elements in that population, it is evident, even on the most unfavourable estimate, that the Greeks form a larger factor than any other single race. According to the statistics of the Syllogues in Constantinople, already quoted, the Greeks in Thrace are far more numerous than the Mussulmans, more than double the number of the Slavs, and about two-fifths of the total census. In Macedonia they are more than double the Mussulmans, more than five times the number of the Slavs, and more than one-half of the total population.¹

All these, and all of any race who are baptised into the Greek communion, we must claim for the sake of our argument, if we would be apt scholars of the Pan-

¹ The question of population, as affecting the Greek claims to the Ægean provinces, is fairly considered in a tract issued by the Hellenic Committee in London (*Hellenic Claims and the Congress*).

slavonian theorists. The friends of Greece must not strain at a gnat whilst her rivals are swallowing a camel. Their Panhellenism must be vigorous and adventurous, if it would earn provinces and merit an empire. It is young as yet, and has hardly dared to expose its arguments and exhibit its "types." But in the future which lies before it—a future wherein it may have a wide Eurasian dominion for its goal—it may rest assured that its wildest dreams of empire, its boldest flights of theory and assumption, will command a deeper sympathy in Europe than the theories of Moscow or the imperial ambitions of St. Petersburg.

Amidst the unavoidable uncertainty by which the problem is surrounded, we seem to be in possession of facts which fully justify the Greeks in their claim (on this ground alone) to the whole littoral of the *Ægean*.

CHAPTER III.

GREEK NATIONALITY.

The Principle of Nationality ; its Moral Limitations—Rights of Nationality—Distrust of the Principle—Its Application in the Case of Greece—Descent of the Modern Greeks—The Theory of Fallmerayer—Testimonies to the contrary.

ONE principle is at the basis of both Panslavism and Panhellenism, as it has been at the basis of almost every recent pretext for war in civilised countries—the principle of Nationalities. It is a keen weapon in the hands of the oppressed, cleaving through the strong arms of tyrants, and severing the bonds of mighty empires ; but it is liable to great abuse, and may serve the purposes of aggression as easily as the aspirations of a struggling people. Before we avail ourselves of it, even when instinct and judgment assure us that the cause is just, it becomes us to inquire what are the warrants, the sanctions, the limits of a principle which has been made responsible for so many sanguinary wars.

The limits may be defined first of all, and without much difficulty, since they arise in the nature of things, and consist of recognised moral laws. The sense of justice and duty, which admits of no rival in its authority over the human mind, would have forbidden, if it had not been suppressed, some of the most effectual operations of the Principle of Nationalities during the past half-century. The conversion of the kingdom of

Poland into a Russian province, the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, the appropriation of Alsace-Lorraine, were abuses, not to say negations, of the principle on which they have been nominally justified. The publicists and theorists who have applauded these acts have cited the name of nationality as though this were an all-sufficient excuse for aggression; but they have not cared to illustrate the various sanctions of the principle by applying them to the cases in point. They did not, because they could not, show, in any one of the instances referred to, that the peoples appropriated and annexed had themselves initiated movements by which the aggressors profited. They did not venture to assert that the free and spontaneous suffrage of those peoples had justified their transfer from one crowned head to another.

The necessity of initiation on the part of the people themselves, and of a free suffrage for the expression of the popular will, is the most important limit to the just operation of this Principle of Nationalities. It includes all others, and is the direct outcome of the abstract principle of justice. This is in accordance with what has already been said in regard to the justification of interventions of every kind—that they must be based on a state of things arising independently of the intervening Power, and must be undertaken for the benefit of the people interfered with. The universal suffrage of a people, *and of a people capable of exercising universal suffrage*, seems to be in general indispensable for the sanction of an act of annexation. It may indeed be admitted that the annexation of a cognate nationality, notoriously oppressed, and having initiated a struggle for freedom, might be justifiable, even if the nationality were unable to express its will by a free and unfettered

suffrage. The initiation of the struggle might then be accepted as a virtual suffrage; but in any such case as this the sanction of the concert of nations would undoubtedly be necessary, in order to cover the responsibility of the annexing Power. The question of simple intervention is different. In that case no universal suffrage seems to be necessary, even in theory. The people receives an accession of freedom, but is not asked to dispose of its liberties, or to give them in pledge to a new monarch. Whether it accepts a new government, the same in kind as its former one, but with additional guarantees, or whether it is left to form its own government, under the protection of a friendly Power, and guaranteed by treaty obligations, the intervention has been entirely beneficial to it, and the necessity for asking its sanction is excluded. But when the liberties of a people are vindicated against one monarch and immediately placed under the direct tutelage of another, then the popular vote is indispensable.

The case in which it might be proposed to erect a new State out of several provinces detached from the dominion of a common ruler—such, for instance, as a Greco-Slav State, or a Slav State including territories in which the Greek element predominated—seems to fall, for the purposes of the present argument, into the same category as an ordinary case of annexation. There would be forcible subjection of one race to another, a violation of the genuine principle of nationality, and, consequently, a necessity for popular sanction. Now, universal suffrage, freely expressed, is the only just and adequate means of ascertaining the will of a nation. But the process of universal suffrage can only be honestly applied in proportion as a nation is free and enlightened. Therefore it is evident, as between Slavs

and Greeks, that the will of the former could not be justly permitted to override the will of the latter. And there is no question as to the fact that the Greeks repudiate, almost to a man, the suggestion of a Greco-Slav State.

The idea of nationality itself is limited by certain well-recognised principles, in the absence of which it is impossible to build up a coherent and stable political edifice. Publicists have formulated these principles for us over and over again. Thus Eœtvos wrote: "If it be asked where is the characteristic of a national individuality, we will answer, solely in the consciousness of personal existence, and in the need of realising it." Buchez declares that "Nations are constituted by the tendency of a population towards a common end." The same thing was shrewdly expressed by Prince Jerome Napoleon, in a notable speech to his constituents at Ajaccio, in the year 1866. "What is a nationality? It is an aggregate of conditions of origin, race, customs, geography, history, language, religion, interests. It is necessary that this nationality should exist in the will of those who desire it; it is necessary, in order that a people should be worthy of acquiring a nationality, that it should know how to cement it by sacrifices."

In what respects would these principles justify a Greco-Slav State? In what respects would they not justify the rehabilitation of the ancient Greek dominion in Europe?

The world was, perhaps, first familiarised with the word and the idea of "nationality" in the literary manifestation of that great national movement which raised the Germans, at the beginning of the present century, against the Napoleonic incubus. Little by little it became a potentiality, being introduced into the

diplomatic vocabulary by the people against whom it was first employed.

When Napoleon III. went to war "for an idea"—as it used to be said—in 1859, the Austrian Government formally put it to England whether she was prepared to admit the novel claim, and to see it applied to India, Canada, and Ireland? Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, if he did not give a categorical reply to the Cabinet of Vienna, at least acknowledged, in all his utterances and despatches, the full right of political communities to combine and govern themselves (saving the rights of others) according to their will.

Does the Europe of to-day believe that the Europe of 1859 was in the wrong? And, if not, why is she unwilling to accord to Greece the moral and physical aid which she gave to Italy? Or is she merely waiting until the Greeks have sufficiently justified their claims by insurrections and bloodshed? She has not been asked, be it once more repeated, to commit an injustice against Turkey on behalf of Greece, but only to help Greece to the utmost of her ability whenever a just occasion arises. She has not been asked to accept the Principle of Nationalities in the sense in which it has been abused by more than one Continental Power, but only to give it a generous interpretation when it can be made the legitimate instrument of a righteous and beneficial act.

The principle has fallen into something like disrepute amongst us, and especially amongst democratic thinkers. 'Apart from its having been used as the cloak of great national crimes, it is alleged that its operation tends to divert the peoples from more important social reforms, that it checks the development of personal liberty by excessive centralisations of power,

that it renders the fusion of races more difficult, and the like. It may, however, be observed, in respect of the general question, that the need of national unity is often greater than, and antecedent to, all other needs, as was the case with Italy; and that the genuine desire of approximation in cognate races is too strong to admit of any other kind of advance until it has first been satisfied. With regard to Greece in particular, it will not be contended that her complete regeneration will retard the acquisition of individual freedom by the race. Everything combines to show that the unification of Greece would instantly and notably develop all the best qualities of the Greeks. We are justified in this belief by the actual development of the Greek Kingdom since its establishment. We are justified again by more general considerations, which affirm it as a necessary and invariable fact that the political emancipation of any race whatever implies its immediate advance in the capacity of self-government, and its speedy promotion in the scale of national power and dignity. No more striking illustration of this fact could be found than in the noble example of Italy, which, twenty years after the time when she was a mere "geographical expression," destitute of liberty and almost hopeless of re-union, has sat as one of the Great Powers at the Congress of Europe, and has raised an influential voice on behalf of the struggling nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the most forcible vindication of the Principle of Nationalities in its highest sense is contained in the work of M. Maximin Deloche, published on the morrow of Italian liberation.¹ M. Deloche sets out by the observation that almost every war and

¹ Maximin Deloche : *Du Principe des Nationalités*.

insurrection in Europe for the past forty years has had for its cause the oppression or dismemberment of a nationality. Greece, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Italy, Schleswig Holstein, the Ionian Islands, had all exhibited, like the German and Pan-slavonian movements, the irrepressible force of this instinct of concentration. "The conception of the right possessed by every nation of re-modelling itself in order to live according to its natural instincts or historical traditions, proclaimed by all the utterances of the publicists, has already achieved rapid progress, and impressed itself deeply on the most inattentive minds. True it is that the German is still isolated in his Germanism, the Slavonian in his Slavonianism, the Italian in his Italianism. . . . But, none the less, these several ideas, flowing from the same source, expanding in the same historical phase, almost in the same hour, and tending to the same goal, are applications of one and the same law. This law, which is passing in our day from the speculative to the positive category, which asserts itself so powerfully amongst peoples and governments—this law may be called 'affinity of race' when it assumes an ethnological instinct, and advances from the origin onward, and 'nationality' in the historical domain. Affinity of race is the brotherhood realised amongst the descendants of one and the same race of men, between tribes which have the same physical and moral type. Nationality is the link between groups of men which have proceeded together in the paths of civilisation, have developed their instincts in the same direction, cultivated the same aptitudes and contracted the same habits, which possess a common tradition, a common history, and in many cases a common language. In

consequence of the division of these races or nations—which has taken place, now in a far-removed past, now in comparatively recent times, by brute force and by the ratification of diplomatic instruments—their fragments have persistently laboured, first underground, then in open light, to assemble themselves together again, to renew the relations which were suspended by violence, and to reconstruct their old union. This spontaneous labour, directed and accomplished by what is essentially intangible and irresistible—the conscience and the will of human agglomerations—is eminently worthy of respect and sympathy.”¹

Nationality, then, according to M. Deloche’s explanation of the word, is manifestly the operative energy which has incited and promoted the Hellenic regeneration. Not simply the prevalence of a “physical and moral type,” though this is significant enough, but also the common instincts, tendencies, traditions, religion, and even language, have re-converged (as yet with only partial success) to build up once more the old Hellenic influence. The same region of the earth’s surface which was Hellenised two thousand years ago strives now to re-assert its old Hellenic character, and appeals, in the widest and yet the most legitimate sense, to the great Principle of Nationalities.

The right of the modern Greeks to claim the inheritance of the Hellenes by direct descent has been contested by more than one theorist; especially, and first, by Dr. Philip Fallmerayer, in a work, published in 1847, on the history of the Morea.² Fallmerayer’s notion, which has been eagerly caught at and maintained

¹ P. 29.

² *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea.*



by Russian writers, was to the effect that the Slavonic immigration, between the sixth and the fourteenth centuries, had practically extirpated the Greek stock, and that the present inhabitants were consequently a race of Slavs. It is true that the Slavonian tribes had penetrated at one time into the very heart of Greece. Even in the fourteenth century, when the Turks first entered Europe, they found a kingdom (not to call it by Stephen Dushan's grander name, an empire) of Servia, extending from Belgrade to the Gulf of Corinth. The Byzantine Empire was at this time hard pressed by its enemies. The Turks had robbed the Greeks of the whole of Asia Minor except the dominion of Trebizond, lying along the Black Sea, between the mouths of the modern Tchouruk-su and Irmak rivers. The Servian conquests fronted the Ægean between the Struma and the island of Thasos. The kingdom of Bulgaria had pushed its frontiers to the neighbourhood of Adrianople. Venice had possession of Argos, of the south-western promontory of the Morea, of Corfu, Crete, and Eubœa. The Duchies of Cephalonia, Achaia, Athens, Naxos, were in the hands of various other Powers. The Greeks at this moment retained in Europe only Byzantium, a narrow Thrace and Macedonia, a contracted Morea, and the promontory commanded by Thessalonica.¹

The result of all this compression must have been to weaken the Greek element, at all events in the towns, and to produce a temporary eclipse of the Hellenic influence. But even at the worst, when the Slavonic incursions were at their strongest, the extirpation of the Greek stock was not simply improbable, it was

¹ Mr. E. A. Freeman, in his *Ottoman Power in Europe*, gives an outline map of south-eastern Europe at the time of the entrance of the Ottomans.

impossible. The geographical character of the Peloponnese forbids the acceptance of Fallmerayer's theory, even if it were not discredited by other all-sufficient considerations. The German theorist seems to have been the victim of a reaction against the Philhellenic movement of his time; and, as a matter of fact, his paradox has been scouted by most writers of authority, until it is now defended, if at all, from purely political motives.

Not only do the Greeks of to-day retain all the features of their ancient nationality, but they exhibit remarkably faint traces of the Slavonic occupation.¹ If their ancestors were decimated, oppressed, driven into the mountains by the invaders of the sixth and following centuries, the most reasonable conclusion from existing phenomena is that they rapidly recovered from the check, absorbed and leavened the Slavs, and re-descended from the mountains in order to govern their conquerors. The modern Greeks, in fact, offer a very notable instance of the persistence of type in the midst of manifold influences which might have been expected to destroy or modify it. Surrounded by Slavonians, and Slavonised Albanians, they remain a distinct and original race, and bear witness to their comparative purity by their physique, their customs, their language, their habits of life and thought. They do not "think Slavonian" any more than they look or "speak Slavonian." The Bulgarians, on the other hand, furnish

¹ Fallmerayer mentions the existence of certain Slavonic names of places in Greece. Probably enough the Slavs changed a name here and there, or gave their own names to new places. But even if this argument were worth anything at all for Fallmerayer's purpose, it would be destroyed by the fact that, in almost every instance where a Slavonic name survived in Greece to a recent date, the true Greek name had survived also, preserved on the spot by Greeks themselves.

us with the true character of a Slavonised race. Probably of Ugrian origin, like the Huns, having entered Europe from the East, and being undoubtedly Turanians, they have become merged in the Slavonian type. They are at this day as much Slavs, in customs and in language, as the western Russians or the Serbs themselves. But all recent travellers in Greece have been struck by the distinctness of the Hellenic character. From Byron and Leake to M. About and Mr. Mahaffy, all have recognised in modern Hellas the true descendants of the Greeks of old.

Far more important than the authority of Fallmerayer, whose theory was based on little else than an hypothesis, is the consensus of modern ethnologists and anatomists, which decides clearly in favour of the identity of the ancient and modern race of Greeks. Thus Dr. Friedrich Müller,¹ to take but one example, includes in his classification of the Indo-European family the following distinct branches: the Thraco-Illyrian (Albanian); the "Greek—ancient and modern;" the Celto-Slavonian, including the old Slavs, Bulgarian Serbs, Slovaks, Russians, Polaks, Czechs, Poles, Old Prussians, Lithuanians, and Lettonians.

It would be possible, if it were necessary, to multiply authorities on this point almost without end. Probably, however, there are very few persons in the present day who seriously contest the descent of the Greeks; and we may be content to let M. Edmond About conclude the argument for us in his lighter vein. M. About spent a couple of years in Greece a quarter of a century ago. He had been one of the most distinguished Greek scholars at the Paris University; he spoke Greek in its modern colloquial form, and was eminently fitted to

¹ *Allgemeine Ethnographie*, Vienna, 1873.

arrive at a just and impartial view of the Hellenic question. He erred, if at all, in severity against the modern Greeks; and certainly he lost no opportunity of ridiculing the foibles of the national character.

"The Hellenic race," M. About wrote in 1854,¹ "constitutes the great majority of the population. This truth has been questioned. According to a certain paradoxical school, there are no longer any Greeks in Greece; the whole population is Albanian, that is to say, Slavonian" (for which we may read Shkipetarian). "It is easy to perceive the aim of such a doctrine, which makes of the sons of Aristides so many compatriots of the Czar Nicholas. But it is sufficient to have eyes in order to distinguish the Greeks, a refined and delicate people, from the rude Albanians. The Greek race, indeed, has degenerated very little; and these tall youths, of supple gait, oval face, bright eye, lively spirit, with whom the streets of Athens swarm, are undoubtedly of the same family from which Phidias took his models. It is true that the War of Independence destroyed a large portion of the population; but since her deliverance, Greece has repeopled herself by the accession of families of Greeks. Some of them came from Constantinople, from that famous Phanar which has so long conducted the affairs of Turkey. It is well known that a part of the Byzantine nobility remained at Constantinople after the conquest. More learned and more clever than the Turks, these Greeks, some of whom descended from imperial blood, set about re-conquering by craft what the fortune of war had robbed them of. They became the interpreters, the secretaries, the counsellors, of the Sultans; keeping modestly in the background, in unambitious posts, they knew how to

¹ *La Grèce Contemporaine*, p. 40.

govern their masters. More than one of them rose to the rank of hospodar, that is, governor of a province ; and those who did not attain such eminence busied themselves simply in making their fortunes. There are at the Phanar more than fifty thousand Greeks who confidently await the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire, and who become rich men whilst waiting. After the War of Independence, when the Greek fatherland was born, several Phanariot families gathered round the King. They were attracted by freedom, no doubt, but perhaps also by the creation of a court, and the hope of occupying the principal posts. The first Athenian families, the Murusis, the Soutzos, the Maurocordatos, the Argyropulos, &c., are Phanariot families.”¹

The Greeks of to-day, then, are practically the same as the Greeks of the classical age. The permanence of type is established, and, with it, the right of inheritance. Granted, only, that the Ottoman power in Europe is declining, and that sooner or later, in part or in the aggregate, some other nation will have to take up the *rôle* of government in which the Asiatic hordes have failed, the modern kingdom of Greece is designated for the succession alike by the justice of its claims and by its deserts. Not only do we find throughout the Ottoman Empire, clinging to their ancestral patrimony, and refusing to merge their existence in that of their conquerors and fellow-subjects, the lineal descendants of the ancient Greeks, but we find them, wherever they

¹ “ During the seventeenth century, the increased importance of the diplomatic relations of the Porte with the Christian Powers opened a new political career to the Greeks, and gave rise to the formation of a class of officials in the Ottoman service called Phanariots, from their making the quarter of Constantinople around the Patriarchate, called the Phanar, their place of residence.”—Finlay, v., 241.

have won their freedom, or avoided the worst evils of an oppressive rule, a prudent, a prosperous, a progressive race. We have gathered this already, from the testimony of more than one competent witness, and we shall presently collect it yet more distinctly by reviewing the recent history of liberated Greece.

CHAPTER IV.

CAUSES OF THE INSURRECTION OF 1821.

The Eve of the Outbreak—The Preservation of Greek Learning—Powerful effect of this Circumstance upon the National Regeneration—Earlier Efforts—The Revolutionary Spirit—Contributory Causes—The Hetairias—Russian Philhellenes—Greece before the War—English Philhellenes—The Cession of Parga—Greek Commerce—Turkish Tyranny—Primates and Tax Farmers—Klephts and Armatoles.

THE existing Greek Question in Europe arose more than a hundred years ago. It is a usual thing to say that it was created mainly by Russian intrigue. There can be no doubt that Russian agents were busy with the Greeks even as early as the time of Peter the Great; and incitements to rebellion amongst the subjects of the Porte were continued under the Empresses Anne, Elizabeth, and Catherine II., and, speaking generally, by all their successors. But Russia could not have created the discontent of the Greeks, and could not have initiated their desire for independence. It is needless to seek in foreign intrigue an explanation of what is more than adequately accounted for by Turkish misrule. The main cause of the struggles for freedom which, after nearly a century of failure, were destined to be successful at last, is to be found in the vitality and energy of the Hellenic race, in its superiority to the race of its oppressors, and in the constant intellectual activity which had its natural issue in revolt. Russia took advantage of a weapon which she found ready to

her hand; but that weapon was forged by humanity, not by intrigue.

The Turks themselves contributed not a little to the triumph of the subject race, by employing large numbers of Greeks in the public service, by according increased privileges to the Greek Church in Turkey, and by raising the more able Phanariots, and others of their countrymen, to the highest offices in the State. Under the Kuprilis, grand viziers in the seventeenth century, honourable and responsible posts were conferred on the Phanariots, and on several natives of the island of Chios—one of the most enlightened, because one of the least actively oppressed, portions of the old Byzantine Empire.¹

The opening up of these new political duties and dignities would necessarily stimulate the ambitions of the Greeks, and make them more impatient of the Turkish yoke. As Finlay observes,² "Some degree of literary instruction was necessary to enable the dependants of a great Phanariot official to attain many offices in his gift. The desire of learning was consequently

¹ The creation of two posts in particular, those of Dragoman of the Porte and Dragoman of the Fleet, is a remarkable instance of the discernment of the Grand Viziers; though there can be little doubt that it was an unwise act from the point of view of a tyrant who could only govern by the sword, and who ought, therefore, to have crushed, instead of using, his most enlightened subjects. These two Dragomans were a sort of Secretaries of State for the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, as the Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia were a sort of Viceroys. All these offices were filled by Phanariots, whose influence, founded especially by the Maurocordatos, Kallimakis, Hypsilantes, and Karadjas, rose to a great height at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Is it possible that the Turks of that age recognised at least one aspect of the Greek Question as it reveals itself to us in the present day? Perceiving the intellectual superiority of their Greek subjects, both to themselves and to the aggressive races of the north, did they seek to plant them in the Transdanubian provinces as a moral barrier against the Russians and Austrians? Such statesmanlike instincts are not rare amongst the Ottoman Turks.

² *History of Greece*, v., 245.

extended among the people, but, unfortunately, the very object for which it was sought prevented its producing any moral improvement on the national character. Fortunately for the Greeks, other contemporary causes tended also to disseminate education from a purer source, and by revealing to the people some idea of the vicious nature of the society by which they were governed, whether Christian or Mahomedan, awakened a conviction that, until the national independence was established, no permanent improvement could be effected in the moral condition of the people."

The influence of which Finlay speaks was hardly needed to encourage education amongst the Ottoman Greeks. It is, in fact, one of the greatest boasts of the race, and one of the strongest arguments which can be urged in their behalf, that they had maintained, in an almost unbroken line, the reality as well as the traditions of Greek learning, throughout the centuries of Turkish rule. The literary productions of their most learned men, written within this period, and published in various European towns, were both numerous and valuable.¹ The loss of their political and social freedom seems to have inspired the Greeks with an ardent love of letters, which they cherished all the more jealously because of the ignorance of their oppressors. We have abundant evidence of the existence of libraries and schools, of literary and scientific research, of vigour and continuity of thought amongst the continental and insular communities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first care of a wealthy Greek, anxious to contribute towards the regeneration of his fellow-countrymen, appears to have

¹ Cf. A. P. Vreto, *Neohellenike Philologia* ; also the chapters on Education and Literature in the first part of the present volume.

been to found a school, or to enrich a library, or to increase the sphere of influence of the clergy.¹ It is natural that the chief depositories of learning should have been the ecclesiastical authorities, or the teachers of schools under ecclesiastical guidance; and it is equally natural that the bulk of the instruction given in the schools should have been based upon the style and matter of the Greek Christian fathers. This was, indeed, the only condition on which education could have been imparted to the children of the subjected race; and the clergy performed their work so well that, as Finlay says,² in spite of the political degradation of the Greeks, probably "a larger proportion of them could read and write than among any other Christian race in Europe."³ One more proof of the permanence of the type; one more justification of the neo-Hellenic claims.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of this salient fact. It is the gist of the whole matter, and there would be no difficulty in showing that Greek independence has sprung virtually from Greek education. If the race had not preserved the traditions and the characteristics of its best days, and placed the

¹ M. Schuyler, in a letter from Constantinople to the *Athenæum*, May 18, 1878, mentions the case of the Evangelical School of Smyrna, founded by Pantoleon Sevastopoulos, in 1743, "who left it his library and small estate."

² *History of Greece*, vi., 16.

³ The evidence of others is less favourable; at least, in one respect. Thus Gervinus (v., 80) writes:—"As early as the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries the (ancient) Greek language had been taught in various schools at Constantinople, Chios, Janina, &c.; but only for ecclesiastical purposes; and even amongst the clergy the knowledge of ancient Greek was limited to such a narrow circle that Tournefort could tell us (in his *Voyage dans le Levant*, letter 3, 1717) that not a dozen persons in the country possessed it." I think that established facts warrant a presumption more favourable to Greek learning than the evidence of Tournefort.

same value on learning in the eighteenth century as it had done when in the zenith of its power, it would inevitably have sunk to the level of the most degraded subjects of the Porte, and would never have recovered its liberty, except, perhaps, as the vassal of another Power. The Greeks have entered upon the path of liberty because they have steadfastly clung to the dignity of education. They have found that education means power, in the best and widest sense, for they can trace their regeneration, step by step, from the school to the kingdom. A nation which, under the oppression of a grinding tyranny, could prove itself more enlightened than many of the mightiest States in Europe has deserved more than a partial emancipation; it has earned the full reversion of its ancient patrimony.

The earlier Greek struggles, previous to the War of Independence which finally shook off the Turkish yoke, were immature and abortive attempts, instigated by Russia, and having for their result to delay rather than to hasten the effectual movement.¹ Great national upheavals have their natural periods of evolution, and cannot be precipitated by spurious and artificial enthusiasms. So long as the Greeks themselves were not thoroughly ripe for revolt, so long as the genuine fire burned only in the hearts of a few pioneers and martyrs of liberty, the intrigues of Russia were hopelessly impotent. The futile war of 1770-4, undertaken by

¹ There had indeed been other desultory attempts to raise the Greeks, incited by agents from Western Europe. Thus Philippe de Comines records an abortive resurrection in the north of Greece, fostered by the emissaries of Charles VIII. of France. The Sultan was warned of the mischief from Venice, and nipped it in the bud. After that Charles de Gonzagne and Cleves, Duke de Nevers, and seventh in descent from Andronicus the Old, Emperor of the East, made an equally unsuccessful attempt. See Vreto, *Life of Kolokotrones*, p. 11.

Catherine II., on the advice of her favourite, Gregory Orloff, and in direct violation of existing treaties between Russia and the Porte, was little better than a filibustering adventure, in which the Greeks bore but an insignificant part. Something more was necessary before Hellas could arise as one man, with an irresistible resolution, and with such a moral force that the European concert of nations (or what was equivalent to it) was compelled to intervene in its favour. The intellectual battle had to be fought out before the battle of material force could be attempted; and the crisis of that intellectual battle was to be brought on by the French Revolution.

Of all the enduring benefits conferred upon Europe by the Revolution of 1789, none was more auspicious than its development of the cause of Greece. Not only were the Greek patriots stimulated to renewed hope and vigour by the grand spectacle of a nation shaking off its chains—I speak especially of the first three years of the Revolution, and of the period immediately antecedent to the meeting of the Assembly—but simultaneously, and throughout Europe, the ideas of the Philhellenes assumed the conviction and the force of maturity. From the French initiative we may trace most of the conquests of liberty which signalised the earlier decades of the present century; and if the fruits of that glorious new growth were not to be reaped in Greece for thirty years after the seed had been sown, this was only because the Greeks had to wait and suffer, in common with the rest of Europe, until the terrible recoil from that great shock had passed away.

It was barely six years from the signature of the Treaty of Paris when the Greeks threw down the gauntlet. Naples and Spain, as we have seen, claimed

their liberties about the same time, and were slaughtered into silence by truculent Austria and reactionary France. But with Greece and Turkey the case was different. The self-constituted vicegerents of fate, who met at Laybach and Verona to protect their own tyrannies by perpetuating those of others, were no longer of one accord in dealing with this question. Russia had an interest in the weakening of Turkey, and without Russia, Austria and Prussia were not likely to interfere. England, who had protested mildly at Laybach, and firmly at Verona, against the suppression of a nation's liberty, was not hard to persuade when the question was one of popular emancipation. Never for many years together has England tried to assure herself and the world that she is anything but the most liberal and democratic of nations. She has allied herself with despots, and truckled to tyrants; but only in unworthy moments of reaction and self-forgetfulness. Herself indissolubly wedded to the supremacy of the popular will, having always rejected, without hysterical passion or undue violence, the presumptions of monarchical prerogative, her generosity has rarely been appealed to in vain by a nation struggling against its oppressor. Appealed to now by Greece, she listened soberly¹ to her claim—not by virtue of, but in spite of, Russia's advocacy.

The question presented to Europe was one between the tyranny of Turkey, hated by all freemen, which had never cared to make itself friends amongst its fellow-tyrannies, and Greece, the land of the Hellenes, of a race which had renewed its youth with the reju-

¹ Very soberly, it is true. The epoch was one of reaction, so far as our Government was concerned; but the people heard the voice of the Greeks. It was the age of Castlereagh and Wellington; but it was also the age of Canning.

venescence of Europe itself, and which demanded to be free amongst the first of the liberated peoples. It was impossible not to recognise the justice of this demand. There was a solidarity between new Greece and new Europe which every enlightened man, every man whose mind had been emancipated by the revolutionary ideas of the epoch, felt and acknowledged as a matter of course. Europe, in fact, was passing through a new Renaissance; and in this Renaissance Greek and Italy had a special right to participate. The sixteenth century had witnessed a Renaissance of letters; in the nineteenth century political action was to take the place of learning, and the new birth was to regenerate nations instead of literatures. None the less was this second Renaissance preluded and ushered in by a new revival of letters. It had been so in France; it had been so, after a different fashion, in Germany and England; and it had been so in Greece. The political revolution was preceded by a literary revolution; but this last was practically a fresh literary Renaissance. Evolved in England, where men revolted against a spurious dogmatism and a feeble Teutonic classicalism—against the vapidities of a Pope and the puerilities of a Johnson—the new ideas were destined to come to maturity in France, and there to be translated into the language of action.¹ In Greece, the

¹ "Although born in England, the philosophy of the eighteenth century could not develop itself in England; the fever for demolition and reconstruction remained superficial there, and momentary. Deism, atheism, materialism, scepticism, ideology, the theory of the return to nature, the proclamation of the rights of man, all the temerities of Bolingbroke, Collins, Toland, Tindal, and Mandeville, the bold ideas of Hume, Hartley, James Mill, and Bentham, all the revolutionary doctrines, were so many conservatory plants, produced here and there in the isolated studies of a few thinkers; in the open air they proved abortive, after blooming for a little time under the too vigorous competition with the old vegetation. . . .

prelude of political resurrection was more distinctly a literary Renaissance than a revolution of ideas. It was so, at all events, as far as the outward expression of these ideas was concerned. The schools, the printing press, the ecclesiastical teaching, the Hetairias, displayed a literary rather than a philosophical activity; but their activity in the eighteenth century was unquestionably cognate with the activity of English and French ideas.

Gervinus, centering his attention on the revival of letters amongst the Greeks, and perhaps making too little of the southward revolutionary current, maintains that "neither the efforts of Latin Christianity during two hundred years, nor the dreams of the Greek Church for more than a century, nor the French Republicans, nor the French Imperialists, nor the Italian carbonari, were to give back their freedom to the Greeks. . . . We shall see at work the savage and anarchical resistance of the Albanians and the Suliots, the strength of the klephts amongst the Greeks themselves, the audacious ambition of the Phanariots, the power of Ali Pasha and Mehemet Ali, which operated sometimes in favour of, and sometimes against, the Greeks. But all these causes would not have had a decisive bearing on the success of the insurrection; everything depended on the recovery to an intellectual and moral life of that nation which, after its political ruin, had already made the European world young again, and which now compelled Europe to take an interest in its political

On the contrary, in France, the seed imported from England takes root and spreads with extraordinary vigour. . . . This is owing to the seed having fallen on suitable ground, that is to say, on the patrimony of the classic spirit. In this land of the *raison raisonnante* it no longer encounters the rivals that impeded its growth on the other side of the channel."—Taine, *L'Ancien Régime*, bk. iv., ch. 1 (Durand's Translation).

resurrection. In their essential parts, that recovery and that rejuvenescence were potentially present in the inner and remarkable development of the Greeks which had displayed itself for the first time during the reforms of Mustapha Kœprili, but which became a splendid tree only when the weather favourable to the growth of the revolution supplied its offspring with a more abundant nourishment.”¹ A little further on, Gervinus strikes the true note. “Since the French Revolution the common aim and centre of action had been found which had been lacking before, and towards which every movement in the moral and material progress of the nation was to be directed. It was the idea of the political recovery of the fatherland which, like an electric spark, touched all the isolated elements, with their divergent forces, suddenly fused them, and made of them a homogeneous whole.”

In 1770 the Greeks had failed, because they were fighting (or were not fighting) for Russia. In 1821 they succeeded, because then, for the first time, they fought for each other.

Throughout the last decade of the last century, and the two earlier decades of the present century, the friends of Greece were impatiently looking forward to her deliverance. Young Greeks at the universities of Europe, or travelling in almost every foreign country, were cheered by the generous fire of sympathy, and returned to their homes with renewed confidence. At Jena, Schiller challenged his Greek hearers to strike a blow for national freedom. Men hoped that the wide conflagration of the revolutionary wars would reach Greece also, where “the landing of a single French regiment would have roused the whole land to

¹ *Geschichte des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, v., 79.

revolt.”¹ The conflagration died out at last, and the Treaty of Vienna had nothing to say to Greece except by placing the Ionian Islands—bandied about from Venice to France, from France to Russia, and back again—under a British protectorate. Even this the Greeks were fain to accept as a happy augury; for they began to look to England for their deliverance.

It was during this period of thirty years that Philhellenism became a mighty moral power, more especially in England. Greece was one of the few places on the Continent which English travellers could safely visit, and they resorted in considerable numbers to the Morea, the Ionian Islands, and the Archipelago, as well as to Albania. “Athens,” says Gervinus, “became a rendez-vous for foreigners, and a colony of scientific men. By the side of the archont Logothetis, called the modern Pericles, on account of his charming and witty conversation, Lord Guildford² was for some time the centre of society. Later on, he used his large fortune, and all the resources of his mind, for the purpose of stimulating the national spirit amongst the Ionians; and he won amongst the Greeks themselves the title of ‘greatest and thrice greatest of Philhellenes.’”

Greek writers were not idle in this preparatory movement. Amongst them was the savant Coraïs, who, in 1803, read before the Society of the Observers

¹ I am here following Gervinus.—During the Napoleonic wars the influence of Russia was rather sinister than favourable to the Greeks. The Czar Alexander had quarrelled with Turkey in 1805, thus driving the Sultan Selim into the arms of the French. Napoleon had already seized Illyria; it would have been easy for him to overrun the Ottoman dominions; and, indeed, he had at one time entertained the idea. But in the long run the enemy of Russia was his friend; and this may have seemed to him a sufficient reason for letting Turkey alone. The Greek armatoles did attempt an insurrection; but it was ill supported and easily suppressed.

² Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.

of Man, at Paris, a memoir "on the present state of civilisation in Greece," which contained one of the earliest direct assertions of the necessity for national emancipation. But it was in the Hetairias especially that the intellectual activity of the Greek patriots and the Philhellenes found its full and free expression. The first of these societies, the "Hetairia of Philomuses," was perhaps founded with a genuine, though not with an exclusively literary, aim. It was inaugurated at Vienna, by Count Capo d'Istria,¹ and its object was described as being the creation of schools in Greece, and the cultivation of a taste for classical art by the opening of museums and libraries. The head-quarters were removed to Athens in the year 1814, under the patronage of many of the distinguished persons of every nationality who had assembled with the Congress at Vienna. Another similar association, under the name of the "Literary Society," had been founded in 1810 by the metropolitan Ignatius, at Bucharest, which was specially promoted and assisted by Russians. Bucharest was already the home of Greek learning, thanks to the Phanariot Voivodes, who, whatever their faults may have been, had left this amongst other proofs of the superiority of their race. Here also, in 1811, Anthimos Gazis had started the *Learned Mercury*,² a magazine of modern Greek literature, in which the neo-Hellenic spirit was vividly displayed.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the opinions of Europe on the true character of the relations

¹ Capo d'Istria was a native of Corfu. At an early age he entered the Russian diplomatic service, and was employed on arranging the details of the Treaty of Paris. He is a prominent figure in history of Greek regeneration.—See on the Hetairias, Gervinus, v., 123; Finlay, vi., 97; Bougeault, iii., 525; Philemon and Xanthos amongst Greek historians.

² Λόγιος Ἐρμῆς.

between Russia and Turkey were very much the same as they are to-day. The suspicion of Russian motives was perhaps not quite so pronounced; but then, as now, it was steadfastly believed that the Government of St. Petersburg was aiming at the dismemberment of Turkey, at the possession of Constantinople, at a Mediterranean frontier; and then, as now, the majority of statesmen perceived in the constant interventions and intrigues of Russia few better motives than the advancement of a selfish ambition. It was not surprising that the less enthusiastic minds, starting with this idea, saw the hand of the Russian Government in the new literary associations of the Greeks. The hand of the Russian Philhellenes was undoubtedly there; and in respect of another society, the *Philike Hetairia* of Odessa, it is placed beyond question that official Russia gave it countenance and support. That the active propaganda carried on by the Hetairists contributed not a little to the outbreak of the insurrection of the Greeks, in 1821, can hardly be contested.¹ Strange to say, the English consuls in the Levant were the only foreign agents who, having had the opportunity of watching this propaganda, shut their eyes, as late as 1820, to the approach of an inevitable Russo-Greek attack upon the Porte.

There was a large and prosperous colony of Greeks at Odessa in the year 1814, when the *Philike Hetairia* was founded.² Finlay tells us that the first members

¹ The semi-political semi-literary clubs of revolutionary Paris very probably, as Finlay observes, suggested these societies, secret or open, of the Philhellenes. The name of the Odessa Hetairia, *Φιλική Ἑταιρία* (*subaudi τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπαναστάσεως*), carries us back to the *Société des Amis du Peuple*, and the like.

² The origination of the scheme is credited to Nicholas Skuphas, a native of Arta.

were "bankrupt merchants and intriguing adventurers, possessed of some cunning and great enthusiasm;" and few historians have found anything better to say of the wilder and more restless spirits who made themselves conspicuous in the earlier conduct of the association. Russian and even Greek writers have naturally said all that it was possible to say on behalf of these men; but the wiser patriots of the time knew that little was to be gained from the assistance of harebrained fanatics who talked of burning Constantinople, assassinating the Sultan and his ministers, and exterminating the Mahomedan population. Desperate remedies of that kind come of overheated passions, and in the emergencies of revolutions. They are not calmly plotted beforehand, except by the enemies of human society.

Gervinus¹ shows how much reason there is to conclude that the Russian Government was at an early period cognisant of the existence and objects of the Odessa Hetairia. In 1816 its head-quarters were removed to Moscow, whilst its very existence was unknown to all save a few of the Greeks resident in Turkey. The members were recruited from the Hellenic communities in Odessa and Moscow, and from travellers passing through these cities, who were initiated by the leaders of the association, and taught its watchword—"the armed union of all the Christians of the Turkish Empire, for the purpose of making the Cross triumph over the Crescent." A Thessalian, named Perrhaibos,² was thus initiated, as he was on his way to St. Petersburg. In 1817 he presented to the Czar Alexander, through the good offices of the diplomatist Stourdza,

¹ *Geschichte*, v., 123.

² He had incited the Suliots to revolt in 1814; and in the following year he published a history of that brave and unfortunate race.

“a new scheme for a rising of the Greeks.” One of the companions of his voyage, also initiated in the secrets of Hetairia, was Nicholas Galatis, of Ithaca; “a vain swindler who gave himself out for a count, and a delegate of the Greeks, and who opened his negotiations with so much imprudence that he was arrested by the police, and conducted to Moldavia. On the same night Perrhaibos was likewise arrested. But—a significant fact—not only was the latter immediately set at liberty, after receiving a compensation in money, but the consul-general at Jassy, Pini, was directed to give his protection and pecuniary help to the swindler Galatis, so that, ‘as a member of an association which aimed at shaking the Ottoman yoke,’ he might not suffer at the hands of the Turks.” This looks as though the Hetairists already had powerful friends at the Russian court; and, at all events, from that moment the propaganda received a wide extension in Southern Russia and the Danubian provinces. The sham Count Galatis was worth appeasing. The first thing he did at Jassy was to win over the consul’s interpreter, George Leventis, a Peloponnesian. Leventis was not content with adopting the idea of an insurrection; he wanted to make it forthwith a reality. By way of a beginning he set himself to promote a rising in Servia, and for that purpose invited Kara George, the expelled prince of that country, to Jassy, where he managed to supply him with means. The attempt was made, in connection with a more serious movement in Moldavia, and proved abortive. This “tragical prelude of the Greek Revolution,” says Gervinus, “a prelude put upon the stage and enacted by the Phanariot Hypsilantes, who had submitted himself to Russian inspirations,” ended in “the atrocities inseparable from every Turkish occupation or triumph.”

From this moment all eyes were turned upon the Greeks; for it was understood that the next act in the drama of emancipation was to be played in Greece.

Before proceeding to pass under review the events of this War of Independence, and of the establishment of the Greek kingdom, it may be well to glance at the actual condition of the subjected Hellenic race immediately before the insurrection. It may be at once admitted that the Greeks in Turkey were by no means specially or universally oppressed at the beginning of the present century. We have already seen that their intellectual superiority and industry had gained for them many exemptions and privileges which were not enjoyed by any other subject race. They had honourable careers thrown open to them; they had the opportunities of making and enjoying large fortunes; their religion was treated with toleration by their Mahomedan rulers; their right of self-education, and in some cases their right of self-government, was generally respected. In certain parts of the empire the Greeks were in a better material condition than their Mahomedan fellow-subjects. No doubt this fact was due principally to the Greeks themselves, and in part even to the loose and ill-organised system of Turkish government; but it was something that, amidst the characteristically blighting despotism of Ottoman rule, there could exist here and there a practically independent district or community. One cause more than any other contributed to produce this result, and it was that the collection of the taxes was chiefly managed for the Porte by Greek officials. From the Phanariots in the capital to the humblest clerks and farmers of taxes, the administration of the empire was

largely carried on by the shrewd, methodical, business-like and fairly trustworthy Greeks. Not only in this respect, but also on account of the ecclesiastical authority wielded by the Patriarch of Constantinople over the great majority of the Sultan's subjects, the Government found it advisable to leave considerable power in their hands; and thus the Greeks throughout the empire enjoyed a general immunity which they would certainly not have retained if the administration had been confided wholly to Mahomedans.

Again, the Porte saw in the Greek population something more than a recruiting ground for administrators and clerks. Commerce, agriculture, the navy, were crowded by skilful and successful Greeks. The Greek merchants and farmers of Southern Turkey and the Archipelago paid a considerable share of the revenues of the empire. The pashaliks of the Morea, of Thessalonica, of Crete, and of the Coast were amongst the most valuable districts of the whole of Turkey, and it was not worth the Porte's while to interfere (except by occasionally increasing the imposts) with such lucrative sources of its annual income.

Another fact helps to account for this comparative prosperity and immunity of the Greeks. Russia had imposed upon Turkey, in the famous treaty of Kainardji (1774), her right of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte. By the seventh article of that treaty the Sultan undertook to permit the free exercise of the Christian religion, and to listen to the special representations of the Russian Government on behalf of the co-religionists of Russia. The constant interference of the Russian embassy between the Mahomedan rulers and their Christian subjects—an interference which was soon emulated by most of the

other European Powers—has done more than anything else to hasten the decline of the Ottoman Government.

If, however, the Greeks in Turkey had some reason to congratulate themselves on the fact that they were not often, or as a race, subjected to the brutality of their semi-barbarous masters, they were never able to forget for a long time together that they were at the mercy of the cruel caprices of a tyrant. The very uncertainty and inequality of their condition prevented the most prosperous amongst them from being content with their lot. "At Constantinople," Finlay observes,¹ "the Greek was a crouching slave; at Bucharest and Yassi, a despotic tyrant; at Chios, a happy subject; and at Psara, and in the villages of Mount Pelion, a free citizen." The fact is instructive, especially when read in the light of subsequent history, which shows us that it was precisely in the most well-to-do portions of the empire—in the Morea, in Crete and other islands of the Ægean—that the most desperate struggles have taken place to cast off the Turkish yoke. It is another proof of the statement that the education and elevation of the Hellenic race have been the principal causes of its recovery of freedom. It is not when the victims of oppression are most abject, and most bitterly crushed, that they are ripest for insurrection and deliverance, but when the dignity of humanity exerts the strongest dominion over them. Not the crouching slave, but the man who has found it impossible to remain a slave, deserves and is able to be free.

Finlay reproaches many of the wealthy Greeks with supineness at the moment of the national struggle for liberty. "Great as the ecclesiastical, literary, and commercial influence of the Greek race really was

¹ *History*, vi., 7.

in European Turkey," he says,¹ "the events of the Greek Revolution showed that the influence of Greek nationality had been greatly overrated by the Greeks themselves. . . . A large part of the Greek nation made but feeble efforts to aid their countrymen when struggling for independence. The literary powers of the learned created a loud echo of patriotism; but thousands of wealthy Greeks continued to pursue their own schemes of interest and profit, under the protection of the Sultan's Government, during the whole period of the Greek Revolution." Finlay would probably have rejected the suggestion that an impartial history of the Greek Revolution could have been written in a spirit of generosity towards the Greeks; and he certainly does not err in that direction. His depreciation of the national sentiment was probably based upon his own observation;² but we are fairly entitled to question the accuracy of his deduction from the particular cases of indifference which may have come under his notice. After a war of several years' duration, maintained against every effort which the Ottoman generals could put forth, it may be questioned whether any foreign observer can be justified in reproaching "a large part of the Greek nation" with lukewarmness, or in stigmatising the circumspection of prominent Greek subjects in other portions of Turkey, whose situation would necessarily be precarious, as the grossest selfishness.

We have every reason for concluding, from indisputable facts, that the Greek nation as a whole deserved the warm sympathy which it commanded throughout

¹ *History*, p. 8.

² Unless, as Mr. Tozer says in a note to Finlay's autobiography, it was the result of his disappointment with the progress made by the Kingdom of Greece after 1830.

Europe, as soon as it had committed itself to its desperate struggle with the Turks. And if we consider the inequality of this struggle, the vast sacrifices which it imposed upon the entire population of Greece proper, the paralysing brutality of the Ottoman troops whenever chance brought them a temporary victory, and the danger incurred by all Greeks outside the limits of the actual insurrection, it is impossible not to admire the gallantry of the movement, and an ungrateful task to fix our eyes upon isolated instances of abstention.

Europe unquestionably hailed the promise of Greek regeneration with enthusiasm; and England, though perhaps the slowest of the Great Powers to give the struggling nationality her countenance and hearty support, was eventually the most efficient instrument in assuring its success. There are, indeed, several reasons which explain the first reluctance of the English Government to take part in the liberation of Greece. Distrust of Russia, a doubt whether Greece would ever be strong enough to use her power in an independent manner, and an unwillingness to weaken Turkey in the important position which she occupied in the East, were motives already influential with English statesmen, though far from being as potent as they have since become. The Philhellenes of the earlier phase were mostly liberal-minded scholars, poets, and travellers, whose ideas asserted themselves in literature, but were slow to exercise an influence over politics. Up to the death of Lord Castlereagh, in 1822, it was useless for the Greeks to expect any assistance, direct or indirect, from the English Foreign Office; and even the influence of Canning was exerted for little else than the patching up of a peace between Turkey and her rebellious subjects. Public opinion, which had begun

to express itself very forcibly in favour of popular liberties in England, was not yet instructed and trained up to the point of enthusiasm for foreign liberties. Our grandfathers knew next to nothing of Greece. For the mass of the nation there was no such thing as an Eastern Question; whilst their knowledge of the relations existing between Turkey and Greece might have been summed up in a sentence. Even those who made some effort to discover the truth, and who for that purpose consulted the records of travellers, must have been puzzled to know whether their sympathies ought to be with the Turks or with the Greeks, so sorry a picture was drawn by many writers of the patriots in their own country. The battle of Navarino itself was not generally approved in England; and it contributed largely to the fall of the Canning-Goderich Administration, and to the return to office of the Duke of Wellington, with his blank negation of popular claims.

How little the English Government, in the time of Castlereagh's greatest influence, was disposed to assist the cause of the Greeks may be seen from the history of Parga, the surrender of which town to the Turks, in 1819, reflects anything but credit on the perversely scrupulous foreign policy which was responsible for it. The Ionian Islands had been ceded by Venice to France in 1797. Three years later they were seized by a combined force of Russians and Turks, and a special convention nominally gave back to the Ottoman dominion all the former Venetian possessions on the coast, including Prevesa and Parga. Ali Pasha, of Janina, alternately a servant and a rebel to the Sultan, had already occupied the places in question, with the exception of Parga. The Porte's jealousy of

Ali Pasha induced it to wink at the resistance offered to him by this town, and to leave it in the enjoyment of its liberal institutions; so that, in effect, Parga was undisturbed up to the peace of 1815. At that time the French garrison in Corfu, being called upon to surrender the island to the English, secretly invited Ali Pasha to enter Parga, on the opposite coast. An English force from Zante, however, lost no time in occupying the town; and the English Government, being called upon by the Porte to carry out the terms of the Russo-Turkish convention of 1800, raised objections, and protracted the negotiations for four years.

The inhabitants of Parga themselves protested vigorously against being handed over to the Turks, and especially to Ali Pasha, whose cruelties had rendered him an object of aversion. They declared that they would leave their homes rather than exchange their independence for the tyranny of Turkish rule; and when the cession was actually resolved upon, the bulk of them fulfilled their threat, and emigrated to the islands, under circumstances "of the most tragical character,"¹ England was able to secure for them a compensation from the Porte of £150,000; but this did not prevent bitter complaints and reproaches being levelled against her. England's destiny made her the last Power in Europe to deliver a territory into the hands of Mahomedans, as she was thereafter to be the last Power to contend for the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In regard to Parga, there was evidently no reason why the convention of 1800, between Russia and Turkey, which dealt with territory belonging to neither the one nor the other of them, which was set aside by the Treaty of Tilsit,

¹ Finlay, v., 227; Perrhaibos, Alison.

in 1807, which had never been acted upon by the Porte, and which was in any case superseded by the cession of the Ionian Islands to England in 1815, should have been considered binding upon Great Britain. Parga seems to have passed to and fro, with Corfu—and it certainly did so in the year 1800. We find the French claiming to dispose of it on the occasion of the surrender of Corfu to the English. It was probably the jealousy of the Continental Powers, who were unwilling to leave England in possession of a fortress on the mainland, which prompted the Porte to insist upon the surrender of Parga. It might have been infinitely better for Europe, and for England in particular, if Castlereagh had steadfastly declined to abandon a position commanding Epirus and the whole of the Greek peninsula. Such a course was dictated by justice and policy, and was certainly not forbidden by international probity. If it had been followed, there would have been something to hand over to Greece, in 1864, more valuable to her than the Ionian Islands.

One result of this lamentable cession was that the refugees of Parga, settling chiefly in the Ionian Islands, there formed a nucleus of discontent, or at all events added largely to the discontent already created by the arbitrary rule of the English Government and their Lord High Commissioners.¹ The soreness never wore off, from that moment until the plebiscite of 1864 declared enthusiastically for reunion with the mother country.

Finlay says,² in reference to the cession of Parga, and to the general indignation provoked by it:—

¹ The first of these, Sir Thomas Maitland, nicknamed "King Tom," was extremely unpopular. Lord Guildford was a genuine Philhellene, and did much to reconcile the inhabitants to their new masters.

² *History*, v., 277. Finlay's work was last revised by the author in 1863.

“Perhaps public opinion is not unjust when it blames the acts of a free government for violations of the principles of abstract justice, which it would praise as wise and politic measures if they were adopted by a despotic prince. Men habitually arraign the free before the tribunal of equity; slaves and depots they judge by the exigencies of expediency and policy. Truth and justice ought always to penetrate to the hearts of free men, but they are not expected to find an echo in the breasts of princes and statesmen. The severe criticism of English policy is the eulogy of English liberty. The conduct of the English Government in the Ionian Islands has, however, neither been wise nor liberal: though it has administered justice with equity, and protected industry and commerce, it long opposed the liberty of the press. The chief ground of its unpopularity nevertheless is, that it has checked the movements of those who desired to cause an insurrection of the Greeks in Turkey. . . . But the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands have no good reason to complain, for if the English Government has not performed its duty, the nobles and the people of the Ionian Islands have completely neglected theirs. They have not availed themselves of the liberty they have so long enjoyed for improving their moral condition, and for attaining a moral and intellectual superiority over the other Greeks who were subject to the Sultan. All foreign domination appears to have exerted a baneful influence on Greek morality.” The reproach hardly seems to be deserved. Mr. Finlay is, at least by implication, bitter against both the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands and those of the Greek mainland—against the first because they disliked English rule, and against the last because they plotted to cast off the

oppression of the Turks; and yet in both cases he admits the domination to have been baneful. He condemns the Greeks for being corrupt under foreign tyranny, but he is unable to sympathise with them when they insist on demanding their freedom. Greece is entitled to appeal to a more generous tribunal.

England owes to Greece a reparation for the wrong done to her children at Parga. In 1819 she subjected a prosperous community to the worst of all tyrannies, with the sole alternative of exile.¹ The time is approaching, if it has not fully arrived, when she may assist in drawing together the Greeks from the Ægean to the Balkans, from Parga to Macedonia and Thrace. Autonomy may serve the ends of compromise; but the nineteenth century can hardly pass away without extending the sceptre of the Greek kingdom over all the Greeks in Europe.

Amongst the clearest symptoms of the fitness of the Greeks for independence was the condition of their commerce during the half-century preceding the establishment of the new dominion. It was not only by an intellectual, but also by a moral and a physical superiority to their oppressors that the rejuvenescent race were to earn their freedom. The industry of the Greeks, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, was phenomenal; it has been admitted and described by many writers, by no means partial to the nation as a whole.² Their manufactures, their agriculture, and their shipping, responded to a common stimulus, due partly to the Russian protection after the

¹ The £150,000 went to the owners of property—not to the mass of the people who had no title-deeds, but only patriotism, and independence, and other unmarketable possessions.

² Finlay, v., 281; and (as quoted by him) Beaujour, Clarke, Leake.

Treaty of Kainardji, and partly to the natural genius and power of recovery in the race. By the terms of the commercial treaties entered into between Russia and the Porte, in the years 1779 and 1783, the right of Russian interference on behalf of the Greek Christians was supplemented by the immunity of Greek property under the Russian flag; and thus the Greek merchants were enabled to carry on a large trade in the Mediterranean, in the Black Sea, and even as far as English ports, under both Russian and Turkish protection. During the long European wars, vast profits were in this way secured by Greek exporters, and by the mercantile navy plying between the mainland, the islands, and foreign ports. This industrial development was woefully interfered with by the long War of Independence; but it contained a promise which has since been fulfilled in the commercial records of New Greece.

It is not to Englishmen that one need insist upon the large influence which this extended commerce must have had upon the aspirations of the Greeks for an independent national existence, nor upon the manner in which the machinery of trade would avail the cause of regeneration and freedom.

It would be superfluous, as already pointed out, to look for the causes of the Greek insurrection with the expectation of finding evidences of desperate cruelty on the part of the Turks, or desperate suffering on the part of the Greeks. Both these things we should undoubtedly meet with in the Greece of 1800 to 1820, but they were not the immediate causes of the outbreak. These causes were, first, the regeneration of the race, the influence of modern ideas, the elevation and enrichment of thousands of Greeks; and next, the fomentation of all such causes by Philhellenism and

Hetairism, by a propagandism exerted both from within and from without—most actively from Russia, which, in so far as her motives were selfish, saw her own advantage in any limitation of the Ottoman power, even if it resulted in the aggrandisement of a nation whereof she had every reason to be prospectively jealous. But it cannot be too often repeated that much more is necessary, in order to stir up a national insurrection, than the intrigues and money of foreign agencies. No influence and no bribes would suffice to create the animosity of a race, much less to plunge a country into civil war, if there were not, to begin with, the two conflicting and irreconcilable elements of oppressors and oppressed, and if the wrongs of the oppressed were not already deep enough to have forced them to the brink of desperation. That this was so with the Greeks, as it has been so with all the Christian races subjected to Ottoman rule, it is useless to deny.

One form alone of the tyranny exerted by the Turks over their victims—although it had disappeared more than a century before the outbreak of the Greek War—would explain any insurrection, however ruthless, and after however long an interval of time. The tribute of children, exacted by the Ottoman conquerors when they could not extort a tribute in money or in chattels, surpassed in subtle cruelty almost every diabolical device which it has entered into the mind of a tyrant to conceive. Whatever the purpose to which the ravished Christian children were put—and it was not only the Janissaries who were recruited from this source—the life-blood of the subject races was drained from them by Sultan Orkhan's obscene institution. Thus to the barbarous cruelty itself were added the enervation and emasculation of the race. The Greeks

in common with the Bulgarians and the Slavs, were held in bondage by their own children and brethren. The kid was seethed in its mother's milk. Generation after generation there was scarcely a house in which there was not one dead—dead, at least, to the ties of home and kindred, and to such honour as could subsist under these denaturalising conditions. Were injuries like this capable of being forgotten? To put a loftier and wider question still—Is it possible for such crimes to be committed without bringing punishment on the heads of the criminals? Surely not, if there is any system or law in the development of history. As inevitably as the quickened seed becomes a plant, or as the dropped stone falls to the ground, so certainly, and by the operation of an immutable law, does tyranny beget the death of tyrants, and oppression the freedom of the oppressed.¹

There was in Greece, under the Turkish rule, an aristocracy of wealth, and partly of talent, which went by the name of the *kodja-bashis*, or *primates*, corresponding somewhat to the *publicani* of the Roman tributary provinces. They farmed the taxes under the Turkish beys, generally subletting them to petty authorities in the several communities within their districts. The taxes fell, as a rule, nominally upon the whole population; but the Mahomedans were

¹ The tribute of children was abolished in form, it is true; but the essence of the tax remained. To this day, according to recent travellers, the Turks have continued to draw upon the Christian populations of the empire for the supply of their harems; and it would appear that the kidnapers and slave-dealers drive a brisk trade in the human commodity amongst the poorer classes of Greeks, Armenians, and other subjected races. Turkey is, in fact, one of the greatest slave-holding and slave-dealing countries yet unconquered by civilisation. The reader may judge for himself concerning the actual condition of affairs from a paper on the subject in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for June, 1878.

usually strong enough to throw the burden upon their Christian fellow-subjects, who were thus made to support, by their unremitting labours, the entire edifice of plunder and extortion, from the lazy Mussulman farmer to the cadis, the kodja-bashis, the beys, the metropolitan officials, and the Sultan himself. The two great divisions of tax-payers were the rural and the urban populations—including the shepherds, the mountaineers, the muleteers (who, in a country destitute of canals, navigable rivers, and almost of roads, were a numerous and important class), the tradesmen of the municipalities, and the merchants of the seaports.

The taxes consisted principally of the levy of tenths in kind on the gross produce, which of course became far more than tenths when the stipulated tax of a given district had to be supplied by a limited number of Christian tax-payers; an additional levy of grain for the provision of the capital; and the haratch, or poll-tax, which, as a matter of course, frequently gave rise to the most galling tyranny.

There were two other classes of the Greek population which played a prominent part in the history of the country—the klephts and armatoles. The klephts, or brigands, who had established themselves in the mountainous districts, were not simply robbers, urged by greed and ferocity to turn their hands against their fellow-men. They included most of those who fled from the cruelties of the Turks or the brutality of the tax-gatherers; and it is not to be wondered at that they gradually came to be regarded with a feeling of romantic interest and admiration, as patriots and popular champions rather than as the scourges of society. The national songs of the War of Independence, and of the generations preceding it, give ample

evidence of the existence of such a feeling. Guarded as their language usually is, and concealing quite as much as it reveals the patriotic sentiment of the writers, there can be no doubt that they were sung by thousands of Greek men and maids with a full appreciation of the spirit which dictated them.

The *armatoloi*, or men-at-arms, were instituted in various localities in the old Byzantine Empire, in order to insure that protection against anarchy or invasion which the later emperors were powerless to provide for their subjects. After the Ottoman incursions many of the mountain districts submitted to the Sultans only on condition of being allowed to retain their local privileges,¹ which, it would seem, were not unlike the *fueros* of the Basque provinces in Spain. It was in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, especially, that the armatoles were tolerated by the Turks, long after they had been suppressed, or had died out, in other districts; but towards the end of the eighteenth century a determined effort was made to destroy the system. The pashas of Janina were appointed from amongst the Albanian Mussulmans with a special view to this end. Ali of Tepelen, who became dervendji pasha² in 1787, was cruelly efficient in the work; and amongst his devices was the secret encouragement of the klephts, in order to provide a pretext for introducing Albanian mercenaries amongst the armatoles, nominally to strengthen, but virtually to assimilate them. At the same time he appointed the bravest klephts to commands amongst his Christian guards; whilst, on the other hand, his policy drove many armatoles to fall back into the ranks of the

¹ Finlay, vi., 20.

² One of his principal duties being to guard the dervends, or mountain passes, from the ravages of the klephts.

klephts. Thus it happened that klephts and armatoles came to be confounded by the Greek population, who began to look on both alike as representing the spirit of opposition to Turkish rule. These two classes of Greeks were subsequently notorious for the part which they took in the War of Independence.

CHAPTER V.

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Weakness of Turkey—Ali of Janina—The Danubian Revolt—The Massacre in the Morea—Character of the Struggle—Turkish Reprisals—Sultan Mahmoud—The Murder of the Greek Patriarch—Intervention of the Powers—1821 and 1876—English Interests—Rupture between Russia and Turkey—Progress of the Greeks—Declaration of Independence—The Greeks disavow the Foreign Intriguers.

TURKEY has been falling to pieces any time during the past century; and, since the Treaty of Vienna, there have been few statesmen who believed it possible that the empire of the Sultans in Europe could endure. Not only had the Porte failed to obtain a place amongst the European community of nations; not only had the Great Powers at Vienna and Paris left Turkey outside the scheme of reconstructed Europe; not only had the Mahomedans shown themselves incapable of assimilating, or being assimilated by, their Christian fellow-subjects, but the oppressed races had learned a lesson from France which the more capable of them were quick to put to the proof. Self-respect and self-reliance were all that was needed to give liberty to the Servians, the Roumanians, the Greeks. The sacred right of rebellion had come almost as a revelation to the victims of Turkish misrule; and no sooner had they recognised that the casting off of a yoke was a solemn duty, justifying insurrection and slaughter itself, than they became, from that very moment, practically free. What had been an underhand intrigue, nourished by money

and lies, was thenceforth a noble struggle and a holy war.

With the Turks it was altogether different. They had been steadily declining, even before they were forced to admit the right of foreign interference. They had lost in moral strength as their Christian subjects had gained. It was by sheer force of arms that they had been able to carry on their mockery of government, to extort their imposts, and to hold their enemies at bay. They would have fallen or been broken to pieces if they had not retained some of the spirit of Orkhan, Amurath, and Mahomet II. But now, even their physical force was deserting them. Their obstinate exclusion of Christians from their armies had the natural effect of diminishing the Mahomedan preponderance after every war; and the Asiatics occasionally introduced in order to redress the balance were necessarily inferior, in many important respects, to those whom they replaced. If the Turks had foreseen what was to happen, and resolved to hold their conquests at any cost, they would probably have thought twice before they abandoned the plan of recruiting their ranks from tribute children and renegades. Criminal nations, like criminal individuals, should have the courage of their crimes, or they are sure to ruin themselves by petty remorse. The Turks have lost their empire by trying to be civilised by halves.

In such circumstances, and with such a race as we know the Greeks to have been, we cannot wonder that the year 1820 found them on the verge of rebellion. Pretext and opportunity were found in the commotion created in Albania by Ali Pasha of Janina, whose overweening ambition had at last compelled Sultan Mahmoud to make war upon his too powerful subject. There

can be no doubt that Ali's rebellion assisted, if it did not hasten, the insurrection of the Greeks. One of his first acts, as soon as he knew that his old enemy Ismael had been sent against him from Constantinople, was to summon the *armatoles* to his assistance; and after that he made a direct appeal to the Greeks. By the advice of his Greek secretaries he assembled a *divan* of Albanian *agas* and Greek bishops, whom he addressed in the Greek language, assuring them that he had made an enemy of the Government by espousing the cause of the Christians. He promised them a Constitution in the event of success, and exhorted them to rouse their countrymen to action. The bait was not taken so greedily as Ali had hoped, but the opportunity was not thrown away by the Greek patriots. One of these, Odysseus, who had been brought up in Ali's household, commanded a body of Christian troops in the interests of his master; but, on the other hand, a considerable number of the *armatoles* adhered to the cause of Sultan Mahmoud, having an old grudge to settle with the Pasha of Janina.

The Greeks of Thessaly secured arms in a like manner, but from the other side. Sulieman Pasha, appointed to the pashalik of Larissa in place of Ali's son Veli,¹ invited all the Sultan's faithful subjects to take up arms against the rebel. At the same time he addressed a circular to the *armatoles* and privileged Christian communities, urging them to unite in the general movement. It has been said that Sulieman's Greek secretary, Anagnostes, who translated this circular into Greek, made it read as if it were a simple authorisation for the

¹ Veli had previously been pasha of the Morea, where he had emulated his father's vices and cruelty, and had done much to exhaust the patience of the Greeks in the Peloponnese.

Christians to take up arms "for their own protection."¹ It may have been so. Such literary oversights have not infrequently occurred in similar circumstances; and the patriots at all events availed themselves freely of the permission.

In one other respect Ali's difficulty profited the Greeks. Nineteen years before, the bloodthirsty pasha had driven the brave Suliotes from their homes; and the refugees, hospitably received by the Russians in Corfu, had remained on the island, under its successive masters, up to the present time. Remembering the indomitable courage of these old foes of Ali's, Ismael now invited them to return to their homes. Perhaps they came all the more readily because their confidence in and gratitude to their English protectors had been rudely shaken by the cession of Parga in the preceding year. Their fighting men, to the number of about two hundred, joined Ismael's camp, but they soon found that there was very little to be expected from the incapable commander. He not only failed to put them in possession of their old homes, but left them almost without the necessaries of life; and as Ali himself intrigued with them at the same moment, and offered to restore to them the strong fortress of Kiapha, they made terms with his agent, and thus recovered their heritage. No doubt the Suliotes were already pledged to assist the Greeks in their projected movement. The Hetairists had been busy in the Ionian Islands, in spite of the repressive measures of the Lord High Commissioners; and it is only reasonable to conclude that the refugees were amongst their most willing converts.²

¹ Finlay, whose narrative of the War of Independence I am now following, side by side with that of Gervinus.

² Mendelssohn Bartholdy, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, as quoted in Mr. Tozer's note to Finlay, vi., 83. Finlay expressly says that the Sultan

One of the successors of Veli, son of Ali, in the pashalik of the Morea, was Khurshid Pasha, a stern, licentious, and remorseless Turk. He had already held other important commands, and had acquired a high reputation for energy and ability. In Egypt he had originated the policy of enrolling negroes in the ranks. At Nish it was told of him that he had built a tower of the heads of the Servians. In the month of March, 1821, this man was removed from Tripolitza to the army before Janina, Ismael having made nothing of his opportunity. The Moreotes, relieved of the terror inspired by Khurshid, and emboldened by the weakness of his successors, were now ripe for an outbreak; and it required but a trifle to light the conflagration. The new Seraskier had scarcely settled to his work in Epirus when he heard that the Morea, the Islands, and a large part of the mainland of Hellas itself, were in open revolt. Nevertheless, he did not abandon the siege of Janina, which continued up to February, 1822, and then ended with the familiar Turkish drop-scene of treachery and cold-blooded murder.

The leaders of the Greek movement may be broadly distinguished as Hetairists and non-Hetairists. There were Greeks and foreigners amongst both, but the most worthy of the two classes of patriots were undoubtedly to be found amongst those who shunned the intrigues of the secret societies, and who felt that Hellenism was strong enough at last to work out its own deliverance. It would be difficult to say in which of these categories

authorised Ismael to restore the Suliotes, and that Ismael thereupon sent an agent to treat with them in Corfu. This statement is not inconsistent with Bartholdy's assurance that the return of the Suliotes was connected with the Greek insurrection, and due to the action of the Hetairists. The fact may be that they had volunteered their services to the Turks in the first instance.

we ought to place Count John Capo d'Istria. When the Hetairists came to offer him the leadership of the insurrectionary movement (so far as they had it to offer), he ostentatiously declined to listen to them; and it was subsequently maintained on his behalf that he knew nothing of the political intrigues of the Philike Hetairia. But he referred them to Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, son of the deposed Hospodar of Wallachia, a major-general in the Russian army,¹ and Hypsilantes closed with them at once.

Meanwhile an insurrection had taken place in the Danubian provinces, almost simultaneously with the outbreak in Greece; and, in order to assume the direction of this movement, Hypsilantes abandoned his career in the Russian service, and crossed the frontier, with his court of Phanariots and his company of comedians, to proceed to Bucharest. The times were not ripe in Moldavia as they were in Greece, and the insurrection failed. Hypsilantes, too, though a genuine patriot, was not a born leader of men; and, moreover, the stars fought against him. The Holy Alliance happened at the moment to be in session at Laybach, and the Czar could not well desert the cause of tyranny in Turkey whilst he was supporting it in Naples. He therefore sanctioned the crossing of the Danube by a Turkish force, dismissed Hypsilantes from his service, and bade Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria to warn him against proceeding with his project. At the same time the Greek patriarch in Constantinople anathematised the rebels, at the imperious command of the Sultan².

¹ According to Gervinus, Capo d'Istria advised Hypsilantes to accept the offer made to him, and assured him that Russia would lend the movement her open support.

² See Tricoupi, i., 106.

Laybach diplomacy and patriarchal anathemas would have been as straws against a thunderstorm if the movement had been inspired by a genuine, ripe, and resolute patriotism. Patriots there were in abundance, but they were fettered by the company of self-seekers and mercenaries; nor was Hypsilantes the man to guide a patriotic movement. He continued the struggle for some time, and egregiously failed; then, abandoning his followers, he took refuge across the Austrian frontier. A pistol-shot would have been a happier and more dignified ending to his career; for Austria, the catspaw of tyrants, having first offered to deliver him up as a deserter from the Russian army—an offer which the Czar politely declined—kept him a close prisoner for six years, and only released him when he was at the point of death.

There remained the genuine patriots of this unfortunate movement. These, to the number of a few hundred—and a few hundred besides had already died in battle—refused to surrender. Under Georgaki and Pharmaki they took their stand where the Turks hemmed them in, and sold their lives with the greatest heroism. A handful escaped across the Russian frontier. Another handful were persuaded to capitulate to the Ottoman commanders, under a promise that their lives should be spared; and these were accordingly beheaded.¹ The remainder, Georgaki amongst them, fell where they fought. Their story is well worth telling; but there are still more honourable episodes in the history of the next few years.

“In the month of April, 1821,” says Mr. Finlay,² “a Mussulman population, generally of the Greek race,

¹ Pharmaki, after undergoing torture at Constantinople.

² *History*, vi., 139.

amounting to upwards of 20,000 souls, was living dispersed in Greece, employed in agriculture. Before two months had elapsed the greater part were slain—men, women, and children were murdered on their own hearths, without mercy or remorse. Old men still point to heaps of stones, and tell the traveller, ‘ There stood the pyrgos (tower) of Ali Aga, and there we slew him, his harem, and his slaves ; ’ and the old man walks calmly on to plough the fields which once belonged to Ali Aga, without a thought that any vengeful fury can attend his path. The crime was a nation’s crime, and whatever perturbations it may produce must be in a nation’s conscience, as the deed by which it can be expiated must be the acts of a nation.”

The judgment is not an unfair one, though it may be questioned whether the whole responsibility for this slaughter, the whole perturbation of conscience, does not properly belong to the nation of the oppressors rather than to the nation of the oppressed. Revolutions, it has been said, are not made with rose-water ; they are made, as a rule, with the same machinery as that of the tyrannies which call them forth. In England we sign a monster petition, which requires two honourable members to carry it up the floor of the house ; in France, a poet makes a speech, and the students raise a barricade. In the Greece of 1821 there was a terrible accumulation of wrongs to be revenged—from the kidnapping of the tribute children to the cruelties of Veli and Khurshid, and the extortions of the gypsy-haratcher. The revenge springs from the injury, the responsibility rests with the oppressor. We need not justify the extermination of the Turks in Greece, but we may fairly turn to the Ottoman Government for its expiation.

It would be useless to discuss the question where the

Greek revolution first broke out. The general uprising had been appointed for the 25th of March (6th of April), but many massacres and revolts took place during the preceding days. The initial chapter in the history of New Greece was written simultaneously throughout the country. In the mountains of Achaia, especially at Bersova and in the Krathis valley, at Kalavryta, at Patras and Vostitza (Aigion), in the Maina, and other parts of Messene, in short, throughout the peninsula, this vindictive passion burst all bounds. The Greeks went about singing a song of slaughter, which has been imitated on more than one occasion since—

*Τοῦρκος μὴ μείνῃ 'ς τὸν Μωρεά
Μηδὲ 'ς τὸν κόσμον ὅλον·*

—“Neither in the Morea nor in the whole world.” It was a sudden energy of instinct, a concentration of the passion of centuries. Over and over again a militant Christianity has exhibited such a paroxysm of blood-thirsty rage, matching the murderous fury of the followers of the Prophet. No one can wonder at it who remembers how obstinately the later apostles of Christianity have insisted upon the Hebrew Scriptures as an indispensable section of the Christian evidences. How was it possible to say to the worshippers of the just God of Israel that they should not avenge themselves, that they should not “slay God’s enemies,” should not “hew them in pieces,” “smite them hip and thigh,” “end them utterly,” “kill every male, and let none escape,” “slay every man his companion, and every man his neighbour,” “take the heads” of the Turks, and “hang them up before the Lord”? Who is there, consistent in the belief which has been taught him in nursery and from

pulpit, who can logically deny that the slaughter of God's enemies is justified by a divine sanction? This, at all events, was in substance what the Christian priests taught the Greeks of 1820. It is a question not of the morality of the patriots, but of their logic.¹

The Greek war, as was inevitable, was a war of *guerrilleros* and *franc-tireurs*, of raids and reprisals, of klephts and brigands. The Hetairists had no great military leader at their service, and those who began by shunning the Hetairists were in no better position. One of the most prominent chiefs was Theodore Kolokotrones,² who, up to the time of the outbreak, had resided in one of the Ionian Islands, where he had attained the rank of major in the English army. It was told of his father, who died at Kastanitza in 1780, that he had killed with his own hands no fewer than seven hundred Turks. Major Kolokotrones had done his best to persuade the English authorities that the cause of his countrymen deserved their active support; but, failing in this endeavour, he had no hesitation about throwing in his lot with the Hetairists. He had been in constant communication with both Capo d'Istria and Hypsilantes, and when the latter embarked on his ill-fated expedition in the Danubian provinces, Major Kolokotrones set out for the Maina, in company with another notable Hetairist, Anagnostaras, formerly a klephtic hero in the band of Zacharias.³ Petros Mauro-michaelis, bey of the Mainotes—the bold and independent inhabitants of the central promontory of the Morea—

¹ At the same time it is right to say that numberless instances occurred throughout the country in which the lives of Mussulmans were saved from the popular fury by influential Greeks.


² He has left an account of his life in his *Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς, ἀπὸ 1770 ἕως 1836*.

³ Gervinus.

was generally expected to take the lead of his countryman in their struggle for freedom. Another prominent patriot at the outset of the insurrection was Germanos, archbishop of Patras, who had been initiated in the Philike Hetairia, and who has left a narrative of many of the events which came under his observation.¹ The initial act of the revolution is held to have been the raising of the cross by Archbishop Germanos at the monastery of Laura, whither he had fled on being summoned to Tripolitza, March 25th (April 6th). This day is still celebrated by the Greeks as the anniversary of their restoration to independence.

The history of the six years' War of Independence has been written often enough, and, if it needed re-writing, it would not be in these pages that its details could be satisfactorily discussed. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we glance at the general character of the struggle, the circumstances under which it attained its end, and the attitude of Europe in respect of it. And, as regards this last point, it may be observed that Greece had to wage with Europe a struggle more difficult and more protracted than its struggle with the Turks. It had to persuade the Great Powers—the Great Powers of the days of Laybach and Verona, of Metternich and Castlereagh—that it deserved its independence. Not only so, but it had to overcome the indifference, the selfishness, in some instances the direct hostility, of these Powers, and to enlist them actively on its side. It was not enough to gain the ear of England, the favour of Russia, the consent of France. Turkey must be smitten by Europe, as well as by her Greek subjects, before she would be willing to resign herself to the loss of the peninsula. Who could be sanguine, in 1821, that all

¹ Ὑπομνήματα περὶ τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως τῆς Ἑλλάδος.



this would ever be accomplished? With Naples and Spain dragooned into slavery, with the Wallachian patriots frowned down by Russia and anathematised by their own patriarch, who could have foreseen Navarino? The Greek outbreak was, in its first stages, a war of despair, and its most enthusiastic champions could scarcely tell how the sacrifice of their lives was likely to avail their cause. Men of discernment of course perceived that the freedom of Greece, though it depended in the first instance upon Greek patriotism, could never be definitely established without European aid; and it was for this aid that the best friends of Greece abroad were continually working and waiting.

The Greeks had almost done their part by the summer of 1821. On the 30th of June they defeated the second attempt of Khurshid Pasha to force an entrance into Acarnania through the Pass of Makronoros. At this moment they had liberated the whole country, from Cape Matapan to the Gulf of Arta and the Eubœan Sea. The few remaining Turks were blockaded in Athens, Lepanto, Tripolitza, Patras, Corinth, Navarino, and half a dozen other fortresses; but the bulk of Hellas, the Morea, Eubœa, Hydra, Spetzas, and other islands, were in their possession. They paid no more taxes, suffered no more oppressions from the Turks. They were in an incalculably better position than that which they occupied six years later, when the victories of Ibrahim Pasha and his Egyptians had reduced them to the verge of submission. If Europe had been as ready to assist them at the beginning of their struggle as at the end, it would have been better for all concerned. It would have prevented a vast amount of bloodshed, including that of the sanguinary war between Russia and Turkey; and it is very difficult indeed to admit that

true statesmanship was exhibited in delaying the settlement of such a question.

A statesman may easily doubt whether Bulgarians, for instance, are ready for independence. No man worthy of the name could doubt the existence, amongst the Porte's Greek subjects, of qualities out of which a free nation might be made. But Europe either failed to see this, or preferred to wash its hands of the struggle, rather than connive at the success of an insurrection. It was necessary for the Greeks to prove their title to freedom with arms in their hands, and to bear, unsupported, the whole brunt of Sultan Mahmoud's power, for a period of six terrible years.

Every reader of history, be it only the contemporary annals of newspaper history, knows something of the Turkish method of fighting, and can conceive how they set about the work of "stamping out" the rebellion. The cruel business of reprisals soon began. One of the first Turks to enjoy the luxury of revenge was Issub Pasha, who, hearing at Missolonghi of the outbreak at Patras, fell upon the Greeks as they were laying siege to the fortress, and dispersed them, afterwards treating the town with great severity. At Levadia, in western Bœotia, the Christians had besieged a body of Mussulman Albanians in the castle, and, after a blockade of three weeks, had taken the place, and slaughtered the garrison. At their head was Diakos, formerly a lieutenant of *armatoles* under Odysseus. Within a fortnight after this, as Diakos was engaged in forming a company of Levadians, he was captured by the Turks and impaled. These are but two isolated instances amongst a thousand. It was *va victis* from that time forward, as between Greek and Mussulman, both in Greece and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

In Constantinople itself the Sultan's repressive measures began before the massacres in Greece. The existence of the Philike Hetairia had long been concealed from the knowledge of the Porte, and even when its designs were made known to the Sultan and his ministers they were treated with contempt. The outbreak of the Danubian insurrection, however, suddenly awoke the Ottoman Government to a sense of its danger, and roused Mahmoud to fury. The Mussulmans were immediately summoned to arm; and as many Greeks as were able to do so now fled from the capital, foreseeing the storm which was about to burst. On the 3rd April a number of Hetairists, or alleged Hetairists, were executed; and about ten days later, the Sultan having received news of the massacres in the Morea, many prominent Greeks were put to death—amongst them being Murusi, dragoman to the Porte. On Easter Sunday, the Patriarch himself, being accused of complicity with the Hetairists, was deposed and hung. His body, after swinging three days from the gate of the patriarchate, was dragged through the streets of Constantinople by the Jews, and thrown into the sea.

Thus encouraged, the rage of the Mussulmans throughout Turkey began to assuage itself in the most terrible cruelties. Seven bishops, a large number of priests, and crowds of Christians of all ranks, were put to death in Constantinople. At Adrianople and in many other parts of Thrace, in Thessalonica, at Smyrna, in Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, and a hundred other towns, provincial districts and islands, wherever the Mussulmans were more numerous than the Greeks, the latter were plundered, outraged, and murdered. A sanguinary revenge was taken for the slaughter of the Turks in Greece. As Finlay writes, "For several months during the year 1821

Greece and Turkey presented a succession of scenes so atrocious that no pen could venture to narrate their horrors. The Turks have always been a bloodthirsty race, indifferent to human suffering, and they had now terrible wrongs to avenge. The Greeks had, by long oppression, been degraded into a kind of Christian Turks. It is impossible to form a correct estimate of the number of Greeks who were massacred by the Turks; some have considered it as great as the number of Mussulmans murdered in Greece."

Sultan Mahmoud was drastic in his methods, and whatever he undertook was done, or at least attempted, thoroughly. Hardly a single prominent Greek was left undisturbed in the capital. In addition to Gregorios and the seven bishops, the Phanariots Rhizas, Photinos, Manos, and others, were arrested and beheaded; and from that time the aristocracy of the Greeks in Constantinople was almost entirely merged in the race as a whole. Some of the old notables, then or a few years later, espoused the fortunes of New Greece, and became the leaders of a royal court and the founders of a new nobility.

In the Divan it was proposed to massacre the Greek population throughout the empire, and the Sultan himself appears to have entertained the project. Saïd Effendi induced Mahmoud and his colleagues to consult the mufti, who declared that the Koran forbade the slaughter of the innocent with the guilty. This struck the Divan as a new reading of old texts, and the mufti was banished. Several of Mahmoud's ministers met the same fate. The grand viziers, Ali Rhiza Pasha and Ali Benderli Pasha, were in turn disgraced. The Sultan could trust no one save himself; but his consciousness of power seems to have fairly justified the preference.

Mahmoud had nursed schemes of reform for several years past, without confiding them to any of his counsellors. To curtail the power of the Pashas, to centralise the authority of his empire, to gather into his own hands the reins of government, to have a strong army at his disposal, and for this purpose to humble the pride of the janissaries—these were amongst the principal objects of his solicitude; and the Greek rising offered him a chance of carrying his purpose into effect. He issued a firman and a hatti-cherif, on two successive days, in which he pointed out that the Osmanlis had too long indulged in the sloth, luxury, and inactivity of town life. He urged them to throw aside their effeminacy, to adopt the life of camps, to become once more a militant race, as their ancestors had been. The appeal was evidently intended to pave the way for the suppression of the privileges accorded to the janissaries, who had grown to be a source of embarrassment and danger to the Sultan.¹ In the meantime the decrees produced an immediate effect, serious enough, as it proved, to involve the Porte in new and still graver perils. The Mussulmans took arms with alacrity in every part of the empire. At the same time every Christian was compelled, even through the medium of the patriarch and the priests, to give up his means of self-defence. Then it was that the massacres were redoubled, and that all Europe was alarmed by the frenzy with which the Turks began to slake their thirst for blood. The Giaours were hunted down in the streets of the capital like veritable “dogs,” the janissaries exercised no restraint whatever, either on themselves or on the armed populace, every Mussulman had his gun or his yataghan, and brought down his quarry when and wheresoever he

¹ The slaughter of the janissaries took place in June, 1826.

chanced to fall in with him. Not even foreigners were safe. The Russian and Spanish embassies were threatened by lawless mobs; and when the representative of the Emperor of Austria was on the point of proceeding to an interview with the reis-effendi, which had been arranged by the dragoman Murusi, he learned that the latter had been beheaded on a charge of intriguing with the enemies of the Sultan.¹

As might have been expected, these massacres of Christians awakened a strong sympathy with the Greeks amongst the Christian nations of Europe, who were not disposed to consider the Greek initiative as affording a justification for acts of the Turks. The hanging of the Patriarch, in particular, aroused the deepest indignation, and gave more and more of the character of a crusade to the War of Independence. The Russian Government, the prescriptive patron of the Sultan's Greek subjects, whose right of interference had been admitted in recent treaties, addressed the strongest remonstrances to the Porte. Russia had a better title than any other Power to take the lead on this occasion, by virtue of her partial community of religion with the Greeks; and the murder of some of her sailors during the massacre added another motive for independent action on her part. But the representatives of the Christian Powers could hardly avoid being unanimous in exercising a forcible pressure upon the Porte, and compelling it, if not to punish, at least to put an end to the butcheries which it had instigated and encouraged. A meeting of the diplomatists was held for the purpose of taking into consideration the desperate condition of Constantinople, the extremity of the Greeks, the common danger of all

¹ Gervinus.

the Christian residents. Various measures were proposed, and unanimity was almost, but not quite, secured. One Power saw fit to withhold its concurrence, and to render ineffectual the protest addressed to the Porte.

That Power was England!

The student of history, suddenly confronted by a fact of this kind in the annals of his own country, finds himself startled and annoyed, like a sensitive man who has had a mirror thrust before his face. He is chilled back from the cosmopolitan to the insular aspects of history, and falls from the higher philosophical regions to the lowest levels of fact. An Englishman scarcely knows what to say or think of such a breach of concert, such an interruption of diplomatic unanimity, as that which occurred in 1821. An act which he would roundly condemn, without hesitation, in the Government of any other European Power, he cannot hastily and unhesitatingly condemn when it has proceeded from an English Government. It is true that, with respect to our policy in 1821, he remembers the character of Lord Liverpool's long Administration, especially in its middle phase, when Castlereagh was at the Foreign Office. He knows too well how England was dragged through the mire of European politics at the tail of the Holy Alliance, and how the better and nobler aspirations of the people were stifled and violated by its rulers. But, at the same time, he knows that Lord Strangford, a just and honourable man, represented the country at Constantinople, and he is aware that no English diplomatist is absolutely compelled to be unjust, even at the direct bidding of a Castlereagh. Unable to approve, unwilling to condemn, he is disposed to fall back upon the easy compromise of believing that the circumstances of the

time justified a step which, taken by itself, and apart from its surroundings, would appear to be without justification.

What circumstances could possibly excuse Lord Strangford in refusing to bring efficient pressure to bear upon the Porte, in conjunction with the other ambassadors? It is certain that this refusal encouraged Turkey to turn a deaf ear to all remonstrances. The embassies, it must be observed, had already spoken, and the excesses of the Mussulmans were actually being restrained. The Grand Vizier at the moment was Ali Benderli Pasha, and he had taken stern measures to bring the massacres to an end. Some attention had been paid to the representations of Baron Strogonoff, the Russian ambassador, as well as to those of Lord Strangford himself; and, perhaps, our ambassador conceived that enough had been done, in the way of intervention. At any rate, he was in a minority of one on this point; and the disastrous effect of his refusal to act with his colleagues seems to prove that he would have done more wisely, on a question of simple humanity, if he had allowed himself to be persuaded by the majority. No sooner had the Porte learned that the representatives of the Powers would not agree to protect the Christians, than it sent a flippant answer to the note of the Russian ambassador (April 27th), excusing "the impulsiveness and zeal, perhaps excessive, of the soldiers." At the same time Ali Benderli was dismissed, and his successor, Hadji Salik Pasha, was enjoined, on the day of his installation, not to follow the example of his predecessor, "who had, in his folly, prevented the punishment of the wretched Greek nation, and thus cooled the zeal of the Mussulmans."¹ Thereupon the massacres broke out

¹ Gervinus, v., 215, *et seq.*

with new fury, and the arrests and executions were resumed.

Historians will draw a striking parallel between 1821 and 1876. They will be able to show, not only that the acts and occurrences of the two periods were alike in many important respects, but also that the same arguments have been employed to justify the policy of Lord Castlereagh and of Lord Beaconsfield. Amongst these, the principal one is to the effect that the English Government had just cause to suspect the sincerity of Russia, and that it was highly desirable to make British influence supreme at Constantinople. This was certainly the policy of Lord Strangford; and the traditions of his ambassadorship have been studiously respected by his successors. It is impossible to deny that England has an interest in maintaining her ascendancy over her rivals at Constantinople. She has a similar interest in every other place where she supports an ambassador, a consul, or an agent of any kind; but it may be admitted that her interest at Constantinople is a specially valuable one. The only question, then, is as to the best mode of defending that interest, and as to the steps which ought to be taken, and the sacrifices which ought to be made, in order to preserve our advantage over other nations. The Governments of Lords Liverpool and Beaconsfield have taken extreme steps, and have made enormous sacrifices for this purpose. We need go no further than the points at which they both separated themselves from the European concert; and, on this evidence alone, we are entitled to ask whether a most lamentable failure of English diplomacy was not ascertained and confessed from the moment of that separation.

It is easy for a nation commanding great material

resources to hold aloof from its allies, and to suggest that each one should follow its own devices for the maintenance of its special interests. *That* is not diplomacy. It is easy to let the common interests of a continent, or of humanity, follow the hazard of events, whilst we, biding our time, and observing our conditional neutrality whilst our friends fight among themselves, seize at last the opportunity of making a good market. But *that* is not diplomacy. The diplomacy which is valuable and indispensable in a community of nations is that which contrives to secure all that is worth having, both for the community and for the individual member, without breach of concert, and without arriving at a point at which it seems necessary to pursue a course of isolation. The difficulty of the art lies precisely in this. If our statesmen are unable to gain just ends and satisfy legitimate ambitions in the council-chamber itself, if they find themselves in danger of being outwitted, and therefore cut themselves adrift from their allies, they may be bold and resolute and honourable men, but they cannot be diplomatists. The policy of each for his own interests is one which succeeds occasionally, and partially, and for brief periods ; but it almost invariably inflicts grievous wrong upon the community, and it utterly paralyses the growth of that national concert which, theoretically, leads the world forward to the substitution of the methods of peace for the methods of war. Our need is for statesmen and diplomatists who can win victories inside the congress of nations, not outside.

It must be allowed that Baron Strogonoff was far from conciliatory in his attitude, whether towards the Porte or towards his colleagues ; and though he had all but Lord Strangford with him in proposing a combined expostulation with Turkey, he was otherwise less

influential in the diplomatic college than the ambassador of King George. This fact increases Lord Strangford's responsibility on the special occasion referred to, but it certainly strengthens the contention of those who hold that he was justified by Russian intrigue.

The rupture between Russia and Turkey to which the Greek revolution ultimately led was delayed for a few years by the conduct of the Czar Alexander, who, as a member of the Holy Alliance, could not bring himself to assist rebels, even when they were Greeks, or to contribute to the defeat of a tyrant, even when that tyrant was the "butcher Mahmoud." But it was by no fault of Strogonoff's, or of his fellow diplomatists, Capo d'Istria and Pozzo di Borgo,¹ that the war did not immediately break out. The masterful Ministers of Russia played fast and loose with their country in that generation, as their successors have done in this; and the insufficient restraint exercised over them by the Government led to many wrong conclusions, and caused the Czar to be blamed for much over which he had had no control. No doubt individual Russians had promised an army to Hypsilantes, to Kolokotrones, and to other Greek patriots, and it was not surprising that the latter should have considered the Government pledged to assist them. But the probability is that the Czar himself never seriously contemplated a war on behalf of the Greeks.

The Russian Government contented itself by despatching a note to the Porte, wherein it dissolved the question in a stream of generalities. It condemned alike the zeal of the Mussulmans and the zeal of the Chris-

¹ Pozzo di Borgo was a Corsican, who entered the Russian service in 1803. He subsequently (1837—9) represented his Government at the Court of St. James's.—The counsel of Nesselrode was strongly on the other side.

tians ; dwelt upon the principles of humanity and the duties of civilisation ; appealed to the growth of public opinion ; and declared that the settlement of the quarrel was a question for Europe at large. The Porte replied haughtily, asserting that all the Greeks who had suffered at the hands of the Government had been punished for crimes committed, and according to the rights exercised by the authorities of every State ; that the Greek churches had been desecrated only by the dregs of the population ; that the arming of the Mussulmans and the formation of camps were measures calculated simply to maintain order within the Sultan's dominions ; and that as soon as tranquillity should have been restored, and the refugees in Russian and Austrian territory should be delivered up to justice, the Porte would engage to re-appoint the Hospodars in the Danubian provinces, and to observe the treaties and conventions into which it had entered. Shortly after the receipt of this note Strogonoff removed himself and his staff from Constantinople ; but the declaration of war which might have been expected to follow was not made. Lord Strangford employed all his influence with the Porte to prevent a rupture ; and it was England herself, under the guidance of Canning, who eventually asked Nicholas to do what Alexander would not !

Meanwhile the rising of the Greeks had already produced important results. Within three months, as we have seen, a large part of the Peloponnese was liberated ; the islands of Hydra, Spetzas, and Psara, had proclaimed their union with the mainland ; all the Cyclades and many of the Sporades were following suit ; in Eubœa, in Crete, in Samos, in parts of Macedonia, the example of the Morea was bearing fruit. A large

fleet of small vessels was at once devoted to the purposes of what was looked upon as a holy war, and the Greek sailors took a noble part in the struggle.¹ Tricoupi² gives an interesting account of the tactics pursued by the combined fleet of the Hydriotes, Spetziotes, and Psarians. It was under the command of Jakomiki Tombazis, who, having fallen in with a Turkish man-of-war (the *Moving Mountain*, 74 guns) off the north of Chios, pursued it to the roads of Erissos, and fired upon it without effect. He then determined to have recourse to a device which his countrymen had formerly found serviceable—the use of fire-ships. The plan was to take an old hulk, and fix upon its fore-deck and along one side three or four large cases of pitch and other combustibile materials. A train of gunpowder connected these cases, and in addition the sails and rigging of the ship were soaked with turpentine. When the time came for action, the prepared vessel was driven upon the enemy, and fixed to her side by means of grappling-irons. The hardy crew would then fire the train, and escape by the port-holes into a small boat, taking their chance of surviving. In the case mentioned, one Pargios of Psara had the honour of making the first fire-ship in the War of Independence; but his effort was unsuccessful. On the following day (June 18th) he constructed two more;

¹ “The following appears to be an accurate account of the naval force of Greece in 1821:—

Hydra	contained	4,000 families,	with	115 ships	exceeding	100 tons.
Spetzas	„	1,600	„	60	„	„
Psara	„	1,200	„	40	„	„
Kasos	„	1,500	„	15	„	„
Trikeri	„	400	„	30 vessels	of various sizes.	
Galaxidhi	„	600	„	60	„	„

The number of vessels between 60 and 100 tons in all Greece was supposed to amount to 200, and there were many decked boats in every island and port.”—Finlay, *History*, vi., 167.

² *History*, i., 275.

one of which burned without injuring the Turk, whilst the other set her on fire and utterly destroyed her, very few of her crew contriving to escape.

The remainder of the year 1821 brought both good and bad fortunes to the Greeks. A Turkish fleet under Kara Ali penetrated to the bottom of the Gulf of Corinth, and laid Galaxidhi in ashes; whilst the patriots, on their part, under Kolokotrones, Anagnostaras, Giatrakos, and Petrobey, captured Tripolitza after a long siege, and butchered the inhabitants with almost incredible ferocity.¹ But perhaps the most significant events of the first year of the revolution were the assembling of the Greek notables at the Convent of Valtetzi, on the 7th of June, and the Declaration of Independence on the 27th of the following January. From Valtetzi this first Greek senate removed to Stemnitsa, near Caritena; and it busied itself, in the summer and autumn months, chiefly in levying taxes and supplies for the army. Committees were appointed to be chosen in the towns and villages, which were to manage the affairs of each locality, to undertake the collection of the imposts, to provide recruits for a national guard, to institute a force of police, and to charge themselves with the support of the widows and children of those who fell on the field.

Thus the instincts of the Greeks recurred at once to the old autonomous institutions of the country; but, before there had been time to act upon the plan of the Senate, a new element was introduced into the government by the arrival at Astros of Demetrius Hypsilantes, the younger brother of Prince Alexander, who had come to assume the direction of affairs. The Greeks, most of

¹ Kolokotrones himself, who has the full courage of his convictions, boasts that the number slain, after capitulation, was 32,000! One-third of that number seems to be a more reasonable estimate.

whom believed him to have been sent by the Czar, received Prince Demetrius with acclamations, hailing him as their deliverer. The leaders, who were too ambitious and jealous to welcome the new-comer with complete satisfaction, concealed their sentiments for a time. Hypsilantes had an excellent opportunity of establishing his authority over the country. He possessed, as Gervinus says of him, qualities more valuable than those of his brother. He was an ardent patriot, unselfish, and ready to sacrifice his own desires. "He was a gallant soldier, . . . an honest, upright, and humane man. . . . But, physically, he could scarcely have been less favoured by Nature. Short, bald, speaking through his nose, timid and awkward in his manners, looking forty years old at twenty-five, requiring much sleep, he had, in addition, neither eloquence nor the art of dealing with men." The last failing out-weighed all the rest. Demetrius gradually lost his popularity; and when the news arrived of his brother's defeat and flight, his chance of ruling the Greeks was practically gone.

The Senate of Stemnitza had been constituted only for the duration of the siege of Tripolitza; and when that event had taken place, Hypsilantes issued a high-flown document, convoking a National Assembly in the captured town. He described himself as "the father of the people, whose complaints he had heard in the heart of Russia." He declared that he had come to fight for the Greeks, to give them laws and institutions, and to protect them both against the Turks and against the "would-be oppressors of the people." An instrument of this kind was not ill calculated to give offence to the more prominent patriots, who had already found cause of annoyance in the assumptions of the four or five

dozen Greeks whom the Prince had brought with him, and who had imbibed lofty ideas of what a new Greek Government should be during the course of a European education. Nevertheless, the Assembly was elected, and met, under the mandate of Hypsilantes; but not without revealing symptoms of that unfortunate lack of harmony which was to militate so greatly against the definitive triumph of Greece. At Missolonghi an Assembly met under the direction of Maurocordatos (Nov. 11th, 1821), which constituted a Senate to exercise authority until the creation of a central Government. Another Assembly met at Salona, under the presidency of Negris; whilst the Archonts of the Peloponnese summoned a third.

The Assembly of Tripolitza—moved thence to Argos, and from Argos to Piada, near Epidaurus—met on the 1st of January, 1822; and, in spite of much irregularity in the mode of its election, it received the general recognition of the country. Maurocordatos, notwithstanding his independent action at Missolonghi, was appointed president; and he had the satisfaction of formally proposing the disuse of the Hetairist emblems—the black flag and the phoenix. The Chamber voted the substitution for these of the figure of Minerva as the national device, with a flag of blue and white stripes. Hypsilantes protested in vain, and raised his black banner amidst the calm contempt of the delegates. The Hetairists, in fact, had done their part. The nation had always been coldly disposed towards them, and the Assembly of Epidaurus virtually discarded them.

After proclaiming the independence of Greece, discussing a constitution, and nominating a government of five members for one year, the Assembly selected Corinth as the temporary capital, and adjourned. The govern-

ment was composed of Maurocordatos, Logothetis, Orlandos, Khanakaris, and Anagnostis Papayannopoulos (Delyannis).¹

The Declaration of Independence, signed at Epidaurus on the 27th of January, bears the signatures of sixty-seven members of the Assembly. In this instrument the Greeks justified their revolt on the highest and most sacred grounds, and took special pains to convince Europe of the worthiness of their cause.

“The Greek nation,” so runs the text, “calls heaven and earth to witness that, in spite of the terrible yoke of the Ottomans, which threatened it with extinction, it still exists. Burdened by acts as unjust as they were ruinous, which these ferocious tyrants, after violating their capitulations, together with every principle (*esprit*) of equity, were rendering continually more oppressive, and which aimed at nothing short of the complete annihilation of the subjected people, it found itself under the absolute necessity of taking up arms for its self-preservation. After having repelled violence by the unassisted courage of its children, it declares this day, before God and men, by its legitimate representatives, united in this national congress convoked by the people, its political independence.

“Far from being based on principles of demagoguery and rebellion, far from having for its motives the special interests of a few individuals, this war is a *national and sacred* war; it has for its sole object the restoration of the nation, and its re-endowment with the rights of property, of humanity, and of existence—rights which are the possession of neighbouring states, but which were torn from the Greeks by a despoiling Power.”

The first words of the second paragraph of this

¹ They were to be re-elected, like the Assembly, every twelve months.

Declaration were doubtless intended to disarm those who had already reproached the Greeks for their revolutionary violence, and condemned the insurrection as being founded upon foreign intrigue rather than upon a genuine patriotism. The cause of the new State would clearly have been vitiated from the beginning if it had been raised on no stronger basis than the plots of a few Russian diplomatists, or the wild schemes of the Hetairists. The Greeks had shown, on several distinct occasions, that this was far from being the case. The jealousy entertained by many of the popular leaders against the Philike Hetaira and its busy emissaries was displayed in an unmistakable manner before Hypsilantes had proved his incapacity. The unfitness of Prince Demetrius had become more and more manifest as the time went by. It was to his weakness that the terrible scenes in the sack of Tripolitza must be attributed; and his want of tact and authority was in a large measure accountable for the formation of the provincial senates in Eastern and Western Hellas, and for the reappearance of the senate of the Peloponnese. True, it was he who had convoked this general senate of the entire nation, and he had done so in response to a general demand of the people. But the result of this convocation was to show for how little the Hetairists, and the supposed nominee of the Russian Government, counted amongst the Greeks. Both in the election itself, and during the windy debates of the delegates, it became apparent that foreign influence, when it pretended to exercise an authority over the political aspirations of the Greeks, was practically a dead letter.

The fact is one of the greatest importance, and goes far to prove the ability of the Greeks to do all that Europe can require of them. They were independent

from the first moment when their political individuality was defined. They were not forced, or even drawn, into the assertion of their national rights (as they were drawn into systematic massacre) by the enthusiasts of a Russian secret society. They stood up by themselves and for themselves, repudiating the tutelage of Russia. This was the spontaneous action of a National Assembly, elected in an imperfectly-liberated country, by universal suffrage, almost without the possibility of preconcerted corruption, and on the morrow of a virtual slavery. A free nation sprang mature into existence; and it is doubtful whether the history of the world affords a parallel to this remarkable phenomenon. Greece may have disappointed her friends by the slow progress which she has made since her establishment as a kingdom. Her sloth may or may not be her own fault; but, at all events, the germs and capabilities of greatness were conspicuous in her patriots from the beginning.

The Declaration was not all that Maurocordatos and his colleagues effected. The Constitution of 1822, drawn up no doubt by theorists who had imbibed the ideas of Western Europe,¹ was yet fully discussed and voted by the Senate; and it laid down several practical principles of political action which figure to this day amongst the guarantees of Greek freedom. The Declaration of Independence, calculated to appease the Governments of the Great Powers, spurns at the unpopular "principles of demagoguery and rebellion"; but the Constitution is evidently founded upon the democratic ideas of the French Revolution. It was "very similar," says Alison,² "to that of the Directory, which for a few years

¹ Finlay says that it was the work of the Phanariots, Maurocordatos and Negris, assisted by an Italian refugee named Gallina.

² *History of Europe from 1815 to 1852*, ii., 381.

governed France—civil and religious liberty, security to person and property, equal eligibility to office, the independence of the judicial body, were duly provided for. The supreme legislative power was vested in a Senate elected by the people, conjointly with an executive council appointed by the Senate. This council, in whom the entire direction of affairs was vested, consisted of five members; it declared peace and war, and was invested with the supreme direction of affairs; but its members were elected only for a year, and were amenable to the Senate for misconduct.”

CHAPTER VI.

THE APPEAL TO EUROPE.

Greek Dissensions—Want of capable Leaders—European Diplomacy—Indecision of the Czar Alexander—The Massacre of Chios—Its Effects—The Congress of Verona—The Appeal of the Greeks—Its Failure—The Responsibility of Europe—Greek Heroism—Byron in Greece—His Good Influence—The First Greek Loan—English Encouragement.

MAUROCORDATOS was a stronger man than Demetrius Hypsilantes ; but even he was not able to control the undisciplined spirits of his fellow-countrymen, or to combine their divergent forces into a single resultant. His own assembly at Missolonghi, and that of Negris at Salona, were duly subordinated by their presidents to the central authority at Corinth. But the Peloponnesian Senate, unjustifiably restored, went far to stultify the constitution of Epidaurus, and perpetuated the anarchy by which the country was distracted for several years to come. Archbishop Germanos himself employed his influence in endeavouring to form at Patras a congress of leading men in the Morea, for the separate government of the Peloponnese. The notion of some of these men seems to have been that the ancient Greek system of local self-rule might be at once revived ; and thus each ardent theorist was anxious to see his own views carried out, at a time when every Greek ought to have contributed his heartiest endeavours towards the expulsion of the Turks. These assemblies, instead of promoting the success of the insurrection,

rather helped to retard it. They claimed the right to maintain bodies of armed men, in order to enforce obedience to their decrees; and the evil effect which this must have produced upon the armies in the field may be judged from the fact that the Peloponnesian Senate alone kept one thousand soldiers in its pay.

This discordance amongst the civil officials was matched by the disagreements of the military commanders. Not only were Hysilantes and Maurocordatos in open rivalry for the supreme command, but the minor chiefs were perpetually at variance with each other. Odysseus, for instance, aimed at a separate government in Eastern Hellas; and his example was followed in other provinces, and at various periods during the war. To such an extent was the ambition or the greed of individuals carried that the country was continually torn by intestine quarrels. Greek met Greek on many a shameful battle-field, whilst the Turks were regaining the ground which they had lost, and preparing even for the recovery of the Morea. The faction-fights stirred up by Kolokotrones (November, 1823, to June, 1824), and after that by the primates of the Morea, distracted the nation up to the year 1825. The second of these movements, being successfully opposed by the Roumeliot military party, established the government of Kondouriotes and Kolettes—Maurocordatos still remaining the nominal dictator of Greece. Kolokotrones, Delyannis, and others, were taken prisoners, whilst Zaimes, Niketas, and Londos, three of the leading primates, escaped into Acarnania, where they contrived to hold themselves safe. The Roumeliots suppressed this attempt to overturn the legislative assembly and the executive with almost as much cruelty as the Turks were wont to employ against their

rebellious subjects. And it was over the very ground ravaged and devastated by Kondouriotes and Kolettes that Ibrahim Pasha, a few months later, made his victorious march.

The history of the Greek War of Independence is a painful one, and we may congratulate ourselves on not having to follow it closely. If the historian had merely to recount the patriotism of the masses and the enthusiasm with which the Hellenic cause was defended, both by a large proportion of the industrial classes in Hellas and the Morea, in southern Albania and the islands, and by the foreign volunteers who flocked to the assistance of this national regeneration, his task would be light and pleasant. But it is impossible to make oneself a spectator of the struggle without being continually reminded of the selfishness, the cruelty, the vanity, and, to crown all, the incompetence of the men who might have led Greece to an earlier and happier victory. Hypsilantes, Maurocordatos, Zaimes, Kondouriotes, all who had the chance of guiding the new State, whether in a military or in a civil capacity, were found unequal to their task, or unworthy of exercising authority. The nation had been so long under the yoke that, when at last it burst its fetters, it had no statesman, no general, no skilful organiser, able to command the confidence of his fellow-countrymen. The primates and Phanariots, amongst whom we might have expected to find a capable leader, had been trained only in the arts of extortion and deception. The able men were frequently dishonest; the honest men almost invariably weak. Italy, happier in her time, found her Cavour and her Garibaldi; but Greece had no Piedmont to build her a bridge between oppression and liberty. It would be idle to draw a parallel between the emancipation of Greece and that of

Italy, except for the purpose of showing under what widely different auspices the two great nations of classical antiquity were destined to recover their independence. Greece became a European State in spite of a thousand adverse circumstances. Italy, nobly as her children struggled, renewed her youth amidst a conspiracy of favouring chances.

With more skilful leaders and more competent and honourable administrators the successful campaign of 1822 ought to have sealed the triumph of the Greeks. The splendid revenge reaped by Miaulis and Kanares for the diabolical massacres of Chios, the capture of all but a few fortresses in the Morea, and of Napoli di

¹ Kanares, a Psarian, who survived to the year 1877, destroyed more than 3,000 Turks during the first year of the war. One of his most brilliant exploits was performed on the 9th of November, in the Bay of Tenedos, where the Turkish fleet was lying at anchor. Two barques, flying Ottoman colours, suddenly hove in sight, followed by two Greek brigs. "The chased vessels," says Alison, "were fire-ships, one of which was commanded by the intrepid Kanares, and the other by a Hydriot hero, manned by seventeen of the seamen who had burned the admiral's vessel at Chios, dressed as Turkish sailors. Not suspecting the *ruse*, the Turks, with great interest, watched the chase, and opened their line, with loud cheers, to admit their supposed countrymen into safety. In an instant Kanares was upon them. The Hydriots ran aboard of the admiral, and the Psariots fastened their bark to another ship of the line containing the treasure, while Kanares called out, 'Turks, you are burned, as at Chios!' The Capitan Pacha, by cutting his cables, narrowly escaped destruction; but the other two-decker was so strongly grappled by Kanares that it caught the flames, and, with 1,600 persons on board, blew up soon after with a terrific explosion. In utter consternation, the whole Turkish vessels cut their cables, and made for the Dardanelles; two frigates ran ashore, and were wrecked in the flight, and the entire command of the sea was abandoned to the Greeks. . . . So daring did they become, that not only did they entirely intercept and ruin the Turkish commerce, but they made prizes of thirteen vessels, including one with a million piastres on board, in the harbour of Damietta. This glorious result is mainly to be ascribed to the cool daring and personal prowess of Kanares, who, after he had left the fire-ship and descended into his bark, seeing that it was not properly inflamed, went on board again alone, and set it on fire."—*History of Europe from 1815 to 1852*; ii., 392.

Romania (Nauplia) in particular, had sufficed to prove that the modern Hellenes were the true descendants of the heroes of Thermopylæ. What might not a Garibaldi have made out of the heroes who were capable of such deeds ! Here were all the materials of a gallant war of liberation—a war of half a million against thirty millions—in which the few would have prevailed, without Navarino, if only the leaders had been equal to the rank and file.

From that day to the present, through two generations, the weakness of Greece has been in her lack of strong and efficient leaders. Those who have been provided for her by her friends abroad have been scarcely, if at all, more serviceable to her than her own eminent men. Rarely in the world's history has a State so sorely needed a hand to rule and a head to direct.¹

It was not, however, from lack of great leaders that Greece suffered most during her revolutionary war. The discord and anarchy in which she was plunged for several years, and which very nearly caused her struggle to be abortive, were due in large measure to her want of the moral support of Europe. Perhaps it was too much to expect that the Great Powers should, as early as 1822, have exacted Greek independence from Turkey at the point of the sword ; but if they had had the grace to show the Porte a united front, and to regard the quarrel with the natural sympathy of Christians for Christians, or even with the strictest impartiality, the hands of the Greeks would have been incalculably strengthened. Instead of this, Christendom frowned at the efforts of this Christian race, and practically backed the Mussulman in his attempt at suppression.

The coquetry of the great Powers over the Eastern

¹ "Delirant reges, miseri plectuntur Achivi."

Question of 1822 is both entertaining and instructive, especially when taken in connection with subsequent phases of the same political problem. The anxiety which was apparently felt by every prominent statesman in Europe to settle the quarrel between Turkey and Greece spoke well for humanity (to all ingenuous minds). It must have been through very excess of zeal that the efforts of diplomacy failed, and that the Greeks were left to work out their own emancipation by more than six years of bloodshed. Let us see what Europe wished to do for Greece—since she did nothing—in the days of her direst need.

On the 21st of June, 1821, Russia had addressed the other Powers in a diplomatic note, wherein the Czar propounded to his allies the two following questions:—(1) What would be the attitude of the Powers in the case of a war between Russia and Turkey? (2) What system would the Powers suggest in lieu of the Turkish rule, supposing that rule to be determined by such a war? This note was accompanied by three exegetical documents; one from the pen of Baron Strogonoff, giving his version of the complications which had arisen between the Porte and the Russian embassy; another pointing out at considerable length that the Powers had committed themselves to the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and the third recapitulating the transactions between Russia and Turkey since the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, and dating from that treaty the claim of Russia in particular to take an interest in the fate of Greece.¹ The Czar, to quote the words of a despatch addressed to Count Alopeus, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, did not desire to advance

¹ I am following Gervinus's account of this diplomatic episode. Book v., 377 *et seq.*

any private ends, or to act without coming to an understanding with his allies. "On the other hand, the Russian army was prepared and ready to execute the decisions of the Powers. Now, as of old, and as in the future, it would not march for the purpose of extending the limits of Russia, but in order to maintain peace, and to strengthen the equilibrium of Europe."

Russian diplomacy, it may be observed, is very scrupulously built upon tradition and precedent. Almost identical words have been employed, on more than one subsequent occasion, for an almost identical purpose.

The Court of Berlin alone responded to the evident wishes of the Czar. The Prussian Chancellor, Prince Hardenberg, replied to Count Alopeus, after a month's delay, that he hailed with satisfaction the disposition of Russia to treat the Greek question as a European concern. He concurred in invoking the concert of the Powers, and suggested a Conference—a Conference, he added, which would not secure the desired end unless France and England openly and unreservedly participated in it. But France and England were by no means enthusiastic at the prospect opened up by Russia; whilst the Austrian Government could not conceal its alarm at the notion of a member of the Holy Alliance contributing to the emancipation of an oppressed race.

The parties to this Holy Alliance were not wanting in cynicism—sufficient, at all events, to absolve them from the reproach of being mere religious visionaries. The Czar wrote an autograph letter to his imperial cousin at Vienna, in which he hinted that the gratification of Francis in Naples had merited a return in kind. That was just where Austria's difficulty lay. She might have understood a Russian expedition to subject the Greeks to Turkey, but her construction of the Holy

Alliance had not made allowance for the encouragement of revolutions.

Castlereagh—a marquis by this time, but still best known by the name under which he had become so unpopular with the majority of Englishmen—did for a subsequent generation precisely what the Russian diplomatists had done—he established precedents both by action and by language. He saw in the question which had now arisen a problem in which England had a very special concern. British interests in the East revealed themselves to his mind with all the distinctness of sudden conviction, and he perceived that the designs of Russia were incompatible with those interests. He was right in his conclusion, if not in the inductions which led him to form the conclusion. The issue which had been raised involved the rehabilitation of Greece; and it would have been an incalculable misfortune for Europe if Russia had gained a permanent footing in Hellas and the Morea. Canning saw the matter in its true light, when he maintained that England had a direct interest in restoring Greece, and giving it the reversion of south-eastern Europe. As for Castlereagh, he, in common with Wellington, saw little more than the necessity of thwarting Russia. He instantly made advances to the Court at Vienna, he bade Lord Strangford unite with the internuncio in nominally supporting the Russian demands at Constantinople—on the principle of avoiding a rupture by backing the stronger against the weaker party—and, above all, he enjoined him not to allow himself to be drawn into any collective action.

Austria now made a proposition of her own for a Conference at Vienna, for the express purpose of preventing a rupture between Russia and Turkey. England,

as in 1876, adhered to the Vienna "note," in preference to the Berlin "memorandum."¹ But now it was Russia's turn to hold back, and the suggestion of Metternich came to nothing. There was an amusing by-play of diplomacy over this invitation. After the despatch had been sent to St. Petersburg, and when the court of Vienna was expecting a reply to its note, a bag of documents duly arrived in the Austrian capital. By a separate communication Metternich was informed that the bag had already been sealed when the invitation was received, and that it was sent off "without a minute having been found for the purpose of reading the new despatch." The excuse was clumsy, but sufficient; and it extorted a rejoinder to the effect that the contents of the bag were left unread.²

Notes and memorandums failing, Castlereagh, who had the warm personal support of his sovereign, invited Metternich to meet him in Hanover; and there the two statesmen arrived at an understanding, by which the shadow of an Anglo-Austrian alliance, with the qualified concurrence of France, was made to eclipse the European concert proposed by Russia and Prussia. The object of the English and Austrian statesmen being to do nothing, and to bring about nothing, their new policy entirely succeeded. They wrote a joint note to St. Petersburg requesting that Russia would unfold her plans in the East. This was of course impossible; or, so far as it was possible, the question had been anticipated and answered in the Russian note of June 21. On the present occasion a few generalities, strung together by Capo d'Istria, explained that the

¹ Metternich wrote to Nesselrode that he had reason to think that England would take part in the proposed Conference.

² Gervinus, p. 394.

Czar did not desire, and had not desired, to act without the sanction of Europe.

Meanwhile, at Constantinople, the ambassadors, who had been unable to agree together in bringing pressure to bear upon the Porte, were discussing the advisability of urging the Greeks to fight in a more humane manner. There was room for such advice, but the suggestion, as we have seen, fell through, partly from a fear lest the intervention should be interpreted as a sanction of revolution. It was then proposed that the Greeks should be recommended to accept an amnesty from the Porte, but this suggestion also came to nothing. As Russia observed, if the Greeks declined to listen to the appeal, she would be deprived of her right to uphold their cause with the Porte; whilst the Greeks had good reason to distrust any amnesty not accompanied by guarantees.

Towards the end of 1821, however, a change came over the spirit of European diplomacy. The instincts of Austria had been right. The Czar Alexander could never have persuaded himself to make war upon a tyrant on behalf of a rebellious race, and the Powers were soon convinced that Russia did not mean to fight. Lord Strangford and Count Lützow received instructions from Hanover to use the firmest language with the Sultan's ministers; and the latter did not fail, whilst making light of the representations, to twit the Powers with their "abject submission to the will of Russia."

On the 8th of March, 1822, the same two ambassadors presented a joint note to the Porte, strongly urging compliance with the Russian demands. The negotiation was interrupted by the news of the Greek movement in Chios, which, as the Porte alleged, apparently with reason, had been openly assisted by the Russian agents at Psara. The effect of the news was

favourable to Turkey, but the scale was once more turned decidedly against her by the inhuman butcheries with which she took her revenge on the devoted island. These butcheries, in fact, caused a profound sensation in Europe, and especially amongst the English people.¹ The public conscience was fairly

¹ Cobden's observations on the massacre of Chios, 'or Scio, are well known, but they are worth quoting once more. They were printed in 1841, from a letter written by Cobden to a friend:—"Having a few years ago, partly at your suggestion, embarked in a controversy upon the Eastern Question, I became so far interested in the subject as to be induced to pay a brief visit to Turkey, Egypt, and Greece, in the spring of 1837, for the purpose of making inquiries on the spot as to the actual state of things in those countries, the result of which effectually opened my eyes to the amount of misrepresentation that had been for years industriously spread respecting the alleged reforms and improvements going on in the Ottoman Empire. Scio is an island about double the size of the Isle of Wight, like it presenting to the side of the open sea a wall of precipitous rocks, and offering to the spectator, who sails along the narrow strait which separates it from the mainland, a series of sloping hills and picturesque valleys. This island, with a population of 100,000 Greeks, was a kind of appanage of the sultana mother; and although ruled nominally by a governor and a garrison of two or three hundred Turks, the latter were, in fact, treated rather as their guests than their masters, and the inhabitants governed themselves by their own laws. Scio became the garden of the Archipelago; the wealthy Greeks retired there after a life of successful commerce. Thither the aged and timid flocked for security; and the widow and orphan, that they might enjoy that protection and means of instruction which no other part of their enslaved country afforded. There, too, was congregated all that was refined, intelligent, and captivating, of Greek society—the very name of *Sciote*, when applied to females, implied fascination and beauty. To complete the picture, schools, colleges, and libraries, were established in this happy island. Such were the fruits of exemption from Turkish visitation. The dismal reverse of this picture remains to be told. Upon the breaking out of the Greek revolution the Sciotes, conscious of their defenceless situation, renounced all participation in the plans of the insurgents, and the heads of their Church, and a number of the principal inhabitants, voluntarily became hostages for the good conduct of their fellow-citizens. The struggle between the Mussulman and the Christian—the tyrant and the slave—became a religious war; and the hapless inhabitants of Scio were at length given over, by a mandate from Constantinople, to the fanaticism of the faithful. There was immediately a rush from the capital, and from the large towns on the coast of Asia Minor towards Tcheshmé, the nearest point of embarkation to Scio. One

aroused, and the Opposition forced upon the Cabinet, and upon the "self elected" majority of the House of Commons,¹ a sense of their responsibility. Lord Strangford, who, in his blind contempt of the Greeks, and his aversion to Russia, had been pursuing a course which rendered his country more or less answerable for all the acts of Turkey—alternately scolding and flattering the ministers of the Sultan, and maintaining confidential relations with them when all his colleagues had orders to avoid unnecessary intercourse with the Porte—received fresh instructions from London. Greece, both by what she had done and by what she had suffered, began to make an impression upon Europe; and the ambassadors now demanded that the mediation of the Powers should be employed, not only to put an end to the insurrection of the Greeks, but also to decide upon their future fate.

Lord Strangford exhibited the adroitness of a genuine diplomatist in effecting his sudden change of

cannot better picture the horrors that followed than by imagining that the Isle of Wight, with its happy and cultivated population, were suddenly given over to the lawless violence of fifty thousand of the most desperate characters of London, Portsmouth, Southampton, and the other large towns of the south, armed with knives, pistols, and guns. Imagine the worst that could arise from the unbridled cruelty and lust of such a mass; imagine fields covered with wounded fugitives, streets filled with mangled corpses, the churches heaped with slain, and the rooms of every mansion and villa, from the nursery to the kitchen, reeking with the blood of men, women, and children. Not one house, excepting those belonging to the Consuls, escaped destruction. Fire, sword, and the still more deadly passions of fanaticism and lust, ravaged the island for three months, during which such horrors were enacted—related to me by eye-witnesses—as quite mock all human credulity. Of 100,000 inhabitants not 5,000 were left alive upon the island. Forty thousand of both sexes were sold into slavery; and the harems of Turkey, of Asia, and Africa are still filled with the female victims. Such was the massacre of Scio, unparalleled in modern history (a tragedy compared by the British Consul, an eye-witness, to the destruction of Jerusalem), which thrilled the public mind of Europe and America with horror."

¹ The phrase was Lord John Russell's.

front. Djanib, the reis-Effendi, protested against the extravagant demand that the Porte should guarantee the safety of the Greeks, and thus admit itself to be in the wrong. "Am I not entitled," he exclaimed, "in my own house, to rule with a light or with a heavy hand?" "True," replied our ambassador; "but if the cries of your wife and children, ill-treated by you, disturb the public peace, I may first in a friendly way desire that you will abstain from your practices, and then, if you refuse, I may apply to the *cadi*. Such things happen every day in your capital." One of the Turkish Ministers laughed heartily at this; but the Porte was not convinced.¹

It was in the month of August, 1822, that the Congress of Verona met—the last of a remarkable series of meetings in which the tyrants of Europe attempted to do the work of freemen. The plenipotentiaries had assembled in the first instance at Vienna, but on the death of Castlereagh they adjourned to Verona;² and there, on the 9th of November, Nesselrode opened the Eastern Question. The Czar, he declared, was ready to renew his diplomatic relations with the Porte, provided that the latter would either discuss the guarantees suitable to be given to the Greeks as an inducement to accept an amnesty, or prove, by a "series of facts," that it was disposed to "respect the Christian religion, placed under the protection of Russia," and establish peace in the Greek peninsula. The Austrian, Prussian, and French representatives concurred in this suggestion; but Wellington hesitated. It was necessary for him to consult his colleagues at home; and, after a fortnight

¹ Gervinus.

² Canning was on the eve of departure from England to assume the post of Governor-General of India; but public opinion at once fixed upon him as the successor of Castlereagh at the Foreign Office.

had elapsed, he was prepared with his reply. Acknowledging the "magnanimous moderation" of the Czar, he declared that, in the opinion of his Government, the Porte had already displayed, by its partial concessions, a "series of facts" which would warrant Russia in re-opening diplomatic relations. At the same time he undertook that the pressure of England should still be brought to bear upon the Porte, in order to confirm it in its good dispositions.

Next day (November 27th) Tatischeff read to the Congress a document in which the Czar declared that "the friendship of his allies inspired him with such a sense of security, that he entirely confided to their wisdom the direction of all future negotiations." It was evident that Turkey had nothing to fear from the Powers.

It was at this fatal moment that Metaxa and Jourdain, the delegates of the Greek provisional government, arrived in Italy with the first formal appeal for recognition. The Declaration of Independence had not been without its effect on the public opinion of Europe, which grew more and more favourable to the Greek cause with every new success over the Turks, and with every month which saw the Peloponnese practically free. Opinion was doing its work; but it was still far from being strong enough effectually to demand the liberation of Greece. The Senate, which included many men of considerable ability, must have foreboded the uselessness of its application to the Great Powers; but the Greeks, proud of what they had already accomplished, and sanguine of ultimate victory, addressed the sovereigns with a lofty humility, and perhaps also with a certain degree of pardonable guile.

In an age when constitutions were smothered by the paternal severity of a Holy Alliance, it became a young

aspirant for freedom, born of rebellion and popular self-assertion, to employ the approved formulas, and to mingle statecraft with religion. The Senate therefore addressed the Allied Sovereigns in a document which bristles with the phrases of an ecstatic piety, and which must have deeply stirred, for a double reason, the emotional heart of the Czar Alexander.¹ In this document Greece demanded her re-admission into Christendom, together with the protection of Europe against the vengeance of the Porte. Neither the justice nor the fervour of the suppliants prevailed; and it was scarcely to be expected that the hypocritical tyrants who decreed the slaughter of Spanish freemen would avert the foulest massacre and outrage from the Christians of Greece. The fate of Chios must have branded the true character of militant Islam upon the heart of every European monarch and statesman; but the practical effect of that unparalleled atrocity was no greater than if the impression had been stamped on running water. The heart of Europe was dead, or callous from a quarter

¹ "Les sentimens de piété, d'humanité, et de justice, dont la réunion des Souverains est animée, font espérer au gouvernement de la Grèce que sa juste demande sera convenablement accueillie. Si, contre toute attente, l'offre du gouvernement venait à être rejetée, la présente déclaration équivaldra à une Protestation formelle que la Grèce entière dépose en ce jour au pied du trône de la Justice Divine—Protestation qu'un peuple Chrétien adresse avec confiance à l'Europe et à la grande famille de la Chrétienté. Affaiblis et délaissés, les Grecs n'espéreront alors que dans le Dieu fort. Soutenus par sa main toute-puissante, ils ne fléchiront pas devant la tyrannie. Chrétiens persécutés depuis quatre siècles pour être restés fidèles à notre Sauveur et à Dieu notre Souverain Maître, nous défendrons, jusqu'au dernier, son église, nos foyers, et nos tombeaux; heureux d'y descendre libres et Chrétiens, ou de vaincre, comme nous avons vaincu jusqu'ici, par la seule force de notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, et par sa divine puissance." —*Annuaire Historique*, v., 405, as quoted by Alison.

Maurocordatos had already, in the summer of 1822, made overtures to England, or at least to Lord Guildford, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, suggesting that Greece might be established under the protectorate of one of the great Powers.—Gervinus, v., 374.

of a century of war. Even England, who would not have the blood of Spain upon her head, found not a word to say for Greece. Canning had not yet felt his power; the baneful influence of Castlereagh overshadowed his country from the tomb.

The reply of the Congress to the appeal of the Greeks contains nothing which need surprise us; and, indeed, it affords an adequate explanation of the change which appeared to have come over the policy of the Czar Alexander. The decision of the European concert of tyranny was made known in a Circular issued at Verona on the 14th of December, which declared that "the coincidence of the Greek rising with the revolution at Naples and in Piedmont left no doubt as to the identical origin of those various movements;" that the leaders of the Greek revolt had erred in thinking it possible to sow discord in the councils of the Powers; and that the Sovereigns had determined to repel the principle of revolution, without inquiring in what shape or in what country it made its appearance.¹

Admirable harmony of oppressors! One scarcely knows whether to praise most the political shrewdness of this solemn assembly of statesmen, who discovered the complicity of the Greek rebels and the Italian secret societies, or the religious fervour of the old Czar, who sacrificed a noble ambition to the more sacred duty of maintaining tyrants on their thrones, or the consistency which made Wellington, on behalf of the Liverpool Ministry, concur in abandoning the Greeks to the brutality of Turkey, whilst he protested at the same Congress against the dragooning of Spain.

Such was the diplomacy of Europe in 1822. In the remarkable parallel which the reader will not have failed

¹ Gervinus.

to draw between the events of that epoch and the events of 1876-8, there are discernible a few points of distinction in principle and action, by no means always favourable to our own age. The art and practice of diplomacy seem to be chiefly learned by the careful study of such parallels ; and I suppose that, if existing traditions of statesmanship are maintained, some new phase of the Eastern question, arising towards the end of the present century, will be laboriously conducted and determined after the models of 1822 and 1878.

The blindness of Europe in 1822—hardly greater, it may be thought, than her blindness in 1878—caused her to throw away an opportunity which she seized, on no better pretext, five years later. Surely it would have been wiser, even from the tyrant's point of view, to establish Greece in 1822, when the massacres in Chios, and throughout the length and breadth of the Ottoman dominions, had made such an intervention in Turkey both just and politic, than to wait for another lustrum, until oceans of blood had been shed, millions of money spent on both sides, humanity sickened and wearied by these rank harvests of tyranny, and when, moreover, the actual intervention (albeit partly the result of an accident) became a reward of successful revolt !

We may dwell upon this phase with the more advantage because Europe's treatment of the Greeks in 1822 was the fountain-head of all her responsibility towards New Greece, and deposited the capital of a debt which has been increasing ever since at compound interest. The greater part of our conduct towards Greece, for more than half a century, has been marked by an injustice amounting almost to positive cruelty. We have made her a State, it is true ; but a State in fetters, and saddled by conditions under which no race of men,

however intrinsically capable of self-government, could be expected to prosper. The injustice began from the moment when we refused to liberate her, though she had shaken off her bonds, and stood at bay before the tyrant who would have re-imposed them. We condemned her to a bitter struggle, after her first battle had been successfully waged—a struggle in which not only thousands of patriots fell year by year, not only her land was desolated and her fleets and towns destroyed, not only the worst elements of a long-oppressed people rose to the surface, and dragged her through countless humiliations, not only her young life was burdened by usurious loans (and indemnities—to Turkey !), but her whole subsequent existence was embittered by the remembrance that the help of her friends had cost her more than the deadly ferocity of her enemies.

The miserable Congress of Verona poisoned the very founts of Europe's generosity to Greece. We have been generous with one hand and unjust with the other. The debt of 1822 still remains unpaid, and the shame of Verona unexpunged.

Well might Kolokotrones, hearing the result of this appeal to the Powers, warn his men that they must trust entirely to their guns and their swords. He, in common with many other leaders, civil and military, had already taken the measure of European diplomacy; and they saw only too plainly that, if Greece would be free, she must enfranchise herself.¹ They were doing it, in spite of every obstacle and every relapse. The

¹ "Hereditary bondsmen! know ye not

Who would be free themselves must strike the blow?"

So Byron had written, apostrophising the Greeks, in 1811.—*Childe Harold*, ii., 76.

number of self-sacrificing Greeks—like Miaulis and Kondouriotès, two merchants of Hydra, who spent more than a hundred thousand pounds to equip a flotilla—was very great; and, considering the slender population of the peninsula, the magnitude of the forces which faced the Turks, both on sea and on land, was especially striking. Comparatively few of the inhabitants of Hellas or the Morea can have shirked at the call of patriotism; and their ranks were continually recruited from that Greater Greece, spread over the whole shores of the Ægean, which already looked to Athens as to its Mecca.

Finlay, who grudges praise to the Greeks in any shape or form, almost does justice to the race who freed themselves without a leader, and broke their bonds by the universal instinct of a regenerate people. From some circumstance, he says,¹ “which hardly admits of explanation”—though it has seemed to later writers that the explanation was simple enough,—“and which we must therefore refer reverentially to the will of God, the Greek revolution produced no man of real greatness, no statesman of unblemished honour, no general of commanding talent. Fortunately, the people derived from the framework of their existing usages”—the surviving communal system—“the means of continuing their desperate struggle for independence, in spite of the incapacity and dishonesty of the civil and military leaders who directed the central government. The true glory of the Greek revolution lies in the indomitable energy and unwearied perseverance of the mass of the people. But perseverance, unfortunately, like most popular virtues, supplies historians only with commonplace details, while readers expect the annals of

¹ *History*, vi., 231.

revolutions to be filled with pathetic incidents, surprising events, and heroic exploits."

There are various kinds of perseverance, as there are various kinds of pathos and heroism; and it is impossible even for the readers of Mr. Finlay's history to avoid the conclusion that everything, however pathetic or heroic, becomes commonplace in the eyes of a man devoid of generous enthusiasm. The story of Botzaris, and his defence of Missolonghi in the autumn of 1823, which is only one out of a hundred similar instances, might satisfy the most exacting reader. Greatly reduced in strength by a sanguinary campaign, having barely three thousand men wherewith to hold his ground in southern Epirus, Botzaris found himself threatened, towards the end of August, by more than eight times his number, under the Pasha of Scodra. Unable to attack the enemy after any of the ordinary fashions of war, he resolved upon a desperate stratagem. Not the first Greek who had been known to take a similar resolution, Botzaris selected a hundred and fifty Suliotes, all as brave as himself, and fell by night upon the Turkish advance guard of five thousand men, encamped in a valley near Carpenitza. The sudden incursion of these heroes produced the desired effect. The Albanians were surprised, and scarcely knew where to strike. It is asserted that they recognised the voice of Botzaris, as he called upon his companions to smite home; their fire was concentrated upon him, and he was wounded in the abdomen. That made no change in the behaviour of the gallant Greek, who fought and exhorted still. Meanwhile the remainder of his three thousand, as arranged beforehand, had attacked at other points; and the Turks, thoroughly beaten, were dispersed in all directions. "Eight hundred men," says Alison, "were slain on the spot; a thousand

prisoners, eighteen standards, seven guns, and immense military stores taken by the Souliotes, who did not lose one hundred and fifty men. But they sustained an irreparable loss in Mark Bozzaris, who was shot through the head as day began to dawn, and soon after expired. He was borne off the field by the weeping Souliotes, interred with the highest military honours at Missolonghi, and the Government published a decree in his honour.”¹

The heroism of the Greeks cannot be seriously contested. With or without efficient leaders, they fought as though the whole struggle depended on each individual; and their valour was well seconded by the volunteers who began to flock into the country from various parts of Europe. The sorry business at Verona stimulated the Philhellenism of all who had “dreamed that Greece might still be free.” In England, France, Germany, Russia, public opinion began more and more distinctly to favour the Greek insurrection; public meetings were held, appeals were made; money, arms, and men were sent to the Peloponnese. The Greek Committee in London was particularly active, and its labours were shared by men eminent in every rank of life. Amongst the more notable Philhellenes who personally offered their services to the Greek Government, in addition to the Russian subjects already named, were Colonel Stanhope (son of the Earl of Harrington), Colonel Napier,² Gordon, Abney Hastings, Raybaud, Blaquièrre, and Lord Byron.

It was on the 5th of January, 1824, that Lord

¹ The decree was signed by Mauromichaelis, and began, “Beloved Greeks! lo, another Leonidas figures in your history.”—Alison, ii., 400.

² Byron wrote to Mr. Bowring (Oct. 10, 1823), introducing Colonel Sir Charles Napier: “A better or a braver man is not easily to be found. He is our man to lead a regular force, or to organise a national one for the

Byron landed at Missolonghi ; and on the following 19th of April he died in that town, having accomplished his mission, and happy in the consciousness that he had done so. By fits and starts the poet may have conceived himself to be a possible great administrator, and he even coquetted with the idea that he might be called upon to occupy a very exalted position in Greece. At times he thought himself a soldier. On his thirty-sixth birthday (January 22) he wrote one of his last poems, which illustrates this more martial mood :—

“ The sword, the banner, and the field,
 Glory and Greece around me see !
 The Spartan, borne upon his shield,
 Was not more free.

“ Awake ! (not Greece—she *is* awake !)
 Awake, my spirit ! Think through whom
 Thy life-blood tracks its parent lake,
 And then strike home ! . . .

“ If thou regret'st thy youth, why live ?
 The land of honourable death
 Is here : Up to the field, and give
 Away thy breath !

“ Seek out—less often sought than found—
 A soldier's grave, for thee the best ;
 Then look around, and choose thy ground,
 And take thy rest.”

But Byron's real mission did not depend on his success as an administrator or a soldier, nor was it abortive because he died in his bed so soon after his arrival in the land to which he sacrificed himself. It was this sacrifice by which he performed all that he could expect

Greeks. He is, besides, a personal friend of both Prince Mavrocordato, Colonel Stanhope, and myself, and in such concord with all three, that we should all pull together—an indispensable, as well as a rare point, especially in Greece at present.”

to perform ; and one cannot doubt, reading the letters and journals written by him at the time, that he had at least an intuitive sense of the true value of his work. " He but looked upon himself," says Moore,¹ "—to use a favourite illustration of his own—as one of the many waves that must break and die upon the shore, before the tide they help to advance can reach its full mark. ' What signifies self,' was his generous thought, ' if a single spark of that which would be worthy of the past can be bequeathed unquenchably to the future ? ' Such was the devoted feeling with which he embarked in the cause of Italy ; and these words, which, had they remained only words, the unjust would have pronounced but an idle boast, have now received from his whole course in Greece a practical comment."

The name of Byron was a greater power in his own day than it is at present, and it would probably be impossible for us to realise the effect produced by his example and his fate, not merely upon the Greeks themselves, but upon all the friends of Greece throughout the civilised world. He shed a lustre on the idea of Philhellenism, and at the same time he did much in a very practical way to advance the cause of the insurgents. From the moment of his embarkation at Leghorn, with Trelawny, Hamilton Browne, and Count Gamba,² through the months of his sojourn in Cephalonia, and up to the day of his death, he worked incessantly to provide the combatants with the sinews of war. Not satisfied with urging the English Philhellenes to persevere with the scheme which had been set on foot to raise a Greek loan, he spent much of his own fortune in anticipation of the money from England. He had entered upon his new

¹ *Letters and Journals of Lord Byron* (Murray, 1832), vi., 80.

² Brother of the Countess Guiccioli.

undertaking with a decided prejudice against the Greek character, and a distrust in the Greek leaders; but his enthusiasm to a great extent overcame at least the first of these feelings. And he had common sense as well as enthusiasm. He saw that nothing but hard fighting would secure the independence of the Greeks, and that this fighting must be done by the Greeks themselves, and in their own fashion. His constant effort was to promote the armament of ships and the equipment of soldiers; and he laughed at the philanthropic designs of Stanhope, who represented the Greek Committee in London, and who wanted to model a new State on the basis of the American Constitution, even while the Turks were threatening to regain all that they had lost.

The rival chiefs in the Morea and the mainland did not succeed in deceiving Byron, as they succeeded with many other Philhellenes. Trelawny and Browne had gone straight to the Morea, in order to ascertain the views of the leaders, and at Tripolitza they met Kolokotrones, who, knowing the friendly relations between Byron and Maurocordatos, plainly assured the Englishmen that if the latter persisted in his intrigues, he would set him on a donkey, and have him whipped out of the country. The crafty Odysseus assumed another tone. He studied the character of his visitors, and contrived to please them all in turn. He was a democrat with Stanhope, a sportsman with Humphreys, an athlete with Trelawny,¹ and eventually, let it be added, a traitor to his fellow-countrymen. The influence of Kolokotrones and Odysseus upon Stanhope and Trelawny was that they set to work "to detach Lord Byron from Maurocordatos;"² but Byron was too wise

¹ Gervinus, vol. vi., p. 24 *et seq.* Mr. Trelawny married the sister of Odysseus.

² Moore's *Letters, &c.*, vi., 191.

to suffer himself to be moved by the petty jealousies of the chiefs. Before his arrival in Greece he had written, from Cephalonia, to the "General Government," urging on them the supreme importance of union; and this letter may be quoted to show what the nature of his influence actually was.

"The affair of the loan," he wrote,¹ "the expectations so long and vainly indulged of the arrival of the Greek fleet, and the danger to which Missolonghi is still exposed, have detained me here, and will still detain me till some of them are removed. But when the money shall be advanced for the fleet, I will start for the Morea; not knowing, however, of what use my presence can be in the present state of things. We have heard some rumours of new dissensions, nay, of the existence of a civil war. With all my heart I pray that these reports may be false or exaggerated, for I can imagine no calamity more serious than this; and I must frankly confess that, unless union and order are established, all hopes of a loan will be vain; and all the assistance which the Greeks could expect from abroad—an assistance neither trifling nor worthless—will be suspended or destroyed; and, what is worse, the Great Powers of Europe, of whom no one was an enemy to Greece, but seemed to favour her establishment as an independent Power, will be persuaded that the Greeks are unable to govern themselves, and will, perhaps, themselves undertake to settle your disorders in such a way as to blast the brightest hopes of yourselves and of your friends.

"Allow me to add, once for all, I desire the well-being of Greece and nothing else; I will do all I can to secure it; but I cannot consent, I never will consent,

¹ Moore's *Letters, &c.*, vi., 95.

that the English public, or English individuals, should be deceived as to the real state of Greek affairs. The rest, gentlemen, depends on you. You have fought gloriously—act honourably towards your fellow-citizens and the world, and it will then be no more said, as has been repeated for two thousand years with the Roman historians, that Philopœmen was the last of the Grecians. Let not calumny itself (and it is difficult, I own, to guard against it in so arduous a struggle) compare the patriot Greek, when resting from his labours, to the Turkish pacha whom his victories have exterminated.

“I pray you to accept these my sentiments as a sincere proof of my attachment to your real interests.”

The first Greek loan was contracted on behalf of the Provisional Government in London during the spring of 1824. The nominal amount was £800,000; it was issued at 59, and was secured on the revenue accruing, or expected to accrue, from the customs, fisheries, and salt works. The Greeks received about £300,000 net, for which they engaged to pay a nominal five per cent., which meant an actual thirteen and one-third per cent. It would be difficult to say which side in this bargain displayed the greatest shrewdness or the greatest ingenuousness. The loan has never been repaid, for the simple reason that Greece has never had the money to pay it with. The debt ought to be, and no doubt will be, liquidated; but one can hardly sympathise with the disappointment of Philhellenes who lent money to an infant and penniless borrower at so exorbitant a rate.

The English Philhellenes were by no means the only foreign friends who rendered notable assistance to the Greek cause. In Germany there were committees which worked in accord with that of London. In America, a

President's Message expressed the desire of the nation to see Greece obtain her independence; whilst material aid was sent both from that country and from parts of the world as distant as India and Australia.

In France, as soon as the Egyptian fleet had set sail for the Morea, an association was formed for the succour of the Greeks, and numbered amongst its members such men as Larochefoucauld, Lafitte, the Duke de Fitzjames, St. Aulaire, and Dalberg. Chateaubriand wrote a "Note on Greece," which, as coming from an ex-minister of Louis XVIII., scandalised many of his friends. The good effect of Chateaubriand's advocacy was soon experienced; and the Greeks received from France several valuable cargoes of arms, ammunition, and money. Switzerland, too, and the Italian States, furnished ardent sympathisers; and there was, perhaps, not a single civilised country which did not hold out to the struggling nation an earnest though unofficial support.

The significance of this constant encouragement and assistance is chiefly this—that the Greeks were backed and fostered in their revolt, from the very beginning, by the public opinion of Christendom; and that consensus of enlightened and energetic sentiment in Europe, cosmopolitan and continuous, virtually created a responsibility which could only be discharged by the constant moral support of Greece in her subsequent difficulties. There are circumstances in which the man who gives incurs the duty of giving again; and this undoubtedly was the case with the Philhellenes of 1820-30. It may have been the fault of the Greeks themselves that so many of them interpreted the English loans and the English volunteers as the first instalments of assistance from the English Government. But it was not their fault that the succour of their friends was so unwisely

bestowed, that the loans were made to them under unjust conditions impossible to be fulfilled, and that they were fooled by the hope that money sufficient for all their needs would be constantly forthcoming. The Greek leaders were undoubtedly misled by the too great zeal of some of their foreign counsellors; and it was most unfair to abandon their cause, as a few Philhellenes did, because they failed to repay these loans, or to display the characteristics of a great nation immediately after their escape from a ruinous seven years' war.¹

¹ Mr. Finlay was one of the friends who thus abandoned Greece. Within four pages, in which he speaks of the employment of the English money, he describes Kondouriotes and Kolettes as "two ignorant and incapable persons;" he says of Maurocordatos that his conduct "was neither honourable to himself nor advantageous to his country"; of John Soutzos that he was "stigmatised as the most corrupt and rapacious Phanariot in Greece;" of Zaimes that he was the author of an "iniquitous movement," "neither energetic nor courageous;" of Londos that he was "addicted to riotous debauchery." Some of these judgments are more warranted than others; but no reproach can be accepted without hesitation from an historian who has a sneer on almost every page. It would have been well if Finlay could have acted on the principle of Byron, who, in a letter written shortly before his death, says, "I have heard a good deal of Sissen, but not a deal of good; however, I never judge from report, particularly in a revolution."

With regard to the character of the two English loans, and the light in which they were looked upon during the earlier years of the reign of Otho, I may quote a passage from a statement made by the Greek Minister of Finance in 1836 (cited in Mr. Strong's *Greece as a Kingdom*:—"The financial affairs of Greece may be divided into three principal epochs. The first commences from the day when the trumpet of liberty was first sounded, and comes down to the year 1828. . . . If we turn our attention to the first epoch, we shall endeavour in vain to find any order or regular system in the finances of the nation. That was the period of universal movement, uncertainty, and war. Government rapidly succeeded government, and their short duration was not calculated to build up solidly the great national edifice—the finances of the country. It is true there existed at that time a finance-ministry, by whom registers and accounts were kept; but the confusion which existed in the financial operations of that period were so vast, through the pressure of circumstances, that even now, after a lapse of so many years, it is scarcely possible to check them. On the one hand, immense sums are charged for extraordinary expenses of

Yet more impressive in the eyes of the insurgents was the recognition by the English Government of the effective blockade by the Greek fleet of various Turkish ports—a recognition which, if not actually premature, was at least a significant illustration of the inconsistency of our conduct towards the Greeks. The reverses of the latter between the summer of 1824 and the end of 1825—the destruction of Kasos and Psara, the sanguinary ravages of Ibrahim Pasha, at the head of the Egyptian contingent in the Morea,¹ the capture of Navarino, Missolonghi, and other towns, the defeat of Kolokotrones by land and of Miaulis by sea, decidedly overshadowed the victories of the Greeks; but they clung throughout to the conviction that England, if not Europe in concert, would step in to relieve them. And it must be confessed that they had reason for their belief.

the state, purchase of warlike stores, preparations for military expeditions, arming and manning the infant navy, and the payment of the troops; on the other we find revenues arising from the tithes raised on the produce of the land, from the sale of national property, from foreign and domestic loans, subscriptions, presents, and other pecuniary assistance. But to determine the precise amount of these receipts and expenses, even supposing that the former were duly paid into the treasury of the provisional government, and properly accounted for, is a work of time, and must be left till the laborious investigations on the subject are completed.” See also p. 108, Part I., of the present work.

¹ Sultan Mahmoud was so near the end of his resources that he was driven to call upon his most powerful and dangerous vassal, already meditating a rebellion on his own account, to suppress the insurrection in Greece. Mohammed Ali responded with alacrity, and embarked 8,000 men and 1,000 horses at Alexandria on the 19th of July, 1824.

CHAPTER VII.

EUROPEAN INTERVENTION.

Plans for Greece—Canning's Views—Successes of the Egyptians in the Morea—English Intrigues in Greece—England and the Holy Alliance—Canning and Metternich—Extremity of the Greeks—Death of the Czar—The Protocol of April, 1826—The Treaty of London (July, 1827)—The Secret Article—The Battle of Navarino; a Happy Blunder—Destitution of the Greeks—Responsibility of the Philhellenes.

THAT the Greeks had been taught to look to England for their ultimate emancipation is rendered sufficiently manifest by their renewed appeal for an English protectorate in 1824, and by the circumstances under which this appeal was made. That the English Government, or rather the English nation, made itself specially and permanently responsible for the due establishment of the Greek State will be found to follow directly from the second series of negotiations, which occupied the twelve months preceding the death of the Czar Alexander (December 1st, 1825).

During the year 1823, which was distinguished by many important successes on the part of Greece, a dozen different suggestions were made as to the future government of the country. The Legislative Assembly—which occupied itself in constant deliberations on constitutional and legal topics, whilst the Executive struggled with the enemies of the country abroad and at home—at one time conceived the idea of offering the crown to Dom Miguel of Portugal. Negrís suggested the ex-king of Holland, Jerome

2

Bonaparte, whilst others turned their eyes to the Duke of Leuchtenberg; but sufficiently strong objections were found to all these ideas.¹ A Russian scheme, attributed to the brain of Capo d'Istria, was published in Paris, in the course of the following year, and was much canvassed throughout Europe. This plan² proposed to deal with the Greek mainland, including Thessaly and Epirus, with the Morea, Crete, and the islands. Leaving to the latter their ancient democratic institutions, it would have created three distinct principalities, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with Turkish garrisons in certain fortified towns, and with a guarantee of this new constitution by the Great Powers.

It is probable that the Czar himself had agreed to this proposal, which at all events went as far as he could have been expected to go in the direction of Greek liberation. English diplomacy in that age, under the influence of Canning, was more robust; and the circumstances offer a curious contrast to those of the present day. Now it is Russia who would show the least reluctance in stripping Turkey of her dominion in Europe, and England who deals most tenderly with her.

Canning had no notion of allowing Russia to settle the question in her own fashion; and in this respect his policy was identical with that of his successors half a century later. He seems to have resolved, not only to assist the Greeks in their struggle, but also to maintain the superiority of English over Russian influence in the East. He knew that the Hetairists, though they had been regarded with suspicion by the

¹ Gervinus, vi., 114.

² Printed by Trikoupi, *Historia*, iii., 385.

patriots, had still their representatives and their propagandists in Greece. He must have heard, for instance, of the mission of Varvakis, a rich Greek merchant from Odessa, who combined with a princely benevolence towards his fellow-countrymen an ardent desire to create a strong Russophile party. Up to his death, in the beginning of 1825, Varvakis constantly advocated the selection of Capo d'Istria for the presidency of the State; and his efforts may have had some effect upon the eventual choice of the Russian diplomatist for that post.

Stimulated by the knowledge of these Russian intrigues, Canning began to move the wires which were destined to set himself in motion. The Greek leaders, understanding that England was willing to assume the charge, resolved to place themselves under her protection.¹

They prepared a declaration to this effect, and invited the signatures of the leading men in the country. At the same time they sent an agent, Spaniolakis, to lay their views before Canning, assuring him that a monarchy was necessary for the good government of the country, and declaring their readiness to accept any one who should be nominated by Great Britain. It was thus early understood that the choice had fallen upon Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. A protest against the Russian scheme of simple autonomy accompanied this direct appeal to

¹ About the same time there had been a French project, for conferring the crown upon the second son of the Duke d'Orleans. The intrigues in Russia were carried on independently, and even in defiance, of the Czar and his ministers; for Alexander clung to his *non possumus*. But so strong was the public opinion of the Empire growing in favour of the coercion of Turkey that a hostile demonstration was made in the Czar's presence, in September, 1824, at a grand review of the Guards.—Alison, ii., 422.

England; and Canning is said to have been "better pleased by this act than by anything which the Greeks had done since the time of Epaminondas." This protest was received on the 4th of November, 1824; and on the 1st of the following month Canning wrote directly to the Greek Government at Nauplia, giving them to understand that, if the Greeks, at a subsequent period, wished to have recourse to the good offices of England, and if they should formally express such a desire, they would find her ready to accept the duty.

Observe how the responsibility of England towards Greece accumulates with every new phase of these negotiations. Canning's letter was little short of a recognition of Greek independence, and it was undoubtedly construed in that sense by the Greeks. The responsibility was doubled and trebled by the open assistance rendered to the Government of Nauplia by English subjects, and even by English vessels in the *Ægean*; and still more by the conduct of Sir Frederick Adam, the new Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands,¹ and of Commodore Hamilton, commanding a British squadron in the Levant. It was at Zante, and under his auspices, that the committee had been formed which drew up the request for an English protectorate, the Government of Greece remaining in the background.

Meanwhile the Czar, perplexed between his desire to pursue the traditional policy of Russia as against Turkey, on the one hand, and his resolution not to encourage the rebellion of the Greeks against a crowned head, on the other hand, had conceived the idea of opening a new chapter in the history of the Holy Alliance. He proposed in 1823 a Conference of the

¹ He had married a Greek lady of Corfu, and was a hearty Philhellene.

Powers at St. Petersburg; and Canning was obliged to weigh the chance of rendering Greece an immediate assistance against the disadvantage of appearing to move in the matter at the instance of Russia. It was hardly possible for him to hesitate. He wrote to the Russian Government to the effect that, in face of protestations both from the Porte and from the Greek leaders, England considered it useless for her to attempt a mediation. Nothing more was needed to excite the wrath of the Continental Powers against the English Foreign Minister, and a storm broke over the head of this misplaced Liberal. The members of the Holy Alliance haughtily denied the value of representations proceeding from the leaders of a rebellion,¹ and they made no effort to conceal the disgust with which Canning's policy inspired them. Metternich went so far as to write to Nesselrode that England ought no longer, even if she should desire it, to be admitted to the Conference; and he began to suggest hostile measures on the part of "the true alliance" against the friend and protector of rebels.²

In the year 1825, in view of the successes of Ibrahim Pasha, the Russian Government renewed its proposal for a Conference, and this time Canning had nothing to say against it. He saw that no result could come of deliberations in which the Powers principally concerned had diametrically opposite interests.

¹ About this time Canning enraged many of his own fellow-countrymen, as well as the great majority of Continental statesmen, by recognising the South American Republics. He has himself told us that he "called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." His instincts were now leading him to call a New Greece into existence, in order to redress the balance of Eastern Europe.

² Gervinus, vi., 120—126.

Russia wanted to be the *mandataire* of Europe, or at least of the Holy Alliance, for the forcible coercion of Turkey; but she was (officially) inimical to Greek independence. Austria, on the other hand, did not desire to see Turkey attacked or weakened, being far more inclined to help her to crush her rebellious subjects;¹ and it was thus by no means likely that Metternich would go out of his way to promote the objects of Nesselrode. The Conference was held; but it was little better than a conclave of the Holy Alliance (February 24th, 1825). Russia, assuming the necessity for intervention, proposed that the Powers should at once demand a cessation of hostilities, under the threat of recalling the Ambassadors. Whereupon the Austrian plenipotentiary, demurring at a step which seemed to lead up directly to the employment of force, suggested, inconsistently enough, that the same end might be gained by a threat to

¹ Austria, whose unchivalric tendencies the student of history is constantly having forced upon his attention, was at this very moment enlisted in the cause of the Turks. "On the 24th May, the Capitan Pasha put to sea from the Dardanelles with the Turkish squadron, consisting of a ship of the line of sixty-six guns, two frigates, six corvettes, and fifty brigs and transports, many of which bore the *Austrian* colours. As they had on board a vast quantity of ammunition, shells, projectiles, scaling-ladders, and platforms, it was supposed their destination was Hydra or Samos. In reality, however, they were intended for the siege of Missolonghi, on the vigorous prosecution of which the Divan were now intent. Sakhtouri no sooner heard of the approach of the Ottoman fleet than he set sail for Hydra, and came up with them as they were beating through the straits between Andros and Eubœa; and, instantly breaking their line, sent the dreaded fire-ships among them. Two of them grappled the sixty-six gun ship, and blew her up, with eight hundred men on board, the whole treasure of the fleet, and the Capitan Pasha's flag. He himself narrowly escaped by getting into a smaller vessel a few minutes before the explosion took place. Another frigate of thirty-four guns was at the same time burnt by the fire-ships on the left. Upon this the Turkish fleet fled in all directions; twenty found refuge in Carysto and Suda, but five *Austrian* transports were taken, with thirteen hundred barrels of gun-powder and great military stores."—Alison, ii., 413.

acknowledge the independence of Greece. The fact is, Metternich knew that the Russian Government would never assent to such a plan; and thus it came about that the Conference fully answered Canning's expectations. It drew up a "remonstrance" with the Ottoman Government, and the Porte, seeing that the Powers were hopelessly divided, naturally replied in a cool and contemptuous tone (June 3rd, 1825).

In the meantime, the wholesome intrigues of England in Greece were bearing good fruit. The declaration asking for English protection had been signed by nearly all the leading men of the country, including every part of the Morea, Hydra, and other islands. The signatures numbered about two thousand, the only notable refusals having come from Hypsilantes, Kolettes, and Kondouriotes. Armed with this general sanction of the nation, the promoters of the scheme brought their declaration before the representative body in Nauplia, and the Assembly formally ratified it. The instrument was short, simple, and conclusive:—

(1) "In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence under the *absolute protection* of Great Britain. (2) The President of the Council shall immediately execute the present law.—Napoli, July 21st (August 1st) 1825."

Demetrius Miaoulis, son of the famous Greek captain, brought this act to London, and presented it to the Foreign Secretary; but Canning did not jump at the offer. Much had happened since he set the intrigue on foot, and since Sir Frederick Adam began his work in the Ionian Islands. Metternich and his friends had not been able to undermine the influence of the English Minister, as they had constantly

laboured to do, but they had found access to the ears of the English Tories, including King George and the Duke of Wellington ; and Canning had apparently become more cautious. Besides, it is to be observed that he had practically obtained his object in the mere formulation and presentation of the appeal to England. Metternich had thought himself happy in having administered a check to Russia and a snub to England ; but Canning saw further than Metternich, and knew that the confidence of the Greeks was not misplaced. For the present, however, he was obliged to bid them wait. He openly told the Greek delegates that their offer could not be accepted ; that its acceptance would involve England in a war with Turkey, and would give cause of complaint to the Powers. He recommended them to look not for a single protectorate, but for the common mediation of the Powers. " There might be a point in the contest," said Mr. Canning, " in which Great Britain might exert her influence to promote a compromise between the Greeks and the Porte ; not for the entire independence of Greece, for that would be asking everything, and could not be the subject of a compromise (if they could conquer it, it was well, and that was their affair), but for anything short of independence which might form the basis of an arrangement with the Porte."

This was diplomatic language ; but the Greeks were not deceived. Nor was Europe deceived. It saw that England was gradually gaining her ends, whilst the Holy Alliance was gradually breaking up. Then, as many times before and since, in a good or an evil cause, the triumphs of diplomacy went to the wielder of the greatest material power, and to the most resolute and self-reliant Minister. The conduct and the fate

of the European Courts may be described without further reference to history and state papers, as the physiologist is able to draw a complete animal from one of its bones. Russia frankly accepted the situation, and showed a desire to effect an understanding with England. Prussia, not greatly concerned in the future of Turkey and Greece, had no intention of moving without the co-operation of both Russia and Austria. France, of whom Metternich had boasted that he held her in his pocket, being liberally inclined to Greece, in spite of her reactionary king, preferred the alliance of England and Russia to the continued concentration of power in Eastern Europe. Austria, *trop fine*, was baffled everywhere, and to almost everybody's satisfaction.¹ Henceforth London, instead of St. Petersburg, was the point to which the friends of Greek liberty turned their eyes.

Of course it was incalculably better for Greece to be served by England than to be served by Russia; and it was incalculably better for Europe that the new State should not owe its emancipation to a Power whose influence on the Ægean would have been a

¹ The annoyance of Metternich, when he found Canning master of the situation, was so great that he drew up a despatch, to be sent to the Austrian representative at the court of St. James's, directing the latter to put the following questions to the English Government:—1. What were the intentions of Canning in the business which, with the co-operation of the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, had been entered upon between Hamilton and the rebels? 2. Had Hamilton acted with the consent of his Government? and, if not, was he to be punished with death? 3. In the opposite case, the Imperial Cabinet would decline to have any further dealings with the British Cabinet, which did not know how to keep its subordinates within the limits of obedience (Gervinus, vi., 142). The terms were toned down before the despatch was sent; but something of the kind was communicated by Esterhazy to Canning. The latter made a conciliatory reply, and Metternich did not insist on an explanation.

danger to the community of nations. No country ought to have seen this more clearly than Austria; and yet no country showed a more absurd jealousy of Canning's increasing power. The humiliation of the Russian intriguers was alone sufficient to have made the Government of Vienna offer its co-operation to England; but, instead of this, Metternich held aloof, and preferred to have no part whatever in the establishment of New Greece. There were, indeed, other questions at issue between the courts, in addition to the question of Greece; and Canning never succeeded, up to the day of his death, in persuading the statesmen of the old *régime* of the soundness or safeness of his views.

The policy of Canning in the autumn of 1825 was natural enough; and it was the only policy which he could have taken, under the circumstances, with any hope of success. He doubted the sincerity of Russia's advances. He was determined to settle the Eastern Question in his own way, and not in Russia's. Of one thing he was quite convinced, namely, that the exclusive intervention of Russia in the affairs of Turkey must tend, sooner or later, to the disadvantage of England. On this point (though on few others) he was in harmony with the Duke of Wellington; and his recent reconciliation to the King and the Court party would incline him to pursue an anti-Russian course with all the greater willingness. His idea was that an understanding between England, France, and Austria was necessary, in order to strip Russia of her last pretension to act independently against the Porte; and this, in fact, was the line which the Russian Government, in a circular note of the 18th of August, had expressed its resolution to take. Therefore, when

Count Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in this country, communicated a fresh memorandum (October 24th), requesting England to take the matter in hand, as being "the only Power able to bring it to a satisfactory issue," Canning was not thrown off his guard. Writing to Lord Liverpool on the following day, he expressed an opinion that the time for action would not have arrived until both Austria and France should have given England their mandate to deal, first with Russia, and then with the belligerents in Turkey.

This was the view of the English Cabinet in 1825; and the development of their policy was only interrupted by the death of the Czar Alexander, which occurred on the 1st of December in that year. The event was of the utmost importance. The new Czar, Nicholas, at once undertook to settle the Eastern Question; and his zeal precipitated the action of Canning.

Whilst the fortunes of Greece were thus canvassed by the diplomatists, the insurgents themselves had been hard pressed by their enemies. Ibrahim Pasha, having occupied Koron, Modon, and Navarino, made the western promontory of Messene a strong base of operations, from which, drawing on Alexandria by sea, he gradually overran the Morea. Kolokotrones, Hypsilantes, and other chiefs made a bold stand against the Egyptians, whenever a favourable opportunity offered; but the disciplined forces of Mohammed Ali—though they numbered, at the time of their greatest successes, barely eight thousand men—were more than a match for the Greek levies in the open field. After the autumn of 1825 the chiefs were never able to face the invader in the plains. They carried on the contest from the mountains, where they could not easily be

pursued, and from whence they occasionally descended upon detached bodies of the Egyptians. During the occupation of the country by Ibrahim Pasha, the Greeks experienced the full bitterness of their struggle for liberty. They had had their day of success, when the whole Peloponnese appeared to have shaken off the incubus of Ottoman rule; and on more than one occasion their day of defeat had been equally glorious—as when the last defenders of Psara destroyed more in their death than they had destroyed during a long siege, whilst the Psariote women cast themselves into the sea, rather than fall into the hands of the blood-thirsty foe. But Ibrahim Pasha fought with other weapons besides the sword and gun. “A market was opened at Modon,” says Alison, “for the sale of captives of both sexes, who were crowded in dungeons, loaded with irons, unmercifully beaten by their guards, and often murdered in pure wanton cruelty during the night. Such, indeed, was the severity with which they were treated that, in comparison with it, the old Turkish system of beheading or blowing from the mouth of a gun every male prisoner above sixteen years of age might be considered as merciful.”

It was the *ultima ratio* of Mussulman warfare, with which a subsequent generation has made us still more painfully familiar. The details may have changed, and for the worse; but the spirit of the Ottoman armies, and the thoroughness with which the Ottoman Government is wont to suppress its insurrections, remain what they have always been. The Asiatic hordes have been wise in their generation. The effect of their mode of fighting has been to paralyse all who were not strong enough to beat them back in the first instance. They had paralysed the Greeks of the fourteenth and fifteenth

centuries; and they (with their African allies) all but paralysed the Greeks of the nineteenth century.

By sea the insurgents reaped many glorious victories, especially by the constant use of fire-ships, whereby they destroyed thousands of their enemies; but, even on the element on which they were almost as much at home as Englishmen, they could not permanently maintain the supremacy. At Missolonghi a protracted siege was endured with incredible bravery, under circumstances which entitle it to be considered as one of the most famous sieges of modern times—a siege which did as much as anything else to give irresistible force to the growing enthusiasm of Europe. In 1826 the fortunes of the Greeks were at their lowest ebb, in spite of European sympathy and their own heroism. The Turks invested Athens, and defeated every attempt to relieve it. Fabvier, Sir Richard Church, General Gordon, Burbaki, Heideck, Hastings, Cochrane, and other foreign volunteers, came to the assistance of the besieged; but they all signally failed. The battle of Phalerum, fought on May 6th, 1827, when Sir Richard Church cast his army of three thousand Greeks against the positions of Reschid Pasha, had for its issue one of the most signal disasters which the insurgents had suffered during the whole war; and the English generalissimo “was so much discouraged by the aspect of affairs that he ordered the garrison of the Acropolis to capitulate.”¹ The garrison refused to follow this counsel; but Church left them to their own devices; and on the 5th of June, taking advantage of the presence of an Austrian and a French vessel at the Piræus, which assured them an honourable capitulation, Fabvier and his companions evacuated the fortress.

¹ Finlay, vi., 432.

Meanwhile the death of the Czar Alexander had put an end to many of the diplomatic trains hitherto pursued by the Russian and English Cabinets in regard to Eastern affairs. The known opinions of Nicholas rendered it certain that he would have less hesitation or compunction in dealing with either Turkey or Greece. More than ten years had passed since the Russians and English had met as allies in the streets of Paris, and there were symptoms that the two Governments would not long be able to maintain even the semblance of amity which had latterly been restored between them. These and other reasons convinced Canning, and those with whom he acted, that new efforts were necessary in order to secure and maintain the ascendancy of English influence in the East.

In the autumn of 1825 Mr. Stratford Canning (cousin of the Foreign Secretary), afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, was despatched on an embassy to the Porte. His instructions were to persuade the Sultan to bring the war in Greece to a close, and at the same time to prevent the war between Turkey and Russia, on which the latter was known to be bent. But he had another mission. On the 9th of January, 1826, off the island of Hydra, he had an interview with Maurocordatos and Zographos, the former of whom Englishmen had persisted in regarding as the most responsible leader in Greece. An arrangement was come to at this meeting, whereby England was authorised (so far as Maurocordatos could authorise her) to suggest to Turkey a basis for the inglorious pacification and future government of Greece. On the strength of this understanding the English Cabinet sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg, in order to

bring about the co-operation of the two Governments. Nicholas, unable to contest the right of England thus to take the first step in the renewed negotiations, agreed without difficulty; and the more readily because at the same time he refused the mediation of England between his own Government and that of the Sultan.

There was a little confusion and hesitation, not to say double-dealing, in the policy of more than one of the Great Powers during the negotiations of 1826. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has recently recalled some of the incidents of the mission which had been entrusted to him; and it is evident from his narrative¹ that the English Government was, at all events, using a weapon with a double edge. Mr. Stratford Canning, who had left for Constantinople in the beginning of October, did not reach his destination until the 27th of February, and it was only then that he heard of the accession of the Czar Nicholas, of the Duke of Wellington's mission to St. Petersburg, of "Lord Strangford's unauthorised suggestion to Count Nesselrode of England's readiness to join the other allies in conference for the pacification of Greece, and the positive disavowal of that notion by the British Government." There seem to have been no new instructions for the English representative. "The instructions," says Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, "which I took with me from London still held good.

¹ See an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1878. The incident of Mr. Canning's interview with Maurocordatos in Hydra appears to require elucidation—which it may not be possible for Lord Stratford to give us. He declares that this interview "had cast a deep shade on my diplomatic prospects." If this means that Maurocordatos and Zographos were too ready to come to an understanding with Turkey, and thus actually threatened to make England's offer of mediation effective, everything is clear. It is quite intelligible that Wellington and Strangford should have been pulling one way, and the Cannings another. The Eastern Question has never found a thoroughly unanimous English Cabinet to deal with it.

England was forced to act alone on the subject of Greece, and resolved, in virtue of her unfettered position, to make a single-handed effort in order to obtain the desired pacification."

A protocol was signed on the 4th of April, 1826, by Wellington on the part of England, and by Nesselrode and Lieven on the part of Russia, according to which the two Powers in concert were to make the following propositions to the Porte:—That Greece should be a dependency of Turkey, paying her an annual tribute, the amount of which was to be "permanently fixed by common consent;" that the Greeks "should be exclusively governed by authorities to be chosen and named by themselves, but in the nomination of which authorities the Porte should have a certain influence;" that they "should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should exclusively conduct their own internal Government;" that, "in order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which must be the necessary consequences of a contest of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the property of Turks, whether situated on the continent of Greece or in the islands;" that, in case of present failure, the two Governments (or, as the protocol has it, "His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty") would still consider the above terms as "the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or separately, between the Porte and the Greeks;" "that, moreover, His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty will not seek, in this arrangement, any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable

by all other nations;" and "that His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty, being desirous that their allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this protocol contains the outline, will communicate this instrument, confidentially, to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and will propose to them that they should, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, guarantee the treaty by which the reconciliation of Turks and Greeks shall be effected, as His Britannic Majesty cannot guarantee such a treaty."¹

This was the first approximation towards the establishment of a Greek State; and it is to be observed that the Governments were already sufficiently sanguine to think of saddling the Greeks with an absolute impossibility—the "exclusive" conduct of their self-government by authorities in whose nomination the Porte was to have a "certain influence." And it may be further observed that the English Government was not at this time at liberty to guarantee the observance of a treaty between Turks and Greeks.

But nothing, in the first instance, came of this protocol, although the Greek Assembly ratified the engagement entered into between Mr. Stratford Canning and Maurocordatos. Both Russia and England had their separate interests to pursue elsewhere; and neither Government had much confidence in the other. In October, Russia obtained from Turkey the convention of Akerman, whereby her influence at the Porte was restored; and in the following December England sent her expedition to Lisbon, at the request

¹ I quote from "Papers relating to the Establishment of the Kingdom of Greece," presented to the House of Commons in 1878. The French version only was presented in 1828.

of the Princess Regent, and without asking for the sanction of Europe. Therefore, when the two Governments at last offered their mediation to Turkey, the Porte had no hesitation in rejecting it (June 10, 1827).

In the meantime another Great Power had duly qualified itself for intervention between Turkey and her rebellious subjects. France had fallen out with the Dey of Algiers, which was a dependency of the Porte; and thus it was that the Government which had suppressed liberty in Spain allowed itself to assist in the emancipation of Greece.

On the 6th of July, 1827, a formal treaty was signed at London, between the Governments of England, France, and Russia (represented by Lord Dudley,¹ the Prince de Polignac, and Lieven). The recitation declares that "His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary struggle which, while it abandons the Greek provinces and the Islands of the Archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, daily causes fresh impediments to the commerce of the States of Europe, and gives opportunity for acts of piracy, which not only expose the subjects of the High Contracting Parties to grievous losses, but also render necessary measures which are burthensome for their observation and suppression; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, having

¹ Canning became Premier (April 30th, 1827) on the resignation of Lord Liverpool, and Dudley succeeded him at the Foreign Office. The Duke of Wellington refused to take office under the popular commoner; and, indeed, he had conscientiously objected to much of Canning's policy.

moreover received from the Greeks an earnest invitation to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte; and, together with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, being animated with the desire of putting a stop to the effusion of blood, and of preventing the evils of every kind which the continuance of such a state of affairs may produce; they have resolved to combine their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal Treaty, for the object of re-establishing peace between the contending parties, by means of an arrangement called for no less by sentiments of humanity than by a concern for the tranquillity of Europe."

The formal initiation of the treaty, it will be perceived, came from England and France, so far, at least, as the solicitation of Greece was concerned; and the Russian Government was careful to have it understood that it acted in this matter on the invitation of England. It was cultivating good relations with the Porte, and was not unwilling that its old rival at Constantinople should take the lead in what was certain to be an unwelcome and (for the time) futile step. As for the interruption of commerce in the Mediterranean and Levant, this had been felt chiefly, and very seriously, by England and France; especially in consequence of the great increase of piracy during the Greek war (in which Greeks, amongst others, had naturally played their part).

The first article of the treaty pledged the Contracting Powers to renew their offer of mediation to the Porte, by means of a joint declaration from the ambassadors at Constantinople; "and," continues the article, "at the same time, a demand for an immediate armistice shall be made to the two contending parties, as a

preliminary and indispensable condition to the opening of any negotiation."¹

The next five articles comprised the substance, and almost the exact words, of the Protocol of 1826; but, in place of England declaring her inability to guarantee the observance of the treaty, the sixth article provides that "the arrangements for reconciliation and peace which shall be definitively agreed upon between the contending parties shall be guaranteed by those of the Signing Powers who may judge it expedient or possible to contract that obligation." The point was left open; and there is no difficulty in understanding that the objection of the English Cabinet to enter into a guarantee, prospectively operative against Turkey, in conjunction with Russia, was partly removed by the introduction of France into the compact.

There was, in this same Treaty of London, an "additional" and secret article, providing for the actual recognition of Greece as an autonomous State, and for the attainment of peace by (at the least) a menace of coercion. It is important to note the precise terms of this secret clause—the tinder to which the blow struck at Navarino presently set fire. It was by this Treaty of 1827, confirming and extending the Protocol of 1826, that Greek liberty was secured; and from the secret clause the complete independence of Greece followed by a natural sequence of events.

"(1.) It shall be declared to the Porte . . . that the inconveniences and evils described in the patent Treaty as inseparable from the state of things which has for six years existed in the East, and the termination of

¹ This demand was duly made, and acceded to by the Greeks alone. The Turks subsequently contended that the insurgents had been guilty of a breach of faith by attacking them (in the naval battle of Salona) after agreeing to suspend hostilities.

which, by the means at the command of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, appears to be still distant, impose upon the High Contracting Parties the necessity of taking immediate measures for forming a connection with the Greeks.

“It is understood that this shall be effected by establishing commercial relations with the Greeks, and by sending to and receiving from them, for this purpose, Consular Agents, provided there shall exist in Greece authorities capable of supporting such relations.

“(2.) If, within the said term of one month, the Porte does not accept the armistice proposed in the 1st Article of the patent Treaty, or if the Greeks refuse to carry it into execution, the High Contracting Powers shall declare to either of the contending parties which may be disposed to continue hostilities, or to both of them if necessary, that the said High Powers intend to exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effects of the armistice of which they desire the execution, by preventing, as far as possible, all collision between the contending parties; and, in consequence, immediately after the above-mentioned declaration, the High Powers will, jointly, exert all their efforts to accomplish the object of such armistice, without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the two contending parties.

“Immediately after the signature of the present Additional Article, the High Contracting Powers will, consequently, transmit to the Admirals commanding their respective squadrons in the Levant conditional instructions in conformity to the arrangements above declared.

“(3.) Finally, if, contrary to all expectation, these

measures do not prove sufficient to procure the adoption of the propositions of the High Contracting Parties by the Ottoman Porte ; or if, on the other hand, the Greeks decline the conditions stipulated in their favour by the Treaty of this date, the High Contracting Powers will, nevertheless, continue to pursue the work of pacification, on the bases upon which they have agreed ; and, in consequence, they authorise, from the present moment, their Representatives at London to discuss and determine the future measures which it may become necessary to employ."

It is probable that the Contracting Powers did not yet contemplate the entire independence of Greece, even as a contingency of the next few years. Nothing in their conduct at this time accuses them of so much robustness of mind as would be implied in that supposition. The Greece with which they desired to "form a connection" was perhaps a simple autonomous State, somewhat on the model of Servia, which, though practically self-governing, should remain a portion of the Turkish Empire. The "integrity and independence of Turkey" were thought as important in the eyes of most English statesmen in 1827 as they were in the eyes of one or two of their successors just half a century later ; and at both epochs the Porte threw away its opportunity of preserving its suzerainty intact. It rejected the offer of July as it had rejected the offer of February, and on the same over-subtle plea that the interference of foreign Powers in the internal government of its empire was unjustifiable.

The words had been written down, and the sequence of events followed more quickly than the most sanguine could have hoped ; though it must be admitted that one of the means which "circumstances suggested to

the prudence " of the Powers for enforcing an armistice tended very happily to produce a rupture. The allied fleets of England, France, and Russia (twenty-six sail, 1,270 guns), unwilling to give the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (eighty-two sail, 2,000 guns) the chance of escaping from the Bay of Navarino during the winter months, and unable to find shelter at the mouth of the bay on the outside, coolly entered the harbour (October 20th, 1827). The Turks naturally thought themselves on the point of being attacked, or at all events they declared this to be their impression. They therefore opened fire upon the Allies from their own vessels, and from the batteries on Sphakteria, before the Russian fleet, which was in the rear, had filed through the entrance of the bay. The Allies needed no second invitation. They returned the fire of the Turks and Egyptians, and with such effect that, by the following morning, of the eighty-two vessels which had ridden safely in the Bay of Navarino on the eve of the battle, only twenty-nine remained afloat.

The battle of Navarino may be fairly described as a happy blunder. It was not contemplated in the instructions given to the allied fleets. Sir Edward Codrington, the English admiral, was blamed at home for exceeding his orders, and taking a step which necessarily resulted in an engagement. But there can be no question as to the wholesome character of the punishment inflicted upon the butchers and slave-dealers of the Porte, or as to the advancement of the cause of freedom, and the actual decrease of bloodshed, which was the consequence of the blow.

The ambassadors of the Allied Powers at Constantinople made a last offer of mediation to the Porte, but it was refused; and they withdrew from the capital

in the month of December.¹ There was, however, no immediate declaration of war. Turks and Greeks still carried on their unequal contest; and, even after the victory of the Allies, an Egyptian fleet sailed from the Morea to Alexandria, with Greek slaves on board, unmolested and unchallenged.²

Thus slowly grew the idea of extorting Greek independence from the Porte by force of arms. Towards the end of 1827, after England, Russia, and France had apparently determined that the insurgent race should be added to the family of the European States, Reschid Pasha was assuring the Sultan, not without reason, that he had re-subjected the continent of Greece, from Missolonghi to Athens. Meanwhile the destitution of the Greeks who had not fallen into the hands of Turks or Egyptians was of the most desperate character. The Asiatic and African invaders (including many who were brought into the country for the sole purpose of devastation) had laid waste all the fertile districts over which the blight of their presence had passed. A wholesale famine had settled down on the devoted land. The starvation of Greece was not figurative, but actual; thousands died of absolute want of food. Private charity alone preserved the life of a vast number of Greeks, amongst whom were many

¹ "In concert with my colleagues," says Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in the article above quoted, "I employed the month of November in occasional efforts to obtain a more favourable hearing at the Porte. Explanations were given, arguments were urged, warnings were repeated to no purpose. The lamented decease of Mr. Canning in August had been followed at home by those rather hesitating counsels which are apt to accompany an uncertain tenure of office. Nothing in the shape of instruction had reached me since the astounding incident of Navarino."

² It was ostensibly for this neglect that Sir Edward Codrington was recalled.

persons of culture and position. If it had not been for the tardy interference of the civilised world, Sultan Mahmoud would have most effectually vindicated his authority over his subjects, by creating a wilderness which he might have called a peace.

At the end of 1826 the Executive Government, which had fled from Nauplia to Ægina, had some sixteen piastres left in the public treasury. The revenue had sunk from five-and-a-half million piastres in 1825 to little more than a quarter of the sum in 1826. The armies, such as they were, were supported only by voluntary efforts. After the surrender of Athens, Lord Cochrane wished to hold a review of the Greek fleet at Poros; but, as he was unable to pay the wages of his sailors, the vessels, which ought to have been ready for action, set sail and dispersed.¹

Demoralisation had increased in every department, and in connection with every authority which professed to speak and act in the name of Greece. The wretched Greeks had been made the football of fortune, and, before relief came to them, they had sunk to the very depths of misery and humiliation.

Let us, in the present day, ascertain and realise the degree in which our fathers and grandfathers contributed to the misfortunes of the struggling race, in order that we may appreciate the responsibility which undoubtedly rests upon us. Let Englishmen in particular face the items of the long outstanding account between this country and Greece, which unquestionably leaves the balance of debt on our side. Be it observed that, if it was England more than any other country which helped Greece to obtain her independence, it was right that England, before all, should have

¹ Finlay was with Lord Cochrane at the time, and relates the circumstance.


prevented that independence from becoming a mockery. We encouraged the Greeks from the very outset. We—that is to say, public opinion in England, rather than the English Government—bade the insurgents persevere against the most hideous forms of suppression, and look to us for the moral force and aid which their cause demanded. We helped them with money and arms. When their own resources were insufficient for their needs we raised loans for them; and when their chiefs were found to be incompetent we sent them leaders.

That is the bright aspect of the picture; but it is not the only aspect. This was how England encouraged Greece; but what did she actually do for her? After seven years, our moral aid—assisted by the splendid blunder of Navarino—converted the rebels into a State; but with that one fact our positive beneficence towards this ill-starred people may almost be said to have begun and ended. Not a third of the money subscribed in England for the Greeks ever reached them. Not a tithe of it assisted their struggle for independence. The officers whom we sent to command their armies and their fleets—one of whom alone made his paltry bargain for fifty-seven thousand pounds—were as incompetent as the Greek leaders whom they thrust aside. The circumstances of the siege of Athens were such as might well make every Englishman blush for shame. It was but a scurvy service that England rendered to the heroic little nation—a nation which, under the black night of tyranny, consequent upon a military *régime* of a quarter of a century, held out the torch of liberty, and was the first to justify the assertion of popular rights. We have been wont to over-estimate the value of what England, and especially the English Philhellenes, did

for Greece in the second decade of the nineteenth century. It is time that we should undeceive ourselves. That which we actually did was to call upon the Greeks for tremendous sacrifices; to stimulate them to resistance until their land had been devastated and their race decimated; to press upon them usurious loans, delusory aid, injudicious counsels;¹ to set up an emaciated and penniless State; to mock it with a President who became an oppressor, and a King who became a selfish tyrant; and then to exact unlimited gratitude, and load it with ungenerous reproaches.

Who that reads and considers the history of the time can doubt that we are still in debt to the Greeks? They have never had the chance of growing into a great and powerful nation, or of developing the genius

¹ No part of Finlay's *History* is more courageously or pungently written than that in which he lashes the conduct of the pseudo-Philhellenes, who transmitted to the present generation so heavy a burden of responsibility. "It was by those who called themselves Philhellenes," he says (vi., 433), "in England and America, that Greece was most injured. Several of the steam-ships, for which the Greek Government paid large sums in London, *were never sent to Greece*. Some of the field-artillery purchased by the Greek deputies was so ill-constructed that the carriages broke down the first time the guns were brought into action. Two frigates were contracted for at New York; and the business of the contractors was so managed that Greece *received only one frigate after paying the cost of two* . . . It will be seen that waste and speculation were not monopolies in the hands of Greek statesmen, Albanian shipowners, and captains of armatoles and klephts. *English politicians* and American merchants *had also their share* . . . The persons principally responsible for this waste of money, and these delays, were Mr. Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton; Mr. Edward Ellice; Sir Francis Burdett; Mr. Hume; Sir John Bowring, the Secretary of the Greek Committee; and Messrs. Ricardo, the contractors of the second Greek loan. Sir Francis Burdett was floating on the cream of Radicalism, and Lord Broughton was supporting himself above the thin milk of Whiggery by holding on vigorously at the baronet's coat-tail. Both these gentlemen, however, though they were guilty of negligence and folly, kept their hands pure from all money transactions in Greek bonds. The Right Honourable Edward Ellice was a contractor for the first Greek loan, but was not a bear, at least of Greek stock. In a letter to the *Times* he made a plain statement of his position, and owned



for self-government and the civilising energy which are their natural inheritance. They were exhorted to be free with their chains half severed, to run in the race with shackles on their feet, to be a model for the very Europe which had demoralised them. Europe demanded an impossibility of Greece; and to that injustice she has added the greater one of condemning and neglecting the half-emancipated race for what has been, not its crime, but its chief misfortune.

candidly that he had been guilty of 'extreme indiscretion in mixing himself up with the Greek deputies and their affairs.' What he said was no doubt perfectly true; but we must not overlook that it was not said until Greek affairs had ceased to discount the political drafts of the Whigs; and a less friendly witness might perhaps have used a stronger phrase than 'extreme indiscretion.' The conduct of Mr. Hume and Sir John Bowring was more reprehensible, and their names were deeply imbedded in the financial pastry which Cobbett called 'the Greek pie,' and which was served with the rich sauce of his savoury tongue in the celebrated *Weekly Register*. Where there was both just blame and much calumny, it is difficult and not very important to apportion the exact amount of censure which the conduct of each individual merited."

CHAPTER VIII.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM.

The Death of Canning—England's New Policy—The Views of Wellington—England Responsible for the Limitation of the Boundaries of New Greece—The French Occupation—Adhesion of Turkey to the Treaty of London—The Protocol of 1832—Removing the Landmarks—The Burdens of the New State—The Hopeless Condition of the Kingdom.

CANNING died on the 8th of August, 1827;¹ and in him the Greeks had lost their most powerful friend. If he had lived, it is probable that the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece might have been effected under happier auspices, and with greater chances of securing immediate good government. Canning was an indifferent Tory, but he was a bold and capable statesman, who had shown that he understood the true mission of the Hellenic race in south-eastern Europe. He was held cheap by Wellington, by the King, by sticklers for the old and unprogressive traditions of diplomacy; but he had known how to make his views prevail over those of Metternich and Nesselrode. He might have done incalculably more for Greece than Wellington or Aberdeen was able or willing to do. He could hardly have done less or worse.

¹ He was succeeded in the premiership by Lord Goderich, whose tenure of office ended on the 10th of January, 1828. From this time until the 16th of November, 1830, the Duke of Wellington presided over the Cabinet, his Foreign Secretary being Lord Aberdeen. From 1830 Earl Grey was Premier, with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office.

When Canning died, all Europe felt that it had lost a master-mind. Within twelve months the understanding between England, France, and Russia was virtually at an end. Russia had declared war against Turkey on her own account, the European concert was more a dead letter than ever, Greece and her friends had almost abandoned the hope of assistance from England (or from any one else, unless it were Russia), and the influence of the Czar was once more predominant in the Mediterranean. "In the protocol of the 15th of June, 1828," says Finlay,¹ "Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic inaptitude which characterises the proceedings of Great Britain at this period, allowed the clauses to be inverted, and by this inversion the claim of Russia to an exceptional position with regard to Turkey was in some measure ratified. England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim she set up to an exceptional position until Sebastopol fell."

This is what Europe lost by the substitution of the Wellington-Aberdeen policy for the policy of Canning. Canning felt no admiration for the conduct of Russia; he did not accept Russia's views; but on the other hand he formed an alliance with her, and by this very means took the lead and gained his end. Wellington, as soon as he found himself at the head of affairs in England, was careful on every occasion to dwell upon the ambition and duplicity of Russia; he almost drove the Czar to pursue an independent course; and the consequence was that he lost the lead, and suffered Russia to gain her end.

Our policy in the Eastern Question in 1828 was the

¹ *History*, vii., 25.

same as our policy just fifty years later ; and, indeed, the one is professedly based upon the other. It starts off with the conviction that Russia is antagonistic to us, is plotting for supremacy in the East, and employs incessant duplicity in labouring for this end. This conviction being firmly entertained (and it may be thoroughly warranted by facts¹) a weak school of diplomacy proceeds—how? To diplomatisé? By no means. It proceeds to hold aloof, to interfere at the wrong moment, to emphasise its suspicion, to boast what it will do if Russia does so and so ; and thus, in the end, either to give the virtual triumph to Russia, or to fight her that we may prove our physical superiority. These are the bad traditions of English policy in the East. They are not traditions arising out of the policy which Canning had begun to pursue. Canning would never have allowed Russia to go to war with Turkey without at least establishing on the spot an independent Greek kingdom, on the widest possible basis, capable of weighing down the scale of influence into which Russia had cast her sword. He would never have allowed a French force alone to sweep the Turks out of the Morea, and to occupy the country during five years. In short, he would have led Russia and Europe, not have been led or pushed aside by them.

A grand opportunity presented itself at this moment to substitute Greece for Turkey (prospectively) as the warden of South-eastern Europe, as the keeper of the Straits, and as a counterpoise against the undue influence of Russia in the Mediterranean. We cannot be surprised if the attainment of this object appeared impossible to the Powers in 1828 ; but we have reason to regret

¹ Canning, at all events, entertained it.

that more was not done towards an end which every statesman must have perceived to be advantageous in the highest degree. The Duke of Wellington was a great soldier, but he was not a statesman. Almost all his political acts were inspired by an ambition to defend his fellow-creatures against the insidious dangers of reform. His instincts in European affairs were identical with his instincts in English domestic questions. He had no enthusiasm for Greece; and it is a question whether he so much as appreciated the possible value of that country in the political economy of Europe. His correspondence during the years 1828 and 1829 is penetrated by suspicions of, and reproaches against, Russia; but it hardly occurred to him to counteract Russia in Greece.

Thus, writing to the Comte de la Ferronays (February 26th, 1828) he refers to the policy of the Allies in respect of Greece as "a course of measures commenced with the view of pacifying" that country, "and of preventing the warfare which has existed there for seven years from spreading to the rest of Europe." And again, "We are all interested in the continued existence, in a state of independence, of the power of the Porte in Europe. We are not prepared for its destruction . . . We ought to direct our efforts steadily to attain *our original object, the pacification of Greece*, without injury, or at least with as little injury as possible, to the power of the Porte."¹ That was written before Russia's declaration of war. On the 28th of August, 1829, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen:—"We mean to maintain the power of the Porte; and although we were ready to agree to the adoption of a

¹ *Correspondence of the late Duke of Wellington* (Murray), under the dates given.

mode of executing our purpose in Greece, consistent with the respect due to that Power, our concurrence in that mode was *founded upon the necessity of coming to some settlement in Greece for the sake of the Porte itself.*"

The "we" includes Canning; but nothing is more certain than that Canning himself would have repudiated such a construction, or such a limitation, of his motives.

In a conversation between the Duke of Wellington, Lord Aberdeen, Prince Lieven, and the Count de Matuscewitz, held at the Foreign Office on the 4th of September, 1829, the Duke "entreated" the Russian representatives "to warn the Emperor of the danger of establishing in Greece a focus of revolution. Such an establishment," he said, "may give this country a little more or less of trouble. But revolutionists in Greece will not limit their efforts to the Ionian Islands. They will turn their attention to other countries, and will lay the foundation of fresh wars, and of misery for mankind."

Here was a spectre almost as chimerical as those of Verona, which the Duke himself, at the instance of Mr. Canning, refused to combat. And, in dread of such a spectre, the Wellington Cabinet threw away an excellent chance of precluding "fresh wars," and averting much "misery for mankind." The same chance has again returned, and again been thrown away. To say nothing of the chance of 1854, the Congress of 1878 has committed itself to another patchwork "settlement" of the Eastern Question, which leaves the whole difficulty unsolved, and condemns the next generation to fresh wars and misery.

The memorandum of the conversation in question was written by the Duke himself, and enclosed to Lord

Aberdeen in a letter dated "Stratfieldsaye, 5th September, 1829." It is right to say that the fears of the Duke may be held to have been partly justified by the conduct of Capo d'Istria; but at all events they appear to have been greatly exaggerated. At this same interview a question arose as to the boundaries of the new State, on which considerable difference existed between the Governments of England and Russia. The Duke declared that "the opinion of this Government was not altered upon that subject." Whereupon Count Matuscewitz retorted, "That is to say, as far as possible from the boundaries proposed by us." The Duke replied "that we had stated our reasons, and were more than ever convinced that the limits proposed by us were those best calculated to secure peace."

Here we have another proof that the Wellington Ministry acted throughout rather as the advocate of Turkey than as a friend of Greece. Its aim was to take from Turkey, and to give to Greece, as little as possible. The chief responsibility of endowing the new State with a lamentably insufficient territory rests, therefore, upon ourselves. It was we who would have clipped out a Greece limited by the mouth of the Aspropotamos, in order that the Ionian Islands might be faced by a Turkish mainland. There was, be it observed, a better and more generous way of relieving ourselves from the fear of insurrection in these islands—a fear which actually led the Duke of Wellington to talk of "sustaining a revolutionary war against a Russian subject placed in Greece as President under the protection of the Powers." This way was to hand over the islands, where we had no business to be at all, to their natural possessors, and thus to give Greece a little better chance of paying her debts. But it took us five-and-thirty

years to perceive our duty in that respect, though a revolution was menacing us during the whole time.

Much would be gained if the public conscience of England could be sufficiently aroused to make it resolve that, on the first opportunity which may hereafter arise, the emancipation of the Greeks shall be completed, and the Eastern Question settled by their establishment as a first-rate Power. The Congress of 1878 has done little more for Greece than was done fifty years ago. The true policy of England and of Europe is yet too advanced for adoption by our statesmen—even if it be not too advanced for bold acceptance by our publicists.

Capo d'Istria was elected President of Greece by a National Assembly meeting at Trœzene, on the 14th of April, 1827. He was selected, for a period of seven years, "because he possessed a degree of political experience which the Ottoman domination had prevented any native Greek from acquiring."¹ But he was really selected because he was a Russian subject, and because the English Government, even at that date, had not sufficient firmness to put its veto upon such a manifestly injudicious choice. A hundred Greeks might have been found who would have governed their country better.

On the 30th of August, 1828, a French army of fourteen thousand men, under General Maison, landed at Petalidi, in the Gulf of Coron. They expelled Ibrahim Pasha, drove the last Turk and Egyptian out of the Morea, and occupied the country until the year 1834. As early as the 10th of August, 1829, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Aberdeen, "We must call upon the King of France distinctly to perform his

¹ According to the decree of the Assembly by which he was chosen. See Finlay, vii. 30.

promise to withdraw his troops from the Morea." He ought never to have allowed the French alone to undertake this service for Greece.

The influence which Canning had carefully nourished, and which had led the Greeks in 1825 to throw themselves upon the "absolute protection" of England, had been wantonly squandered. Greece had passed out of our hands. We had not merely lost an opportunity; we had inflicted an injury, and incurred an immense responsibility.

By the tenth article of the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14th, 1829), Turkey gave its adhesion to the protocol of the Conference of London, which had been signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the 22nd of March in the same year. Another Conference became necessary, in view of the Russo-Turkish treaty, and, in anticipation of this, the Porte had entered into a separate agreement with the representatives of England and France at Constantinople, in these terms: "The Sublime Porte declares, that having already adhered to the Treaty of London, it now further promises and pledges itself to the Representatives of the Powers who signed the said Treaty to subscribe entirely to all the decisions which the Conference of London shall adopt with respect to its execution."

The triumph of the Russian arms had thus brought the Ottoman Government to a mood of complete submission to the will of the three Powers. Let us see what it had effected for the Greek nation.

The Conference of 1829 had based its decisions upon a series of conclusions, arrived at by a previous Conference, held at Poros on the 12th of December,

1828, which latter Conference acted upon "information supplied by the Greek Government," and "after frequent communications with Count Capo d'Istria." The Conference of Poros had fully discussed the questions relating to the "continental and insular boundary" of the proposed new Greece, to the "tribute" and "indemnity" which the liberated State was to pay to Turkey and Turkish subjects, and to the "suzerainty" which it was intended to give to the Sultan in place of his forfeited sovereignty. Upon the conclusions which had been arrived at in the course of these discussions, the plenipotentiaries at the first London Conference (Aberdeen, de Polignac, and Lieven) determined to "propose to the Ottoman Porte" that Greece should pay it a million and a half of Turkish piastres as an annual tribute, and an indemnity on behalf of Mussulman proprietors and other sufferers in Greece; that the new State, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, should enjoy the rights of self-government; that the Porte should "participate in the choice" of an hereditary "chief of Greece," who should receive his investiture at Constantinople; that the arrangements to be entered into should be placed "under the guarantee of such of the signing Powers as shall think it advantageous or possible to contract that obligation;" that "the guarantee in question shall assure the Ottoman Porte against every hostile enterprise or act on the part of the Greeks," and *vice versâ*. With regard to the boundaries of the new State, it was "proposed to the Porte that the point of departure for the continental boundary shall be near the entrance of the Gulf of Volo; from whence the line, ascending to the crown of the Othryx, shall follow its whole range as far as the summit,

situated to the east of Agrapha, which forms its point of junction with the chain of Pindus. From this summit it will descend into the valley of the Aspropotamos, by the south of Leontitos, which it will leave to Turkey; crossing afterwards the chain of the Macronoros, it will include in the Greek territory the defile of that name, which leads from the plain of Arta, and will terminate in the sea at the Ambraciot Gulf. All the provinces situated to the south of that line shall be comprised in the new Greek State. The islands adjoining the Morea, the island of Eubœa, or Negropont, and the islands commonly called Cyclades, shall form part of that State."

Such was the proposal of March, 1829. Eleven months later, on the 3rd of February, 1830, after a declaration from Russia that her Treaty of Adrianople did not "invalidate the rights of the Emperor's allies, nor clog the deliberations of the Ministers assembled in Conference," the plenipotentiaries came to the following decisions, which form the basis upon which the Kingdom of Greece was built up.

"Greece shall form an independent State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence.

"In consideration of these advantages granted to the new State, and in deference to the desire expressed by the Porte to obtain the reduction of the frontiers fixed by the protocol of the 22nd March, the line of demarcation of the limits of Greece shall take its departure from the mouth of the river Aspropotamos, ascend that river as far as the latitude of Lake Angelo Castro, and traversing that lake, as well as those of Vrachori and Saurovitza, it shall strike the Mount

Artolina, from whence it shall follow the ridge of Mount Oxas, the valley of Calouri, and the ridge of Mount Ceta, as far as the Gulf of Zeitoun, which it shall reach at the mouth of the Sperchius.

“There shall likewise belong to Greece the whole of the Island of Negropont, with the Devil’s Islands and the Island of Skyros, and the islands anciently known by the name of Cyclades, including the Island of Amorgo.

“The Greek Government shall be monarchical, and hereditary according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of the families reigning in the States that signed the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. The choice of that Prince shall form the object of subsequent communications and stipulations.”

After which, and after further arrangements for the pacification and immediate settlement of Greece, “the three Courts sincerely congratulate themselves on having come to a perfect agreement, in the midst of the most serious and delicate circumstances. The maintenance of their union during such a period offers the best pledge of its permanency; and the three Courts flatter themselves that this union, as firm as it is beneficial, will not cease to contribute to the confirmation of the peace of the world.”

These self-congratulations are affecting; but the friends of Greece might have appreciated the mutual complaisance of the three Powers still more if it had not been for the fact that the infant kingdom was made to pay a somewhat heavy price for its independence. A glance at the map will show how large

a slice of Continental Greece was cut out of the new-made State "in deference to the desire expressed by the Porte." The Powers had created a cripple, and then, in their compunction, and at the desire of a tyrant, who had "subscribed entirely to all their decisions beforehand," they mutilated their sorry creation.

It is true that on a subsequent occasion, in the arrangement signed at Constantinople, on July 21st, 1832, between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey, the limits of Greece were again advanced, so as to approximate to the frontier assigned by the Conference of March, 1829. The "definitive boundary-line" was now settled as it is drawn in the map of Greece which accompanies the present volume; but only on condition of the payment to Turkey, by the unfortunate country which the Turkish mercenaries had rendered a desert, of as much as forty million piastres!¹ The mutilated cripple was partially healed, and then made to pay more than it possessed for the operation.

The final arrangement of the boundary, as settled in 1832, was as follows:—"On the eastern side, the extreme point of separation of the two States shall be fixed at the mouth of the little river which flows near the village of Gradiza. The frontier line shall ascend this river to its source, shall thence reach the chain of Mount Othryx, leaving to Greece the passage of the Klomo, provided the crest of that chain be not passed; thence it shall follow in a westerly direction the crest of the same chain along the whole extent thereof, and especially the Peak of Varibovo, in

¹ The piastre was then worth about 2½d. The forty millions may be reckoned at £462,500.

order to attain the height which, under the denomination of Veluchi, forms the point of connection of the three great chains of mountains of the country. From this height the line shall continue, adapting itself as much as possible to the salient features of the country, across the Valley of the Aspropotamos to the Gulf of Arta, terminating at that gulf between Coprina and Menidi. . . . Nevertheless, as the representatives, *full of deference for the wish which has been expressed in the name of his Highness* relative to the portion of the district of Zeitoun, situate to the left of the Sperchius, have agreed that reference should be made on the subject to the Conference of London, upon the express condition that the decision and execution of the measures consequent thereupon should not be retarded thereby, it has become necessary to provide for the contingency of that portion of the territory of Zeitoun remaining to the Ottoman Empire. The boundary-line to the east will in that case commence at the mouth of the River Sperchius, and will run up its left bank to the point of contact of the districts of Zeitoun and of Patradjik; thence it will reach the summit of the chain of the Othryx, following the common boundary of those two districts, and the most direct line, in the event of that common boundary not attaining the summit of the chain of the Othryx. It will continue in the manner before mentioned, in order to terminate at the Gulf of Arta."

This arranged, the plenipotentiaries of 1832 wound up with fresh self-congratulations. They "declared" that, "considering the arrangements recorded by common agreement in the present instrument, the object of the Treaty of London of the 6th July, 1827, and of the Protocols under different dates which relate thereto, is

completely attained ; that the prolonged negotiations to which those stipulations have given rise are terminated in such a manner as never to be renewed ; in fact, that the Greek Question is irrevocably settled."

"Irrevocably settled !" The whole history of Greece, from that moment to the present, bears witness to the fatuity of the assertion.

It can hardly be necessary to say that the Greek nation was not consulted in the striking of these bargains, or that it was not particularly grateful for the mode in which Europe had secured its independence of the Porte. It may be pleaded that there was no very practicable method of consulting the nation, which remained more or less turbulent during the whole term of Capo d'Istria's presidency, and which, in the year 1832, was in a condition of general anarchy. But, at all events, the attempt was not made. Greece was in tutelage to Europe, and Europe knew no other way of treating her ward than by taking its government entirely out of its hands, and enforcing her decisions at the point of the bayonet.

As for the payment of the forty million piastres, it was known to everybody concerned that Greece had, practically speaking, no resources from which to meet the obligation imposed upon her. Europe therefore provided the money by raising a loan, in the name of a country which was virtually a stranger to the whole transaction, and which was bound down to the liquidation of capital and interest before it was even ascertained what its revenues were likely to be.

A king was sent with the money. That is to say, at the same time with the papers representing Greece's debt of honour, contracted by foreigners for the fictitious

purchase of a portion of Greece's own territory, there arrived a young lad of seventeen, absolutely ignorant of kingcraft, utterly incompetent to govern, capable of nothing but the indefinite increase of the national debt, and escorted by an army of hungry Bavarians (November 1st, 1832).

The business was flagitious from beginning to end. The young kingdom was stifled in its birth. No nation whatsoever could have flourished under such conditions; and, if Greece had not been maintained by the Powers for their own purposes, she would inevitably have fallen a prey to her old enemy, or to the anarchy which was perpetuated by foreign misrule. The very founts of national life were dried up. The establishment of New Greece was a patent mockery.

These words ought not to be used lightly; but they are justified by the facts of the case. The Powers borrowed on behalf of Greece three series of a loan of sixty million francs¹—raised, under their guarantee, at 94 for the 100, bearing interest at five per cent. The disposal of the first two series, of the nominal amount of 44,672,000 drachmas, was as follows:—

	Drs.
Six per cent. on the price, commission, &c.	5,298,009
Indemnity to Turkey, for extension of frontier, forty million piastres, equivalent to	14,920,000
Interest and sinking fund for first year, kept back by Rothschilds	4,842,000
Paid into the Greek treasury ²	19,612,000
	44,672,000

And the greater part of the third series of the loan was employed, as soon as received, to liquidate the interest

¹ About 67,000,000 drachmas, or £2,400,000.

² It may be incidentally remarked that the sum spent on the (Bavarian) army alone during the years 1833-5 was stated by the Minister of War, Schmaltz, in 1836, to have been 20,087,978 drachmas.—Strong, p. 287.

and sinking fund of the first two series, already in arrear !

This was surely a crushing weight to lay on the shoulders of the new-made kingdom. No one can be surprised that, by the year 1846, this debt alone had reached the amount of seventy-two million francs, now charged at six per cent. ; whilst new loans have since been contracted, all virtually necessitated by the usurer's legacy wherewith New Greece was endowed.¹

Nothing more can be needed to complete the condemnation of those who undertook, in such a niggardly spirit, to found the new Hellenic State. Forced to action by the indomitable resolution of the Greeks, and anxious at the same time to establish a kingdom on the *Ægean* which should be independent of foreign influence, they had set up a practically bankrupt State, restricting its boundaries with a cynical indifference to the claims of nationality, compelling it to pay a heavy price for a few extra miles of territory, excluding from its government the patriots whom a brief period of freedom would have converted into statesmen, saddling it with an army of rapacious foreigners, and forcing upon it a selfish young tyrant, whom it eventually became necessary to drive out by a new revolution. Few greater cruelties, if such a word can be applied to political blindness and incompetence, are recorded in the pages of history.

There were many better things which Europe might have done with Greece, short of the most drastic remedy of all—the liberation of the entire Greek coast in Europe, from Epirus to Constantinople, and from thence to Cape Emineh, where the Baltic chain overhangs the

¹ See, also, the chapter on Greek Finance, Part I. Of course the country had other heavy expenses to meet ; as for instance, in connection with the indemnity of its own population, ruined by ten years of war.

Black Sea. That would have been a great and a bold deed, possibly requiring another Navarino, and another campaign in Thrace ; but it could have been done, there was a just pretext, and it ought to have been done. It might have involved the dissolution of Turkey in Europe, but this would have been accomplished amidst the applause of all far-seeing men. It would have advanced civilisation in a notable degree. There would have been a price to pay, in life and money ; but the cost would not have been a tithe of that which Europe has had to expend in maintaining the barbarous rule of the Porte. There would then have been no Crimean War to look forward to ; no Bulgarian insurrections and massacres ; perhaps no Servian and Montenegrin wars ; no Russo-Turkish war ; no dangerous conflicts of rival diplomacies, such as those which have since cast their shadow over Europe. Russia might not have been absolutely excluded from interference across the Danube ; but the troubles of Bulgaria would have been trifling by comparison with what they actually have been ; and at all events the presence of Greek garrisons in the Balkans would have robbed them of almost all their danger to the Mediterranean Powers and to Europe. A strong Greece, a Greece such as she has yet to be made, a Greece in Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, would have been a bulwark against all possible aggressions, incalculably stronger than that broken reed of Ottoman corruption on which English statesmen have chosen to lean.

As it is, the partial establishment of New Greece was the crisis of liberty in modern Europe ; but what would not her complete establishment have been ! For England and for Russia it would have been the harbinger of a happier future, and the pledge of a more

enduring peace. For Italy it might have implied regeneration in 1848, instead of in 1860. For France and Austria, it might have signified at least one war the fewer. But for Greece herself, it is impossible to exaggerate the benefit which it would have conferred upon her.

All this was too heroic for times still in thralldom to the leagued saints of the Holy Alliance. From then until now Europe has been learning, by national humiliations, by vast armaments, by the slaughter of her bravest men, and by the arrest of popular progress, a lesson which is not even yet impressed upon us, that heroic deeds, boldly conceived and sternly executed, mean less blood, less money, less slaughter in peace and war, than the policy of making many nations wait on the convenience of one, and of patching up by compromise what ought to be determined by timely and resolute action.

This was too much for the Europe of 1829, as it proved to be too much for the Europe of 1878. But what can be said of the policy which refused Thessaly and Epirus to the Greeks, and which made a penniless State buy its oppressors out of the valley of the Aspropotamos? "Policy" is too grand a word to be wasted on such a petty and mischievous job. One is almost inclined to suspect that the very object of the Governments, in this and every other arrangement in connection with the "settlement" of Greece, was to render it absolutely impossible for her to become strong or self-dependent. If so, there is no difficulty in deciding which of the parties to the bargain had most cause to congratulate itself.

CHAPTER IX.

GREECE UNDER THE BAVARIANS.

The Crown offered to Prince Leopold—His wise Stipulations—Tyranny and Death of Capo d'Istria—Another Civil War—Otho of Bavaria—Bavarian Rule—The Council of Regency—European Responsibility—England and her Representatives—The Revolution of 1843—The new Constitution—The Creditors of Greece—Relation between Greece and Turkey—The Revolution of 1862.

THE protocol of 1830, which, whilst it abolished the suzerainty of the Porte, deprived Greece of Acarnania, was of course bitterly complained of throughout the country; and Capo d'Istria seems to have taken care that this feeling should be kept alive, and brought prominently before the notice of the Great Powers. His chief object in the management, or rather in the mismanagement of the State, was apparently to pave the way for his own accession to the throne; and accordingly, when the crown had been offered to and accepted by Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (February 11th, 1830) he set to work to throw obstacles in the Prince's way, and to disgust him beforehand with the task which he had undertaken. He did not want to be deprived of his power; and he therefore did all he could to persuade the Prince that he would not be well received in Greece. No doubt the dislike of many of the Greeks to the monarch who had been chosen for them was spontaneous and sincere; but it must be admitted that Capo d'Istria took advantage of the dislike, and made the most of it.

Leopold made a good King of Belgium, but it is questionable whether he would have made a good King of Greece. The virtue of a crowned head, in a settled country, consists in holding aloof from public affairs, and allowing the work of Government to proceed without the slightest interference. Society is becoming so thoroughly organised that it is a matter of comparative indifference whether a State chooses to maintain the form of royalty or not, so long as the monarch is wise enough to let his subjects rule him. Leopold possessed this wisdom in a notable degree; and therefore the probability is that he would not have displayed the special qualities desirable in the ruler of Greece.

In Greece society had been disorganised, and the future subjects were not quite prepared to rule their king. The nation was still in a condition of anarchy, and it required above all things a firm, just, and judicious Government. It was almost impossible for the Great Powers to supply the new State with that of which it stood so much in need; but the selections which they actually made were unfortunate in the extreme.

The chief faults of Leopold, in connection with the Greek sovereignty, appear to have been timidity and vacillation. Eight days before accepting the crown he wrote to Lord Aberdeen that he could imagine no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete in its territories. That was very wise to begin with; and yet he yielded to the temptation of ruling over a State which he could not imagine it possible to pacify. For three months he trifled with the duties he had so lightly undertaken, and then resigned his short dream of ambition. It may be that if he had gone straight to Greece, and formed a

council of the ablest and most honest men in the country, he would have established at once a powerful State and an enduring dynasty.

The offer of the crown to Prince Leopold was made in a joint note from Lord Aberdeen and the French and Russian Ambassadors in London. The Prince made certain stipulations in accepting "the useful and honourable career opened to him by the High Powers;" and the plenipotentiaries, in a protocol of the Conference of February 20th, 1830, undertook as follows:—To guarantee Greece against foreign aggression; to guarantee a loan "to be applied exclusively to the maintenance of the troops of the Sovereign Prince;" and to leave at the Prince's disposal, for one year, the division of the French army still remaining in Greece. At the same time they declined to interfere with Turkey, except by diplomatic representations, in respect of its treatment of the Greeks in Samos and Crete; and they spoke of "insurmountable difficulties" in regard to the extension of the Greek frontier on the mainland, which Prince Leopold had suggested.¹ The

¹ There is a short summary of these Notes in the *Examiner* of May 15th, 1830. It is interesting to note the tone of public opinion in those days on the subject of this appointment. The *Examiner* of April 18th, 1830, has some remarks which are far more pungent than we should dare, or care, to employ in the present generation. Only two or three sentences are capable of quotation:—"How inexplicable is the silence which has prevailed in the press and in Parliament, respecting the appointment of Prince Leopold to the Sovereignty of Greece, one of the most impudent and impolitic measures that have ever disgraced the councils of the country. . . . The occasion which made the name of the Prince of Saxe-Coburg known to the world was the favour which his person found in the sight of a young Princess . . . England would seem to have seized the first opportunity of making a King of him, at no other risk than that of plunging herself into wars for the maintenance of his throne, and with no other violation of justice than giving away a people without their consent, or a care about their opinions . . . The injustice and impolicy, however, of the appointment in question pass without remark, while writers and

appropriation of the loan contemplated by the Powers is significant. It was for the support of the king and his army that our grandfathers lent Greece their money; and this was an additional reason why greater care should have been bestowed on his selection.

Meanwhile Capo d'Istria had been gradually forcing the country into fresh anarchy and bloodshed. His tyranny grew from day to day. He had contrived to secure an Assembly entirely subservient to himself. "Most of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from the public service, and excluded from the Assembly of Argos. The Senate was composed of the President's creatures. The Government had not received a permanent organisation. No administration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and property to private individuals."¹ A law was passed to limit the freedom of the press; and Capo d'Istria was even able to obtain, through the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, an order from the Ottoman Government to the editor of a Smyrna paper "to abstain from criticising the conduct of the President of Greece."²

The consequence was that the whole country soon became overspread with a network of revolutions. Capo d'Istria engaged in a civil war, in which he was assisted

orators are never weary of inveighing against the usurpation of Miguel; so true it is, that what least concerns the country most interests our public men." On the other hand, the *Standard* of that day, writing after the resignation of Prince Leopold, declared that it had "never expressed the slightest interest in this question of the Sovereignty of Greece. We believe firmly in the burden of our national song, that we should 'rule the waves,' and as long as we can do that, the Morea, no matter by whom governed, is in our power to use as we please." This was, apparently, the spirit in which many Englishmen then regarded their responsibilities towards Greece.

¹ Finlay, vii., 56.

² *Ibid.*, p. 61.

by the Russian fleet ; and that was the net result of the first government which Europe had imposed on Greece.

The assassination of Capo d'Istria, at Nauplia, occurred on the 9th of October, 1831. The Senate immediately appointed a Commission to carry on the government of the country, which consisted of Agostino Capo d'Istria, brother of the late President, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes. This body was, of course, bent on continuing the tyrannic *régime* of the past. All attempts at conciliation were fruitless. The Capodistrians, who commanded a sufficient force of troops through the influence of Kolokotrones, and who were backed up by the Russian ships, intimidated the new National Assembly which met in the autumn of 1831, and forcibly excluded the deputies from Hydra, the Maina, and other constituencies, in order to weaken the Opposition. The Commission quarrelled with the French officers, whom they compelled to retire from their posts ; and there is evidence to show that the influence of the Russian Government was directly employed in shaping the course of the Capodistrians. The Opposition, to which Kolettes soon made up his mind to adhere, repudiated the conduct of the majority in the National Assembly ; and as both sides were supported by an armed force, a new civil war broke out.

It was just at this time that Sir Stratford Canning landed at Nauplia for the purpose of informing the Greek authorities that Otho of Bavaria had been selected by the Powers as King of Greece. He made strong representations to Agostino Capo d'Istria and his supporters respecting the dangers of the policy which they had adopted. He pointed out to them that the eyes of Europe were fixed upon Greece, and that he was now on his way to Constantinople in order to secure the

assent of the Sultan to the definite establishment of the royal dynasty; and he urged them to put an end to the civil war, and to convoke a National Assembly from the entire country. But, in the meanwhile, the plenipotentiaries of the Powers, imagining that the Assembly of Argos was legitimately constituted, sent directions to the residents in Nauplia, authorising them to recognise the Provisional Government; and their protocol appears to have crossed the report sent home by Sir Stratford Canning. Thus all was in confusion, and the more moderate Greeks may be excused for hesitating as to where their allegiance was due. The majority of the moderate party probably adhered to Kolettes, who, driven back with his Roumeliot troops upon Megara, was now preparing to return to Argos, in order to recover his authority, if possible, before the arrival of the Bavarians. He was strong enough to effect his purpose. He entered Argos, accompanied by Kondouriotes, Maurocordatos, Mauromichaelis, and Miaoulis; and on the 9th of April, 1832, Agostino quitted the country in a Russian vessel.

But the civil war was by no means at an end. The Capodistrians rallied themselves, and unhappy Greece was once again plunged into universal anarchy. The Great Powers had given her two rulers at least. They had signed treaties, arrangements, protocols without end. They had "settled" Greece over and over again; and yet they proved themselves absolutely incapable of restoring peace to the distracted nation. Almost as long a period had passed since Navarino as that which intervened between the outbreak of the War of Independence and the destruction of the Turkish fleet. In the meantime France had exchanged Charles X. for Louis Philippe, England had been busy over the new

kingdom of Belgium, and Russia had a Polish insurrection on her hands. The incompetent diplomatists of the three Powers did, indeed, find time for Conferences and diplomatic notes ; but they were impotent in everything beyond this. For five years they left the Greeks frying in their own fat ; and, possibly as a salve to their uneasy consciences, they complained that the discords of the country (for which they were themselves largely responsible) prevented Europe from carrying out her benevolent intentions. The existence of an evil prevented the Powers from discovering a remedy !

If ever there was a clear case for intervention—for intervention of a thorough and effective kind, such as a competent statesman might have planned, and European benevolence might have carried out—this was one. It is absurd to say that there was any serious difficulty about it. Any diplomatic secretary in his first noviciate might have drawn up a scheme. A joint Provisional Government and a joint military occupation would have sufficed to rescue Greece from civil war, to establish order, to organise the public service of the country, and to initiate the ablest Greeks in the art of constitutional self-rule. It may be urged that this was impossible for the Europe of 1827 or 1830. If so, nothing more is needed to prove the political incapacity of the men of that day, and—most important fact of all—our own responsibility for the failure of our grandfathers.

The last National Assembly elected before the arrival of Otho was dispersed by a riotous mob of unpaid soldiers (August 26th, 1832);¹ and this act of

¹ In connection with this riot, Papadopoulos Vretos relates an anecdote which he professes to have heard from the mouth of Mr. Dawkins, the English resident in Greece—and which, if correctly repeated, may be added to the long list of English responsibilities. He tells us that he dined with the Russian resident on the day after the dispersion of the

violence, apparently prompted by the English representative in Greece, though probably without anticipating the fatal effects of his conduct, proved to be the crisis of the anarchy by which the country had so long been afflicted. Eleven weary years were to elapse before another Greek Assembly met. Of course the suppression of free institutions was not due to the riot of Pronia, which was, after all, only an isolated phenomenon. It was the Bavarian boy-king, as the instrument of Europe, who suspended the liberty of Greece.

This Otho of Bavaria was the second son of King Louis. He was sixteen years old when the Greek crown was offered to him by the three Powers (February 13th, 1832). The election was ratified by the Assembly at Pronia (August 8th), which at the same time abolished the Senate. On the 4th of October the new king was recognised by the sovereigns of the Germanic Confederation. On the 1st of the following month King Louis concluded a treaty of alliance with his son, by which he agreed to provide three thousand

deputies, and that Mr. Dawkins called after dinner, and told the following story:—"As I was riding out yesterday with Griffith, we were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to be delivering set speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them that they were without credit. I saw that instantly. They wished my Excellency to take their case into consideration, and provide for their wants. I stated to them that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary; but, pointing with my whip to the hall of the National Assembly, I said that I believed there were many persons in that building who possessed great experience as commissaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride, and when we returned in the evening we heard of the great event of the day."—See Finlay, vii., 95.

five hundred Bavarian troops ; but the elder monarch cautiously declined to take any part in guaranteeing the Greek loan, out of which the troops were to receive the first instalments of their pay. It was not until the 1st of February, 1833, nearly one year after his acceptance of the crown, that Otho arrived at Nauplia ; and his arrival had been preceded, a fortnight before, by a battle in the streets of Argos, between the French troops and the Capodistrians under Kolokotrones.

With a boy of seventeen, one can never predict very confidently what he is likely to do or to become. It was natural that the advent of Otho in Greece should be hailed with enthusiasm by the more sanguine of his subjects, as well as by all those, in every country, who anticipated that Greece would now be happy and united, prosperous in herself and serviceable to Europe. But these happy forecasts left one thing out of consideration which ought not to have been forgotten. However Otho might hereafter develop himself, it was certain that he was not yet able to rule ; and Greece required above everything a strong and experienced ruler. This was a fatal blot in the arrangements of the Great Powers. England, France, and Russia must bear the whole weight of responsibility for the failure of their unfortunate, their insane experiment. They were directly answerable for the faults of their nominee, and for the misfortunes of the infant kingdom. And we, in the present generation, are indebted fourfold to Greece for the short-sighted act of our forefathers.

The king being at best a cipher, it was necessary to look to his Ministers for a pledge and promise of national liberty. A Council of Regency was appointed by King Louis, in accordance with the terms of the

Convention signed between the three Powers and the Court of Bavaria (February 13th, 1832).¹ Not a single member of this Council was a Greek. The incoherent elements of the new-made State, forced asunder by a dozen years of discord, and yet needing only a strong and just Government to weld them into a compact nation, were delivered into the hands of a boy-king who could not rule, and of a foreign triumvirate who had no conception of their character or requirements. Count Armansperg was a Bavarian nobleman who contented himself with setting up a mimic Greek court; and he offended even his colleagues by his haughty assumption of superiority. Maurer was a professor of law, whose sympathies hardly extended beyond the technical labours which devolved upon him. General Heideck was the only one of the three who had been in Greece before, and he knew next to nothing of the people whom he had to govern. The Council never worked harmoniously together; and their individual acts showed so little wisdom that it might possibly

¹ The following articles of this Convention (which was signed for England by Lord Palmerston) define the authority of King Louis during his son's minority:—

“Article 9.—The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his twentieth year; that is to say, on the 1st of June, 1835. Article 10.—During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of Sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent by a regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria. Article 11.—The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full possession of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria moreover engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set apart for the crown in that State . . . Article 16.—As soon as possible after the signature of the present Convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with his Royal Highness the Prince Otho, by his Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the regency of Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the Sovereign, who on his part will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible.”

have been worse for the unfortunate Greeks if they had been of one mind about their duties.

The history of the first ten years of Otho's reign is a history of broken pledges, violated rights, and abused privileges. The King of Bavaria had engaged, amongst other things, that a National Assembly should be summoned by the regency to assist in drawing up a Constitution. The promise was never kept. The Greeks were practically excluded from participation in the government of their country; the regency was invested with unlimited power; and it was only by a revolution, at the end of ten years of tyranny, that the nation was able to recover the fundamental rights of freemen. Considerable attention was naturally paid by the Bavarian administrators to the organisation of the army; and a great service was rendered to the country by the partial suppression of the irregular bands who had begun to make civil war a trade by which they earned their living. Beyond this, and one or two salutary acts of Maurer, it would be difficult to mention any special or enduring advantage which the people received from their new rulers.

We need not stay to examine the system, such as it was, by which the Council of Regency attempted to govern Greece. The impotence of the attempt was manifest long before the popular impatience displayed itself in action. One evidence of original and independent talent on the part of the Bavarian triumvirate was afforded in their rejection of the very forms of administration which were most characteristic of the political genius of the Greeks. They dispensed with the valuable assistance which they might have derived from the municipal institutions of the race,

and set up a framework of centralisation which the humblest of Greek secretaries could have shown them to be impracticable. They issued their fiats, and expected nature itself to bow to them. They were as rational in establishing their system of government as they were when they talked of rendering the Greek rivers navigable. If they could have Haussmanised the country in the first instance, they might have made their brand-new machinery work. As it was, their failure was worse than ridiculous.

Nature mapped out Greece for the home of a democracy. Its thousand valleys, cut asunder by trackless mountains, watered by precipitous rivers, and almost destitute of roads, must be self-governed, or not governed at all. Even under the Turks the Greek race had been characteristically democratic; its municipal institutions had survived because they were a physical necessity. The Bavarians retained the Turkish system of taxation, even to imposts in kind, and to exactions by brutality; but they attempted what the Turks had never done, to destroy the indestructible fabric of local self-government. They divided the kingdom into ten nomarchies, which were subdivided into eparchies; but even this arrangement was so arbitrary that it was modified twice within the first five years. Eparchs and nomarchs, moreover, were strictly subjected to the caprices of the central Government.

It would be a long task to enumerate the evidences and symptoms of misrule by the Council of Regency. The press was gagged; brigandage increased; the development of the country languished; unjust or oppressive taxation ruined whole districts, and converted peaceful shepherds into marauding klephts.

The natural consequence was that plots and conspiracies began to multiply, and these were encouraged by the quarrels of the regents themselves. The ablest member of the Bavarian Council was undoubtedly Maurer, whose legal institutions were especially creditable and beneficial to the State. The jealousy which had sprung up between him and Count Armansperg, or rather between Count Armansperg and the majority of the Bavarian officials in Greece, came to a head in 1834, when the King of Bavaria, taking the part of the Count, suddenly recalled Maurer, together with the experienced Secretary to the Council. From July in this year until the beginning of 1837 the whole government of Greece was practically in the hands of this vain, presumptuous, incompetent, but amiable aristocrat. One act of the Count's during this period of tyrannic rule may serve as an indication of his general disposition. The *Soter* newspaper having offended him by the freedom of its criticism, he determined to punish it. In order to secure a verdict, "two judges were removed from the bench in the tribunal before which the cause was brought, immediately before the trial." The editor was fined 2,000 drachmas (about £72), and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. But now Maurer had his revenge on his rival, by virtue of the fair legal system which he had set up and caused to be respected. On an appeal being made to the Areopagus, the sentence of the inferior court was annulled, and "the attacks of the press became more violent and more personal."¹

¹ Finlay, vii., 144. According to the same authority, Armansperg "took care that all the Ministers should never be able to speak the same language; and he deprived the Cabinet of its control over the finance department, by keeping the place of Minister of Finance vacant for a whole year. His lavish expenditure at last filled all Greece with complaints."

Armansperg was recalled in February, 1837, and was succeeded in the presidency of the King's council by Rudhart, another Bavarian. Rudhart was driven to resign at the close of the year, and Zographos, the Greek representative at Constantinople, was appointed Premier. The foreigners had failed one after another; and at length, after ten years of Russian and Bavarian oppression, a Greek was allowed to try his hand at the government of Greeks.

Let us mark the responsibilities underlying this series of facts. Europe had lightly set up a Government in Greece which the Greeks were morally certain to dislike, and eventually to destroy. It had required an emancipated race, intensely proud of its nationality, and of its recent exploits, to submit to the rule of aliens, foreign to them in blood, in religion, in habits, and in tendencies. It had made Munich the source of authority for Attica and Arcadia. The power which England, France, and Russia delegated to the King of Bavaria, the latter delegated to feeble and presumptuous individuals, who had no qualifications for their work, who boasted that their authority was above the law, and who refused to the Greek nation all voice in its own government. There was no crime or blunder committed by the Bavarians for which Europe itself may not be called upon to answer.

More than this, the residents of the three Powers in Greece intensified the original wrong. The affairs of the unhappy kingdom seem to have been regarded as by no means a monopoly for one set of foreign officials. The Bavarians were constantly reminded of the presence of the residents, and especially of the

English representative. We have seen how Mr. Dawkins interpreted the duties of his position in 1832. A year later we find Maurer vainly asking for his recall, on the ground that he persistently thwarted the acts of the Regency. Mr. Dawkins may or may not have been justified in the course which he took ; but it is difficult to perceive what justification he and his colleagues can have had for their active espousal of Armandsparg's quarrel against Maurer and Abel. It is still more difficult to justify the English and Russian Governments for urging King Louis to recall the most efficient members of the Council, and to leave a virtual autocracy in the hands of this arrogant German Count. England went even further than this. When the viciousness of Armandsparg's financial measures was realised by France and Russia, and when the two Governments hesitated to guarantee the third series of the loan, on the ground of the Count's unsatisfactory explanations, the English Cabinet saw fit to defend the Bavarian. Lord Palmerston was so enthusiastic in the matter that he applied to Parliament for power to guarantee the English portion of the third series, independently of the action of France and Russia. Whether this was done to curry favour in Greece, or whether Lord Palmerston had been convinced by Admiral (afterwards Lord) Lyons, who had succeeded Mr. Dawkins, and who warmly supported Count Armandsparg, there can be no question as to the impolicy of the act, or as to the responsibility of the English Cabinet. Almost at the very time when Lord Palmerston was recommending his fellow-countrymen to accept this new burden, and to hand over another large sum of money to a man so utterly incompetent, the King of Bavaria

and his son found it necessary to recall the Count, whose failure could no longer be concealed.¹

Admiral Lyons was an energetic asserter of British dignity abroad. There could have been no better exponent of the spirit implied in Lord Palmerston's famous boast—"Civis Britannicus sum." He made the Greek Government, or rather the King himself, humbly apologise to him, after permitting him to stand outside the royal circle at a theatrical representation. He was not liked at Athens; and yet for years together he contrived to make Court and Ministers follow up each act of annoyance with a fresh apology. This may have been spirited, after the true spirit of English foreign policy in that age; but it was surely impolitic in the highest degree. At all events it sufficed to cause and maintain a breach between England and Greece, which has scarcely been closed to the present day. But there were other reasons, at the same time, which contributed to alienate the two countries from each other.

Greece, partly through England's fault, was now overrun with brigands; and pirates by sea were almost as active as the brigands on shore. Our unfortunate retention of the Ionian Islands brought it to pass that a number of English subjects suffered injury from these marauders; and Admiral Lyons was instructed to demand redress. We had insisted on investing our money in Greece, and we now insisted—no doubt

¹ The vast responsibility incurred by English interference in Greek affairs is impressed upon us at every turn, and can scarcely be exaggerated by any words which we may see fit to employ. When King Otho attained his majority he seems to have been on the point of making Kolettis his chief Minister. The hopes of the Greek statesman, as Finlay candidly asserts, "were frustrated by the influence of Great Britain at the Court of Bavaria."

rightly—upon the indemnification of injured “British citizens.” But the manner of our insistence made the very name of Englishmen to stink in the nostrils of the Greeks. With his “spirited foreign policy,” Lord Palmerston would not be satisfied until he had humiliated King Otho, exasperated Greek merchants by seizing private property for the debts of the Government, and finally, after a dozen years of recrimination, compelled the Greek Cabinet to make a second restitution.¹

Thus the English influence in Greece, wisely fostered by Canning, had been wasted and frittered away by the clumsy diplomacy of a too spirited age. The country which might have done so much for the Greeks, which might have helped them to develop their great resources, and to become strong and solvent in a single generation, was really contributing to the paralysis by which their national life was stunted. The conduct of England towards Greece is only partially explained by the fact that our statesmen and diplomatists were supremely ignorant of the condition of the country. Admiral Lyons was continually assuring Lord Palmerston of the freedom and tranquillity which had been established by the King’s Government, though, as Finlay points out, “not one of his assertions was true.”² The whole land was infested with brigands,

¹ Then only by the intervention of France, in 1850.

² “On the 24th of February, 1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that ‘the communes in Greece have the entire direction of their own affairs; the press is unshackled; the tribunals are completely independent; private property is scrupulously respected; the personal and religious liberty of the subject is inviolable.’ Yet not one of these assertions was true.”—“Finlay,” vii., 164. Admiral Lyons seems to have taken his facts from Count Armansperg. He cannot have taken them from the newspapers of the day, nor from the critics of the Government, nor from eye-witnesses of the phenomena which he describes.

whom the Bavarian Executive was unable to hold in check. The authorities were openly defied, life and property were unsafe, the press was gagged, the law was strained in order to secure convictions, agriculture and commerce were almost at a standstill. The worst of all the injuries inflicted upon Greece by her subjection to the feeble rule of the Bavarians was that the bulk of the wealthy and energetic Greeks abroad, who had contemplated a return to the land of their forefathers, stayed away. Twenty years after the first blow had been struck for independence, Greece was still no home for the merchant, the farmer, or the man of private fortune.

It must be admitted, in common fairness to the Bavarians, that they had little encouragement from Europe to develop such capacity for government as they actually possessed. We have seen how Maurer and Abel were dismissed, whilst Armansperg was retained, and how the specious promises of the Count secured him for a time the countenance of the Great Powers. When Armansperg was dismissed, Rudhart attempted a vigorous and stern administration; but he contrived to quarrel with the English representative, and in ten months he was obliged to resign. By this time King Otho had attained his majority, and he took it into his head to govern virtually without a council. This at least displayed some vigour of mind in the young monarch, and men waited to see if the new promise would be fulfilled. Otho's personal rule was a thorough failure. He had never made himself loved; but now he made himself hated. His despotism had already been pushed to extremities when the three Powers began to press him for payment of the interest on the guaranteed loan. Otho was driven to exact

more grievous taxes than ever from his unfortunate subjects; but within six months it was found necessary to relax the severity of an impost which was found to be absolutely intolerable.

By this time (1843) Greece was more than ripe for another revolution; and Europe took no pains to conceal its opinion that a revolution under the existing circumstances would be quite justifiable. King Otho was not only urged to provide for the payment of his debts, he was reminded that his father had accepted the kingdom on his behalf with a distinct pledge that Greece should be constitutionally governed; and it was plainly intimated to him that his subjects had a right to exercise a voice in their own government. The Greeks knew that Europe had remonstrated with their king; they knew that they were expected to revolt; and in all probability they had their revolution managed for them from without. At any rate, they had good reason for their rebellion against a despotism which was fast ruining, if it had not already ruined, the country.

On the 15th of September, 1843, a bloodless revolution got rid of Bavarian absolutism, and compelled Otho to assume the *rôle* of a constitutional monarch. Without much trouble the young king was induced to dismiss his Bavarian Ministers, to appoint a new Ministry composed of Greeks, to summon a National Assembly, and to engage beforehand to abide by its decisions. The Assembly met in November, and, about four months later, on the 30th of March, 1844, Otho took an oath to the Constitution. It is needless to examine this imperfect instrument, which was replaced, twenty years afterwards, by another and a better charter of popular liberties. It seems to have been drawn up without much premeditation; and it was, at all events, the work

of men who had had little or no practical experience in the methods of constitutional freedom.

The interference of the Powers in the affairs of Greece can hardly be said to have grown less frequent or less imperious under the constitutional *régime*; and, indeed, the exercise of supreme political authority by men like Maurocordatos, Kolettes, Tricoupi, and Djavellas, young in the art of government, and often rash from a novel sense of power, was calculated to afford grounds for more or less reasonable intervention on the part of England, France, or Russia. Corresponding with the distinct policies of London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, there were political parties in the Greek Assembly which went by the name of English, French, and Russian, and which were undoubtedly encouraged by the action of the three Governments. This rivalry for diplomatic supremacy at Athens had the effect of checking the growth of independent statesmanship; and it swells the aggregate of responsibility incurred by Europe towards the kingdom of Greece.

In 1846 Lord Palmerston roundly accused Kolettes of winking at the existence of brigandage, and of granting impunity to certain individuals or bands from interested motives. The accusation has been made on many subsequent occasions, and in connection with other equally prominent men. It appears, however, to have been made too lightly, on an inadequate basis of facts, and with an insufficient knowledge of the special character and history of brigandage in Greece. Kolettes indignantly denied the justice of Lord Palmerston's complaints, and declared that life and property were safe in the provinces, especially amongst the labouring classes, as indicated by the progress of agriculture and commerce. There was apparently more truth in the

assurance of Kolettes than there had been in the similar assurance of Admiral Lyons to Lord Palmerston a few years before; and the statistics of the country prove that its commerce made great strides at the period of which Kolettes spoke.

In 1847 the English Government renewed its demand for the payment of interest on the guaranteed loan. The Greeks complained, not very reasonably, that this was an unfriendly act on our part, especially since France and Russia declined at that moment to concur in the demand. The debt was unquestionably due from Greece; and it was not necessarily an unfriendly act to urge her to pay her just liabilities. If she could have made the effort, and paid off the loans of 1824-5 and 1832-6, Greece would have occupied a stronger position before Europe, and would have received a warmer support from her friends abroad. But it is to be considered that the kingdom was actually bankrupt when Europe gave it birth, and that it had ever since been labouring in vain to make its revenue exceed its expenditure. Kolettes did not repudiate the debt, but he pointed out that the Chamber of Deputies was devoting all its energies to the reduction of taxation, which had been most oppressive, both in character and in amount, for many years. He suggested a plan by which the Government might hope to begin by paying one-third of the interest in 1848, and gradually increase until the full amount was paid off in 1860. The Governments had apparently no confidence in the Greek Cabinet, for they do not seem to have accepted this offer. But, unfortunately for Greece, Kolettes died just a week after the despatch of the note, and without having had the opportunity of proving the sincerity of his intentions.

The immediate difficulty was got over by the princely generosity of M. Eynard, of Geneva, who supplied the Greek Government with half a million francs wherewith to satisfy the English demands. But it was not long before new difficulties arose. In 1850 Lord Palmerston set about maintaining, or restoring, the English influence in Greece by blockading the Piræus, and seizing Greek vessels, in order to enforce the settlement of claims by Mr. Finlay, by the notorious Don Pacifico, and others. The spirited action of Lord Palmerston on this occasion nearly upset his Ministry, and quite destroyed his influence in Greece. The unjustifiable blockade of the Piræus, suddenly renewed after negotiations had been entered into, naturally gave offence to France and Russia. The latter country protested against our breach of international law ; and it must be admitted that the protest was warranted by facts. The conduct of England on this occasion is the more to be regretted because our demands included a claim for the two islands of Cervi and Sapienza, as belonging to the Ionian group—a claim which could not be enforced, and which it would scarcely, under any circumstances, have been creditable to us to put forward.

The most intelligible and beneficent interventions in Greece after her establishment as a kingdom were undertaken for the purpose of preventing a rupture of diplomatic relations between Athens and Constantinople. Twice at least before the Crimean War the Powers had reminded Greece that their guarantee of the State against foreign invasion made it incumbent upon them to demand that she also should abstain from provocations. In 1854 the case was different. Then the Greeks found one of the guaranteeing Powers engaged in hostilities against their old oppressor, and

it was only natural that the country should have been tempted to cast in its lot with Russia, in the hope of securing a further instalment of its legitimate patrimony. But England and France, having the command of the sea, were able to awe Greece into an unwilling neutrality. The combined fleets occupied the Piræus, after an abortive invasion of Thessaly and Epirus; and troops were landed on Greek soil in May, 1854, which remained until February, 1857.

This was a terrible blow to the hopes of the Greeks, as well as to their pride. Their invasion of Turkey had been almost ridiculous by its inconsiderate rashness, and by its absolute want of success. The King and his Ministers could not for a moment have expected that the Western Powers would permit them to take up arms against the Porte; and it was only by the most absurd miscalculation that they could imagine the time to be suitable for the forcible extension of their borders. The result of their ill-advised movement was to humiliate the country by a foreign occupation, to discredit several prominent politicians past recovery, to increase the burdens of the State, to bring the idea of Greek aggrandisement into disfavour with those who were best able to promote it, and, generally, to check the advance of Greece towards her fuller emancipation.

The fortunes of the Greeks were at their lowest ebb during the latter years of King Otho's reign. That they were bankrupt was not their own fault; but they did little or nothing to extricate themselves from the quagmire of debt into which Europe had plunged them. That the land was infested with brigands must be regarded rather as the misfortune than as the crime of the Greeks as a nation; and yet we find under the

miserable Bavarian rule that the curse of brigandage increased instead of diminishing, and that the Government became less and less able or willing to suppress it. These were but two of the causes which fanned the discontent of the nation into a flame. The revolution of 1862, which drove Otho from his throne after a failure protracted over nearly thirty years, was the natural outcome of the popular despair of good government. From the very beginning of the national regeneration, it had been popular Greece—Greece without leaders, and submitting by compulsion alone to the yoke of the foreigner—which had kept alive the flame of genuine patriotism. It was the people which had believed in itself, and which had retained the confidence of others through a hundred phases of public disgrace and dishonour. And it was a spontaneous upheaval of the people in 1862 which shook off the incompetent monarch imposed upon it by the three Powers.

The Greeks held themselves justified in taking their affairs into their own hands; and the right was hardly contested by any Government in Europe. There was at that time presiding over the English Foreign Office a statesman with all the matured love of popular liberty, and all the courage in giving expression to his ideas, which had distinguished Canning himself. Earl Russell had spoken boldly and imperiously to Austria on behalf of the Italian patriots, and he now spoke boldly in defence of the Greeks.

“During a long course of years,” he wrote to Mr. Scarlett, the English representative at Athens (November 6th, 1862), “the British Government endeavoured to impress on King Otho the mistaken nature of the system of government which he pursued, and the necessity of adopting a system better calculated

to conciliate the affection and confidence of his subjects, and to promote the prosperity of Greece. The Kingdom of Greece having, by the transactions of 1832, been acknowledged as an independent State, the people of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights of national independence; and one of the rights which belong to an independent nation is that of changing its governing dynasty upon good and sufficient cause.

“Her Majesty’s Government cannot deny that the Greeks have had good and sufficient cause for the steps they have taken.”

Words like these on the part of an English Minister did much to wipe off the reproach of Verona.¹ Still more was done in the same direction by the cession of the Ionian Islands in 1864, and by the less dictatorial tone which has been employed in despatches from London to Athens since the Revolution of 1862.

It will be interesting to see what has been done for New Greece by this Revolution, and what progress has been made by the nation during the reign of King George towards the realisation of its ambitions.

¹ It is strange, considering the behaviour of Earl Russell in 1862, to mark what almost seems to have been a studied omission of any mention of Greece in his Lordship’s *Recollections and Suggestions* (1875). By continually subordinating Greece to Turkey, our statesmen would appear to have dulled or destroyed some of their own noblest aspirations. Nevertheless, we have it on very good authority that Lords Russell and Palmerston took, at all events up to a certain point, the most statesmanlike view of the position of Greece. Mr. Gladstone declares it to be within his knowledge that his former colleagues were “most desirous . . . to retrieve the error committed at the inception of the Hellenic State by the deplorable restriction of its territory. In no spirit of unfriendliness to the Porte, they wished for the assignment of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece, subject to the conditions of sovereignty and tribute. Our own surrender of the Protectorate gave us, in a measure, occasion to consider what arrangements might be most conducive to the general tranquillity of the East. Happy would it have been for all concerned if these opinions could have taken practical effect.”—“The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem,” *Contemporary Review*, Dec., 1876.

CHAPTER X.

ENGLISH CONSTRAINT OF GREECE.

The Expulsion of Otho—Elevation of the National Sentiment in Greece—Hawking the Greek Crown—Prince Alfred—King George—The Cession of the Ionian Islands—Mr. Gladstone's Mission—Unreasonable Terms of Cession—England's Responsibilities—The Cretan War—Lord Stanley's Despatch—English Constraint in 1877-8—Pledges of the English Cabinet.

THE expulsion of Otho from Greece was one great step in a process of purification and refinement, instinctively determined upon by the people, independently of, and even in spite of, their rulers. The regeneration which had produced the patriots of 1821, and which had enabled them to throw off the Turkish yoke, now inspired new patriots with an energy of a somewhat different kind. The obstacle to freedom was no longer in the tyranny of foreign oppressors, but in the corruption of the Greeks themselves, deepened and encouraged by the selfishness of the monarch whom the Great Powers had imposed upon them. The one obstacle was as fatal to genuine liberty as the other, and there was the same necessity to remove it out of the path of the rejuvenescent race.

The Greeks of the nineteenth century were fast becoming re-Hellenised; and the maturing of the true Hellenic sentiment was attested in many different ways. A comparison of the Constitutions of 1844 and 1864 reveals this new development of the ancient spirit in a very noteworthy manner; and the same fact was illustrated by the leaven of political integrity, dignity,

and order which brought about the honourable revolution of 1862. The Greek people, which had dared to be free, now determined (so far as they were able) that their Government should be above the suspicion of dishonour. It has been said that the movements which cost Otho his throne were guided by indistinct aspirations, and led up almost fortuitously to their actual results. The truth seems to be that the action of the people throughout Greece was determined by the energy of the re-awakened national feeling, which was undergoing a natural process of evolution.

Europe had some vague idea of this. It had been admitted from the first outbreak of the War of Independence, as it is admitted to the present day, that the modern Hellenes have an indefeasible claim to liberty, as the lineal descendants of the Hellenes of old, and exactly in proportion as they display the qualities of their forefathers. But the Greek kingdom has not been treated leniently, or with partiality. It has been put to a severe test in being made to establish its legitimacy under the most arduous conditions, and has been allowed to take its place amongst the nations only step by step, as its difficulties have been painfully surmounted. In 1862-4 Europe was unwontedly complaisant to the people which was dethroning its king. We have seen what Earl Russell thought on the subject. Not one of the Powers protested against the conduct of the Greeks. Public opinion had anticipated the fall of Otho, and it welcomed the inauguration of a new *régime*.

Of course Europe took it for granted that Greece would obey another king; and it may be doubted whether the Powers would have sanctioned an experiment on the part of the Greeks to govern themselves

on any other than a monarchical system. Nor do the Greeks appear to have had any inclination for a Republic. Their aim was twofold; first, to increase the area of national emancipation, and secondly, to reform and purify the Government. They conceived that the first of these two objects might be gained by selecting Prince Alfred of England as the successor of Otho, whereby they hoped to obtain the Ionian Islands without delay, and probably other territories in the course of time. Prince Alfred, however, was excluded by the understandings of 1827 and 1830, which laid it down that no member of the reigning families of the three Powers should ascend the throne of Greece.¹ Earl Russell renounced the crown for the Queen's second son; but at the same time the Cabinet entered into a new and vast responsibility towards Greece, which has influenced the relations of the two countries from that time forward, and which has made England in a very exceptional and particular manner answerable for the welfare of the Greek nation.

The Cabinet of Lord Palmerston undertook to find a new king for Greece. Earl Russell wrote to Mr. Scarlett that it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that the first interest of Greece was "to elect a prince to rule over her who should be generally accepted,"

¹ Universal suffrage was appealed to by the Provisional Government to decide upon the future occupant of the throne. Before the voting had been completed it was announced that the Powers adhered to their undertakings on the first establishment of the kingdom. Notwithstanding this fact, the votes recorded, in Greece and at the foreign consulates, were as follows:—For Prince Alfred, 230,016; for the Duke of Leuchtenberg (a Romanoffsky) 2,400; for an orthodox King, 1,917; for the Czar, 1,841; for "a King" simply, 1,763; for Prince Napoleon, 345; for the Prince Imperial of France, 246; for a Republic, 93; for Prince Amadeo of Italy, 15; for the Count of Flanders, 7; for Prince William of Denmark (King George) 6; and for Prince Hypsilantes, 6. In accordance with this vote, Prince Alfred was actually proclaimed as King of Greece.

and "that he ought not to be a prince under twenty years of age, but rather a prince of mature years, and of some experience in the world."

The opinion was a reasonable one; but the task of finding such a prince amongst the reigning families of Europe (even in the days when many families reigned in Germany) proved to be beyond the power of the English Government. Two selections were made, in King Ferdinand of Portugal and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg; and Mr. Henry Elliot, who had been sent on a special mission to Athens, had the rashness in both instances to announce the choice to the Greeks before a reply had been received from the kings elect. The two Coburgs, however, declined the offer; and, after another delay of about a month—sufficiently long to enable the English Government to forget its resolutions on the subject of age and experience—the choice fell upon Prince William George, second son of Prince Christian of Holstein-Glucksburg, subsequently King of Denmark. The Prince's sister had recently been married to the Prince of Wales, which will partially account for his selection; but any possible jealousy which the Russian Government may have been inclined to feel was obviated by finding for the Prince a consort in the daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine, the niece of the Czar.

In spite of some trouble amongst the rival ministers and leaders of factions, which would have occurred whatever the decision of the English Government had been, the Greek Assembly and nation acquiesced in the selection; and they were the more disposed to resign their right into the hands of England because Mr. Elliot had already announced the resolution of this country to cede the Ionian Islands to their natural owners.

Ever since Lord Lytton had sent Mr. Gladstone on his mission to Corfu in 1858, as High Commissioner Extraordinary (though subsequently, for a few weeks, he exercised the functions of Lord High Commissioner), it had been generally recognised amongst English statesmen that the Ionian Islands could no longer be retained by England without gross injustice. The fact had been recognised for a long time by a few more discerning and courageous politicians; but Mr. Gladstone's mission, and the perspicacity of Sir H. Storks, who succeeded him, left no doubt in the minds of those who had any pretension to genuine statesmanship. Mr. Gladstone, especially, was soon weary of attempting to reconcile to English rule a population which had for thirty years persistently demanded its union with the mother country, and which met his first approaches by declaring its unalterable desire¹ to become a part of New Greece. He was not the man to contravene the will of a people. He even suggested that the Ionians should petition the Queen for the independence which they coveted; and he forwarded to Her Majesty a vote of the Ionian Parliament, declaring that "the single and unanimous will of the Ionian people has been and is for their union with the Kingdom of Greece."

The Revolution of 1862 occurred at a happy moment for the Greeks. There was a Liberal Administration in England. Earl Russell was at the Foreign Office. Cavour and Garibaldi had made Italy; and the English Foreign Minister had given Austria to understand that this country recognised the right of a people to choose how and by whom it should be governed. Earl

¹ The word was *θέλησις*, and was probably intended to signify determination, rather than desire.

Russell and his colleagues not only said this, but they meant it.

A new era in international politics was being inaugurated, an era in which policy is to be squared more precisely with principle; in which moral constraint is not to be acknowledged in theory and neglected in practice; in which a duty, once perceived and acknowledged, is to be performed by Governments as by individuals, even to the actual sacrifice of a nation's apparent interests. These maxims, applied to the case of the Greeks, pointed steadily to one conclusion; and, though they were so applied in 1862 rather by undefined instinct than by argument and profession, they were still formulated in the writings of contemporary publicists and politicians. It is true that the Cabinet in which Lord Palmerston was Premier, Earl Russell Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer, resisted the cession up to the eve of the Revolution; but it volunteered the tardy act of justice in the last month of 1862.

The conditions of annexation are worthy of note. On the 27th of May, 1863, the three Powers had recorded in a protocol that they held themselves bound to maintain the monarchical principle in Greece, as well as to watch over the peace and tranquillity of the kingdom. On the 5th of the following June they recognised Prince George as the elected King of the Hellenes, and further entered into the following, amongst other, engagements:—To “induce” the Ionian Parliament, before voting the annexation, to appropriate an annual sum of £10,000 as an increase to the civil list of the King; and to endow King George, *out of the revenues of their respective peoples*, with an annual sum of £12,000

—the said sum to be deducted from the interest due from Greece on the loan of 1832.¹ On the 14th of November a treaty was concluded between the same three Powers, with Austria and Prussia, by which it was agreed that the Ionian Islands should be ceded on condition of their future neutrality in time of war, of the dismantling of their fortresses, and of the retention of existing commercial privileges by foreigners.

The Greek Government stoutly protested against these latter conditions, and succeeded in limiting the neutrality to Corfu and Paxos. The deed was eventually signed; and on the 2nd of June, 1864, the cession of the Ionian Islands was completed.

The act was distinctly good and beneficial; and the selection of Prince George as the constitutional monarch of a self-governing kingdom has turned out to be fairly successful. But the manner of both these transactions was thoroughly objectionable. The English Government took upon itself too great a burden of responsibility in engaging to purvey a king for Greece; and, having undertaken that responsibility, it set its hands to a new act of injustice by strictly defining the terms on which the Prince was to accept his crown, and the rate at which his future subjects were to appraise him. The expropriation of money decided upon in the act of the 5th of June was manifestly unjust, both to the taxpayers of Greece and to the taxpayers of England, France, and Russia; and it transcended the legitimate power of the three contracting Governments.

From this time most unquestionably, if not before, England assumed to herself the chief responsibility for

¹ The young king, to his credit be it said, resigned one-third of his civil list in 1865.

the good behaviour and the welfare of Greece. That which had been the joint concern of Europe, or at least of three leading Powers in Europe, our statesmen had now made the special and prominent concern of this country. We know why they did this. We know how persistently our rulers have saddled themselves and their successors with responsibility in South-eastern Europe. We have experienced the cost of this policy, and have had some opportunity of appreciating its value.

The attitude of England in regard to Turkey and Greece, which has been steadfastly maintained up to the close of the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, received a noteworthy illustration in our conduct during the Cretan insurrection of 1866-9. The assistance rendered by Greece to her struggling children in this heroic and long-suffering island was so efficient, and it added so largely to the difficulties of the Porte, that England and France thought it their duty to intervene.¹ Pressure

¹ Mr. Hilary Skinner, who has had many opportunities of arriving at just conclusions on the subject of Greek insurrections against Turkey, wrote for the Eastern Question Association a pamphlet on "Turkish Rule in Crete," from which I quote a passage which seems to give a fair account of the motives of Greece in this business:—"When the Cretan chiefs met at Omalo in May, 1866, to consider their grievances and to petition the Porte for redress, there was much to encourage them in the political situation of Greece. Some four years previously, a revolution, as sudden as it was bloodless, had driven King Otho into exile, and Prince George of Denmark had mounted the Greek throne amid the acclamations of the people. There was a feeling that the old policy of caution and timidity might be thrown aside now that the Conservative influence of Austria had received so severe a check. Many Greeks were sanguine enough to imagine that even England would be more inclined to favour a young monarch allied to her own royal house, a Protestant in faith, and thoroughly constitutional, than she had been to favour Catholic Otho. Others, who did not go so far as to hope for any active help from England, were encouraged by the evident revival of Russia's strength, and by the anxious pre-occupation of Austria in her quarrel with the Prussian Court. It was evidently a favourable moment for the Christians in Turkey,

was brought to bear upon the Government of King George, and Greece was compelled to play a humble part before Turkey. The Conference of the Western Powers at Paris, in January, 1869, renewed that constraint of Greek liberty in the interest of Turkey which has been a characteristic feature of European—and especially of English—policy for nearly fifty years.

But before the Conference at Paris, before the crisis of the insurrection, England had done enough for the oppressor to show that she had deliberately resigned her claim to be considered the chivalrous champion of the oppressed. The conduct of this country in 1866 and the two following years must sting with shame the heart of every Englishman who reads the history of the Cretan war. No pen can be impartial which does not bitterly condemn the encouragement given to Turkish tyranny by the administration of 1866–8, and especially by the notorious despatch of its Foreign Secretary, which forbade the captains of English vessels to remove the Cretan women and children from the fury of the Turks.¹

when their arch enemy, Austria, was occupied elsewhere. I will not stop to discuss the various theories which have been propounded, as to the exact foreign influence which induced the Greeks to encourage the Cretans to make a try for freedom. To those who can see nothing but the hand of Russia in every move on the Eastern chess-board, it is useless to offer other explanations; whilst to more reasonable persons it may seem an open question whether Bismarck or Napoleon III. was the more likely to have set the ball in motion. My own belief is that the Greeks were not urged on by any foreign Power, but that they gradually drifted into helping the Cretans through earnest sympathy with their cause, and traditional dislike of Turkey, whose cruelties the elder inhabitants of her some-time province could well remember."

¹ See the Blue Book, "Correspondence respecting the Disturbances in Crete, 1866, 1867," No. 158. In the following passage the italics merely indicate the amazement which must be felt by every reader of this utterly inexplicable document; and they are the only comment which is needed. "Lord Stanley has received despatches from Greece which

Russia, be it observed, refused to take part in this new subordination of Greek to Turkish interests. She had not come to love Greece more, but she loved Turkey less than ever. She did not want to make Greece a first-class Power, but she had sickened of the farce of sacrificing the new kingdom to the empire which she wished to destroy. Every enemy of Turkey was, at least to that extent, a friend of Russia; and the diplomacy of St. Petersburg now aimed more and more at competing with England for the supremacy of influence at the court of Athens. If England had given Greece a king, Russia had given her a queen.¹ If England had ceded the Ionian Islands, Russia held out hopes that she would go beyond her rival in generosity, and obtain for the Greeks a more extended frontier. Against the liberality and freedom of England, which enlisted the admiration of Greece, Russia was able to set the ties of a common religion. But the rivalry was one in which superiority of force was more

clearly show that the proceedings of H.M.S. *Assurance*, in taking off from Crete a certain number of refugees, has been regarded in Greece, not in the light of a simple act of humanity, irrespective of political considerations, but as an indication on the part of Her Majesty's Government that they sympathise with the cause of the insurgents, and Lord Stanley cannot doubt but that the same construction would be put on any similar proceedings on the part of Her Majesty's ships of war, especially if taking place in consequence of express orders to that effect sent out from this country. Lord Stanley fears that the effect of any such step would be to hold out false hopes of assistance to the insurgents, and thereby in the end to create far more suffering by the protracting of the war than that which might be averted at the moment by the removal of these destitute persons. Her Majesty's Government deeply lament the further ruin and misery in which a prolongation of the struggle cannot fail to involve the Christians in Crete; but *it is their duty not to expose themselves to misconstruction, and not, by an appearance of intervention, the moral effect of which might be very great, to depart from the position of strict neutrality which they have thought it their duty to assume.*"

¹ It was in October, 1867, that King George married the Grand Duchess Olga, at St. Petersburg.

persuasive than mere promises. Russia had promised in 1853 what she had not been able to fulfil; and, as a matter of fact, the prestige gained by England in the Crimean War was proof against all the approaches and blandishments of Russia—at all events up to the year 1878. An influence which could survive Lord Stanley's despatch could survive anything; and thus it happened that the English Government was able, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, to restrain Greece from action, and, once again, to retard her natural development.

A special significance attaches to the behaviour of Greece during the last Russian invasion of Turkey, and to the action of the English Foreign Office in intervening between the Porte and the Government of Athens. The relations of the three countries at this juncture may be looked upon as an epitome of their relations from the first establishment of New Greece.

To impede the growth of Greece, in the vain hope of preventing the dissolution of Turkey, has been the consistent, the costly, and the ineffectual policy of English statesmanship for more than half a century.

A Blue Book, published in the year 1878,¹ enables us to appreciate the actual issue between England and Greece, and throws a clear light upon the subsequent conduct of both Governments. The salient points of the correspondence included in this publication may be presented in a few words.

In June, 1877, before the Russian army had crossed the Danube, the Porte saw reason to fear that Greece would cast in her lot with Russia. A change of

¹ "Correspondence respecting the Relations between Turkey and Greece" (Turkey, No. 19).

Ministry had occurred at Athens, and the new Cabinet was virtually pledged to war. Every one supposed that the Greeks would attack Turkey; but, as time passed by, and as the King's army did not move across the frontier, it became evident that the influence of England was being used on behalf of the Porte. On the 9th of June our representative at Athens had an interview with the Greek Foreign Minister, M. Tricoupi, in which, at the instance of Mr. Layard, he invited an explanation of the intentions of Greece. M. Tricoupi at once expressed himself in frank and intelligible terms. He stated that Greece was prepared to observe a strict neutrality, "provided no unforeseen incident should force her to assume a different attitude;"¹ but, at the same time, "he did not consider that the Hellenic Government was bound to go out of its way to prevent the outbreak of insurrectionary movements amongst the Hellenic subjects of Turkey, should it believe that such movements would conduce to the ultimate or to the general interests of Hellenism. The Hellenic Government would, nevertheless, be prepared to exert all its influence with that object, and to be entirely guided by the advice of Her Majesty's Government in that and in all other matters of its foreign policy, if it could obtain authority from Her Majesty's Government to assure the Hellenic populations that their interests would not suffer, at the conclusion of peace, in consequence of their having now abstained from resorting to insurrection. To put the case in a few words, M. Tricoupi undertakes to go beyond the international duties which can strictly be required of Greece, and to endeavour to prevent outbreaks in the neighbouring provinces, upon condition of obtaining a promise from

¹ Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby, June 9th, 1877.

Great Britain that when the time comes for entering upon negotiations for peace, over which Her Majesty's Government may be expected to exercise considerable control, it will be considered *that there is an Hellenic question before Europe*, no less than if such an Hellenic question had been raised by the actual insurrection of all the Hellenic provinces."

This was perfectly explicit. The Greek Government proposed a bargain to the English Government—neutrality for the moment in return for English advocacy of the Hellenic claims when the war was concluded. M. Tricoupi was as precise as it was possible for him to be in defining the advocacy which was desired. He asked for an undertaking that England would "secure for the Hellenic race a position of equality with their Slavonic neighbours;" and he went on to declare that, without such a pledge, the position of Greece would be, perhaps, more difficult than that of any other nation affected by the war. "Independently of the aspirations of her people for an accession of provinces which they deem to be their rightful inheritance, she could not submit inactively to the increased degradation and suffering to which the population of those provinces would be subjected, if they should be abandoned to their fate, whilst the Slav provinces obtained special privileges, or were placed under the special protection of the European Powers. An Hellenic question will then certainly arise, unless Her Majesty's Government will admit *that it already exists*, and that, in the settlement of other collateral questions, it will not be ignored."

What was the answer of the English Government to this appeal? It could hardly be other than favourable. Greece offered to leave Turkey alone, when she might have caused her most serious embarrassment, on

the sole condition that England would not permit the Slavs to profit at the expense of, or to the exclusion of, the Greeks.

In other words, England should secure what she desired, on condition that she would thereafter do what it was her special interest to do. That is how the matter stood in point of fact. But it was contended that England could not undertake beforehand to advocate "an Hellenic question" without admitting that Turkey must be weakened in order to strengthen Greece—which she was not prepared to admit. And, in effect, Lord Derby replied to M. Tricoupi's proposals in this sense. "Her Majesty's Government," he wrote,¹ "are not prepared to give any assurances in relation to events which might occur in case of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe. It would, in their opinion, be both improper and premature to contemplate such a contingency as the partition of the country now under Turkish rule. They are, however, ready to assure the Greek Government that, so far as may lie in their power, they will, when the time comes for the consideration of the settlement of the questions arising out of the war, be ready to use their best influence to secure for the Greek population in the Turkish provinces any administrative reforms or advantages which may be conferred upon the Christian population of any other race." And at the same time the Greek Government were "counselled" not to "raise insurrectionary movements" in the Turkish provinces, which could "only serve to increase the misery and devastation of the war, and injure the population whose interests the Greek Government desired to secure."

¹ Lord Derby to Mr. Stuart, July 2nd, 1877.

So much for the pledge and the prophecy of July.

In August the Russians had occupied the Shipka Pass ; and Greece once more showed signs of an intention to strike a blow at Turkey! The Porte did not hesitate to appeal to England for the assistance which it had good reason to expect. On the 21st of August Server Pasha telegraphed to Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, in the following terms :—

“You are aware that the military preparations in Greece are being carried on with ever-increasing activity. Although the Cabinet of Athens does not cease to endeavour to reassure us on this point, yet the action of the revolutionary committees and the language of the Greek newspapers become daily more pronounced. The Government is urged on to war by the press ; the nation is being called to arms ; and to say nothing of the volunteers who, contrary to the Greek laws, are recruited from among our populations, paid emissaries are circulating through our frontier provinces in order to organise a rising there. It is also the aim of Greece to excite the feelings of Europe ; witness the representation she has made to the Powers on the pretext of the insignificant incident which occurred at Kavarna. This state of affairs causes deep and unceasing anxiety to the Imperial Government, and obliges me to call to it the serious attention of the Guaranteeing Powers of Greece. I have to request you, therefore, to speak on this subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, *who will not fail, I am sure, to exercise a salutary influence over the Cabinet of Athens.*”

Such a message as this might have been regarded as a mere specimen of Turkish insolence, if we did not know that English policy had given the Porte a right to

count upon the good offices of our Foreign Ministers. After some little hesitation, Lord Derby did as he was requested. On the 3rd of September he wrote to Mr. Wyndham, at Athens, instructing him "to ask the Greek Government if they will authorise Her Majesty's Government to give assurances in their name to the Porte that they will not attack Turkey, or connive at attempts to stir up insurrection in the Greek provinces."

The Greek Government gave a qualified pledge in this sense, whilst carefully limiting their engagements to the "present" time, and flatly declining to "discourage" the insurrections in Thessaly and Epirus. The Porte was obliged to be content with this assurance. It expressed its "most sincere thanks" to Lord Derby; but the Greek Cabinet very naturally considered the intervention "as an unfriendly act on the part of Her Majesty's Government."

Most Englishmen, in all probability, consider that the act was something more than unfriendly. It is very difficult to admit the justice of this step on the part of the English Cabinet; but at any rate it cannot be denied that Lord Derby and his colleagues, by acting as they had done, had contracted a most grave and pressing responsibility, which could only be discharged by a warm and persistent advocacy of the Hellenic claims on the conclusion of the war.

M. Tricoupi seems to have taken up, throughout this remarkable correspondence, a judicious and unassailable position. It is humiliating for Englishmen to find a Greek Minister placing this country so thoroughly in the wrong as M. Tricoupi does, for instance, in a despatch addressed, on the 11th of September, to M. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London, "The Porte," he says, "should herself endeavour to find

the means to avert the dangers that her position towards Hellenism in Turkey creates for her, and should not appeal to Greece. A conscientious study of the causes of the present state of affairs will convince the Porte that it depends upon itself to effectually remedy the evil, the responsibility for which it unjustly tries to throw on another. As regards Greece, in her relations with her fellow-countrymen in Turkey, she is very careful to respect her international obligations towards the Porte, but beyond this she takes as guide the interests of Hellenism only. It was for the sake of these interests that she was created an independent State. She appreciates too highly the mission which the Great Powers of Europe have entrusted to her in the East to give up the exercise of the rights and the fulfilment of the obligations which that mission imposes on her. That crises like the present were possible in the East was not unforeseen by the diplomatists and statesmen who, assembled in a Conference, were called upon in the year 1832 to answer the demands by which the Porte tried to fetter Greece even then; and now that these predictions have come to pass, Greece will not deviate from the path of duty traced for her by the London Conference."

As the Russian invasion of Turkey progressed, the anxiety of the Greek Government naturally increased. M. Tricoupi expressed, with complete frankness, the fear of himself and his colleagues lest the abstention of the country from hostilities should leave it with a weaker claim on the Great Powers than the States which had made common cause with Russia. The Greek nation continually urged its Ministers to declare war, and to send an army across the frontier; but the Cabinet listened a dozen times to the insistence of the

English Foreign Office. Thus, on the 9th of November, Mr. Wyndham reminded M. Tricoupi of "the advice Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly given, that Greece should maintain a strictly neutral and pacific attitude," and told him that "the Greek Government could hardly turn to England for protection if they involved their country in a war with Turkey in spite of the advice of Her Majesty's Government."¹ Both the counsel and the threats were reiterated on many distinct occasions, especially at the instance of the Porte, through Musurus Pasha or Mr. Layard. M. Tricoupi and his colleagues showed every disposition to conform themselves to the advice of the English Government, "as being the Government of a Power to whom Greece turned more than to any other for protection and advice."²

The effort made by Greece in this submission, and the confidence which she was led to feel in the future advocacy of England as a *quid pro quo*, are very clearly gathered from this correspondence. On the receipt of a rumour at Athens, towards the middle of December, to the effect that Russia was offering terms of peace to Turkey which conflicted with Greek interests in the southern provinces of the Empire, M. Tricoupi complained to Mr. Wyndham "that it appeared as if Hellenic interests were to be completely neglected;" and he declared his opinion "that even if a Greek force invaded Thessaly and Epirus, and was beaten, Greece would be better off than if she continued to maintain a pacific attitude." And further, he "spoke with much bitterness of the policy of England, and of the

¹ Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby, Nov. 10th, 1877. The language was "approved" by Lord Derby in the usual manner.

² The same to the same, Dec. 2nd.

advice which she had given to Greece to maintain a pacific attitude.”¹

The Greek army did, in effect, cross the Turkish frontier in the first week of February, 1878; but the Government recalled it immediately, at the urgent request of the Powers. M. Delyannis (M. Tricoupi's successor) accompanied this act by a Circular Note, dated February 7th, which merits attention. “The Government,” wrote M. Delyannis, “has just given orders to the Commander-in-Chief of its troops to re-cross the frontier, as it counts with perfect confidence on the promise of the Great Powers . . . to take care that the national aspirations and interests of ‘the Greek populations in Turkey’ shall become the object of the deliberations of the approaching Congress, and is firmly convinced that the Powers, in their sense of equity and impartiality, will regard as a just complement and natural fulfilment of their promise concerning the national aspirations of the Greeks of Turkey, the special representation of these aspirations in the Congress itself. . . . This step, which is an evident proof of the readiness of the Government to follow the counsels of the Great Powers, gives us also the right to hope that our demand for the representation of Greek aspirations in the approaching Congress will be kindly acceded to by the Great Powers.”

If the Hellenic Government at any time “entirely mistook the views of Europe,” as Lord Beaconsfield afterwards declared, surely they did so at this moment; and it was now that they ought to have been solemnly warned of the fact. It was perfectly well understood what was meant by “the national aspirations and

¹ Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby, December 13th, 1877.

interests" of the Porte's Greek subjects; and the Ministers of King George ought not to have been allowed, in so vital a matter, to labour under such a fatal mistake.

On the day preceding that on which the Circular Note was despatched, Mr. Wyndham had communicated to M. Delyannis an intimation, received by him from Lord Derby, on which we are justified in assuming that the Note of the Greek Government was intended to rest:—"While instructing me to join in the representations made by his Excellency the Minister of France," said Mr. Wyndham, "Her Majesty's Government charges me to renew the assurances contained in the despatch addressed to Mr. Stuart, dated the 2nd July last, in which Her Majesty's Government gives the assurance that *it will do all it can*, when the time comes to consider the settlement of the questions resulting from the war, *to secure for the Greek population of the Ottoman provinces any administrative reforms or advantages which may be conceded to the Christian population of other races.*"

In these words is comprised the essence of the pledge to which the Government of Lord Beaconsfield committed itself. The language of diplomacy is naturally and necessarily vague; and the promise thus made and ratified to Greece is not remarkable for its definite character. But it is clear enough up to a certain point; and, such as it was, it insured the submission of Greece to the counsels of the English Government. It was as sacred a promise as has ever been made by one nation to another; and it ought to have been regarded as all the more binding because of the vastly superior strength of the nation which made it.

How was this pledge redeemed by the English


Government? We must turn for an answer to the protocols and the secret history of the Congress of Berlin.

We have thus completed our brief survey of the actual condition and recent history of Greece. We have taken, as it were, a *coup d'œil* of the field of European diplomacy during the past sixty years, in so far as that diplomacy has had Greece for its subject-matter. We have dwelt upon such details as most clearly illustrate the spirit in which Europe has acted in the establishment of New Greece, and more especially upon those which illustrate the conduct of England in the Hellenic question. We have, in short, re-stated the problem, in the form in which it comes before us for solution. It may not be amiss to recapitulate, in a few words, the terms of this problem, as it shapes itself for Englishmen in particular.

We established the kingdom of Greece, partly because a successful revolt compelled us to intervene between the Porte and its subjects, and partly because the policy of our statesmen, half a century ago, resulted in the diplomatic actions of 1826–1833. It is therefore right that we should consider, first, whether Greece, having secured a national status confessedly imperfect, and confessedly inadequate to her needs and her capacities, is not entitled to demand a further development as a matter of simple justice; and, secondly, whether we ourselves, having consulted our own interests in the creation and the frequent constraint of Greece, are not in duty bound to exert ourselves, on every possible occasion, to give her that which she is entitled to demand.

There is no necessity to multiply phrases. The

whole problem is practically before us in this double form. It involves the right of Greece and the duty of England; and everything which can be said on the subject is serviceable only as it tends to elucidate these two considerations. If the foregoing pages have not had the effect of emphasising both the rights of the Greeks and our own duties, they have been written in vain.



APPENDIX.

List of Treaties or Diplomatic Instruments bearing on the Kingdom of Greece from its Establishment up to 1878.

- Declaration of Neutrality of Great Britain. September 30th, 1825.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain and Russia. April 4th, 1826. (Protocol of St. Petersburg.)
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 6th, 1827. (Treaty of London.)
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 7th, 1827. (Secret Article.)
- French Occupation of the Morea. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 19th, 1828.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. December 12th, 1828. (Conference at Poros.)
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. March 22nd, 1829. (Conference at London.)
- Religion of the King of Greece. March 22nd, 1829; April 30th, 1833; November 20th, 1852; June 5th, and July 3rd, 1863.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. February 3rd, 1830. (Conference at London.)
- Independence Guaranteed. February 3rd, 1830; May 7th, 1832.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. May 7th, 1832.
- Greece and Bavaria. Crowns not to be United. May 7th, 1832.
- Agreement between Turkey, Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 21st, 1832.
- Act of Parliament, 2 and 3 Wm. IV., c. 121 (August 16th, 1832).
- Otho recognised by the Germanic Confederation, at the request of the Powers. October 4th, 1832.
- Greece and Bavaria. Family Compact. November 1st, 1832.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain and Russia. February 21st, 1833.

Crown of Greece not to be United with that of any other Country. April 30th, 1833.

Renunciation by King Otho of Succession to Bavarian Throne. March 18th, 1836.

Act of Parliament, 6 and 7 Wm. IV., c. 94 (August 19th, 1836).

Occupation by Allies of the Kingdom of Greece (May, 1854), prolonged at the Paris Conference; April 8th, 1856. (Ended February, 1857.)

Arrangement. June, 1860; June 26th, 1865.

Exclusion of members of royal families of Great Britain, France, and Russia from the Throne of Greece. December 13th, 1862.

Loans: Guarantee. Great Britain, France, and Russia. December 13th, 1862.

Crown offered to Prince Alfred. February 5th, 1863.

Accession of Prince William George, of Denmark. March 30th 1863; May 27th, 1863; June 5th, 1863.

Protocol. May 27th, 1863, maintaining the Monarchical principle.

Civil List of the King, June 5th, 1863; July 13th, 1863; October 19th, 1863; March 29th, 1864.

Treaty. Surrender of £4,000 annually by each of three protecting Powers for Dotation to King George. June 5th, 1863.

Guarantee of the frontiers of Greece. June 26th and July 13th, 1863.

Treaty: Ionian Islands. Union with Greece, Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. November 14th, 1863.

Act 27 and 28 Vict., c. 40 (July 14th, 1864).

Invitation of Turkey to rectify the Greek Frontier, and offer of Mediation between Turkey and Greece. Protocol 13th of Congress of Berlin, and Art. 56th of the Treaty of Berlin. 1878.

AUTHORITIES CONSULTED.

- P. A. Moraïtinis, "La Grèce Telle qu'Elle est." Paris and Athens, 1877.
- F. Lenormant, "La Grèce et les Iles Ioniennes." Paris, 1865.
- P. Vreto, "Contes et Poèmes de la Grèce Moderne." Paris, 1855. With an Introduction by Prosper Mérimée.
- C. Fauriel, "Recueil des Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne." Paris, 1824.
- A. Bougeault, "Histoire des Littératures Etrangères." Vol. III., "Grecque Moderne." Paris, 1876.
- Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, "La Vie de Province en Grèce." Paris, 1878.
- R. Rangabé, "Greece, her Progress and Present Position." New York, 1867.
- F. Strong, "Greece as a Kingdom." London, 1842.
- E. About, "La Grèce Contemporaine." Paris, 1854.
- M. Deloche, "Du Principe des Nationalités." Paris, 1860.
- H. Martin, "Pologne et Moscovie." Paris, 1863.
- , "La Russie et l'Europe." Paris, 1866.
- Elisée Reclus, "Nouvelle Géographie Universelle." Paris, 1875.
- G. Finlay, "History of Greece." Vols. V. to VII. Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1877.
- G. G. Gervinus, "Geschichte des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, seit den Wiener Verträgen." Vols. V. and VI. Leipzig, 1861.
- Sir A. Alison, "History of Europe" (1815—1852). London, 1864.
- E. Burnouf, "Origines de la Poésie Hellénique." (*Revue des Deux Mondes*: Paris, 1866; t. 65.)
- E. Burnouf, "Le Brigandage en Grèce." (*Ibid.*: t. 87.)
- A. Synvet, "Les Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman." Constantinople, 1878.
- T. Moore, "The Works of Lord Byron, with his Letters, &c." London: Murray, 1832.
- P. Fallmerayer, "Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea." Munich, 1847.

Besides a number of Pamphlets, Parliamentary Papers, Reports, &c., as cited in the text.

In addition to this list, I may append the following titles of books on the same subject, many of which have been casually referred to:—

Brunet de Presles, "La Grèce Romaine . . . Turquie et Régénérée." Paris, 1860.

- Madame Dora d'Istria, "*Excursions en Roumilie et en Morée.*" Paris, 1865.
- Viscount Kirkwall, "*Four Years in the Ionian Islands: their Political and Social Condition, with a History of the British Protectorate.*" London, 1864.
- Edward Strickland, "*Greece, its Condition and Resources.*" London, 1863.
- Sir Thomas Wyse, "*Impressions of Greece.*" London, 1871.
- A. N. Bernadakis, "*Le Présent et l'Avenir de la Grèce.*" Paris, 1870.
- Hon. Dudley Campbell, "*Turks and Greeks.*" London, 1877.
- Earl of Carnarvon, "*Reminiscences of Athens and the Morea.*" London, 1870.
- Charles K. Tuckerman, "*The Greeks of To-day.*" London, 1873.
- Villemain, "*Lascaris.*" Paris, 1825.
- Rhizas Neroulos, "*Cours de Littérature Grecque Moderne.*" Paris, 1827.
- Eugène Yéméniz, "*La Grèce Moderne; Héros et Poètes.*" Paris, 1862.
- J. P. Mahaffy, "*Social Life in Greece*" (Homer to Menander). London, 1874.
- , "*Rambles and Studies in Greece.*" London, 1877.
- Koulouriotes, "*Greece under King Otho.*" London, 1863.
- Soteropoulos, "*The Brigands of the Morea.*" London, 1868.
- H. H. Parish, "*The Diplomatic History of the Monarchy of Greece from 1830 to 1838.*" London, 1838.
- T. Gordon, "*History of the Greek Revolution.*" Edinburgh, 1832.
- C. Robert, "*Le Monde Slave.*" Paris, 1851.
- L. Léger, "*Etudes Slaves.*" Paris, 1875.
- P. J. Schafarik, "*Slavische Alterthümer.*" Leipzig, 1844.
- F. Müller, "*Allgemeine Ethnographie.*" Vienna, 1873.

INDEX.

- Abel, 379, 381.
Aberdeen, Lord, 358, 349, 353.
About, M. (*quoted*), 126, 132, 226.
Adam, Sir F., 324, 327.
Administration, 99, 129, 133.
Agreement at Constantinople (1832), 360.
Agriculture, 149.
Akerman, Convention of, 337.
Albania, 212, 262, 311.
Alexander, Czar, 282, 297, 305, 307, 322, 324; death of, 321, 331.
Alfred, Prince, 394.
Ali Pasha, 259, 262.
Amadeo, Prince, 394.
Areopagus, 130.
Armansperg, Count, 376.
Armatoules, 72, 258.
Asia Minor Hellenised, 203; population of, 213.
Athena, University of, 53; Academy of, 74; siege of, 333.
Austria: her occupation of Bosnia, 7; supports Greece, 14; her political character, 179; imprisons Hypsilantes, 267; her consistency, 298; helps Turkey against the Greeks, 326; her abstention, 330.
Ballot in Greece, 92.
Bavarians in Greece, 41, 109, 116, 128, 158, 362, 375, 384.
Beaconsfield, Lord: his treatment of Greece, 7; his probable motives, 15; his statesmanship, 20; responsible for the disappointment of Greece, 21, 23, 33; his phrases, 24, 25, 410; his cynicism, 28.
Berlin, Congress of, 1...; Treaty of, 1....
Bismarck, Prince, 30, 399.
Bonaparte, Jerome, 322, 394; (*quoted*) 219.
Bonaparte, Louis (Prince Imperial), 394.
Botzaris, Mark, 311.
Brigandage in Greece, 118, 382.
Buchez (*quoted*), 219.
Bulgaria, 20, 62.
Burnouf, M. (*quoted*), 51, 120, 139.
Byron, Lord, 39, 149, 309; his arrival in Greece, and death, 313—319.
Byzantine Empire, 58, 67, 128, 224, 231, 259.
Canning, Mr., 179, 236, 249, 283, 307, 322, 325, 329, 338; death of, 349.
Canning, Sir Stratford (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), 334, 344, 371.
Capital punishment, 132.
Capo d'Istria, Count, 51, 128, 152, 241, 266, 270, 282, 300, 322, 323, 354; President of Greece, 355, 362; his plots, 367; his assassination, 371.
Capodistriani, 371.
Castlereagh, 179, 236, 249, 278, 299, 304, 307.
Catherine II., Empress of Russia; her theory of Russian descent, 199.
Cattle, 153.
Chesson, Mr., on slavery in Turkey, 94.
Chios, 214, 301; massacre of, 302, 306.
Church, Sir R., 333.
Cities in Turkey, Greek population of, 214.
Cities rebuilt, 165.
Cobden, Mr. (*quoted*), 302.
Cochrane, Lord, 333, 345.
Codes, Civil and Criminal, 128.
Codrington, Sir E., 343.

- Competition for employment in Greece, 48, 101.
- Conference at London (1829), 356.
- " " (1830), 358.
- " at Paris (1869), 400.
- " at Poros (1828), 356.
- Conference at St. Petersburg (1826), 236.
- Conference at St. Petersburg (1825), 325.
- Congress of Berlin, admission to, 2; its method of work, 11; its "invitation" to Turkey in the interests of Greece, 22; its treatment of Greece, 27, 31; its results, 32.
- Congress of Laybach, 178, 236, 266.
- " of Verona, 179, 236, 304; the Greeks appeal to, 305; its reply, 307.
- Constitutions of Greece, 89, 92, 128, 290, 385, 392.
- Conventual property, 159.
- Convicts, 132.
- Coraïs, M., 240.
- Cotton, 156.
- Coumoundouros, M., 159.
- Crete, 13, 17, 30, 33, 45, 146, 274, 383, 322, 399.
- Crime in Greece, 131.
- Cultivation, Systems of, 152.
- Currants, 144, 153.
- Customs duties, 144.
- Cyprus, 60, 203, 214, 274.
- Dawkins, Mr., 373, 381.
- Declaration of Independence, 288.
- "Deferred Debt," 111.
- Deloche, M. (*quoted*), 222.
- Delyannis, M., 16, 410.
- Demarchies, 92, 199.
- Derby, Lord: his pledges to Greece, 5, 403; his despatch during the Cretan war, 400.
- D'Estournelles de Constant, Baron (*quoted*), 82, 132.
- Dilke, Sir C. W. (*quoted*), 20.
- Diplomacy, 27, 277, 281, 297, 321..., 386, 402...
- Dom Miguel, 321.
- Don Pacifico, 388.
- Dudley, Lord, 338.
- Education in Greece, 48, 95, 104; expenditure on, 53, 152; 233.
- Egyptian mercenaries, 40, 153, 320, 331, 343.
- Electoral system, 90.
- Elliot, Sir H., 395.
- England; her constraint of Greece, 4, 29, 45, 382, 388, 392...; her promises, 5; her fulfilment of the same, 11; the nation and its representatives, 29; her policy in the East, 34, 191, 220, 281, 322, 331, 335, 350, 402; guarantees the Loan of 1832, 147; revolutionary spirit in, 237; her reluctance to assist in the establishment of Greece, 249; breaks the concert of the Powers, 278, 305, 325; encouragement of Greece, 320, 324, 334; her responsibility for the development of Greece, 321, 324, 345, 364; appeal of the Greeks to, 323, 327; blockades the Piræus, 388; claims Cervi and Sapienza, 388; her present obligations, 345, 356, 375, 381, 397, 411—413.
- Ecetvos, Baron (*quoted*), 219.
- Eparchies, 100.
- Epirus, 3, 17, 27, 60, 213, 322, 389, 409.
- Establishment of New Greece, 175...
- Exhibitions, 145.
- Eynard, M., 388.
- Fallmerayer: his notion of Greek descent, 223.
- Ferdinand of Portugal, 395.
- Figs, 156.
- Finlay (*quoted frequently*): his animus, 248, 253, 310, 319; claim for land bought of the Turks, 388.
- Fireships, 284, 295.
- Forests, 43, 124, 157.
- France, 14..., 146, 179, 318; quarrel with the Dey of Algiers, 338; drives the Turks out of Greece, 355; unites with England to constrain Greece, 388, 411.
- French Revolution, its motive force, 235.
- Galatis, 244.
- Gennadius, M., 407.
- George I., King of Greece, 41, 89, 92, 97, 101, 107, 394, 395, 401.
- George IV., King of England, 300, 328.
- Germany; supports Greece at the Congress of Berlin, 23.
- Gladstone, Mr., 17, 140, 391; his mission, 396.
- Goderich, Lord, 349.
- "Greater Greece," 67, 203. (*See Map*.)
- Greek agriculture, 42.
- " character, 42, 91, 116, 133, 228, 233, 315.
- Greek Question, 1, 17, 35, 44, 191; 355, 362, 404.

- Greek delegates; at the Congress of Berlin, 16; in 1825, 328.
- Greek resources, 40, 43, 105, 134, 150, 156.
- Greek frontier, 22, 26, 125, 354.
- „ prospects, 29, 41, 148, 169, 209.
- „ patriotism, 50.
- „ language, 65, 233.
- „ literature, 65, 241.
- Greek Church, 67, 69, 92, 159.
- „ imports and exports, 104, 137, 141.
- Greek trades, 136.
- „ commerce, 136, 141, 159, 255.
- „ debts, 35, 103, 108, 317, 346, 363, 387.
- Greek chamber, 90, 97, 387.
- „ drama, 76.
- „ song, 68.
- „ Press, 79, 95, 370.
- „ folk-lore, 81.
- „ fairy tales, 82, 86.
- „ Government, 89, 98, 114, 131.
- Greek finance, 103.
- „ expenditure, 53, 103.
- „ budgets, 104.
- „ law, 127, 128, 157.
- „ courts, 129, 133.
- „ shipping, 140, 146, 284.
- „ revenues, 105, 144, 345.
- „ roads, 150.
- „ nationality, 216.
- „ descent, 223.
- „ Senaté, 90, 285, 305, 370.
- „ Assemblies, 287, 292, 321, 327, 337, 370, 372, 374, 385, 395.
- Greek brigands, 118, 382, 389.
- Greeks *versus* Slavs, 1, 12, 61, 188, 202, 218, 225, 404.
- Guildford, Lord, 240.
- Hamilton, Commodore, 324, 329.
- Heideck, General, 376.
- Hellenic Race, 2, 16, 32, 58, 209, 215.
- „ claims, 2, 5, 12, 19, 104, 189, 219, 233, 254, 355, 365, 393, 403.
- Hellenisation, 2, 59, 204, 223, 392.
- Hesperidean fruits, 156.
- Hetairia of Philomuses, 241.
- „ Philike, 242, 274.
- Hetairists, 265, 274, 287, 289, 322.
- Holy Alliance, 266, 282, 305, 324, 326, 328, 366.
- Honey, 158.
- Hydra, 67, 110, 283.
- Hypsilantes, Alexander, 266, 270.
- „ Demetrius, 285, 293, 327, 331, 394.
- Ignatieff, General, 1, 202.
- Industrial progress, 139.
- Insurrections of Greece, 230, 234.
- Intervention in Turkey, 176, 186.
- Intervention, the general theory of, 175.
- Interventions, popular, 183.
- „ dynastic, 178, 182.
- Ionian Islands, 36, 89, 128, 154, 222, 240, 250, 264, 270, 354; ceded by England, 391, 395.
- Italy supports Greece at the Congress of Berlin, 14.
- Judges, difficulties of, 133.
- Judicial system, 99, 127.
- Kanares, 111, 295.
- Katkoff, M. 201.
- Khurshid Pasha, 265, 268.
- Klephtic songs, 70.
- Klephts, 70, 121, 157, 258.
- Kolettes, 293, 327, 371, 386.
- Kolokotrones, 270, 282, 293, 309, 315, 320, 331, 371, 375.
- Kondouriotes, 293, 327, 372.
- Laurium mines, 144.
- Layard, Sir A. H., 403.
- Lenormant, M. (*quoted*), 61.
- Leopold, Prince, 22, 323, 367.
- Leuchtenberg, Duke of, 322, 394.
- Lieven, Count, 331, 338.
- Lighthouses, 169.
- Liverpool, Lord, 331.
- Louis, King of Bavaria, 374.
- Lyons, Admiral (Lord), 381, 383.
- Lytton, Lord, 396.
- Macedonia, 13, 32, 283.
- Mahmoud, Sultan, 262, 275, 282, 320, 345.
- Maitland, Sir T. (First High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands), 252.
- Malet, Mr., his Report on Greek Finance, 108.
- Manitaki, M. (*quoted*), 165.
- Mansolas, M. (*quoted*), 156.
- Martin, M. Henri (*quoted*), 193.
- Matuszewitz, Count de, 353.
- Maurer, von, 128, 376.
- Maurocordatos, 287, 315, 334, 372.
- Mauromichaelis, 270, 372.
- Metternich, 300, 325, 327, 349.
- Miaulis, 295, 320, 372.
- Ministry, 100, 120.
- Moldavia, 266.
- Montenegro, 7.

Moraïtinis, M., his plan for the consolidation of the Greek Debts, 111 (*quoted frequently*).
Mulberries, 156.

Napoleon, Prince Jerome (*quoted*), 219.
Nationality, the Principle of, 216.
Navarino, 250, 331, 343.
Nereids, 82.
Nesselrode, Count, 282, 325, 349.
Nicholas, Czar, 282, 334, 394.
Nomarchies, 99.

Odysseus, 263, 293, 315.
Olga, Queen of Greece, 395.
Otho, King of Greece, 107, 362, 373, 389; expelled, 392.
Olives, 156.
Olympiads, 146.

Palmerston, Lord, 35, 147, 349, 381, 383, 386, 391, 394.
Panhellenism, 192, 202, 214.
Panslavism, 192, 214.
Panslavonian Committee, 200.

Parallel between the years 1878 and 1828, 171, 280, 298, 307, 328, 342, 353, 366.

Parga, surrender of by England, 250, 264.

Patriarch of Constantinople, 246, 266, 274.

Phanariots, 228, 231, 241, 275, 294.

Philhellenes, 68, 239, 249, 312, 317, 346-8.

Piræus, 139.

Polignac, Prince de, 338.

Politics in Greece, 100, 123.

Population of Greece, 52, 60, 107, 209.

„ of Turkey, 211.

Ports, 167.

Powers of Europe "invite" Turkey to rectify the Greek frontiers, 23; their loans to Greece, 108; their policies, 169, 272, 328, 335; intervention in Turkey, 176, 277, 297, 327; their concert, 176, 180, 218; their injustice to Greece, 308, 360, 364, 375; send their fleets to Navarino, 343; intervene between Turkey and Greece, 356, 388; their "deference" to Turkey, 361; their impotence, 372; their responsibilities, 381, 386, 397.

Primates, 257, 294.

Prisons, 131.

Protocols: of Berlin, 10; of St. Petersburg (1826), 336.

Prussia, her policy, 298, 329.

Psara, 67, 283, 320.

Public Order, 114.

Public Works, 42, 162.

Railways, 166.

Rangabé, M., 16, 19 (*quoted*), 150.

Reclus, M. (*quoted*), 205.

Republicanism in Greece, 80.

Revolution of 1843, 385; of 1862, 91, 146, 390, 393, 396.

Roads, 165.

Roumania, 9, 62, 160.

Royalty in Greece, 90, 96.

Rudhart, 380.

Russell, Earl, defends the right of popular self-government, 220, 303, 390, 394.

Russia: her policy, 1, 184, 230, 234, 297, 326, 330, 339, 401; her clients, 4, 12, 277; supports Greece at the Congress of Berlin, 23; her oppression of Poland, 177; of Hungary, 182; intrigues with the Greeks, 234, 242; her military power, 208; her quarrel with Turkey, 282; war of 1828, 350; helps the Capodistrians, 371; her invasion of Turkey in 1877, 402, 408.

Russian race, origin of, 195.

Salisbury, Lord, 10, 12, 15, 27.

San Stefano, the Treaty of, 1, 17.

Saxe-Coburg, Duke of, 395.

Schools in Greece, 51.

Schiller, a Philhellene, 239.

Secret Article in the Treaty of London, 340.

Senate, abolition of, 90.

Servia, 7.

Shepherds, 121, 157.

Skinner, Mr. H. (*quoted*), 399.

Slavs and Greeks. (*See* "Greeks and Slavs.")

Slavs, Slavonians, 195.

Spaniolakis, 323.

Spetzas, 67, 110, 283.

Strangford, Lord, 278, 282, 299, 303, 335.

Strogonoff, Baron, 278, 282.

Strong, F. (*quoted*), 151, 163.

Suli, Suliot, 264.

Syllogues, 78, 210.

Taine, M. (*quoted*), 237.

Taxation, 97, 105, 384.

Tcherkasky, Prince, 202.

Thessaly, 3, 17, 27, 60, 213, 263, 322, 389, 409.

"The Three Sisters," 82.

Thrace, 13, 32, 274.

Thiersch, agent of King Otho, 137.
Tobacco, 156.

Treaty of Berlin, 1...

- „ San Stefano, 1...
- „ Kainardji, 246, 255, 297.
- „ Vienna, 240, 261.
- „ London, 338.
- „ Adrianople, 356.

Trial by Jury, 130.

Tribute children, 256.

Tricoupi, M., 5, 386, 403.

Turkey invaded by Greece, 3; appeals to England, 4; partitioned, 9; Greek provinces of, 13, 17, 261; "invited" to rectify the Greek frontier, 22; admonished, 23; reassured, 26, 30; her last batch of promises, 31; her devastation of Greece, 39, 149, 153, 162, 331; slavery in, 94, 256; Greek convents in, 160; intervention of Europe in, 176, 277, 297, 327, 336, 338, 343; her integrity forfeited, 185; her heirs, 187, 206; her employment of Greek officials, 231; condition of the Greeks in, 245, 257; her decline, 261; her mas-

sacres, 265, 267, 273, 302, 306, 332, 344; submission to Russia and Europe, 356; appeals to England against Greece, 406.

University of Athens, 53.

Varvakis, 323.

Waddington, M., 16, 20.

War of Independence, 107, 134, 146, 261...; massacre of the Turks, 267, 294.

Watson, Mr., his Reports on Greece, 49, 56.

Wellington, Duke of, 35, 179, 236, 299, 304, 307, 328, 330, 334, 349; his statesmanship, 352.

Wielopolski, Marquis, 193.

Wines of Greece, 140, 143, 154.

Wyndham, Mr., his Reports, 104, 140, 409.

Zaimes, M., 123.

Zographos, M., 334, 380.





UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW

5161 5 ADM

APR 17 1915

SEP 6 1920

AUG 14 1922

APR 6 1925

APR 20 1925

5 Jan 50C3

5 Mar '54 BM

Patterson

APR 1954

JUN 3 1954 LM

8122-506

LD

MAY 17 1963

LIBRARY USE ONLY

FEB 22 1965

CIRCULATION DEPT

9 1/2

14 DAY USE
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED
LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or
on the date to which renewed.

Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

3 Mar 57 TS

IN STACKS

FEB 19 1957

REC'D LD

APR 26 1957

30 Apr '64 SS

UNIVERS

REC'D LD

MAY 20 '64 -12M

FEB 22 1985

CIN

EST

LD 21-100m-6,'56
(B9311s10)476

General Library
University of California
Berkeley

